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# **The Roles and Functions of Amphibious Forces in the Nuclear Age**

- An Appraisal of the American and Russian Amphibious Forces  
in the Asia-Pacific Region-

**PYO-KYU LEE**

A Thesis is submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements  
for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

**Department of Politics and International Relations,  
The University of Wales, Swansea**

**2005**



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Lastly, my family for their dedicated efforts and contributions.

# **ABSTRACT**

In the contemporary era, the military forces of a state are important as an ingredient of a state's power to defend itself or as the most significant instrument for achieving its foreign policy goals abroad. This thesis provides an account of the roles and functions of the American and Russian amphibious forces in the Asia-Pacific region. Historically, amphibious forces were, in some aspects, seen as an amalgamation of army and navy or air force, thus their status was threatened by the other services or politicians in the matter of the allocation of national resources. However, during the Cold War, the two cases examined in this thesis had enormously contributed to the promotion of their national power reflecting both the geographical realities and the two blocs' strategic configurations as a means of deterrence or coercive diplomacy. In addition, the USMC has firmly occupied its status in the post-Cold War era as one of the most effective forces in achieving US foreign policy objectives.

This thesis tests the conditioning factors of amphibious force buildup using a total of 6 variables at two levels: (1) general variables; international/ regional security environments and maritime dominion, (2) specific independents variables selected from the US national strategic directives; national interests/foreign policy, military strategy/policy and maritime strategy/policy. These variables are employed in order to explain how they affected the rise and fall of the two cases, and they provide the background of what kinds of roles and functions they demanded from the amphibious forces. On the bases of these explanations, this thesis sets out how the two amphibious forces contributed to obtaining their countries foreign policy objectives throughout three periods: until the end of the Vietnam War, until the end of the Cold War, and in the post-

Cold War era. With time and the transitions of the general and specific independent variables, the roles and functions of amphibious forces were enormously changed. For example, the USMC moved from being a means of deterrence against Soviet expansionism during the Cold War, to a trouble-shooter reacting to any kinds of international and regional conflicts in the post-Cold War era.

In the final chapter, the thesis evaluates the relationship between the examined variables and their effects on the rise and fall of amphibious forces after summarizing the worth of amphibious forces derived from their possession while waging a war. Even though there are some additional factors influencing the amphibious forces buildup, the direction of a national strategy has already included all environmental and constraining factors in the development of a policy decision-making system. Moreover, with the development of international and regional organisations, a state's military forces buildup cannot help considering the others' trends, particularly those of a potential enemy or alliance. Consequently, the decision for a state to build up its amphibious force mainly depends on the relevant state's geo-strategic condition, i.e., a necessity to project military power across the sea.

Nowadays, the USMC is a shining example of how a state employs its amphibious force in achieving its national interest. In my view, the American legal protection regarding its size and organisation by the constitutional legislation of 1952 was one of the most important prime movers for the present development. In fact, what size of amphibious force a state possesses is a matter of how it allocates its national resources. However, once a state keeps its amphibious force, it is necessary to guarantee its status in order to maximize its usefulness.

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## **List of Abbreviations**

AAAV	: Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle
AAV	: Amphibious Assault Vehicle
ABM	: Antiballistic Missile
ACMAT	: The Amicable Cooperation and Mutual Assistance Treaties
ACSA	: Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreements
ACV	: Air Cushion Vehicle
AF	: Amphibious Force
AFMAC	: Air Forces Military Airlift Command
Airb	: Airborne
AM	: The Australian Marines
Amphi	: Amphibious
APC	: Armoured Personnel Carrier(s)
APSC	: Air Planning Subcommittee (Japan)
ARFY	: Annual Report Fiscal Year
ARG	: Amphibious Ready Group
ASEAN	: The Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ASW	: Anti-Submarine Warfare
ATTU	: Atlantic to the Urals
AW	: Amphibious Withdrawal
BLT	: Battalion Landing Team
BMD	: Ballistic Missile Defence
Bn/ bn	: Battalion
bn	: billion
BSAG	: Battleship Surface Attack Group
BSSG	: Battalion Service Support Group
BWC	: The Biological Weapons Convention
CATF	: Commander of the Amphibious Task Force
CDE	: The Conference on Confidence-and-Security Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe
CENTCOM	: Central Command
CFC	: Combined Forces Command (i.e., the US-ROK CFC)
CFE	: The Conventional Armed Forces in Europe

C <sup>4</sup> I(SR)	: Command, Control, Communication, Computer, Intelligence, (Surveillance, and Reconnaissance)
CFRP	: Council on Foreign Relations Press
ch	: Chapter
CIA	: Central Intelligence Agency (US)
CIS	: Commonwealth of Independent States
CIIPS	: Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security
CinC	: Commander-in-Chief
CLF	: Commander of Landing Forces
CMC	: Commandant of the Marine Corps
CMFC	: Combined Marine Forces Command (ROK-US)
CNN	: Cable News Network
CNO	: Chief of Naval Operations
Co	: Company
COMECON	: Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
COMUSFK	: Commander, USFK
COMMARFORPAC	: Commander, US Marine Forces in Pacific Fleet
CPSU	: The Communist Party of the Soviet Union
CSCE	: The Conference on the Security and Cooperation in Europe
CTR	: The Cooperative Threat Reduction (Programmes)
CV	: Aircraft Carrier
CVBG	: Carrier Battle Group
DDG	: Destroyer with area SAM
Dets	: Detachments
DoD	: The Department of Defence
DoN	: The Department of Navy
DoS	: The Department of State
DPRK	: The Democratic People's Republic of Korea
DPRKNI	: The Democratic People's Republic of Korea Naval Infantry
DS	: Destroyer Squadron
EMW	: Expeditionary Manoeuvre Warfare
EU	: European Union
FF	: Frigate
FFG	: Frigate(s) with area SAM
FID	: Foreign Internal Defence

FLEX	: Fleet Landing Exercise
FMF	: Fleet Marine Forces
FMFLant	: Fleet Marine Forces, Atlantic
FMFPac	: Fleet Marine Forces, Pacific
FPB	: Fast Patrol Boats
FY	: Fiscal Year
GDP	: Gross Domestic Product
GNP	: Gross National Product
GPF	: Global Purpose Force (US)
GPO	: The US Government Printing Office
GPSC	: Ground Planning Subcommittee (Japan)
HA	: Humanitarian Assistance
HCF	: High Command of Forces (in the Soviet TVD)
hel	: Helicopter(s)
HQ	: Headquarter
IAEA	: International Atomic Energy Agency
ICBM	: Intercontinental Ballistic Missile
IDR	: International Defence Review
IEWS	: The Institute of East and West Studies
IISS	: The International Institute for Strategic Studies
INF	: The Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (Treaty)
Inf	: Infantry
INTERFET	: International Forces East Timor
IRBM	: Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile
ISC	: The Institute for the Study of Conflict
JANET	: Joint Army-Navy Exercise
JASF	: Jane's Amphibious and Special Forces
JCS	: Joint Chief of Staff
JDE	: The Joint Doctrine Encyclopedia
JFC	: Joint Force Command
JFSC	: The Joint Forces Staff College
JGSDF	: The Japanese Ground Self-Defence Force
JMSDF	: The Japanese Maritime Self-Defence Force
JNIDS	: The Japanese National Institute for Defence Studies
JPC	: The Joint Planning Committee
JSDF	: The Japanese Self Defence Forces

JSF	: Joint Strike Fighter
KPA	: The Korean People's Army
LARC	: Lighter Amphibious Re-supply Cargo
LAV	: Light Armoured Vehicle
LCAC	: Landing Craft, Air Cushion
LCC	: Amphibious Command Ship
LCG	: Landing Craft, Gun
LCM	: Landing Craft, Mechanized
LCP(L)	: Landing Craft, Personnel
LCS	: Littoral Combat Ship
LCU	: Landing Craft, Utility
LCVP	: Landing Craft, Vehicles and Personnel
LF	: Landing Forces
LFM	: Landing Forces Field Manual
LHA	: Landing Ship, Assault-General Purpose
LHD	: Amphibious Assault Ship-Multipurpose
LKA	: Assault Cargo Ship
LLS	: Large Landing Ships
LPD	: Landing Platform(s), Dock
LPH	: Landing Platform(s), Helicopter
LSM	: Landing Ship, Medium
LST	: Landing Ship, Tanks
LTBT	: The Limited Test Ban Treaty
MAF	: Marine Amphibious Force
MAG	: Marine Aircraft Group
MAGTF	: Marine Air-Ground Task Force
MARFORPAC	: Marine Forces, Pacific Fleet
MAU	: Marine Amphibious Unit
MBFR	: Mutual Balanced Forces Reduction
MCDP	: Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication
MCMV	: Mine Counter-Measure Vessels
MD	: Military District (USSR)
MEB	: Marine Expeditionary Brigade
MEB AE	: MEB Assault-echelon Equivalents
Mech	: Mechanized
MEF	: Marine Expeditionary Force

MEU (SOC)	: Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operation Capable)
MFARF	: The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation
MIRV	: Multiple Independently-targetable Re-entry Vehicle(s)
MIT	: Massachusetts Institute of Technology
MLS	: Medium Landing Ships
MLSFS	: Mobile Logistic Support Force Ships
MMP	: MAGTF Master Plan
MND	: Ministry of National Defence (ROK)
MoD	: Ministry of Defence
MOOTW	: Military Operations Other Than War
MOU	: Memorandum of Understanding
MPF	: Maritime Pre-positioning Forces
MPS	: The Maritime Prepositioning Ship
MPSC	: Maritime Planning Subcommittee (Japan)
MRC	: Major Regional Conflict
MSCS	: Major Surface Combat Ships
MSDF	: The Maritime Self-Defence Force
n.a	: not available
NATO	: North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NBC	: Nuclear, Biological and Chemical (Weapons)
NCW	: Network-Centric Warfare
NDC	: National Defence Committee (DPRK)
NDP	: Navy Doctrinal Publication (US)
NDU	: National Defence University (US)
NDUP	: National Defence University Press
NEF	: Naval Expeditionary Force
NETF	: Naval Expeditionary Task Force
NIP	: Naval Institute Press (US)
NPT	: The Non-Proliferation Treaty of Nuclear Weapons
NSC	: The National Security Council
NUPI	: Norsk Utenriks Politisk Institutt(Norwegian Institute of International Affairs)
NWP	: Naval Warfare Publication
OED	: The Oxford English Dictionary
OMFTS	: Operational Manoeuvre From the Sea
OPLAN	: Operational Plan (for the Major Theatre War)
OSC	: Other Surface Combatants

OTH	: Over-the-Horizon
P & R	: Patrol and Reconnaissance Force
PFP	: Partnership for Peace
PGMs	: Precision-Guided Missiles
PKO	: Peace Keeping Operation(s)
PLA	: People's Liberation Army
PLAN	: People's Liberation Army Navy
PPBS	: Planning Programming Budgeting System
PRC	: The People's Republic of China
PRO	: Antimissile Defence
PSC	: Principal Surface Combatants
Pt	: Platoon
PVO	: Antiair Defence
RAN	: The Royal Australian Navy
RCPUK	: The Research Center for Peace and Unification of Korea
R & D	: Research and Development
RDJTF	: The Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force
Regt	: Regiment
Ret	: Retired
RF	: The Russian Federation
RM	: The Royal Marines (UK)
RMA	: Revolution in Military Affairs
RMA	: The Royal Military Academy
RNI	: The Russian Naval Infantry
ROK	: The Republic of Korea
ROKAC	: The Republic of Korea Army College
ROKMC	: The Republic of Korea Marine Corps
RRF	: Ready Reserve Force (US)
RUSI	: Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies
SALT	: Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
SATS	: The Short Airfield for Tactical Support
SCSI	: Strategic & Combat Studies Institute
SDI	: Strategic Defence Initiative
SF	: Special Force
SHAPS	: School of Hawaiian Asian & Pacific Studies
SIOP	: The Single Integrated Operational Plan



SIPRI	: The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
SLBM	: Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile
SLOC	: Sea Lines of Communication
SMI	: The Spanish Marine Infantry
S(R)NI	: The Soviet (Russian) Naval Infantry
SPF	: The Soviet Pacific Fleet
SPFNI	: The Soviet Pacific Fleet Naval Infantry
SRBM	: Short-Range Ballistic Missile
SRF	: The Soviet Strategic Rocket Forces
SS	: Submarine(s)
SSB	: Ballistic-missile Submarine
SSBN	: Nuclear-powered Ballistic Missile Submarine
SSGN	: Nuclear-powered Guided Missile Submarine
SSM	: Surface-to-surface Missile(s)
SSN	: Nuclear-fuelled Submarine
SSRC	: The Soviet Studies Research Centre ( Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst)
START	: The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
STC-CR	: Soviet Research Center-Consultant Report (UK)
STOM	: Ship-to Objective Manoeuvre
STOVL	: Short Takeoff and Vertical Landing
STRAC	: The Strategic Army Corps (US)
Sub	: Submarine(s)
TLE	: Treaty Limited Equipment
TMD	: Theatre Missile Defence
TTBT	: The Threshold Test Ban Treaty
TVD	: <i>Teatr Voennykh Deistvii</i>
UKRM	: The United Kingdom Royal Marines
UN	: The United Nations
UNC	: The United Nations Command (ROK)
UNTAET	: The UN Transitional Administration East Timor
URG	: Underway Replenishment Group
US	: The United States
USA	: The US Army
USAMGIK	: The United States of America Military Government in Korea
USFK	: The US Forces in Korea
USGET	: The US Support Group East Timor Unit

USJCS : The United States Joint Chiefs of Staff  
USMARFORK : The US Marine Corps Forces Korea  
USMC : The United States Marine Corps  
USN : The United States Navy  
USNI : The United States Naval Institute  
USSR : The Union of Soviet Social Republics  
VC : Vietcong  
V/STOL : Vertical or Short Take-off and Landing  
WEU : Western European Union  
WMD : Weapons of Mass Destruction  
WTO : The Warsaw Treaty Organisation

# **Chapter I. Introduction**

## **1. Background and Purpose of Study**

This study analyses the rationales for the United States and Soviet/ Russian amphibious forces with particular reference to the Pacific region. It seeks to locate these capabilities within the broader strategic and political circumstances which provided the framework for decisions concerning the size, equipment and deployment of amphibious forces. As a result, it necessarily adopts a 'broad brush' approach, in which the focus is on wider geopolitical arguments rather than narrower doctrinal or technological issues. It seeks to place the amphibious forces within a crucial strategic and historical context.

### **A. The Transitions of the Maritime Powershifts in the Pacific**

#### **(1) The General Security Environment Changes after WWII**

The ferocious and complicated conflict of the Second World War produced a tremendous change in the whole situation of international political and military affairs. Among the most important consequences of WWII were the creation of the UN, substituting for the old League of Nations; the emergence of nuclear weapons and a new global order, the bipolar system dominated by the two superpowers, the US and USSR.<sup>1</sup> Firstly, the role of the UN was, in reality, passive during the Cold War era, because of

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<sup>1</sup> P.M.H. Bell, *The World since 1945: An International History* (London: Arnold, 2001), pp.31 - 41. With the end of WWII, the other European Powers, notably Britain, France, Germany, Italy, and the Asian major powers, mainly China and Japan, were in decline and divided into two groups: the communist camp (Eastern side) led by the USSR and the capitalist camp (Western side) led by the US, according to ideology.

the veto authority of the permanent members of the Security Council. Secondly, the Cold War was a great political and strategic struggle between the US and USSR. The main objective of US foreign policy was to stop the growth of the areas under the control of the Communist regimes over against the Soviet goal of expanding the area of Communist control. Finally, the nuclear weapons possessed by the two superpowers were regarded as a critical means of exercising their foreign policy, especially as a means of deterrence, in relation to other states.<sup>2</sup> Hence nuclear weapons were taken for granted as the symbol of power politics.

From the above perspectives, as the optimists believed, it appeared that states possessing nuclear weapons (or that were effectively protected by the nuclear umbrella) no longer needed physical security<sup>3</sup>. It appears that during the Cold War, nuclear weapons influenced the pursuit of national policy as well as the maintenance of international stability. They changed military and political relationships from the horizontal to the vertical between nuclear and non-nuclear states and widened the gap between the two superpowers and other major powers<sup>4</sup>.

However, after the first use of the nuclear weapons against Japan at Hiroshima and Nagasaki by the US, the USSR effectively established mutual nuclear deterrence in 1949 by the detonation of its first atomic bomb in the Ustyurt desert. After that, the policy makers of both sides realized that the nuclear war, though not nuclear weapons,

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<sup>2</sup> Regina Cowen Karp (ed.), *Security without Nuclear Weapons? Different Perspectives on Non-nuclear Security* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 2.

<sup>3</sup> Patrick J. Garrity and Steven A. Maaranen (eds.), *Nuclear Weapons in the Changing World* (New York: Plenum Press, 1992), p. 3.

<sup>4</sup> Ciro Elliott Zoppo, "Nuclear Technology, Multi-polarity and International Stability," *World Politics*, Vol. 18, No. 4 (July 1966), pp. 579-581.

could not be a rational instrument of state policy.<sup>5</sup> In reality, as George H. Quester has analysed, after the success of the launch of the Soviet Sputnik at the end of the 1950s, US superiority was no longer guaranteed<sup>6</sup>. It meant that both sides could never be secured against each side's retaliatory attack using atomic bombs or missiles (see Table 1-1). On reflection, it seems likely that the pendulum had begun to fluctuate from one side to another. Put simply, the American ability to drop atomic bombs did not counterbalance the Soviet conventional military advantage. In this sense, the pessimists insist that such a fundamental transformation of international relationships may not have taken place, and therefore the effects of nuclear weapons in the bipolar context cannot be extrapolated.<sup>7</sup> Put simply, the political effects of nuclear weapons were much smaller than the realists expected, and therefore nuclear weapons could not be employed as usable instruments of state policy.

**Table 1-1: The Pendulum of Nuclear Superiority**

Classification	Seen in:	Looking forward to:
US monopoly	1945	1955
US superiority	1949	1960s
Soviet superiority (bomber gap, missile gap)	1957	1959
US superiority? (Missile gap in reverse)	1961	1970
US superiority	1963	1970s
Parity	1968	1970s
Soviet superiority	1974	1980s

Source: George H. Quester, "The Impact of the Strategic Balance on Containment", in Terry L. Deibel and John Lewis Gaddis (eds.), *Containment Concept and Policy* (Washington, DC: NDUP, 1986), p. 267.

To summarize, as Alvin Toffler described in his book *'War and Antiwar'*, nobody employed nuclear weapons to wage a war because of the potential disastrous effects. As such, it seems likely that nuclear weapons were a means of intimidation or blackmail rather than intended for real use on the battlefield in order to achieve a state's foreign

<sup>5</sup> Colin S. Gray, *Modern Strategy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 316.

<sup>6</sup> George H. Quester, "The Impact of the Strategic Balance on Containment", in Terry L. Deibel and John Lewis Gaddis (eds.), *Containment Concept and Policy* (Washington DC: NDUP, 1986), pp. 265- 268.

<sup>7</sup> Patrick J. Garrity and Steven A. Maaranen (1992), p. 3.

and military policy goals. By and large, the political studies and considerations for making policy in association with nuclear weapons were also more focused on the political rather than the military aspects. Even so, it is clear that nuclear weapons have the effect of acting in a forceful way, and they exist as the most important strategic element in human history.<sup>8</sup> Consequently, in the nuclear strategy, the most significant concepts<sup>9</sup> were (1) the credibility to employ it in the worst-case scenario and (2) a survival capability, the second strike not the first being the crucial element. All in all, it is undeniable that nuclear weapons have remained ever since at the heart of international relations.

## **(2) Maritime Powershifts in the Pacific**

Given the end of WWII and the geo-international political transitions, there was an explosive fluctuation in the balance of maritime power in the Pacific area. Traditionally, the major maritime powers in Northeast Asia were China<sup>10</sup>, Japan and Russia, but the Japanese Navy defeated the Chinese and Russian Navies in the Sino-Japanese war in 1895<sup>11</sup> and in the Russo-Japanese war in 1905<sup>12</sup>, respectively. Owing not only to the

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<sup>8</sup> Colin S. Gray, "To Confuse Ourselves: Nuclear Fallacies", in John Baylis and Robert O'Neill (eds.), *Alternative Nuclear Futures: The Role of Nuclear Weapons in the Post-Cold War World* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 4-7.

<sup>9</sup> Lawrence Freedman, "The First Two Generations of Nuclear Strategists", in Peter Paret (ed.), *Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 750-755.

<sup>10</sup> China is not well known as a maritime power. However, history indicates that Chinese ships had cruised the Indian Ocean and the coast of Africa via South Asia from at least the 12<sup>th</sup> Century, and it was a great maritime power until the 15<sup>th</sup> Century. After that, with the development of industrialized armaments in Europe, its maritime power relatively diminished, but it had sufficient naval power to defend its homeland and to influence its surrounding countries as a regional maritime power. Refer, William H. McNeill, *The Pursuit of Power: Technology, Armed Force, and Society since A.D. 1000* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1982), pp. 41-50 and 285-299.

<sup>11</sup> This war was fought to gain influence in the Korean peninsula (Chosun dynasty). The defeat of China brought home the sad decline of the Ch'ing Dynasty as well as the Chinese navy, while giving Japan the possibility of the beginning of an empire in Northeast Asia. Edwin O. Reischauer, "China and Japan: Rivals or Allies?", in Francis O. Wilcox (ed.), *China and the Great Powers: Relations with the United States, the Soviet Union, and Japan* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1974), pp. 31-32.

<sup>12</sup> For the courses and results of this war, refer Donald W. Mitchell, *A History of Russian and Soviet Sea*

collapse of the Ch'ing Dynasty and Tsarist Russia initiated by the two wars, but also the withering of European influence in East Asia because of WWI, Japan became the paramount power in East Asia. As such, Japan was able to greatly expand through the annexations of Formosa (Taiwan) for maritime advantage in 1895 and of Korea for an Asian land route to Manchuria in 1910.

According to Hector C. Bywater's research<sup>13</sup>, Japan continuously increased its naval budget from an estimated £ 6,000,000 in 1906 to £ 32,000,000 in 1920. Despite the fact that this is an estimated amount, there is no doubt that the sum had been considerably increased. Along with this increase, the Japanese Navy had emerged as one of the major maritime powers in the world having a total strength of 12 battleships, 12 battle-cruisers, 25 light-cruisers, 102 destroyers, 113 submarines in 1922. In addition to the above facts, Japan established an ongoing naval construction plan seen in the programmes of 1923-24 and 1927-28.<sup>14</sup> On the basis of this kind of naval development, Japan expanded its influence throughout the Pacific area such as the Mariana Islands (occupied 1914, mandated 1922). At this stage, most of the Pacific area countries were occupied by the major powers, i.e., Britain (Hong Kong, Singapore), France (Indochina), and the US (the Philippines, Guam and Hawaii Islands).

An international turning point in naval power construction was the Washington Conference of 1921-22, which created a new order in the Pacific region. In this conference, the Four Major Powers agreed not only to recognize the *status quo* in the

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*Power* (London: André Deutsch Limited, 1974), pp. 204-247.

<sup>13</sup> For more details, refer Hector C. Bywater, *Sea-power in the Pacific: A study of the American-Japanese Naval Problem* (New York: Arno Press, 1970), pp. 131-241.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 152-153.

Pacific via the Four Power Treaty on Insular Possessions (December 13, 1921), but also to keep an international capital ship ratio (5, 5, 3, 1.75, for respectively the US, Britain, Japan, and France).<sup>15</sup> As a result of this conference, the Japanese Imperial Navy obtained greater freedom in the Pacific, since they agreed not to build any new military base between Singapore and Hawaii<sup>16</sup> in the Washington and the subsequent London treaties. It seems that American naval power together with the other major powers was insufficient to challenge Japanese predominance in East Asia as well as its naval expansion. Hence, the best way to prevent Japan from continuous expansion was to appease its ambitions by providing incentives like goods and loans needed for development due to the uncertainties of both the European Security environment, and the American domestic, international and military situation.<sup>17</sup>

Most of the Japanese leaders, however, believed that “if Japan failed to be an empire, it could not survive as a nation.” Thus, the Japanese government’s slogan, “Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere”, would inspire the Japanese thirst and craving for recognition throughout the world.<sup>18</sup> Under these circumstances, despite the concessions of the other major powers, Japan invaded Manchuria in 1931 with the justification of its national and economic interests there.<sup>19</sup> With the occupation of Manchuria, Japan

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<sup>15</sup> Russell F. Weigley, *The American Way of War* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1973), p. 244.

<sup>16</sup> Here, the US made a concession that it could not fortify its bases in the Philippines or on Guam or Wake Island, since the Japanese were hesitant to accept the 5:5:3 ratios. Refer George W. Baer, *One Hundred Years of Sea Power* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1994), p. 100.

<sup>17</sup> One of the significant examples of these approaches is the secret agreement between the US and Japan on July 29, 1905, in which the US agreed to the establishment of Japan’s suzerainty over Korea in return for Japan’s disavowal of aggressive plans for the Philippines. John Edward Wilz, “Did the United States betray Korea in 1905?”, *Pacific Historical Review*, LIV (August, 1985), p. 252.

<sup>18</sup> Thomas G. Paterson, et al., *American Foreign Policy: A History/ 1900 to Present* (Lexington: D.C. Heath and Company, 1991, 3<sup>rd</sup> ed.), p. 344.

<sup>19</sup> In 1928, Japan joined fourteen other nations in signing the Kellogg-Briand Pact, which denounced “recourse to war for the solution of international controversies.” The Japanese pretext was based on this. However, the real reason was liable to be affected by ultra-nationalists, who were composed of



paved the way for additional expansion by a land route. In addition to this effort, it continually attempted to build up a gigantic naval power in order to support the government slogan and to ensure its survival, because its natural resources were extremely limited. In order to do this, Japanese militarists were not eager to continue being involved in the disarmament pacts. Furthermore they wanted quantitative as well as qualitative parity in naval power, equal to the US and Britain, which meant that the 5:5:3 ratio was no longer acceptable. It meant that Japan would be the major power in the Pacific, because its naval power would be greater than the US and Britain, whose naval powers were divided geographically.<sup>20</sup> As a result, the London Conference broke up without agreement and Japan announced its abrogation of the Washington and London treaties.

After that, Japan began to invade and expand its influence by occupying China from land and sea, i.e., Shanghai (1937) and Hainan (1939).<sup>21</sup> Moreover, Japan joined the Axis alliance with Germany and Italy by signing the Tripartite Pact, and ratified the Japanese-Soviet Neutrality Pact in April 1941. The goal of these military agreements was to re-divide the world, which policy was directed primarily against the US.<sup>22</sup> Consequently, on December 7, 1941, Japan attacked the US naval base at Pearl Harbor in the aftermath of not only the statement of Japanese Prime Minister, Gen. Hideki Tojo, in November 1941, that British and American influence must be eliminated from the Orient, but also the ratification of the Imperial Conference, December 1, 1941, to

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navy and army officials, who prepared themselves for the defense of the budgets. Japan-diplomacy between the Wars, sourced by the US Library of Congress. <<http://countrystudies.us/japan/30> and [31.htm](http://countrystudies.us/japan/31.htm)>, accessed: November 12, 2003.

<sup>20</sup> Scot MacDonald, "Evolution of Aircraft Carriers: The Japanese Developments", *Naval Aviation News* (October 1962), pp.41-41.

<sup>21</sup> Thomas G. Paterson, et al. (1991), pp. 345 - 346.

<sup>22</sup> The Rise of the Militarists between the Wars, sourced by the US Library of Congress. <<http://countrystudies.us/japan/32.htm>> accessed: November 12, 2003.

embark on a war of “self-defense and self-preservation”.<sup>23</sup>

Thus conceived, the US also predicted that sometime it would engage with Japan in the Pacific area, even though its security environment, i.e., American weakness in Asia, forced it to establish close rapport with Japan by 1920. The first effort to prevent Japan from being the proprietor in the Pacific would be, as previously described, the successful negotiation of the Washington Conference, which was considered a prestige victory for the US administration in terms of the capital-ship parity with Britain.<sup>24</sup> In truth, there were two very significant issues pointed out in Navy Secretary Denby’s Annual Report for 1922. On the one hand, on the matter of the enlargement of the naval force’s role, the US Navy should be maintained in sufficient strength to support its policies ...and to guard its continental and overseas possessions. On the other hand, on the matter of future construction, the US government should try to create, maintain, and operate a Navy second to none and in conformity with the ratios for capital ships.<sup>25</sup>

In spite of the success in terms of definitive naval policy, the results of the Washington Naval Conference caused a few problems with the passage of time. As M. S. Koromhas and Lt Col. J. Jones have noted in their report<sup>26</sup>, the negotiations were undertaken by naval officers so that, in association with a future role and construction, there was a significant disconnection between the government agencies, i.e., the Departments of

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<sup>23</sup> For more details, see Akira Iriye, *The Origins of the Second World War in Asia and the Pacific* (Essex: Longman Group UK Limited, 1987), pp. 159-167.

<sup>24</sup> George W. Baer, *One Hundred Years of Sea Power* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1994), p. 104.

<sup>25</sup> Edwin Denby, “Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy,” in *Annual Reports of the Navy Department for the Fiscal Year 1922* (Washington, DC: GPO, 1923), pp. 1-2, quoted from George W. Baer (1994), p. 104.

<sup>26</sup> M.S. Koromhas and Lt Col J. Jones, “American Naval Preparations for Pacific War 1931-1941: A Retrospective and Reappraisal”, *CSC 1995*, March.

State and War. As a result, this disharmony resulted in both a disjointed and passive foreign policy in the Pacific, and the failure of the planned naval build up<sup>27</sup>. The second preparation was Plan Orange, which was the basic scheme of the US Navy for war against Japan for about twenty years. It had sound principles: move the fleet out to the Western Pacific, establish sea control, and defeat Japan through blockade, but it was impossible to execute it. Due to the distance and geography, the plan was divided into three phases; Phase I: Japanese Invasion, Phase II: The Counter-attack, Phase III: The Counter-Offensive<sup>28</sup>. The fundamental issue of this plan was, however, unable to answer the basic questions of the Navy planners, “What is the political goal of the military action?” and “What are the interests of the US in the Far East?” Consequently, this was never enacted by Congress or signed by the President until after 1941.<sup>29</sup>

In the meantime, a gleam of hope was the emergence of the Roosevelt administration in early 1933, which did bring the Navy up to the strength permitted by the Washington and London conference treaties. The President pushed ahead with naval construction in such a way as to deter Japanese expansion in the Pacific area, and therefore he allocated funds for thirty-two new vessels, including two aircraft carriers.<sup>30</sup> Nonetheless, the US was unable to raise funds to build even up to the Treaty limits, and, as a consequence, the US Navy possessed only 15 of its 18 authorized battleships by 1940.<sup>31</sup> As a matter of fact, it was one of the main reasons that Japan seceded from the treaties in 1936, and

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<sup>27</sup> In reality, Japan built to the edge of treaty limits, in contrast, the US never built to this limit until the end of the treaty. Refer, George W. Baer (1994), pp. 104-145.

<sup>28</sup> “War Plan Orange in USS Panay Sunk”, <<http://home.sandiego.edu/~pbugler>>, accessed: November 14, 2003.

<sup>29</sup> George W. Baer (1994), pp. 120-128.

<sup>30</sup> Thomas G. Paterson, et al. (1991), p. 344-345.

<sup>31</sup> Despite the restrictions in the treaties, in terms of technology development, the US Navy improved its performance, i.e., battleship propulsion changed from coal to oil fired boilers, main battery elevation from 24 to 36 degrees. For the details, see Robert L. O’Connell, *Sacred Vessels: The Cult of the Battleship and the Rise of the US Navy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991).

it precipitated a vigorous naval arms race. With the development of Japanese influence in almost all the major Chinese seaports, the Roosevelt Administration cautiously moved to occupy several Pacific islands (e.g., Enderbury) as potential naval bases.<sup>32</sup>

At this stage, several international factors impinged on Roosevelt's foreign and naval policies towards Asia and the Pacific. The first and most important factor was the rise of Hitler's Germany, particularly the declaration of rearmament in 1936. At several strategic meetings held between British and American leaders, they decided that Germany was the primary threat to Anglo-American security interests,<sup>33</sup> which caused a major shift in American strategic thinking. As a result, the US strategy for WWII was Plan D among five Rainbow Plans, more specifically, a holding action in the Pacific against Japanese expansion and the offensive action in the Atlantic and in Europe to beat Germany, projected by army and navy war planners in 1939.<sup>34</sup> Apart from the other reasons, the US Pacific fleet in Pearl Harbour came under a surprise attack from the Imperial Japanese Navy on December 7, 1941. In the light of this disaster, the US lost the initiative to Japan in the Western Pacific.

The outbreak of WWII was a striking opportunity for expansion by Japan, because the European powers, notably France and the Netherlands, invaded and occupied by Germany<sup>35</sup> found it impossible to protect their colonies in the Pacific. Japan occupied

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<sup>32</sup> Thomas G. Paterson, et al. (1991), pp. 346-347.


<sup>33</sup> James J. Herzog, *Closing the Open Door: Japanese-American Diplomatic Negotiation 1936-1941* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1973), p. 254.

<sup>34</sup> For more details, see Steven T. Ross, *American War Plans 1941-1945: The Test of Battle* (Portland: Frank Cass, 1997), pp. 1-20. The British and Americans agreed to the 'Germany First concept' as the broad strategic objective in the ABC1 Conference from January 29 to March 27 1941. Refer "US Serial 011512-12(R)", in <[http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/pha/pt\\_14/x15-049.html](http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/pha/pt_14/x15-049.html)>, accessed: June 06, 2005.

<sup>35</sup> Regarding the German help, see the Tripartite Pact at Basil Collier, *The War in the Far East 1941-1945: A Military History* (London: Morrison and Gibb Limited, 1969), pp. 480-481.

French Indo-China using the opportunity of the defeat of France in 1940-41; destroyed the US Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbour<sup>36</sup> and drove out the Americans from the Philippines; captured Singapore and Burma from the British; and conquered the Dutch East Indies in March and April 1942.<sup>37</sup> The Japanese expansion reached the peak of its success by occupying most of the key islands which served as advanced bases in the Pacific area (refer Figure 1-1: the Japanese expansion and the Allies' counterattack). After this, European colonial prestige in Asia and the Pacific area came to an end with these defeats, although Hong Kong remained a British colony until 1997.<sup>38</sup>

**Figure 1-1: The Japanese Expansion and the Allies' Counterattack**



Sources: Thomas G. Paterson, et al., *American Foreign History: A History/ 1900 to Present* (Lexington: D.C. Heath and Company, 1991, 3<sup>rd</sup> ed.), p. 398, etc.

<sup>36</sup> For the reasons for the Pacific Fleet's defeat, refer Thomas C. Hone, "The Destruction of the Battle Line at Pearl Harbor", *Proceedings*, Vol. 103/12/898 (December 1977), pp. 49-59.

<sup>37</sup> For the possessions of the major powers in the Pacific before 1939, see Bernard C. Nalty (ed.), *War in the Pacific: Pearl Harbor to Tokyo* (Norman: the University of Oklahoma Press, 1999), p. 14.

<sup>38</sup> Of course, the Dutch and the French fought to regain control of the East Indies and Indo-China respectively after the end of WWII, but they failed.

The Midway Battle, mainly from 4<sup>th</sup> to 7<sup>th</sup> of June 1942, was the foundation of the recovery of hegemony for the US in the Pacific. When the engagement ended, Japan had lost four carriers, a heavy cruiser and over 332 aircraft, which meant she had lost the ability to defeat the US<sup>39</sup>. Furthermore, the successes of the US both at Midway and Guadalcanal (12-15 November 1942) became the turning point. As a consequence, maritime superiority shifted back to the US, who never thereafter lost it. The plans for the Allied counterattack were divided into two main streams: the South Pacific theatre of General MacArthur based on the Elkton and Reno plans, and the Central Pacific theater of Admiral Nimitz founded on the Granite Plan.<sup>40</sup> These operational plans were successfully accomplished. The US captured the Solomon Is in 1943, Leyte and the Philippines in 1944-45, Iwo Jima in March and Okinawa in July 1945.<sup>41</sup> Finally, it employed atomic bombs to avoid the invasion of Japan and suffering heavy casualties as at Iwo Jima and Okinawa (refer Figure 1-1). Following the dropping of the atomic bombs, the Japanese surrendered unconditionally on August 15, 1945, and were later incorporated into the Western Pact led by the US.

Meanwhile, the Soviets launched their attack against the Japanese in Manchuria on three fronts.<sup>42</sup> One of these advanced from Vladivostok towards Korea, and the Soviets occupied the northern part of the Korean peninsula on August 20, whereas the southern

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<sup>39</sup> Gordon W. Prange, *Miracle at Midway* (New York: Penguin Books, 1983), pp. 393-397.

<sup>40</sup> Steven T. Ross (1997), pp. 43-161.

<sup>41</sup> For more details, refer Samuel Eliot Morison, *The Two-Ocean War: A short History of the United States Navy in the Second World War* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1963), pp. 264-577. For the Japanese perspective, see Masanoro Ito, *The End of the Imperial Japanese Navy*, Andrew Y. Koroda (trans.), (New York: Norton & Company Inc, 1962), pp. 70-179.

<sup>42</sup> Bernard C. Nalty (1999), p. 293. The Soviet Union declared war and started combat with Japan on August 9, 1945. When the Japanese surrendered on August 15 1945, it continuously pushed back the Japanese forces in the relevant areas until the end of August in order to seize the initiative.

part was occupied by US forces.<sup>43</sup> The other front was from the North towards South Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands, and they were recaptured and occupied by the Soviet Pacific Fleet on August 25, 1945.<sup>44</sup> Furthermore, the victory of the Communist Party in mainland China in 1949 was perhaps one of the major factors in the transition of the maritime security environment. Given their natural hostility and the numerous territorial disputes, from the early 1960s the PRC (the People's Republic of China), despite the common political regime of the two countries, parted company in the field of geo-strategic and political cooperation.<sup>45</sup>

As a lasting consequence of WWII in the Pacific, the US began to dominate Asia and the Pacific area as the leader of the Western Pact, following the demise of the European and Japanese Empires. In other words, it meant that the war transformed the power structure throughout the world, particularly in Asia and the Pacific in terms of the ability to control the sea. With the onset of the Cold War, the maritime boundary between the two pacts was set up, with the narrow Bering Strait separating the Soviet Far East from Hokkaido, the northernmost island of Japan, which was close to Soviet Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands<sup>46</sup>. This boundary and the transition of the international security environment brought a completely new element into the conduct of international and military affairs. Moreover, this maritime environment had not changed even by the end

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<sup>43</sup> After the end of the Japanese control of the Korean Peninsula, the two superpowers' military occupation was begun. Finally, the current boundary was decided via the Korean War. North Korea (Democratic People's Republic of Korea) was adjacent to continental Asia as a member of the Eastern Pact. In contrast, South Korea (the Republic of Korea) was completely converted into a maritime country as a member of the Western Pact.

<sup>44</sup> V. Sabanyev, "Pacific Fleet Sailors", *Soviet Military Review*, No. 8 (August 1980), pp. 34-36.

<sup>45</sup> From the second half of the 1950s, the PRC received the help of massive Soviet aid, for example an increase of Soviet naval advisers, and many ships such as destroyers, submarines, torpedo boats and minesweepers. Refer, David G. Muller, Jr., *China as a Maritime Power* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1983), pp. 29-89.

<sup>46</sup> J. P. Cole, *Geography of World Affairs* (Middlesex: Penguin Books Inc., 1974, 4<sup>th</sup> ed.), pp. 256-257.

of the 1950s, even though there were a few regional conflicts, i.e., the Dutch in the East Indies and the French in Indo-China. Above all, the consequences of WWII enabled the US to become the predominant maritime power in the whole of the Pacific, meeting the communist threat in the Cold War<sup>47</sup>.

## **B. Purpose of Study**

During the Second World War, one of the most significant revolutions in the field of military affairs was the systematic development of amphibious operational capabilities in order to overcome the obstacles of straits and sea, in the hope of attacking mainland Europe to defeat Germany, and to recover the islands and countries in the Pacific from Japan. The first great invasion from the sea in the 20<sup>th</sup> century occurred at Gallipoli in 1915 during WWI, which, while the overall campaign was a great disaster for the Allies, not only produced many significant lessons, i.e., the importance of armoured landing boats<sup>48</sup>, but also temporarily discredited the concept of large-scale amphibious assaults. In the US, the necessity of amphibious landing operations was, however, not overlooked, but taken into profound consideration.

Given the establishment of the advanced base force at Quantico, the US, particularly the Joint Board of the Army and Navy, established a landing force role for the marines, devised adequate amphibious doctrines, and supplemented the lack of transport vessels

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<sup>47</sup> Another critical area was Europe, which was protected from Soviet expansion by a collective security system with the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) on April 4, 1949 in Washington, DC, see NATO, *NATO Facts and Figures* (Brussels: NATO Information Service, 1969), pp. 15-16.

<sup>48</sup> Tom McGowen, *Assault from the Sea: Amphibious Invasions in the Twentieth Century* (Brookfield, Connecticut: Twenty-First Century Books, 2002), pp. 5-15. Here, the *River Clyde*, which had been a coal carrier, was employed to sail straight onto the shore.



and landing craft via a series of fleet landing exercises (FLEX) and joint Army-Navy exercises (JANET).<sup>49</sup> These kinds of efforts were both the foundations for a series of successes for the US Marine Corps (USMC) in the Pacific during WWII, which was the golden age of amphibious warfare, and their survival in the post WWII armed forces unification controversy. Right after the war, the US was trying to maintain a military posture, in accommodating the facts of the atomic age and jet propulsion, and simultaneously reducing their military forces to peace-time levels despite expanding overseas commitments. In the light of this fact, the US War Department, dominated by the Army and Air Force, favoured the USMC's drastic reduction to a 60,000-man force restricted to performing the "waterborne aspects of amphibious operations, but the National Security Act in 1947 reaffirmed its primary responsibility for the amphibious mission<sup>50</sup>.

In addition to that, the complete success of the amphibious landing at Inchon during the Korean War, which is regarded as one of the great military operations in history, highlighted the worth of the USMC, despite the fact that the supporting powers of the two Koreas, the US and USSR possessed atomic bombs, which remained unused by both sides. In 1952, the USMC's performance led to an amendment to the National Security Act of 1947, which legally guaranteed its size at a minimum force level of three combat divisions and three air wings.<sup>51</sup> In July 1956, the First Marine Aircraft Wing moved from Korea to Iwakuni, Japan, which, in July 1962, became officially a

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<sup>49</sup> Frank O. Hough, Verle E. Ludwig, and Henry I. Shaw, *Pearl Harbor to Guadalcanal*, vol. 1 of *History of U.S. Marine Corps Operations in World War II* (Washington, DC: GPO, 1956), pp. 11- 37.

<sup>50</sup> Gordon W. Keiser, *The U.S. Marine Corps and Defense Unification 1944-1947* (Washington, DC: NDUP, 1982), p. 113.

<sup>51</sup> William D. Parker, *A Concise History of the United States Marine Corps 1775-1969* (USMC, Historical Division Headquarters, 1970), pp. 87-88.

USMC Air Station. The III Marine Amphibious Force stationed in the Pacific also transferred from mainland Japan to Okinawa in 1957 as a result of an agreement with the Japanese Government to remove all American ground troops from that nation.<sup>52</sup> From then on, the USMC began to consider amphibious forces as an ingredient of US foreign policy in East Asia. Moreover its substantial characteristics such as mobility, versatility, and sustained reach coupled with naval power enlarged its role throughout Southeast Asia and the whole of the Pacific area.

The Soviet amphibious force, known as the Soviet Naval Infantry (SNI: *Morskaya pekhota*), fought as normal infantry during WWII. Despite its long history, there were few opportunities available for amphibious operations during the Great Patriotic War. However, it did take part in a number of quite successful attacks in the Black Sea area, North Norway-Finland, and the Far East. By the end of the war, approximately 350,000 naval infantrymen were part of Soviet forces. Nonetheless, after the end of the war it was disbanded, and the existing troops were subordinated to the respective coastal defence commanders<sup>53</sup>. The chief reasons might have been the limitations of both the defence budget and naval power to project the SNI abroad as well as the emergence of nuclear weapons. After the end of WWII, the USSR perceived that the greatest potential threat from across the sea derived from both the US maritime expansion throughout the Pacific to Japan and the atomic bombs possessed by the US. In particular, the USSR confronted the huge US maritime capabilities with a short coastline, which included Vladivostok in the extreme south of the Pacific as the only year-round ice-free port. In this situation, it was natural that the USSR had to concentrate on developing new naval

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<sup>52</sup> Paolo E. Coletta (ed.), *United States Navy and Marine Corps Bases, Overseas* (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1985), pp. 170-246.

<sup>53</sup> Milan. Vego, "Soviet Amphibious Forces", *Naval International* (May 1983), p. 274.

powers and institute its own nuclear forces so as to deter the potential US threat.

As a result of the above facts, the revolution in military affairs in the USSR focused on the mass production of nuclear weapons and the equipping of the services with nuclear rocket weapons from just after WWII to the end of the 1950s.<sup>54</sup> The greatest attention had been given to the development of the capabilities for waging nuclear war assuming an outbreak of general war via the building of very large numbers of submarines as well as the creation of both the strategic rocket forces and the Air-Defense Command<sup>55</sup>. Meanwhile, Soviet strategists like Malinovsky warned that world war could break out from a local conflict, so no one could dismiss the possibility of a swift war, not only because the first surprise nuclear rocket strike might bring unprecedented destruction, but because the war might not just be limited to strikes with nuclear weapons.<sup>56</sup> However, this kind of view slowly changed after the Cuban confrontation in October 1962, and thereafter the Soviets no longer insisted that war would inevitably become a world war.<sup>57</sup>

Within these transitions of Soviet military thought, it seems that the Soviet strategists started to scrutinize the nature of war, and, in particular, the operations of the US and British marines in the postwar period such as the uncontested landings in Lebanon in 1958. The result of the scrutiny and analyses of the USSR's requirements for naval

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<sup>54</sup> William R. Kintner and Harriet Fast Scott (trans. & eds.), *The Nuclear Revolution in Soviet Military Affairs* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1968), pp. 26-27.

<sup>55</sup> When Zhukov became the Minister of Defense in 1955, he accepted the possibility of nuclear war, and took steps to improve air defence in order to blunt any strike by American bombs. As a result, the Air-Defence Command (PVO-Strany) became independent. John Keegan, *World Armies* (London: The MacMillan Press Ltd, 1979), p. 732.

<sup>56</sup> Harriet Fast Scott and William F. Scott, *Soviet Military Doctrine: Continuity, Formulation, and Dissemination* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1988), pp. 40-41.

<sup>57</sup> *Ibid.*

operations led to the decision to re-institute the SNI in the early 1960s,<sup>58</sup> as a specialist force designed to spearhead amphibious assaults in a limited war. The SNI were grouped in brigades, and attached to each of the four Soviet Fleets: Baltic, Northern, Pacific, and Black Sea. The Brigade in the Pacific Fleet could be considered as the counterpart of the USMC in the Pacific area, despite major differences such as size, composition and missions. The Soviets learned a lesson from the Russo-Japanese War, that the eastern ports were easily blocked by the string of islands and peninsulas. As such, they tried to occupy the choke points of the ports such as the northern part of the Korean peninsula and the Kurile Islands at the end of WWII. From this perspective, the Pacific Brigade deployed at the port of Vladivostok was a springboard for projecting their maritime power abroad.

Given their demand that the Soviets be involved in the Pacific War, the Allies gave the Soviets the authority to disarm the Japanese in Manchuria at the Yalta Conference in April 1945<sup>59</sup>. Immediately after the surrender of the Japanese forces, the Soviets established a military administration by setting up a provisional Communist regime in North Korea. In contrast, the US forces arrived in South Korea on September 8<sup>th</sup>, and instituted the United States of America Military Government in Korea (USAMGIK).<sup>60</sup> In 1948, the Republic of Korea (ROK) and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) were formed in the south and north respectively. From this time, Korea was

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<sup>58</sup> Norman Polmar, *The Naval Institute Guide to the Soviet Navy* (Maryland: the United States Naval Institute, 1991, 5<sup>th</sup> ed.), p. 57. According to the Russian Newspaper, Pravda, the highest point of Naval Infantry power reached about 500,000 during WWII after its creation in November 1705 when, pursuant to a decree of Peter I, the formation of a regiment of naval infantry for boarding, landing and marching service on the ships of the Baltic Fleet started. *Pravda*, November 27, 2001.

<sup>59</sup> Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945* (Washington, DC, 1945), p. 396.

<sup>60</sup> Malcolm W. Cagle & Frank A. Manson, *The Sea War in Korea* (Annapolis, ML: Naval Institute Press, 1957), pp. 1-11.

divided into two regimes strongly opposed to each other; moreover the border became a critical frontier of the Cold war. The physical and political division of the Korean peninsula at the 38<sup>th</sup> parallel made it abundantly clear that the two ruling pacts had been trying to create their own military forces.


I have so far examined the history of the two countries' amphibious forces in the Asia-Pacific region until the early 1960s concerning their rises, developments and falls. Their histories fluctuated according to the political and military circumstances of their own country. However, from the early 1960s, they took control of their own status alongside the other services. Furthermore, their developmental processes and enlargements of role and function, size and capabilities were closely related to those of their countries foreign and defence/ maritime strategy policies. The marines and naval infantry's status at the beginning of the 1960s are in Figure 1-2 on the basis of the foregoing history and force presence in the Asia-Pacific region.

The Korean War brought an actual change in US foreign and defence policy towards Korea and Asia. After the end of the Korean War, the US policy makers thought that the main cause of the war had been the omission of Korea from its defensive perimeter in the Far East announced on January 12, 1950. For instance, the US Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, stated at St. Louis on September 2, 1953 before the American Legion convention, "it is ... probable that the Korean War would not have occurred if the aggressor had known what the US would do"<sup>61</sup>. The US believed that it could deter or prevent a war between the Communists and the Western world by strengthening the resolve of nations, which regarded the communists as enemies.

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<sup>61</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 22-23.

**Figure 1-2: Amphibious Forces Presence**



Sources: IISS, *The Military Balance 1964-5*, p. 5-6, 10, etc.

In this context, numerous multilateral and bilateral treaties, both in Europe and Asia, had extended the US commitments over almost all the pro-Western community surrounding the USSR. As a part of this policy, the bilateral treaty between the US and ROK was signed on October 1, 1953, just two months after the end of the Korean War, following the bilateral treaty with Japan on September 8, 1951 during the Korean War, stipulating the obligation that in the case of an armed attack in the Pacific area on either of the Parties, each party would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional process.<sup>62</sup>

<sup>62</sup> *American Foreign Policy 1950-1955, Basic Document*, Vol. I, released July 1957, Department of State Publication 6446, General Policy Series 117, (Washington, DC: GPO, 1957), pp. 789-967, and between 1788-1789.

As far as the Communist countries were concerned, it was necessary to conceal their defense treaties so as not to reveal their intentions and capabilities. Little is known about both the original military convention between the USSR and DPRK secretly contracted on March 17, 1949, together with the agreement in the fields of economy and culture for the next 10 years, and the Mutual Defense Treaty between the DPRK and the PRC in Moscow signed on the next day.<sup>63</sup> After that, the Premier of North Korea, Il-Sung Kim, visited Moscow and Peking in June and July 1961, and ratified the Amicable Cooperation and Mutual Assistance Treaties (ACMAT), which articulated that if each party met a war situation, the other party must immediately support it by all available means including military assets.<sup>64</sup> From this time, the real defence alliance relationship within the Communist and the Western communities was formulated around the two Koreas in Northeast Asia, the Asian frontier in the Cold War.

In retrospect, concerning the transition of the maritime powershifts in the Pacific, the winners in the ocean wars, that is, the power which controlled the sea, took the initiative and critically affected the balance of power in the relevant ocean area. In addition, the two superpowers and their relationships with China, Japan, and the two Koreas shaped geo-political and strategic affairs in East Asia and the Western Pacific. These factors implicitly and explicitly influenced both the role and function, and the rise and fall of each country's amphibious force, which undertook its enlarged mission in the relevant area, i.e., Southeast Asia, as well as in the stationed region. In this regard, the purposes

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<sup>63</sup> Chun-Ki. Eun, 北韓의 對 中蘇 外交政策 [North Korea's Diplomatic Policy toward China and the USSR] (Seoul: Namji, 1994), pp. 92-93.

<sup>64</sup> Gye-Dong. Kim, 북한의 외교정책 [Foreign Policy of North Korea] (Seoul: Baeksan Publishing House, 2002), pp. 138-140. The period of the Mutual Treaty with the USSR was 10 years, but without each party's will to stop, it was automatically extended for the next five years. Consequently, it would last until the end of the Cold War without an amendment. On the contrary, the treaty with the PRC stipulated an unlimited period from the first.

of this study are to provide an account of their role, function and capabilities discerning the peculiarities and influences in the developmental process in the context of the international and internal political and security environment.

## **2. Research Area and Methodological Issues**

### **A. Time Setting**

This study covers 1963-2001. The year, 1963, was an important year for the changes in foreign and defence policy in international politics. First of all, the two superpowers slowly recognized, with the shifts in American and the Soviet military thinking, that the threat of the use of nuclear weapons would not work in the future, as a direct measure for waging general war after the end of the Berlin crisis in 1961-2<sup>65</sup>, and the Cuban missile crisis in 1962. The two crises were not a confrontation by allies or substitutes; nonetheless, they ended without escalating to a general war. The two leaders controlled the crises leaving room for bargaining. In other words, there was the definite possibility of avoiding a mutually damaging war or of coercing an adversary by threatening war rather than waging it. From this time, the strategy for using a potential military capability including nuclear weapons to pursue a nation's objectives came down to a last resort.<sup>66</sup> After all, with these crises as a momentum, the hot line, which was a direct telephone link between Moscow and Washington was inaugurated by the agreement signed in Geneva on June 20, 1963.<sup>67</sup>

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<sup>65</sup> At the end of the crisis, there had been no real change either in Soviet demands or in the Western position, but Soviet threats of unilateral action had lost some of their potency. Elisabeth Barker, "The Berlin Crisis 1958-1962", *International Affairs: A Quarterly Review*, Vol. 38, No. 1, (London: Chatham House, January 1963), p. 71.

<sup>66</sup> Thomas C. Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict* (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), p. 1-7.

<sup>67</sup> P.M.H. Bell (2001), p. 269.



Next, in the Northwest Pacific, there were two very important issues in terms of international relations. The first was the struggle between the PRC and USSR beginning in 1959, whose mutual distrust deepened significantly due to both the test-ban treaty, and the Sino-Indian border dispute. It appeared to the Soviet leaders that the PRC was attempting to exploit the Cuban missile crisis for its own national interests. The Soviet leaders, however, gave up trying to restrain the Chinese polemics<sup>68</sup> that the USSR was giving up its most powerful bargaining weapon by signing the test-ban treaty. In the end, the PRC detonated its first nuclear weapon in 1964, and joined the ranks of the medium-class nuclear states. The next was the US involvement in the Vietnam War initiated from the establishment of the Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam in December 1960. The US was convinced of the critical importance of South Vietnam because of the domino effect, and therefore provided economic assistance and military advisors. Despite those efforts, South Vietnam's President Ngo Dinh Diem was assassinated on November 2, 1963, and the demise of his regime followed. As a result, the worsening situation led to the deeper US military involvement in the Vietnam War.<sup>69</sup> All in all, the most important factor about this starting point is that events encouraged both superpowers to develop their amphibious forces in order to take an appropriate role in international politics.

The final year covered by this study, 2001<sup>70</sup>, was also a dramatic year in terms of

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<sup>68</sup> John Gittings, "Co-operation and Conflict in Sino-Soviet Relations", *International Affairs: A Quarterly Review*, Vol. 4, No. 1 (London: Chatham House, January 1964), pp. 74-74.

<sup>69</sup> Bernard B. Fall, "The Second Indochina War", *International Affairs: A Quarterly Review*, Vol. 41, No. 1 (London: Chatham House, January 1965), pp. 66-67; H. G. Nicholas, "Vietnam and the Traditions of American Foreign Policy", *International Affairs: A Quarterly Review*, Vol. 44, No. 2 (London: Chatham House, April 1968), pp. 189-201.

<sup>70</sup> Even so, it will be expedient to discuss the major changes in the independent and dependent variables up to the present day, if they are necessary for predicting or explaining the future of the two countries' amphibious forces.

changes in the causes and method of waging war as well as the relationship between the countries regardless of their roles in international politics. Even though most political commentators declared that the Cold War had ended with the demise of the USSR and the reunification of Germany, the military alliances never completely disbanded whether the NATO or the bilateral treaties in Asia and the Pacific Area. For example, the NATO and WEU still considered the ballistic missiles of Russia and the other countries of the former USSR to be a cardinal potential threat.<sup>71</sup>

It is, however, true that the post-Cold War military action in Afghanistan represented a global coalition effort in the process of conducting the War on Terror. In this war, most states including Russia (the main rival in the Cold War) and China (a new potential enemy in the new post Cold War era) expressed their sympathies and promised positive support<sup>72</sup>. The world order began to be reorganized from this time and the Iraqi War is a current example. Furthermore, defence planning, as the US Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld has stated, shifted from the “threat-based” model dominated thinking in the past to a “capabilities-based” model for the future.<sup>73</sup> Accordingly the role, function, and organization of amphibious forces are significantly being transformed, particularly in the USMC. For example, according to the Commission on the Review of Overseas Military Facility Structure of the United States-more commonly known as The Overseas Basing Commission-, which was established in 2003 by Public Law 108-132, the US marines presence in Okinawa will reduce by up to 8000 personnel from its current strength of approximately 20,000. It means that the basic role of the III marine division

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<sup>71</sup> Boyer, Y. et al., “Europe and the Challenge of Proliferation”, *Chaillot Paper 24*, The Institute for Security Studies of Western European Union (WEU), May 1996.

<sup>72</sup> *The New York Times*, September 13-17, 2000.

<sup>73</sup> *Washington Post*, November 1, 2001.

has essentially changed from deterring the emergence of a regional dominant power to acting as a stabilizer of the region. If there were still a dominant enemy, the US might have not planned to reduce the manpower of the III marine division.<sup>74</sup> In the long run, the years, 1963 and 2001, were very important reorientations as regards international politics and the development of amphibious forces.

## **B. Methodological Issues**

This thesis intends to be primarily concerned with theory testing. In order to test the theories, I will extract the independent variables to use in analyzing and evaluating the capabilities and doctrines via examining the theories of military and maritime strategists.<sup>75</sup> It means that deductive thinking will be used for a logical approach. In particular, I will focus on explaining how the theories held by military and maritime strategists impact on the developmental process of the amphibious forces.

My basic methodological approach is positivist, although I hope to use both qualitative and quantitative data. The main point of this study is a review of the similarities and differences between the geo-political influences and their capabilities comparing Continental and Maritime amphibious forces. For this I will employ the historical comparative research design using two cases, across time, in the Asia-Pacific region.<sup>76</sup>

Fundamentally, it is desirable to use original materials, but access to them has been difficult due to each country's classification procedures. As such, regarding the goal of

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<sup>74</sup> LA Times, May 27, 2003; Al Cornella. et al., "Commission on Review of Overseas Military Facility Structure of the United States", 1655N. Ft. Myer Dr. Suite 700 Arlington, VA 22209, May 9, 2005.

<sup>75</sup> Alan. Bryman, *Social Research Methods* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 51-57.

<sup>76</sup> W. Lawrence Neuman, *Social Research Methods: Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches* (Needham Heights, MA: Allyn and Bacon, 2000, 4<sup>th</sup> ed.), p. 387-409.

foreign and defence policies, and doctrines, the official documents such as White Papers, Annual Reports, and military field manuals published by governments and relevant services will be employed. In some aspects, especially regarding the comparative analysis of the capabilities of amphibious forces, my research requires confidential documents, but I will use open materials to the utmost such as the data in *the Military Balance* of the International Institute for the Strategic Studies (IISS), *Jane's Fighting ships* and the results of previous studies.

### **3. Questions Raised and Framework Used**

#### **A. Questions Raised**

From the above perspectives, I raise the main question: what are the roles and functions of amphibious forces in terms of international political relations in the nuclear age? In order to answer this question, I also address the following questions:

Firstly, what are the general roles and functions of amphibious forces? And, how do they contribute to the achievement of a state's national goals or foreign policy objectives in wartime or peacetime?

Secondly, what are the conditioning factors in the make-up of amphibious forces, and how do they influence the rises and falls of the USMC and S(R)NI?

Thirdly, are there any differences between the roles, functions and ultimate characteristics of the operational concepts of the USMC and S(R)NI in the Asia-Pacific region?

Fourthly, in practice, amphibious operations are, as most strategists have pointed out, very difficult to execute in wartime. How did/does the USMC try to overcome these difficulties in terms of the doctrinal development?


Lastly, considering the past and present construction of the USMC and S(R)NI, what kinds of principles for amphibious forces buildup can be drawn up? How can the relationship between the independent variables and general amphibious forces buildup be described?

## B. Framework used

### (1) Analysis Framework

In order to answer the above research questions, I will use the following framework for analysis to provide a logical approach in explaining how the independent variables in this model interact to determine the roles, functions and the development of amphibious forces in the two countries (see Figure 1-3). Military forces assessed are not for domestic, but for international use.

**Figure 1–3: Relationship between Independent and Dependent Variables**



If there was no specific tension in relation to another country or region, the development

of a country's military forces would be limited at the minimum force level. The location of amphibious force in a national military organisation is usually below the three major services as a branch of the navy. Scholars and political researchers have long recognized the role of military forces as a political tool in exercising a country's foreign policy objectives. The purpose of this thesis is, as indicated, to examine the roles, and functions of the American and Russian amphibious forces in the Asia-Pacific region. To achieve this goal, it is necessary to explain why the strengths of the two marine corps fluctuated with the transitions of the independent variables. This means that the analysis should be understood in terms of the entirety of each country's national strategic direction for military force planning.<sup>77</sup>

In terms of the roles and functions of amphibious forces, they have been closely related to each country's national foreign policy objectives, and defence and maritime strategies/ policies over time. Amphibious forces have a history of adaptation since their historical creation. In a microscopic sense, an amphibious force is the force to be specially organized for the amphibious operation which projects "power, support, or medical and humanitarian relief inland from the sea, rivers or lake without using formal ports, slipways, Ro-Ro terminals, beaching sites or airfields"<sup>78</sup>. However, an amphibious force usually maintains its equipment and military skills on the battlefield by fighting alongside conventional army troops as for example, the USMC did during the Korean (the activities of the 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division after the Inchon amphibious landing operation) and Vietnam Wars<sup>79</sup>. Hence, in a macroscopic sense, it can perform several

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<sup>77</sup> For the process of limiting the independent variables, refer Chapter II. 4. Roles, Functions and Independent Variables.

<sup>78</sup> Ewen Southby-Tailyour OBE (ed.), *Jane's Amphibious and Special Forces* (Surrey: Jane's Information Group Limited, 2003, Issue 10), p. [32] (hereafter cited as *JASF-ISSUE 10*).

<sup>79</sup> Geoffrey Till (1987), pp. 112-123; Geoffrey Till (ed.), *Seapower: Theory and Practice* (Essex: Frank

specific missions such as nation-building work, counter-insurgency, humanitarian relief, rescue and peacekeeping operations ordered by the highest command which are quite different from those of war, in addition to its basic functions of spearheading force in an amphibious landing operation and ships guards / security duties ashore. Consequently, even though its functions and tasks could be divergent according to missions, there is no difference in terms of its roles (peacetime<sup>80</sup>: defence posture, deterrent and compellence, and wartime: warfighting) in comparison to other services or branches of the national armed forces. From these perspectives, the roles and functions of the American and Russian amphibious forces will be discussed in the context of the following table (see Table 1-2).

**Table 1-2: Roles and Functions of Amphibious Force<sup>81</sup>**

Classifications	Roles	Functions	Remarks
Wartime	Waging War	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Coastal Defence/ Islands Defence</li> <li>• Contribution for SLOC Defence</li> <li>• Contribution for Sea Control/Denial</li> <li>• Provide Security for Advanced Naval Bases</li> <li>• Projection of Force</li> </ul>	
Peacetime	Defence Deterrence Compellence	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• All Above Functions</li> <li>• Force Presence (Forward Deterrence &amp; Defence)</li> <li>• Compellence against Relatively Minor Opposition</li> </ul>	Including the realm of MOOTW
	Coercion	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Contribution to the Improvement of Diplomatic Relationship</li> <li>• Exercising Political Effect</li> </ul>	

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Cass & Co. LTD., 1994), pp. 178-179.

<sup>80</sup> The role of the SNI in terms of its political effect toward the Third World, in the Cold War seems completely different from that of the USMC, but it could be interpreted as a peacetime role of the SNI.

<sup>81</sup> Regarding the roles and functions of amphibious forces, there is no uniform reference point in this regard. Currently, those of the USMC can be seen as a benchmark for a fully capable amphibious force in relation to other countries. For the process of extracting the roles and functions of AF, see Chapter II.

## **(2) Thesis Framework**

This thesis consists of six chapters. Chapter I is a historical introduction to the dissertation, historical focus. Chapter II, as a theoretical study, describes the roles and functions of amphibious forces, and the conditioning factors for their construction via schema theories posited by military and political commentators in the application of the general theories concerning the totality of military forces. However, it basically focuses on explaining why I used the above analysis framework. In Chapters III, IV and V, firstly, the general situations of the international and regional security environment and the transitions of maritime dominion as the background information for developing further analysis are provided in the first part of each chapter. Secondly, I will provide the in(ex)trinsical interests of the two superpowers regarding the Asia-Pacific region and the transitions of the military/maritime strategies and policies. After that, the role and functions, and amphibious lift capability focusing on the Asia-Pacific area are briefly presented. Lastly, in the last part of each chapter, a comparative analysis of the differences between the superpowers with regard to the independent variables as well as the USMC and S(R)NI's roles, functions and amphibious lift capabilities are chronologically analyzed. In addition, an explanation of how the new doctrines of the USN/MC reflect the principles of war is briefly described. In Chapters III and V, case studies focusing on the employment of amphibious forces in the relevant region are included. Lastly, I will try to generalize the relationships between the independent variables and their effects in order to apply them to the other states' amphibious force buildup by setting out the independent variables and major findings in the form of conclusions in Chapter VI.



# Chapter II. What is an Amphibious Force

## 1. Definitions

There are over 40 countries which possess dedicated amphibious infantry units in the name of marines or naval infantry<sup>82</sup>. Moreover, many other countries, typically Japan, with no such organisations, also maintain similar capabilities by embedding them within the army or navy in order to use the sea routes in wartime or peacetime, whether their original purpose is to attack the enemy in wartime or not. The terms for amphibious forces used in the thesis are various according to the usage of the individual country, because they may reflect the particular military history and political culture. The prime reason for this may arise from the intrinsic reason of it never having had its own original fighting scope unlike the other services: Army, Navy and Air forces.

The Oxford English Dictionary (OED) gives as the first definition of ‘amphibious’, “living both on land and in water”. It further distinguishes the military terms as to the third meaning: (of a military operation) involving forces landed from the sea and (of forces) trained for such operations.<sup>83</sup> These definitions are unlimited to define that of an amphibious force as a branch of the navy or any other service, as this thesis will explain. In order to name this kind of force, the term ‘Marine Corps or Marines’ is more commonly employed in Western countries, in contrast with the term ‘Naval Infantry’ in the countries affected by the Soviet military culture, for example, North Korea. With the

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<sup>82</sup> *JASF-ISSUE 10*, p. [34]

<sup>83</sup> Sara Tulloch (ed.), *The Oxford Dictionary and Thesaurus* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 47.

constant American influence, the term 'Marines' has increasingly come to be used as the definition for amphibious forces as distinct from 'Naval Infantry'. Furthermore, the term 'triphibious' is occasionally employed in order to express the added dimension of the air activity<sup>84</sup> of the USMC and UK Royal Marines (UKRM). To summarize, the term 'amphibious force' is used to include not only Marines and Naval Infantry units, but also those who have been trained and will potentially be used for amphibious operations even though they are those currently organized into the other services<sup>85</sup>. Nonetheless, this thesis tries to use its original name and focuses on legally organized troops possessed in the relevant country.

Other confusing factors concerning definitions are the differences between the definitions of the words: roles, functions and missions. As defined in the Oxford Dictionary, these terms are often used interchangeably<sup>86</sup>, but the distinctions among them must not be overlooked. *The Joint Doctrine Encyclopedia (JDE)* of the US gives the difference among them in detail in a sentence that "the primary function of the Services is to provide forces organized, trained, and equipped to perform a role – to be employed by the combatant commander in the accomplishment of a mission"<sup>87</sup>. The definitions of the terms illustrated in *JDE*<sup>88</sup> are as follows:

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<sup>84</sup> Raymond G. O'Connor, "The US Marines in the 20 Century: Amphibious Warfare and Doctrinal Debates", *Military Affairs*, Vol. 38, Issue 3 (Oct., 1974), p. 97.

<sup>85</sup> Because, amphibious operations are not the privilege of marines, naval infantry, nor the slightly misnamed coastal artillery. Given the complexity of the amphibious art, it is essential that all trained services including naval, marine, army, air and merchant navy forces must be trained to make up the whole of amphibious operations, see *JASF-ISSUE 10*, p. [36]. In this context, regardless of their name, the term 'amphibious force' is used to include all forces designed for amphibious operations.

<sup>86</sup> For example, the first meaning of 'function' as a noun: 1. a) an activity proper to a person or institution, 1. b) a mode of action or activity by which a thing fulfills its purpose, and 1. c) an official or professional duty, includes all meanings of the terms "role, missions, and functions", see, Sara Tulloch (1997), p. 606.

<sup>87</sup> Joint Chiefs of Staff of the US, *Joint Doctrine Encyclopedia* (July 16, 1997), pp. 624-625 (hereafter cited as 'JDE').

<sup>88</sup> *Ibid.*

Firstly, “roles” are the broad and enduring purposes for which the Services were established by Congress in law.

Secondly, “missions” are the tasks assigned by the President or Secretary of Defence to the combatant commanders.

Lastly, “functions” are specific responsibilities assigned by the President and Secretary of Defence to enable the Services to fulfill their legally established roles.

Judging from the above broad definitions, the roles of amphibious forces come from its original established purpose regulated by the law in association with the general attributes of military forces, e.g., amphibious operations, offence, and defence<sup>89</sup>. In stark contrast, the functions of amphibious forces depend on their position in the state’s military hierarchy, because it is usually the responsibility of the upper level commander to provide organised, trained, and equipped troops for a designated forces to perform a particular objective. For example, if USMC fulfills a task, the responsibility to provide forces primarily rests on the Department of the Navy (DoN, Secretary of Navy). Furthermore, USMC devolves this responsibility to its major components, such as its 3 divisions and wings. Even so, it does not mean that the responsibility includes the functions of both building-up and manipulating the troops<sup>90</sup>. It is, in a few cases, different in these two different functions, i.e., manipulating belongs to the supreme command like the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) in the US, and then it is defined according to its position in the military hierarchy in the form of a ‘Directive’<sup>91</sup>. The missions of amphibious forces are task-oriented as ordered by the supreme commander or the leader

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<sup>89</sup> As Carl Von Clausewitz wrote, the aim of war would always and solely be to overcome and disarm the enemy in order to achieve the political purpose. And then offence and defence are basic activities for engagement, see Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War*, Michael Howard and Peter Paret (eds. & trans.), (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989, Paperback Printing), pp. 90-99, 360-366 (hereafter cited as Carl Von Clausewitz, “On War”).

<sup>90</sup> In the US, the words ‘Operational and Support Responsibilities’ is substituted by ‘building-up’ and ‘manipulating’ respectively, see The Joint Forces Staff College (JFSC), *JFSC PUB 1: The Joint Staff Officer’s Guide*, 2000, p. 1-4.

<sup>91</sup> Refer, the US Department of Defense (DoD), *Directive (Subject: Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components) No. 5100.1* (September 25, 1987, and August 1, 2002).

of a state regardless of the conditions, either wartime or peacetime.

## **2. Location within a State's Military-Operational Hierarchy**

The amphibious forces most frequently discussed after WWII were those of the two superpowers (the US and USSR), and the UK. But, there are in fact several different forms of amphibious forces, with varying missions. The reasons for this are not only, as described in the JASF-ISSUE 10, because there are over 70 per cent of the world's population, 80 per cent of countries and almost all centres of international trade and military power in the littoral regions of the world, but also because there is no country that ignores the advantages of possessing an up-to-date amphibious capability, so it does not matter whether its name is amphibious force or a general branch of navy or maritime police forces, whatever its size may be, in order to protect its national interests concerning the adjacent seas.<sup>92</sup>

The national interests even in the littoral regions may not be protected by merely an amphibious force, and therefore it becomes no more than a part of the navy, which basically includes surface (battleship) and underwater (submarine) vessels. In addition to that, as concluded via the historical disputes between the strategists, originally Halford Mackinder and Alfred Thayer Mahan, with the development of war scales and features (e.g., coalition warfare) as well as technology, "naval force alone is too weak for offence to really maintain itself in the world struggle, if it is not based on great industry and has a great population behind it"<sup>93</sup>. As such, it was natural historically that

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<sup>92</sup> JASF-ISSUE 10, p. [32]

<sup>93</sup> Eric Grove, *The Future of Sea Power* (London: Routledge, 1990), p. 5.

a state basically kept two powers, land and maritime. However, with the transport revolution based on flight, the modern type of military organization came to possess basically three services, land, sea and air powers. When J.F.C. Fuller and Basil H. Liddell Hart established the fundamental theoretical framework for the air-land team in armoured warfare<sup>94</sup>, the major powers found the possibility of using it as a part of the navy, and configured the Naval Wings, i.e., the Royal Flying Corps for coastguard duty in October 1912<sup>95</sup>. In this mood, a few major powers, notably Britain, Japan and the US, converted their capital ships or building programmes to those of fleet carriers<sup>96</sup>. As a result of this fact, naval aviation was comprised in the naval power. In this context, the basic location of amphibious forces is seen in Figure 2-1, which may not be adapted by all countries, and which varies according to a nation's political and strategic conditions.

Amphibious forces, as a branch of a state's naval forces, are obviously a war-fighting instrument. It is no exaggeration to say that the history of amphibious operations<sup>97</sup> is as

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<sup>94</sup> David MacIsaac, "Voices from the Central Blue: The Air Power Theorists", in Peter Paret (ed.), *Makers of Modern Strategy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 632.


<sup>95</sup> See, the Royal Navy homepage, <<http://www.royal-navy.mod.uk/rn>>, and the Fleet Air Arm Archive, <<http://www.fleetairarmarchive.net/History/index.htm>>, accessed: January 26, 2004.

<sup>96</sup> The first aircraft carrier, even remotely considered, was the British cruiser, *Hermes*, which was able to carry two seaplanes at first by installing a wheeled launching platform in June 1913. The US commissioned its first aircraft carrier, *Langley* (CV-1), on March 20, 1922. Refer, Scot MacDonald, *Evolution of Aircraft Carriers* (Washington, DC: US GPO, 1964), pp. 2-17; George W. Baer (1994), p. 100; The US Navy, "Carriers: List of Carriers", in the USN homepage, <<http://www.chinfo.navy.mil/navpalib/ships/carriers/cv-list1.html>>, accessed: March 17, 2004.

<sup>97</sup> Here, the definitions of terms, 'amphibious operation' and 'sealift', should be distinguished. The former is "an attack launched from the sea by naval and landing forces embarked in ships or craft involving a landing on a hostile shore", whilst the latter includes "the initial movement and critical resupply of equipment, warriors, and materials to a theatre of war using the sea routes, which is an enduring mission of a navy as the modern day version of Mahan's navy". The critical different point here is the phrase, 'a landing on a hostile shore', in the former, which means that a simple movement to a theatre of war, where it is not the enemy's shore at that time, is not considered as an amphibious operation. In this manner, 'Amphibious Withdrawal (AW)', the withdrawal of forces by sea in naval ships or craft from a hostile shore, is a type of amphibious operations. Refer, the US Army Field Manual 31-11, Naval Warfare Publication 22(A), Marine Corps Landing Force Manual 01, *Doctrine for Amphibious Operations* (Washington, DC: USN & USMC, July 1962), pp. 1-3 & 1-4; John Scott Redd, "Naval Forces and Joint Vision 2010: Traditional and Emerging Roles", in Richard H. Shultz Jr. and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff Jr. (eds.), *The Role of Naval Forces in 21<sup>st</sup> Century Operations* (Washington,

long as that of human warfare as seen in the historical evidence that the Egyptian Empire was subjected to attacks by sea-borne raiders from the Mediterranean islands and the coastline of southern Europe as early as 1200 BC<sup>98</sup>. About 2,500 years ago, 413 – 415 BC, the Greeks made full use of amphibious operations with an armed force, however their defeat in Sicily became a key turning point in the Peloponnesian War.<sup>99</sup> In these cases, all countries used an armed force<sup>100</sup> as an amphibious force<sup>101</sup>, later in the form of ‘fleet infantry or marines’ to distinguish them from ‘sailors’ until the creation of a regular force as a branch of the navy.

**Figure 2-1: Basic Location of an Amphibious Force**



Officially, the first organization for purely amphibious operations was the *Infanteria de Marina Espanola* [Spanish Marine Infantry: SMI] with its creation by order of King

DC: Brassey's, 2000), pp. 151-153.

<sup>98</sup> Ian Speller and Christopher Tuck, *Amphibious Warfare: Strategy and Tactics* (St Paul, MN: MBI Publishing Company, 2001), pp. 8-9.

<sup>99</sup> *Ibid.*, and Tom McGowen (2002), p. 5.

<sup>100</sup> Strictly speaking, it was a total concept of military forces, because at that time there was no distinction between army and navy.

<sup>101</sup> The early history of these “soldiers of the sea” remained *ad hoc*; organised in times of national emergencies and quickly disbanded in the aftermath of its employment, most likely during peace.

Carlos I in order to serve with the fleet on a permanent basis in 1537<sup>102</sup>, despite the fact that the long history of amphibious operations commenced in 1200 BC. It is from this perspective that most authorities, notably Jane's, accept SMI as the oldest existing Marines. From this, the following definitions of amphibious forces can be extracted:

Firstly, authority; the troops should be created by an order of the highest leader of a state or on a legal basis.

Secondly, the ultimate aim of creation; troops must operate with the fleet to project a military force ashore or on land from the sea. It means that an amphibious force is clearly a branch of the navy<sup>103</sup>. Reflecting the fact that amphibious warfare takes place when military capability 'moves to battle by ship but fights on land'<sup>104</sup>, it is essential to depend on naval power for support, in order to overcome the complexity and dangers of crossing a stretch of water and consolidating ashore<sup>105</sup>.

Lastly, perpetuity; troops must exist on a permanent basis, which means that temporary organised troops for an amphibious landing operation by any military operational demand is not to be considered as an original amphibious force.<sup>106</sup>

From the above perspectives, the Amphibious force has been designed to carry out war-oriented tasks, in the field of littoral warfare with the accompanying role of spearheading the amphibious landing as a part of naval operations, devoting most of their time to preparing for war by planning selected landing sites (planning), to enhance

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<sup>102</sup> *JASF-ISSUE 10*, p. 587.

<sup>103</sup> Of course, there are a few exceptions, i.e., The Australian Marines (AM). In this case, AM held amphibious craft such as LCM (landing craft, mechanized) and LARC (lighter amphibious resupply cargo), not ships like LST (landing ships, tanks) which are a component of the Navy, so that AM receives additional support from the Royal Australian Navy (RAN). See, The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), *The Military Balance 1989- 1990 and 1993-1994*, p. 154-155 and 149-150 respectively; *JASF-ISSUE 10*, p. 25.

<sup>104</sup> Joshua Goldstein, *International Relations* (New York: Harper Collins, 1996), p. 238.

<sup>105</sup> *JASF-ISSUE 10*, p. [36].

<sup>106</sup> In my view, these three factors are the ingredients for defining the attributes of amphibious forces. The factor of perpetuity, however, suffered from the transitions of the international and domestic political/ military situations as seen in the cases of USMC, the S(R)NI. For example, the first RNI regiment with two battalions that each had five companies was created by order of Peter I, in October 1705, replacing Army troops with regiments of sea soldiers, and it repeatedly experienced rises and falls. Even so, RNI (SNI) counts its age from the year of its formation, 1705. In the light of this fact, it is difficult to calculate exactly how many years meet the requirements of perpetuity. Regarding the history of RNI, refer, Dominik George Nargele, "The Soviet Naval Infantry, an Evolving Instrument of State Power", Ph D Thesis (Washington DC: Georgetown University, 1983), pp. 27-77; *Pravda*. November 27, 2001.

fighting capability (exercise) and to maintain readiness (maintenance). Consequently, the role usually associated with amphibious forces is basically to fight in wars. However, as seen in Figure 2-1, it also has always had more than a fighting function as an instrument of national policy. Its peacetime employment can take a variety of forms and serve a variety of ends, like serving the general role of military forces as well as of naval forces. In light of this fact, Arch Whitehouse emphasized the roles of the Navy-Marine Corps team by writing that:

“Military success is measured in terms of carrying out the national policy. Today, our national policy demands that the Navy maintain a capability of projecting Marines ashore anywhere.... The Navy-Marine Corps team is exceptional in history since its mobility and versatility permit it to make a contribution to virtually every medium of warfare, land, sea and air.”<sup>107</sup>

To sum up, the amphibious force is a part of the navy, and it is at the same time a component of a state's military forces. If the sagacious maxim of Clausewitz that “War is thus an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will”<sup>108</sup> is true, it can be applicable in peacetime or not, and an amphibious force must at least be a certain means of the use of force in war fixing its essential value in the projection of power from the sea under the topographical environment of the earth<sup>109</sup>. As widely accepted<sup>110</sup>, there is no doubt that the roles of military forces have developed into a firm instrument of a state's foreign policy, so it is natural that amphibious forces as a component of military

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<sup>107</sup> Arch Whitehouse, *Amphibious Operations* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Co. 1963), p. 312.

<sup>108</sup> Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, p. 75.

<sup>109</sup> According to JASF-ISSUE 10, “five per cent of the world's coastline is manmade where ships, landing craft and hovercraft can unload with ease, about 25 per cent have beaches suitable for landing craft, 75 per cent of these coastlines can be crossed by hovercraft, 95 per cent can accept landing by small assault craft, sometimes putting ashore cliff and rock climbing specialists, while less than 1 per cent is unsuitable for any form of landing”. See, *JASF-ISSUE 10*, p. [32]

<sup>110</sup> Especially see, Robert J. Art, “The Fungibility of Force”, in Robert J. Art and Kenneth N. Waltz (eds.), *The Use of Force: Military Power and International Politics* (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publisher, Inc, 1999), pp. 3-22.



forces are a true political instrument by having the capability of projecting force from the sea, and threatening such action, or placing them in a specific locality.

### **3. Roles and Functions of Amphibious Forces**

The need for an organisation of amphibious landing operations either in offence or in defence has almost been taken for granted down through maritime history from 1200 B.C. because of the various topographical factors, without any distinction of seas, rivers or lakes, encountered in wartime. The requirement for amphibious operations has a growing importance and there has really been a remarkable increase in its being an ingredient of military forces, particularly of the world's navies. The capability of naval forces has clear limitations in occupying the land area, apart from the question of the ability of the fleet to put ground forces ashore<sup>111</sup>. From this perspective, it is most likely that one crucial factor affecting governmental decision-making processes for the construction of an amphibious force would be the necessity to make amphibious landings to make a beachhead on the enemy's shore in a future expected war. To be candid, this principle probably worked until the end of WWII, and for a while in the aftermath of the Korean War, because of the successes of wars in both the European and Pacific theatres, i.e., North Africa, Sicily, Normandy, Guadalcanal, Tarawa and Okinawa, during WWII, and at Inchon during the Korean War which were initiated by successful amphibious operations<sup>112</sup>.

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<sup>111</sup> James F. Dunnigan (1982), p. 196.

<sup>112</sup> Brigade General. Richard F. Vercauteren, "Amphibious Operations in the Modern Age", in the HQ of ROKMC, 해병대 발전 심포지움 발표논문집 [Symposium Articles for the Future Development of ROKMC], August 7, 1996.

Given the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the 1950s and 60s, when the two superpowers were already capable of destroying each other, it was impossible to use the full extent of the total military capacity of either superpower. From that time, the roles and utilities of military forces began to be transformed in the direction of creating a superior bargaining position so that there was, in the words of Dr Stanley Hoffmann, “a predominance of the latent over the manifest, of the oblique over the direct, of the limited over the general in all considerations of force”<sup>113</sup>. Nonetheless, the demise of the USSR and the end of the Cold War occurred at the beginning of the 1990s. What accounted for this? This was not purely the result of military capability by itself – certainly not amphibious warfare, unlike the outcome of wars in the previous era. The main reasons might be not only the US military domination in each contentious area of the world to protect the Western powers from Soviet expansionism and threats, but also the economic, political, and moral pressures from within the Soviet Union<sup>114</sup>. Amphibious forces, particularly USMC, played a significant part within the overall role of the US military forces, as did SNI in the Soviet military forces. In this way, the roles of amphibious forces have changed and enlarged from those mainly based on amphibious landing operations or such similar operations to take the initiative on the battlefield, to those of general military or naval forces. In this sense, it is necessary to examine its roles and functions in the light of the utilities of the whole military force as well as the naval forces.

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<sup>113</sup> Lawrence Freedman, “Military Power and Political Influence”, in the Royal Institute of International Affairs, *International Affairs*, Vol. 74, No. 4 (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 764-767.

<sup>114</sup> Joseph H. Alexander and Merrill L. Bartlett, *Sea Soldiers in the Cold War: Amphibious Warfare, 1945-1991* (Annapolis, ML: Naval Institute Press, 1995), pp. 6-7.

## A. General Roles of Military Forces and MOOTW<sup>115</sup>

### (1) The Theories of the Military Strategists

The importance of military forces was emphasized at least from the 5<sup>th</sup> century B.C. in China by Sun Tzu, who said, “War is of vital importance to the state. It is a matter of life and death on the road to either the safety or ruin of a state.” Here, among diverse translations of war—corresponding to the several meanings of the word “war[兵者: war, soldier, weapon]”<sup>116</sup>, this pregnant sentence highlighted the significance of military affairs. He continually emphasized the importance of the build-up of military forces in that at least a thousand swift and heavy chariots, a hundred thousand mailclad soldiers, and basic logistic and supply systems are essential to raise or prepare for a war.<sup>117</sup> The most obvious characteristic of his concept was, of course, to defeat the enemy without waging a war. Even though he wrote the book with this concept<sup>118</sup>, it is undeniable that he considered military forces as an indispensable factor in managing a state. Put simply, a state cannot freely exist without developing its own military forces to prepare for an anticipated war in the near future. Despite his purpose in writing this, it could be inferred that the roles of military forces in that era should have involved the roles of

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<sup>115</sup> Military Operations Other Than War

<sup>116</sup> Byungchun. Ro, 孫子兵法 [Sun Tzu's Art of War] (Seoul: Gana, 1996, 8<sup>th</sup> ed.), p. 26. In reality, this word can be translated into at least 7 different meanings: 1) military forces, 2) weapons, 3) soldiers, 4) military affairs, 5) war, 6) the supreme military power, and 7) combat power.

<sup>117</sup> The ROK Army College [陸軍大學, ROKAC], 孫子兵法講義 [Lecture on Sun Tzu's Art of War], (Daejeon: ROKAC, 1999), p. 16, and Byungchun Ro (1996), p. 56.

<sup>118</sup> Most specialists about Sun Tzu's Art of War think that his fundamental logic is based on the way of winning without waging war, which is demonstrated in chapter three, 'offensive strategy[謀攻]. For example, he highlights that in the practical art of war, the best thing of all is to capture the enemy whole and intact; to shatter and destroy it is the last resort [凡用兵之法, 全國爲上, 破國次之]. Moreover, as Michael I. Handel described [see, Michael I. Handel, *Masters of War: Classical Strategic Thought* (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2001, 3<sup>rd</sup> ed.), p. 22], if Sun Tzu considers a large variety of non-military means such as diplomacy as a means for waging war, he might find a supporting role for military forces. It means that he sees the diplomatic role of military forces, because, without the background power deriving from military forces, other countries might not be obedient spontaneously. However, it is difficult to find this as a clear statement.

preserving a state and its resources, enlarging its state power abroad, and protecting soldiers and the civilian population from the violence that the enemy would inflict upon it. As most interpreters of his thoughts concluded, his basic standpoint was that war would be indispensable, because waging war was determined by the supreme leader of the state. As a result, it was likely that he put the focus on how to prepare for and to win a war; thus the roles of military forces remained on the levels of defence and offence.

The first revolutionary strategist systematically establishing the roles of military forces was Carl von Clausewitz who observed that their distinctive role could be a means of obtaining political aims. He might be classified as a forerunner of this kind of view. Objectively speaking, Sun Tzu's thoughts on waging war also implicitly included that military forces could be one of the tools for accompanying the national policy goal judging from the sentence that "the general is the bulwark of the state: if the bulwark is complete at all points, the state will be strong; if the bulwark is defective, the state will be weak"<sup>119</sup>. Here, he affirms the correct position of the general, the supreme commander of military force, as a supporter for the leader of a state. It means that the military forces are also one of the tools for evolving the state's foreign policy.

Compared with Sun Tzu's thought, Clausewitz defined the fundamental role of military forces by examining the characteristics of war that "War is merely continuation of policy by other means" in chapter one, *Book 1* on "What is War?"<sup>120</sup>. Furthermore, he additionally described the relationship between political objectives and war in that

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<sup>119</sup> Byungchon Ro (1996), p. 86.

<sup>120</sup> Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, p. 87.

“political objectives are the goal, war is the means of reaching it”<sup>121</sup>. Certainly, this implication included both the real nature of war and the attributes of military forces so that he succeeded in setting out a theory putting the nature of war and military forces as a means of achieving a state’s political objectives. He wrote in Chapter 3B, *Book 8* on “War Plans”, “To discover how much of our resources must be mobilized for war, we must first examine our political aim and that of the enemy.”<sup>122</sup> As Peter Paret has pointed out, he regarded war as an extreme but natural expression of policy.<sup>123</sup> Considering these assessments of the nature of war, it is clear that it could never be an independent thing in itself. Consequently, military forces were the basic instruments for waging war, which included the basic roles of offence and defence: being at the same time the most effective method of achieving the political goals of the state.

With time, the roles of military forces fluctuated because of several transitions in the environments such as the developments of new weapons and the relationships with the other countries through the establishment of the United Nations (UN). First of all, the most significant factor was the emergence of nuclear weapons, which raised a suspicion among the strategists whether the former utilities of military forces, e.g., a means for defence or offence or politics, were properly defined or not. This kind of suspicion was grounded on the observation that the nuclear powers would be unable to use their most powerful weapons in a real war, because it would deservedly invite their own destruction.<sup>124</sup> As such, the role of military forces as a means of achieving political objects was somewhat disputable. Consequently, the basic question among the

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<sup>121</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>122</sup> Michael I. Handel (2001), p. 97.

<sup>123</sup> Peter Paret (2000), ‘Clausewitz’, pp. 186-187.

<sup>124</sup> R. J. Vincent, “Military Power and Political Influence: The Soviet Union and Western Europe”, *Adelphi Papers*, No. 119 (London: IISS, Autumn 1975), p. 3.

strategists and policy makers<sup>125</sup> was ‘how much would be enough or would additional weapons compared with those of the other side be politically influential in these circumstances?’ The answer might be that there are no limits or that additional weapons would not have political influence anymore. From this time, the newly-coined terms such as ‘the diplomacy of violence’, ‘the manipulation of risk’, ‘the dynamics of mutual alarm’, and ‘the credibility of the threat’ posited mainly by T. C. Schelling were becoming more popular<sup>126</sup>.

This is not to say that conventional weapons and the former roles of military forces were completely obsolete. Indeed, as K. J. Holsti has stated, “Even the nuclear powers have found it expedient to maintain conventional forces to deal with limited provocations...nuclear power cannot easily be converted into political influence”<sup>127</sup>, the roles of conventional forces have not been, and will not be diminished: on the contrary, they might become more complicated and fractionised. In this connection, many states frequently have to depend on the use of military forces in the bargaining process. Up to the present day, military forces are still one of the most effective means for not only exercising a state’s power toward other states, but also protecting its territory from the threats of other states. As such, there is no doubt that the role of military forces has developed into a firm instrument of a state’s foreign policy. In this age where societies are closely engaged via transnational associations, as K. J. Holsti argued, military forces, particularly a nuclear force, are often thought to increase the diplomatic influence of

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<sup>125</sup> Laurence Martin, “Changes in American Strategic Doctrine-An Initial Interpretation”, *Survival*, Vol. XVI, No. 4 (July/August 1974), pp. 163-164.

<sup>126</sup> Refer, T. C. Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963), and *Arms and Influence* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966).

<sup>127</sup> K. J. Holsti, *International Politics: A Framework for Analysis* (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc, 1995, 7<sup>th</sup> ed.), p. 216.

those who possess powerful capabilities.<sup>128</sup>

Next, from the perspective of the transition of the relationships between states, the offensive role of military forces is basically ruled out at least in the Western community. After WWII, there was a radical change in attitudes towards the use of force in international relations. A good example of this is the reflection on the UN Charter, which regulates that:

“To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace. (Article 1), all members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace, security and justice, are not endangered (Article 2).<sup>129</sup>

The Charter allows the use of force only in the case of self-defence or the necessity “for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security (article 43)<sup>130</sup>”. However, as seen in the cases of several wars after WWII, i.e., the conflicts in East Asia, this has not radically impacted on a state’s behaviour in international relations. Even so, it appears that the offensive role of military forces have declined in the light of the official disputes among the strategists.

After all, the intrinsic roles of military forces certainly cannot be altered, even though the implications have become significantly complicated and deepened. In this sense, apart from their domestic functions, Julian Lider has divided the external functions of military forces into the following four categories.

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<sup>128</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 117-124.

<sup>129</sup> See, the Charter of the United Nations, <<http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/chapter1 & 7.htm>>, accessed: February 8, 2004.

<sup>130</sup> *Ibid.*

Firstly, a defence against any aggression (the waging of an external war is always described in defensive terms).

Secondly, a deterrent against various types of war.

Thirdly, coercion as a means of backing negotiations of any kind.

Lastly, a protective structure behind which other instruments of foreign policy – diplomatic, economic and political – can operate.<sup>131</sup>

These kinds of fractionisation of the role of military forces in peacetime are well described by Robert J. Art in the 4<sup>th</sup> edition of *The Use of Force* (see Table 2-1), adding the role of swaggering.<sup>132</sup>

**Table 2-1: Fractionisation of the Roles of Military Forces in Peacetime**

Type	Purpose	Mode	Targets
Defence	Fend off attacks and/or reduce damage of an attack	Peaceful, physical	Primary: military Secondary: industrial
Deterrence	Prevent adversary from initiating an action	Peaceful	Primary: civilian Secondary: industrial Tertiary: military
Compellence	Get adversary to stop doing something or start doing something	Forceful, physical	Military, civilian, industrial with no clear ranking
Swaggering	Enhance prestige	Peaceful	None

He also argues for the importance of military force in the 5<sup>th</sup> edition of the same book that military forces are an indispensable part of a state's foreign policy, because they can be exercised forcefully as well as peacefully<sup>133</sup>. To summarize, there is seldom any difference among scholars concerning the roles and functions of military forces. In view of all this, the roles and functions of military force are manifestly many and diverse.

<sup>131</sup> Julian Lider, *Military Theory* (Aldershot: Gower Publishing Company Ltd., 1983), p. 25.

<sup>132</sup> Robert J. Art, "The Four Functions of Force," in Robert J. Art & Kenneth N. Waltz (eds.), *The Use of Force: Military Power and International Politics* (Lanham: University Press of America, Inc, 1993, 4<sup>th</sup> ed.), pp. 3-11.

<sup>133</sup> Robert J. Art, "The Fungibility of Force", in Robert J. Art & Kenneth N. Waltz (eds.) *The Use of Force: Military Power and International Politics* (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc, 1999, 5<sup>th</sup> ed.), p. 3.



The 'swaggering' role is, strictly speaking, a little awkward, regardless of whether it refers to the role of military forces in such peacekeeping operations or not, because in most cases the winner or stronger could take the opportunity to enhance its prestige if it was successful. The role of protective structure posited by Lider can be merged into these three categories, because the concept of power is very relative to that of enemy and is related to all the resources of a state. This is expressed in the idea that 'modern war is total war'.

From the above perspectives, the role could be summarized as a means of not only protecting a state's sovereignty including territory and resources from external attacks (defence<sup>134</sup>), but also evolving the foreign policy of a state employed either peacefully (deterrence) or forcefully (compellence). The difference between deterrence and compellence is like that of statics and dynamics. Thomas C. Schelling explains it clearly:

"Deterrence involves setting the stage-by announcement, by rigging the trip-wire, by incurring the obligation-and waiting. The overt action is up to the opponent.... The act that is intrusive, hostile, or provocative is usually the one to be deterred; the deterrent threat only changes the consequences ... Compellence, in contrast, usually involves initiating an action that can cease, or become harmless, only if the opponent responds".<sup>135</sup>

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<sup>134</sup> As Carl von Clausewitz states that defenders can take offensive action, so modern war includes preventive war (to consider an attack against a potential enemy before he establishes a balance of power) and preemptive war (at a stage of crisis or an escalating war, military preparations by one side may be perceived as preparations for a potential attack, thus the other side creates incentives for a preemptive strike). In this context, it is not difficult to conclude that the concept of defence broadly means offensive action as well.

<sup>135</sup> Thomas C. Schelling (1966), pp. 71-72. The similar term 'coercion' is usually employed in diplomacy as a bargaining process, which is based on the power, notably military power, to hurt. Coercion implies the meaning of deterrence as well as compellent intentions (*Ibid.*, pp. 1-6, and 71.). According to Lawrence Freedman's study, the distinguishing feature of coercion is that "the target is never denied choice, but must weigh the choices between the costs of compliance and of non-compliance". Lawrence Freedman (ed.), *Strategic Coercion: Concepts and Cases* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 36.

The role of military forces in peacetime focuses on keeping the day-to-day tensions between nations below the threshold of armed conflict or war and maintaining a state's influence in foreign countries, whereas that in wartime is to fight by engagements in any form of offence or defence.

## **(2) The Relationship with MOOTW**

If evidence for a new trend in the upgraded role for military forces was found in the peacekeeping operations of the Cold War era by the mandate of the UN to preserve political stability or human rights throughout the world, then this should be added to the role of military forces. Contemporary peace operations apparently cannot be explained by the above traditional roles of military forces in the context of the political-military environment, operational objectives and tasks. These objectives are not victory, in the sense of defeating a defined enemy militarily to achieve a political goal, but the successful implementation of a mandate, usually maintaining the political-military *status quo*.<sup>136</sup> The forces can be employed only in the cases of self-defence, defence of the mission, and deterring a small-scale threat.<sup>137</sup> As such, it is difficult to simply classify this as a particular role of military forces. It will be necessary to examine the relationship between the roles in these kinds of operations and those in the accepted concepts.

It can, in the broadest sense, be included in the above roles of military forces of either coercion or deterrence or defence, however these kinds of operations are, in a narrow

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<sup>136</sup> William J. Durch and J. Matthew Vaccaro, "The Environment and Tasks of Peace Operations", in Antonia Handler Chayes & George T. Raach (eds.), *Peace Operations: Developing an American Strategy* (Washington, DC: NDUP, 1995), pp. 23-24.

<sup>137</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 25.

sense, not easy to classify into those categories. They can be classified, as the US Joint Chiefs of Staff (USJCS) have done, in terms of MOOTW<sup>138</sup>, which in reality includes all types of employment of military forces in peacetime in order to deter potential aggressors, protect national interests, support the UN or other regional organisations, satisfy treaty obligations, support civil authorities, or provide humanitarian assistance (HA) in the forms of peace enforcement, counter-terrorism, some foreign internal defence (FID), enforcement sanctions, support for insurgency and counterinsurgency, evacuation of noncombatants, HA, and the support of counter-drug operations<sup>139</sup>.

The difference between MOOTW and the utilities of forces in peacetime is that the former includes some part of the range of the latter, when operations involve a risk that a large scale of military forces could become involved in combat.<sup>140</sup> Whilst the previous roles of military forces place the focal points on the developmental points of crisis towards a large-scale war, those in MOOTW seem to focus on avoiding war as far as it is possible for a state involved to do, except for a case that is impossible. In other words, when instruments of national power are unable to achieve national objectives or protect national interests any other way, the national leadership may decide to conduct a large-scale war, placing the state in a wartime situation, the declaration of war by the supreme leader of a state may follow. On the other hand, MOOTW focuses on deterring war, resolving conflict, promoting peace, and supporting civil authorities so that it may involve elements of both combat and non-combat operations in peacetime, conflict, and exceptional war situations (i.e., monitoring a cease fire).

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<sup>138</sup> Refer, The US Joint Chiefs of Staff (USJCS), *Joint Pub 3-07: Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War*, June 16, 1995.

<sup>139</sup> *JDE*, pp. 513-516.

<sup>140</sup> *Ibid.*

Herein lies a complex problem in deciding what are the guidelines to distinguish large and small-scale wars. Does a general war use unlimited resources including nuclear weapons? The answer is probably 'No', because the policymakers of states and strategists never imagined simply that kind of a general war as a future war even during the Cold War period, even though they planned and prepared for it. According to a study by the RAND Corporation, the guideline is the level of major regional conflict.<sup>141</sup> In this regard, it is more acceptable that MOOTW is the military activity before the leadership of a state declares the outbreak of war, as the concept established in the post Cold War period, the beginning of the 1990s, which reflects the transitions of international relations and the doctrinal developments<sup>142</sup>.

It is not difficult to conclude from the foregoing accounts that the concept of MOOTW is literally to regulate peacetime military operations in the process of conflicts, which is not directly related to the previous roles of military forces, which is mainly operated by missions assigned by the authorities, such as the supreme leader of a state or Secretary (Minister) of Defence<sup>143</sup>. Hence, the effects of the roles of military forces unintentionally or intentionally emerges in the process of waging operations, as the range of MOOTW includes the role of deterrence.<sup>144</sup> Consequently, the term 'MOOTW' is used for the purpose of defining the difference between wartime and peacetime operations. It is a matter of the level of execution (for example, the roles of military forces can vary, according to the countries or organisations such as the UN, US

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<sup>141</sup> Alan Vick, David T. Orletsky, Abram N. Shulsky, John Stillion, "Preparing the US Air Force for MOOTW", *MR-842-AF*, p. 1. <<http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR842>>, accessed: February 9, 2004.


<sup>142</sup> The US Army FM 100-7 defines that MOOTW is operations in two states of the range of military operations: peacetime and conflict. The Headquarters of the US Army, *FM100-7: Decisive Force: The Army in Theater Operations* (Washington, DC: Department of Army, 1995), p. 8-1.

<sup>143</sup> Refer, the definitions of roles, functions and missions in the above.

<sup>144</sup> *JDE*, p. 513.

or Somalia in the UN-led operation in Somalia from 1992-95<sup>145</sup>), whether the effects of the roles of military forces emerge or not. All in all, the relationship between the roles of military forces and MOOTW can be outlined in Figure 2-2.

**Figure 2-2: The Relationships among the Roles, MOOTW and War<sup>146</sup>**



The basic assumption of the above depiction is the fundamental belief that all countries either neighbouring or with allied relationship have an invisible basic tension with the other countries, because the political, economic and social goals of a country cannot,

<sup>145</sup> It was a humanitarian intervention for the UN and US, but the deployment of forces had the effect of deterring the civil war as well as applying coercion using armed forces, whilst the forces of Somalia fought each other in the form of the civil war. See, Antonia Handler Chayes & George T. Raach (1995), pp. 27-29; George B. N. Ayittey, "The Somalia Crisis: Time for an African Solution", *Policy Analysis* No. 215 (March 28), 1994.

<sup>146</sup> Re-made on the base of the figures of C. R. Mitchell's the Sequence of Conflict Management Techniques, see, *The Structure of International Conflict* (London: MacMillan, 1981), p. 256 and Glen H. Snyder & Paul Diesing's Crisis Phases, see, *Conflict among Nations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977), p. 15.

without coordination in terms of at least negotiation, concession or control, coincide with each other. At this stage, the role of military forces is defence, in the form of a protective structure, which, of course, works throughout all stages including wartime. However, the basic level of tension varies according to the geo-political, economic and strategic location of a country, hence the basic roles of a state's military force apply to the second (deterrent) or third (compellence) at times.

To conclude, military forces have been the basic political instruments for achieving national objectives in the situations of international (very rarely domestic) conflicts since the ancient era. As such, military forces deserve their existence in any country as one of the most important ingredients of national resources for evolving national power abroad as well as protecting national interests from any kind of threat, considering their roles as examined in the studies of former politicians and strategists. However, at a more systematic and sophisticated level, reflecting not only the recently developed field of the air force and the services based on technological developments and innovations (i.e., the Strategic Rocket Forces of the former USSR), but also the subdivided branches in each service, it is natural that all countries redistribute their roles by legal stipulation in the form of the constitution or laws or presidential decrees, reflecting both the theories of military strategists about the distinct roles of each service and the spontaneous roles possessed by each service in the fundamental purposes of its creation. Consequently, it is to be hoped that the next step is to examine the roles of naval forces as defined by the maritime strategists and the legal stipulations of the US, as the leading power possessing the most developed amphibious force on earth, in order to gain fresh light on the subject.

## B. Roles of Naval Forces in the Theories of Maritime Strategists

The notable igniter of maritime theories was A. T. Mahan who is unquestionably widely known all over the world with his studies on naval and international affairs explaining the fact<sup>147</sup> that the keys to national greatness are world trade, expansion, and sea power. In this sense, he recognized the importance of seapower, which included both the military strength afloat and peaceful commerce and shipping, in their roles in the fields of commerce and the strategic lines of sea communications rather than the others, i.e., offensive or defensive operations, or sea blockade.<sup>148</sup> The concept of strategic lines was one great example, because the flexibility of sea routes, in terms of easy and wide unlimited maritime roads, like the use of the sea in modern war, provided both free supplies and an exit route, which were two essentials for the safety of an army on shore (a ground force, in modern terms, an amphibious force) or of a fleet.<sup>149</sup> To summarize, even though he never directly referred to the roles of seapower as a means of national politics, his ideas were able to act in the same context as Clausewitz, giving due consideration to the ultimate goal of seapower, which is national greatness. However, it is unlikely that the focal points of his work about naval warfare strayed very far from Jomini's principles of war<sup>150</sup>.

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<sup>147</sup> The other important point of his findings is concerning the elements of seapower, which affects the seapower of nations by its principal conditions: Geographical Position, Physical Conformation, Extent of Territory, Number of Population, Character of the People, Character of the Government. See, Alfred T. Mahan, *The Influence of Sea Power upon History 1660-1783* (London: Sampson Low, Marston & Co., 5<sup>th</sup> ed.), pp. 28-89. However, these factors have emerged into the modern policy-decision making system, e.g., PPBS (Planning, Programming Budgeting System).

<sup>148</sup> As his work has been criticized, in association with Jomini's ideas by a few strategists, it seems that the mainstream ideas of naval forces roles on the battlefield are discussed in relation for the roles of the army dealing with the influence of seapower at a specific time in history. Allan Westcott (ed.), *Mahan on Naval Warfare: Selections from the Writings of Rear Admiral Alfred T. Mahan* (Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, 1999), pp. 49-99.

<sup>149</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 75-78.

<sup>150</sup> Even though Jomini dealt more with the practical aspects of war than did Clausewitz, it is true that he also recognized, as did Clausewitz, the importance of political objectives in wars between nations. Brig.

A truly great maritime strategist who applied his principles to the nature of war reflecting Clausewitzian theory was Sir Julian Corbett, who elaborated on the limited warfare idea and the relationship of strategy to broad political policy. Yet, he inherently assented and expressed the principles of maritime warfare in almost the same ways as Mahan such as the basic concept of “the command of sea”, the importance of “lines of communications” for either commercial or military purposes, the concentration and forms of blockade, but they disagreed at some points, e.g., Mahan’s tendency to elevate concentration<sup>151</sup>. By contrast, his greatness in the development of maritime strategy was that he explored the nature of maritime warfare in a limited war waged under limited political objectives. In this sense, he made the distinction between major and minor objects to be pursued in a war; thus he depicted naval strategy as only a sub-division of a division of strategy.<sup>152</sup> In the light of this fact, even though he did not directly outline the roles of naval forces in peacetime, he did give a clue to development of the systematical roles of naval forces.

Despite these kinds of theoretical developments, the first and second World Wars remained the classical models of the use of force to intrude upon the conduct of hostilities. Nevertheless, the naval operational concepts of the German and Italian navies in the Atlantic and Mediterranean theatres were completely different from the main objective of naval warfare, which was “to secure the command of the sea or to prevent the enemy from securing it”. They concentrated on a single task: severing Allied

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Gen. J. D. Hittle, “Jomini and his Summary of the Art of War”, in *Roots of Strategy Book 2: 3 Military Classics* (Mechanicsburg, PA, 1987), pp. 359-431. In these regards, it is not too much to say that most strategists have implicitly or explicitly taken military forces for granted as an ingredient of achieving the national political objectives abroad.

<sup>151</sup> Eric J. Grove, “Introduction” for Julian S. Corbett: *Some Principles of Maritime Strategy*, in John B. Hattendorf and Wayne P. Hughes (Series eds.), *Classics of Sea Power* (Annapolis, ML: the United States Naval Institute, 1988), p. xi-xiv.

<sup>152</sup> *Ibid.*, p. xix.



lines of communication, instead of attempting to pursue the model of fleet battle,<sup>153</sup> using particularly U-boats. Owing to this kind of use of naval force, the few maritime strategists who are engaged in studying naval issues began to re-examine the subject by classifying the peacetime roles of naval forces to obtain national political objectives as well as distinguishing the wartime roles of naval forces. It seems that much of this work began to appear only in the 1970s after not only careful consideration of the effect of nuclear weapons on international politics, but also by observing the fact that the roles of Great Power navies had been shifting to political missions as a means of deterring or compelling the other states' actions.

A good example of this was the work done by Edward N. Luttwak, who emphasized the political use of the navy. He based his approach on an analysis of the role of the US Sixth Fleet in a major international incident such as the 1972 expulsion/ withdrawal of Soviet forces from Egypt on the theory of suasion, which was akin to the fractionisation of the peacetime use of military forces in terms of the effects of military forces employment and progressive levels of conflict. However, his explanation provided a more delicate mechanism, because as seen in Figure 2-3, he analyzed laterally on the bases of the effects according to the countries involved, e.g., the effects of armed suasion on the reactions of the USSR, Turkey, and Israel, rather than all levels of intensity.


In analyzing this point, he highlighted that the navy's ability to threaten, support, and use force has several implications for the countries involved through the intermittent

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<sup>153</sup> John B. Hattendorf, "Recent Thinking on the Theory of Naval Strategy", in John B. Hattendorf & Robert S. Jordan (eds.), *Maritime Strategy and the Balance of Power* (Basingstoke: MacMillan, 1989), pp. 136-137.

manifestation of the US political will with respect to its possible use.<sup>154</sup> His contribution to the development of naval strategy was that the focus of his work was the exploitation of potential force like the Clausewitzian ideas on the relationship between military affairs and politics, not the actual application of naval forces as it had been for Mahan, and Corbett<sup>155</sup>.

**Figure 2-3: The Political Application of Naval Power**



Source: Edward N. Luttwak, *The Political Uses of Sea Power* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974), p. 7.

This line of thinking was developed further by many academics, and dealt with in practical disputes about the uses of a navy. Among many others at various levels, Ken

<sup>154</sup> Edward N. Luttwak, *The Political Uses of Sea Power* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974), pp. 1-7.

<sup>155</sup> John B. Hattendorf (1989), p. 141.

Booth is the most prominent in his work, *Navies and Foreign Policy*,<sup>156</sup> is the most fundamental statement about the political use of a navy as a means for evolving foreign policy. He argues that the navy exists “as part of a state’s general maritime policy, whose objective is to attempt to use the sea for one’s own purpose, while being in a position to attempt to prevent others from using it”.<sup>157</sup> He lists three levels of roles in a trinity, namely the policing, diplomatic and military roles. Here, the military role, balance of power functions and projection of force functions, support the other two additional roles as the base of the trinity. However, if considered in the light of the above general military thinking, it seems that the policing role, coastguard responsibilities and nation-building functions, is purely related to domestic issues, because the navy is, as he argued, a means of extending sovereignty, defending offshore resources, and contributing to internal stability. Thus, this role might be the fundamental *raison d’être* of why a state builds it up. The other two roles are, in strict meaning, additional employments of the navy generated by possessing it. The next role, the military one<sup>158</sup> (strategic nuclear deterrence, conventional deterrence and defence, and extended deterrence and defence) is dealt with in the aspects of the defence and deterrence roles of the general armed forces. Lastly, with the diplomatic role, the navy can provide the force to change the political calculations of other nations as well as promote prestige, which would be explained by the compellence roles or coercion, when it is purely employed for diplomatic purposes in the context of latent or active means.

To summarize, the roles of naval forces seen in the above varying situations have

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<sup>156</sup> Ken Booth, *Navies and Foreign Policy* (London: Croom Helm Ltd, 1977).

<sup>157</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 15.

<sup>158</sup> It can be inferred that the meaning of military and diplomatic roles includes the role of compellence as well, see *ibid.*, pp. 235-265.

expanded into some new dimensions, as did those of the general armed forces in the post World War era, from a means of naval warfare and for using the sea effectively as a means of evolving a nation's foreign policy, and have emphasized some traditional usages with the form of either MOOTW or War. In the long run, naval forces are an ingredient of the broad spectrum of warfare and a specialized means for political purposes, and strictly diplomatic purpose. In reality, the maritime strategist, Geoffrey Till divides the spectrum of naval tasks into three categories: good order at sea, naval diplomacy, and war fighting (see Table 2-2)<sup>159</sup>. It is, however, true that the demarcation among spectrums is, as he admitted, very ambiguous.

**Table 2-2: The Spectrum of Naval Tasks**

Classifications	Tasks	Intensity	Frequency
		High	Low
War Fighting	Against Relatively Major Opposition Against Relatively Minor Opposition		
Naval Diplomacy	Coercive Alliance Building International Maritime Assistance		
Good Order at Sea			
		Low	High

Source: Geoffrey Till (ed.), *Seapower: Theory and Practice* (Essex: Frank Cass, 1994), p. 180.

After all, an appropriate way to explain the roles and functions of a navy, considering the enlargement of the spectrum of the use of force, is to classify it with a time partition of peacetime and wartime, which can be condensed into Table 2-3 on the basis of the modern maritime strategist's theories. Of course, according to the maritime strategists, their classifications of the spectrums about roles and functions do not coincide with

<sup>159</sup> Geoffrey Till, "Maritime Strategy and the Twenty-First Century", in Geoffrey Till (ed.), *Seapower: Theory and Practice* (Essex: Frank Cass & Co. Ltd., 1994), pp. 179-197.

each other.

However, not all navies carry out all these roles and functions. The roles and functions of a state's navy are inevitably connected with its strength, geo-strategic position, interests and strategy, and the navy's missions may be determined by the military or political commander of a state on consideration of these factors. For this reason, each navy has a different mission, although its basic roles and functions are generally similar.

**Table 2-3: The Roles and Functions of Navy<sup>160</sup>**

Classifications	Roles		Functions	Remarks
Wartime	Waging War		Contiguous Sea /Coastal Defence SLOC Defence and Interdiction Blockade Sea Control (and Denial) Projection of Force	
Peacetime	International	Defence Deterrence Compellence Coercion	All Above Functions Naval Presence (Forward Deterrence & Defence) Gunboat Diplomacy (Showing the Flag) Strategic Deterrence	MOOTW
	Domestic (Policing Role)		Sovereignty Protection of the Offshore Estate Maintenance of good order Contribute to internal stability Contribute to internal development	

\* SLOC: Sea Lines of Communication

<sup>160</sup> Eric Grove (1990), pp. 232-236; Geoffrey Till, *Modern Sea Power* (Oxford: Brassey's Defence Publishers, 1987), pp. 1-9, 91-172, *Maritime Strategy and the Nuclear Age* (Basingstoke: MacMillan Academic and Professional Ltd, 1990, reprinted), pp. 181-225; John B. Hattendorf (1989), pp. 149-158; Ken Booth (1977), pp. 15-25.

## **C. Roles, Functions, and Legal Stipulation of the US**

### **(1) Roles and Functions of Amphibious Forces**

In having a peacetime political role, in addition to its combat capabilities, the roles and functions of amphibious forces are not dissimilar to those of all other forms of military power. The familiar attributes of an amphibious force-its performative capability of amphibious landing operations in conjunction with the attributes of the navy, such as mobility, flexibility, and wide geographic reach, *etc.* - render it peculiarly useful as an instrument of policy even in the absence of hostilities. Traditionally, an amphibious force was developed for the purpose of performing amphibious landing operations by overcoming the gap of natural water obstacles, seas, rivers, lakes, *etc.*, but it has enlarged its roles and functions into all realms of the general purposes of military forces in some countries, particularly in the US.

The fundamental question to be raised here is 'how many roles and functions can an amphibious force perform among the navy's or in a joint operation<sup>161</sup>?' Is the answer only a projection of force on shore? Or, is it all of them? The answer may depend on 'what kinds of missions will be allocated to the amphibious force from the supreme military and political leader of a state to a specific scene in either peacetime or wartime', as inferred in the definitions of the roles, functions, and missions. If USMC held or kept nuclear weapons in an advanced base in 27 countries worldwide deployed by the US<sup>162</sup>,

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<sup>161</sup> Today's military operations are not performed just by a single service or branch, because both the uncertainties and risks in battlefield situations, and the changing characteristics of the international security environment demand a cooperative operation involving most of the available resources in the form of a joint operation or allied operation.

<sup>162</sup> The US secretly deployed (because in most cases they were deployed without informing the state involved) thousands of nuclear weapons surrounding the USSR and potential adversaries with priority given to the forward bases of the US Forces, see *New York Times*, October 21, 1999.

why have no military strategists or political commentators discussed the strategic deterrence role for amphibious forces up to the present time? And in that case, might it be considered as one of its roles? The answer may be 'No', not only because this issue has rarely been dealt with in the academic community, but also because it has so far not been unveiled to the public. Consequently, with the transitions of both the war and political environments, it is necessary to have an inclusive approach in order to explain them in terms of the use of armed forces in peacetime for the following reasons.

The first is that for the wartime roles and functions, amphibious forces significantly contributed to the victory of the Western allies in the Cold War<sup>163</sup>. During the Cold War, it was true that nuclear weapons changed the nature, character, and purpose of war; thus a World War III did not occur, although it might be true that amphibious forces, in combination with naval power, might have enhanced deterrence or compellence. From this perspective, they cannot remain only in the realm of the projection of force. Next, in its domestic role, there is, as Lieut. Col. Southby-Tailyour argued, a point ought not to be overlooked, that amphibious forces, a branch of the navy, are a maritime counterbalance to political ambitions in the case of an attempted *coup d'état* by politically ambitious army leaders - or of course *vice versa*.<sup>164</sup> This may be impossible

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<sup>163</sup> Refer, Colin S. Gray, *The Leverage of Sea Power* (New York: The Free Press, 1992), pp. 265-277. Here, he argues, "the Western seapower would perform its classic missions... to work for strategic advantage as well as should have enabled its political owners to succeed in a more or less protracted struggle against a wholly continental enemy in a World War III in which nuclear weapons were not used extensively ... could have functioned as a vital enabling agent for Western victory," pp.275-276.

<sup>164</sup> *JASF-ISSUE 10*, p. [36]. In fact, it is difficult to find an example that an army *coup d'état* has been prevented by an amphibious force. However, I agree with this argument, because there was a similar case in South Korea. In 1961, when South Korea's domestic situation was seriously unstable, there was the 516 Military Revolution on May 16, led by the Army Major General Park. A Marine brigade participated in this revolution, and performed some most critical operations such as a breakthrough of the governmental forces' Han River blockade, which was possible due to a different operational command authority system compared with the Army. If the government had controlled the Marines or employed them as a counterforce against the revolutionary force, it might not have succeeded, because most army troops planning to participate were not able to operate on schedule.

in the developed nations, but it might have warranted an adequate use of amphibious forces in certain situations. So, it is possible that this idea could be used to undertake the various domestic policing of naval forces as posited by Ken Booth.

## (2) Legal and Directive Stipulations of the USMC

Nowadays, in possessing the most developed amphibious force in the world, the policy of the US toward the MC is a very appropriate example of knowing about its development and operations, and which direction it will take. USMC is under the protection of the law, the Douglas-Mansfield Act of 1952 (Public Law 416, 1<sup>st</sup> Session of 82<sup>nd</sup> Congress) regulating its force structure. However, it appears that this legal protection reflects the uncertain roles and functions of USMC which duplicate those of Army ground forces. Concerning the historical disputes in the US, the *raison d'être* of USMC was enlarged from providing internal security aboard ships, to providing a means to meet the most likely threats to US national security along with the enlargement of the US role in the international political topography (refer Table 2-4).

**Table 2-4: Transitions of the *Raison D'être* of USMC**

Classifications	Time	<i>Raison D'être</i>	Remarks
Phase 1	After the American Revolution	Main: Ships Guards and Security Duties Ashore Secondary: to Provide Infantry for Ship Battles or Landing Operations	Limited (President Order/ Congress)
Phase 2	1899-1941 (Military Intervention)	Main: Capture of Advanced Bases by Amphibious Assault as an Expeditionary Force Secondary: Ships Guards and Forward Naval Bases Protection * Increased its reputation for "Peacetime" Utility	Regular
	1942-1945 (WWII)	Main: Amphibious Landing Operations in the European theatre and the Asia-Pacific region	
Phase 3	After WWII	Main: Force in Readiness to Respond to International Crises Fundamental: Amphibious Assault	Enlarged

Main Source: Allan R. Millett, *Semper Fidelis: The History of the United Marine Corps* (New York: MacMillan Publishing Co., Inc, 1980), pp. xv-xvii.



As USMC Gen. James L. Jones has said, “USMC is the nation’s premier expeditionary force, the contribution to the ascendancy of the US as a superpower during the 20<sup>th</sup> century is our history, our legacy and our future”<sup>165</sup>, and it is certain that USMC remains organized, equipped, trained, and deployed mainly to conduct attacks from the sea. This is the lasting characteristic of an amphibious force: and is at the same time the *raison d’être* in every country who possesses it. In this sense, it seems that the roles of deterrence, compellence, and coercion are manifestly abstractions derived from its advanced presence or deployment and possession having the characteristics of general armed forces like the other services; thus these are unable to be the *raison d’être* of an amphibious force.

As a result, the functions, not roles, of USMC were promulgated by the US Department of Defense (US DoD), which regulates the functions of the DoD and its major components in the form of a Directive on August 1, 2002<sup>166</sup>, canceling the previous one of September 25, 1987. The functions of USMC are shown in Table 2-5, but most of them are promulgated together with those of naval forces due to the inherent character of the amphibious force. From Table 2-5, the following facts can be extracted as a rule.

Firstly, USMC contributes to the conducting of traditional functions of naval forces by providing its forces.

Secondly, USMC has the general responsibility for conducting amphibious operations or to provide essential factors such as doctrine, training, and equipment for the other services for joint amphibious operations.

Lastly, as a regular force having the general capability of an armed force, USMC should support or perform or provide its forces for any kind of military operations on order (as directed).

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<sup>165</sup> The Headquarters of USMC, *United States Marine Corps Concepts & Issues 2000* (Washington, DC, 2000), p. vi (CMC Introduction).

<sup>166</sup> The US DoD, *DoD Directive*, No. 5100.1, August 1, 2002.

**Table 2-5: The Functions of USMC**

Classifications	Functions	Remarks
Primary (Navy and/or Marine Corps)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Destroy enemy naval forces</li><li>• Suppress enemy sea commerce</li><li>• Gain and maintain general naval supremacy</li><li>• Control vital sea areas</li><li>• Protect vital sea lines of communication</li><li>• Establish and maintain local superiority</li><li>• Seize and defend advanced naval bases</li><li>• Conduct the above land, air, and space operations</li></ul>	Marine Corps: Provide Fleet Marine Forces, Detachment, Organisations
Further (Marine Corps shall)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Develop Doctrines, Tactics, Techniques, Equipment</li><li>• Train and Equip Forces for Airborne Operations</li><li>• Develop Doctrine, Procedures, and Equipment for Airborne Operations</li><li>• To Organize, Equip and Provide Naval Forces</li><li>• Responsible for the Amphibious Training of all forces, and so on.</li></ul>	For Joint Amphibious Operations
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• To Organize, Equip, and Provide Forces for Strategic Nuclear Warfare to Support Strategic Deterrence</li><li>• Provide the Afloat Force for Strategic Sealift</li><li>• Provide Forces to Operate Sea Lines of Communication</li><li>• Provide Forces for the Support and Conduct of Psychological/ Special/ Space Operations and so on.</li></ul>	For the Other Operations
Collateral (Navy and Marine Corps)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• To Interdict Enemy Power</li><li>• To Conduct Close Air and Naval Support for Land Operations</li><li>• To Establish Military Government and so on.</li></ul>	

Source: *The US DoD Directive*, No. 5100.1 (August 1, 2002), pp. 19-23.

To put it simply, the ultimate goal of the existence of USMC is to conduct amphibious landing operations, and it is appropriately structured to meet the most likely threats to US national security. It shows that USMC is not a single purpose force, but it has

developed into a multiple-purpose force under the protection of law enlarging its functions according to the transitions in the world security environment.

#### **4. Roles, Functions and Independent Variables**


It is not difficult to conclude from the foregoing accounts that, as navies have done, so the functions of amphibious forces vary according to the individual country, but the roles are almost the same in the aspects of having the characteristics of military forces, although the distinctive quality of the roles varies according to size, armaments and capabilities. How many roles and functions amphibious forces have or will fulfill depends on how well they are organised for amphibious operations, because the capability to perform the other additional tasks comes from this. As such, a country, which has great interests in conjunction with the sea or a specific area, usually possesses and deploys a relatively larger amphibious force for the purpose of defending its interests against a potential or manifest enemy.

##### **A. Interests, Policies, Strategies and Decision Making System**

In the broadest sense, a superpower should show a tendency to deploy its force outside of its homeland in order to protect its critical interests from an adversary, not only because the effectiveness of force is in inverse proportion to the distance from its source (in other words, it is the very important prior acquisitive precaution to gain supremacy at the initial stage of the war in terms of operational art), but also because it is a signal to reassure and strengthen one's allies. Michael C. Desch well explained this relationship in comparison with that of an ordinary state, which could use only its limited internal resources to defend itself or pursue other ends. In stark contrast, "a great

power can”, as he observed, “increase its military strength by utilizing the resources of intrinsically valuable areas outside of its homeland”<sup>167</sup> (refer Figure 2-4).

**Figure 2-4: The Operational Concept of Resources**



Source: Michael C. Desch, "The Keys that Lock Up the World", *International Security*, Vol. 14, Issue 1 (Summer 1989), p. 98.

Here, he classified Northeast Asia as an intrinsically important area, which had to be incorporated into US grand strategy in the post war period,<sup>168</sup> and beyond. It has also become increasingly vulnerable, because the divided two Koreas were aligned with at least one superpower, which meant that this implied the importance of a relationship with an ally in the utilisation of military forces. Even if the two superpowers, the US and USSR, never actually went to war in the North-West Pacific during the Cold War, nevertheless the forces im(ex)plicitly provided each side with a considerable deterrent

<sup>167</sup> Michael C. Desch, "The Keys that Lock Up the World: Identifying American Interests in the Periphery", *International Security*, Vol. 14, Issue 1 (Summer 1989), 97.

<sup>168</sup> *Ibid.*, pp.110-111.

or compelling leverage against each other in situations short of war.

From the above perspectives, the roles, functions, and missions of the two amphibious forces<sup>169</sup> that will be discussed here are determined by the grand strategy to obtain the goals of the national policy of each country taking responsibility for a part of the total resources. The concern of the war planners and policymakers is how to organize all the available resources to achieve the national aims as well as to maximize their country's benefits. In order to do that, considering the degree of national interest, they may deploy or possess the necessary forces to a greater or lesser extent. For example, the movement of US strategic thinking because of the geopolitical and strategic situations in the Cold War era focused on the direction of weaving the roles and functions of related forces into a coherent concept, e.g., Joint Operations, for using early, forceful, global, forward deployment of conventional power, both to deter war with the Soviet Union, and to achieve the US war aims just in case deterrence failed. The size, armaments and capabilities of amphibious forces are determined by the operational demands in the hierarchy of the national strategic direction (NSD, refer Figure 2-5: the US NSD).


As seen in the figure, all strategies and plans are systematically related to each other; moreover they closely influence the other strategies and plans. However, whatever the national strategic directions of a given state, policy makers or relevant organisations must resolve conflict within the state to create appropriate decisions within the range of the embodiment of national interests and values. One of these organizations is the US

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<sup>169</sup> Clark G. Reynolds observed that different type of nations-continental powers, maritime-islands nations, and small coastal states - had different uses for navies. Amphibious forces, a branch of navy, of the two countries represent three different uses of them, refer, Clark G. Reynolds, *Command of the Sea: The History and Strategy of Maritime Empires* (New York: William Morrow & Co., 1974), pp. 12-16.

Department of State (DoS) or the ministry of foreign affairs, which decide the foreign policy objectives based on the national interests in different regions and other states considering the transitions of the international system. These foreign policy objectives are a means of achieving national security, and are at the same time the ends of waging the theater strategy. This is a complicated intertwining of an ends-means net in terms of Keith R. Legg and James F. Morrison<sup>170</sup>.

**Figure 2-5: The US National Strategic Direction**




Source: Re-made on the Basis of the National Strategic Direction in USJCS, *Joint Publication 3-0: Doctrine for Joint Operations*, September 10, 2001, p. I-5.

In line with this net, the relationship between the strategic goals and the foreign policy objectives along with the transitions of domestic decision-making and international

<sup>170</sup> Keith R. Legg & James F. Morrison, "The Formulation of Foreign Policy Objectives", in James Barber & Michael Smith (eds.), *The Nature of Foreign Policy: A Reader* (Edinburgh: Holmes McDougall, 1974), p. 196.

political systems has changed pluralistically and multilaterally. With the development of modern governmental organisations, it is likely that the two defence and foreign affairs administrations are located at the same level; thus the structure to control and adjust the differences between them is the National Security Council (NSC) or a similar security decision-making organisation, which depends on the relevant state's political culture, directed by the supreme ruler of a state (see Figure 2-6).

**Figure 2-6: Political-Military Strategic Decision System**



Sources: Remade on the bases both 'Three Sector Model of Strategic Analysis' in David Jennings, "Strategic Decision Making", in David Jennings & Stuart Wattam (eds.), *Decision Making: An Integrated Approach* (London: Pitman Publishing, 1994), p. 217, and 'Decision Cycle' in *JDE*, p. 222.

This model is applicable to all governments; sometimes the names of the structures are different like the *Politburo* of the USSR. This decision model is based upon the Observation, Reflection, Decision, Action cycle, which operates in all kinds of structure,

even in the HQs of USMC or the lower subordinate structures. Even so, it is never intended to deny the logic of the Clausewitzian school that armed force is a means of evolving foreign policy.

### **B. Which factors should be Compared and Analysed?**

In the long run, the modern roles and functions of amphibious forces are fundamentally derived from the capabilities of amphibious landing operations. On this basis, amphibious forces can perform any kind of mission, as directed by the supreme ruler of the state in the situation of a war or MOOTW. As such, the modern character of amphibious forces can be defined as a naval ground force prepared, organised, and equipped to perform amphibious landing operations when they are needed within a specific geographical environment, but it can also role-play and function like the general ground force of an army as the USMC did during the 2003 War with Iraq for example.

From Figure 2-6, the independent variables affecting the construction of amphibious force can be extracted, which are the national goals and interests (or regarding the Asia-Pacific region in the cases of the US and USSR/Russia), the national defence strategy/policy, and maritime strategy/policy. By analysing and comparing these variables, the basic causes of the differences between the construction of amphibious forces in the relevant nations will be explained.

In addition to this, over the last decades of the second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century in particular, there were many attempts to examine which factors determine the size of military forces in a state, such as that by the Stockholm International Peace Research



Institute (SIPRI) which employed the absolute figures of each country's military spending to assess transitions in the level of military preparations. One remarkable study is James L. Payne's work, which elaborates the benchmark for military forces construction by comparing the size of individual countries' military forces.<sup>171</sup> He explores many specific conditions at five levels, namely the effect of wealth, geographical influences, foreign military involvement, domestic uses, and cultural & ideological influences, which affect a nation's level of military preparation.

From the standpoint of seapower, the modern maritime analyst, Sam J. Tangredi<sup>172</sup>, lists six characteristics: economic strength, technological prowess, socio-political culture, geographical position, dependence on maritime trade and sea resources, and government policy updating Mahan's list.<sup>173</sup> These specific conditions are, to some extent, interlocking and supportive. Consequently, to provide an appropriate explanation for the transitions of amphibious forces, it is necessary to identify the latent factors influencing the establishment of national interests, values and policies from Figure 2-6: Political-Military Strategic Decision System.

Unlike the other branches of the navy, the economic strength of a nation is not a significant factor in the build-up of amphibious forces, as is seen in the cases of the USMC and SNI after WWII. One of the plausible excuses made by those who were opposed to amphibious forces, as seen in the defence unification of 1944-1947 in the

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<sup>171</sup> James L. Payne, *Why Nations Arm* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell Ltd, 1989), pp. 14-15, 37-168.

<sup>172</sup> Sam J. Tangredi, "Sea Power: Theory and Practice", in John Baylis, et al. (eds.), *Strategy in the Contemporary World* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 119.

<sup>173</sup> Regarding Mahan's list, refer footnote 67 in the Chapter II. Eric Grove also listed these six factors, but he divided them into two parts: first (1. Economic Strength, 2. Technological Prowess, 3. Socio-Political Culture) and second order (4. Geographical Position, 5. Sea Dependence, 6. Governmental Policy and Perception). Eric Grove (1990), p. 231.

US, was to save on the defence budget and promote its effectiveness.<sup>174</sup> They suggested that the USMC's primary mission, amphibious warfare, was neither a required nor a viable military capability. However, the main reasons for the survival of the USMC were the possibility of it being employed in future conflicts in terms of roles and functions. This decision was finally arrived at by the President with the support of members of the Senate and the assistance of Congress.

In stark contrast, in the immediate postwar years, Soviet military debates focused on exaggerating the role and significance of Stalin's leadership and his pronouncements in the sphere of military affairs because of the socio-political culture of the Soviet Union. In this situation, despite the fact that the real problems of military science were studied very little or ignored altogether<sup>175</sup>, discussions on the influence of the nuclear weapons used by the Americans in the last stage of WWII were at that time initiated by the military strategists and commentators.<sup>176</sup> The priority of military forces construction focused on improving their capability to be employed in a nuclear war, thus the building of fleets and amphibious forces practically ceased, since their military value in a future nuclear war was regarded as useless or obsolete. Furthermore, the new maritime security environment in Northeast Asia formed with the end of WWII, limited coastline

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<sup>174</sup> On that occasion, Army Chief of Staff, General George C. Marshall submitted the defence unification proposal to solve the inequality of the budget process, because the US Army needed to budget for the build up for mobilization. With this submission, the struggle to take a superior position in the allocation of the US defence budget took place among the services, for example, the Army against the Navy, the Army against the Marines, and even the Navy against the Marines. Lt. Gen. Victor Krulak explained the struggle: "In time of peace the armed service competes for dollars, whilst in time of war they compete for military tasks and material priority". See, Victor H. Krulak, Oral History Transcript (Washington DC: Historical Division of the USMC, 1973), pp. 113-114; James P. O'Donnell, "The Struggle for Survival", *CSC 1985*, <<http://globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1985/OJP.htm>>, accessed: April 19, 2004.

<sup>175</sup> Harriet Fast. Scott and William F. Scott, *Soviet Military Doctrine: Continuity, Formulation, and Dissemination* (Boulder, CO: Westview press, 1988), p. 19.

<sup>176</sup> S.G. Gorshkov, *The Sea Power of the State* (New York: Pergamon Press, 1979), p. 156.

and advanced bases<sup>177</sup>, really restricted any movement towards a recovery of the will to build up the Soviet navy. It made it necessary for the USSR to revise maritime strategy and tactics, which not infrequently brought about radical transformation of its naval forces, as well as altering many technical means of waging war.

Is it possible to think that there is the influence of a political system, or a Socio-Political Culture, on the above outcomes? It is undeniable that there was certain help given to the USMC from it in the process of 'Military Unification 1944-47'. However, if there were no demands in terms of the roles and functions of the USMC on the whole US national strategic direction system, the USMC would have found it difficult to survive in that process. In contrast, if there were certain roles or functions for the SNI, it might not be absorbed into the Coastal Defence Unit, for example. Similarly, as Eric Grove has explained, "Certain social and political systems are better at adapting to technological change than others". It seems a little inconvenient to conclude that there is no relationship between economic strength, technological prowess and socio-political culture. However, not only looking at amphibious forces, whose manoeuvre capability is from the sea to the enemy shore, the main technological factor demanding the economic strength of a nation, mainly centers on the navy, but also considering the national political-military strategic decision system, it is deniable that the three factors, the economical strength, technological prowess, and socio-political culture are

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<sup>177</sup> Most maritime strategists have highlighted the importance of the magnitude of any element of naval power. Among the first of these is, however, probably advanced bases, particularly for the superpowers, because a modern fleet is capable of self-sustained strategic activity only to the extent that it can carry the necessities of that activity such as fuel, ammunition and food, in its own bottoms. Therefore, it has become a criterion of naval fabric, roles and functions regardless of peacetime or wartime. For the importance of it, refer the Headquarters of USMC, *FMFRP 12-45: Naval Bases: Location, Resources, Denial, and Security* (Washington, DC: 1992), pp. 1-7.

independent variables.<sup>178</sup>

Above all, from the foregoing examples and accounts, it is, of course, difficult to see that the above assumption can apply to the construction of all amphibious forces throughout the world. However, considering the two cases and the time spectrum of this thesis, the basic accounts of the international and regional security environment, and the transitions of maritime dominion<sup>179</sup> should be essential prerequisites prior to a discussion of the main independent variables as a background. As such, these are first reckoned as being the general factors, and the time spectrum is also divided into three phases reflecting the changes in the independent variables. As a result, this thesis will be analysed by a total of six factors including the three factors derived from the US national strategic direction.

In order to analyse the peculiarities of amphibious capabilities, it is essential to compare their composition in relation to the characteristics of ground forces as well as their roles and functions, but the more important factor is the naval sealift capability. This is because an amphibious landing operation itself is impossible without movement to the enemy shore. In addition, in order to answer the fourth question of how the USMC tries to overcome the difficulty of amphibious landing operations in terms of doctrinal

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<sup>178</sup> As Eric Grove illustrated, it meant a nation's inhibitions to invest in a navy because of socio-cultural factors as with Japan, which has the basic guidelines for national defence, or in similar countries. The demands of the national political-military strategic decision system can cover this and stand prior to the three factors. See, Eric Grove (1990), p. 230-231.

<sup>179</sup> In geographical terms, Soviet-American security relations were seen in terms of "landpower versus seapower". If geo-strategic circumstances permit, the Soviet/Russians, as Colin S. Gray has argued, have a strong will to construct its maritime power in order to offset the achievement of any superior maritime power. Consequently, the fundamental condition for maritime power build-up depends on geographical sanctions such as a hinterland for a naval base to deny the others hegemony or access to relevant oceans, and legal approval for the right of free navigation in any ocean and coastwise. Refer, Colin S. Gray, *Maritime Strategy, Geopolitics, and the Defense of the West* (New York: Ramapo Press, 1986), pp. 7-10.

development, this can be done by examining doctrine reflecting the transitions of the above independent variables rather than discussing the two superpowers' general amphibious landing operational doctrines. The most important thing in the amphibious landing operation in terms of doctrine is the sequence of events or activities that consists of 5 phases: planning, embarkation, rehearsal, movement to the objective, and finally assault and capture of the objective as USFM 31-11 (Doctrine for Amphibious Operations) described. In reality, these 5 phases are used in most countries even though each phase's name is a little bit different<sup>180</sup>. Consequently, my discussion will focus on the emerging doctrine in the USMC during the nuclear era.

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<sup>180</sup> For example, the Soviet amphibious landing operation consisted of 3 phases: embarkation, the sea passage, preparation and landing phases. However, in order to execute an operation, it is necessary to plan how to execute it. In this sense, the Soviet doctrine naturally included the planning phase. To do rehearsal depends on available time for the execution. In the case of the SNI, the objectives were located relatively short distances from the home base compared with that of the US. Thus, it could be inferred that the SNI doctrine combined the rehearsal phase together with landing phase. For the Soviet amphibious landing operation phases, Geoffrey Till, *Modern Sea Power* (London: Brassey's Defence Publishers, 1987), pp. 125-127.

# Chapter III. Until the End of the Vietnam War<sup>181</sup>

## 1. General Factors

### A. International Security Environment

The showdown between the US and USSR had been firmly in place by the end of the 1950s. Soviet territorial expansion had begun during the Second World War and ended with the occupation of nine Eastern European countries (an area about 39,000 square miles and a population of over 90 million non-Russian inhabitants)<sup>182</sup>. In order to prevent the Western European territories and their political system from becoming part of the Soviet satellites and their communization, the Western European countries including the US and Canada created NATO on April 4, 1949 in Washington, DC. The counterpart of NATO was the WTO, a multilateral military alliance of Eastern Europe as a 'Treaty of Friendship, Mutual Assistance and Co-operation', which was ratified in Warsaw on May 14, 1955. As such, Europe became the most critically disputed area where the interests of the two organisations represented by the powers of the US and USSR potentially came into collision. In contrast, the composition of such a confrontation in the Pacific region was, as previously stated, formed on the basis of many bilateral or mutual defence treaties rather than multilateral ones among the states on either side reflecting the changes in the security environment with the

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<sup>181</sup> In 1973, the US admitted defeat in Vietnam via the Paris agreement between the US, the South and North Vietnamese Governments and the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam. Here, they agreed to withdraw all foreign troops and the dismantling of foreign bases within sixty days. As a result, the last US troops withdrew from Vietnam on March 29, 1973. After that, the North Vietnamese occupied Saigon (renamed Ho Chi Minh City) on April 30, 1975.

<sup>182</sup> NATO, *NATO Facts and Figures* (Brussels: NATO Information Service, 1969), pp. 15-16.

communization of mainland China as well as the outcome of the Korean War.

From the very first of the above confrontations, Europe was provided with shelter under the US nuclear umbrella by Article 5 of the NATO treaty, a commitment which lasted beyond the end of the Cold War. However, with the creation of the Soviet Strategic Nuclear Forces, it came to be recognized not only as a deterrent to NATO first use of nuclear weapons, but also to weaken conventional deterrence in Europe.<sup>183</sup> Meanwhile, the Cuban missile crisis in 1962 led to the negotiation of arms control measures between the two superpowers to avoid a nuclear catastrophe. The fruits of these endeavours were the establishment of a 'hot line' reflecting the lessons of the Cuban missile crises, and some arms control agreements such as the Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT) of 1963, the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America of 1967<sup>184</sup>, the Non-Proliferation Treaty of nuclear weapons (NPT) of 1968 and onward, and the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) and Strategic Arms Limitation Talk of 1972, and the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) in 1974. Although their real effects were doubtful<sup>185</sup>, it was not surprising that the major world powers including, of course, the medium powers among most of the developed countries worldwide, whether spontaneously or not, signed up to those treaties, even taking ample time to join. However, it was certain that in this *détente* period the major powers did not want to go to nuclear war regardless of what their real war plans were.

With the threat of a Soviet military invasion, the anti-Communist countries were afraid

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<sup>183</sup> Stephen J. Cimbala, *NATO Strategy and Nuclear Escalation* (London: Pinter Publishers, 1989), p. 75.

<sup>184</sup> In the aftermath of this treaty, the Latin America Denuclearization Treaty followed, which was the first regional denuclearization effort by a group of regional powers.

<sup>185</sup> Refer, Michael Sheehan, *Arms Control: Theory and Practice* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell Ltd, 1988), pp. 22-40 (Chapter 2).

they would lose their territories and sovereignties, and that the Communists would gain power through a combination of elections, subversion, and unrest. This tension slowly began to shift towards the Third World, where radical change was welcomed and encouraged by the USSR on the basis of strong military power as well as Communist ideology. The main reason for this was the anarchic nature of the international system and the absence of a supranational authority. Thus, neither side could neglect the possibility that the others would become aggressive in the future, nor was there a credible guarantee that they would remain peaceful due to the military strength that both sides possessed in secure second-strike capabilities.<sup>186</sup> In this situation, they did not want to threaten the other's vital interests, and pursued a policy of protecting themselves through deterrence. Consequently, they tried to avoid severe conflict that had the potential to escalate into a general war in Europe, where arms control measures and political protocols were flourishing, focusing on the reduction or control of nuclear and conventional arsenals to a level where they would not threaten the others.

## **B. Regional Security Environment**

The North East Asian region was steadily becoming one of the most important zones in the world where the four main powers-the US, the USSR, China and Japan actually faced each other, and where their borders and maritime interests intersected.<sup>187</sup> The Korean peninsula is located at the centre as one of the potential conflict zones on the border dividing North and South Korea, therefore the relationships between the 4 great

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<sup>186</sup> Robert Jervis, "Was the Cold War a Security Dilemma?", *Journal of Cold War Studies*, Vol. 3, No. 1 (Winter 2001), pp. 36-54.

<sup>187</sup> Henry Trofimenko, "Long-Term Trends in the Asia-Pacific Region: A Soviet Evaluation", *Asian Survey*, Vol. 29, No. 3 (March 1989), pp. 238-239.



powers was naturally determined by the course of events both in the region and elsewhere in the world. The US was waging the Cold War with increasing intensity in Vietnam after its full-scale involvement, but was simultaneously willing to keep its hegemony through improving both the self-defence capabilities of the Western alliance and its relations with the USSR.

The most dramatic change in the relationships among the relevant countries that affected the balance of power both in the region and throughout the world occurred between the PRC and USSR. The 1950 Sino-Soviet treaty of friendship and mutual assistance, which pledged Soviet assistance in the event of the PRC being attacked by Japan or any country allied with Japan (i.e., the US), seriously cracked not only because of the bitter personal rivalry between Nikita Khrushchev and Mao Tse-tung, but also because of the open Sino-Soviet political/ideological split of the early 1960s<sup>188</sup>, so that the tension between them continuously escalated. After Khrushchev's ousting in October 1964, the new Soviet leadership tried to improve the relationship between the two countries, but with the Chinese boycott of the 23<sup>rd</sup> Soviet Communist party congress, small-scale border clashes, a three day anti-Soviet rally at the Soviet embassy in Peking, and the intensification of the Chinese "Cultural Revolution" in 1967-68<sup>189</sup>, it was further damaged. In addition, even though the most serious border fighting along the disputed Ussuri River border in March 1969 was terminated *via* border negotiations in October of that year by threatening the PRC with the use of nuclear weapons, both

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<sup>188</sup> Gerald Segal, "Sino-Soviet Relations after Mao", *Adelphi Papers*, No. 202 (London: IISS, Autumn 1985), p. 4.

<sup>189</sup> The major motive of the termination of the Cultural Revolution stemmed from the Chinese fear of a Soviet attack under the rubric of the "Brezhnev Doctrine", see Marian P. Kirsch, "Soviet Security Objectives in Asia", *International Organization*, Vol. 24, No. 3 (Summer 1970), p. 453.

sides remained mainly concerned with the threats of land attack.<sup>190</sup> Despite this settlement, that same year, the USSR continuously accused the PRC of trying to dominate Asia if not the whole world, and viewed its foreign policy as more dangerous than American foreign policy.

The implications of intense Sino-Soviet relations were very considerable. The USSR was forced to prepare for a possible two-front war, which deepened its concern about encirclement by hostile military coalitions. The PRC considered the USSR as one of its cardinal concerns in the field of security<sup>191</sup>, because it posed potentially the most devastating threat through troop reinforcements, expansion and construction of airfields in Siberia, and emplacement of rocket launchers with a nuclear warhead capability in the border regions. Consequently, military tension along the Sino-Soviet border remained high with major forces confronting one another and both nations supplementing their border forces (see Table 3-1). Moreover, the two nations continued to seek more reliable defences against a possible war and to restrain the other's expansionism<sup>192</sup> in South and Southeast Asia.<sup>193</sup> For the West, the implications of this

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<sup>190</sup> In the 1970s, US military experts believed that China had achieved a modest ICBM force and relatively invulnerable second-strike nuclear capability by the mid-1970s, which were not to be regarded as a serious threat. The PRC nuclear capability made Moscow very cautious about military action along the Sino-Soviet border.

<sup>191</sup> In reality, it appears that the PRC denounced Soviet-American 'contention and collusion' after the open Sino-Soviet break in 1963, since it began to consider both super-powers as a threat.

<sup>192</sup> After the Cultural Revolution in the PRC, the Chinese believed that they had a duty and a mission to spread their achievement throughout the world to encourage the under-developed poorer countries stand up and challenge the developed countries of the world. Refer, Wang Gungwu, "Chinese Society and Chinese Foreign Policy", *International Affairs*, Vol. 48, No. 4 (October 1972), pp. 616-618; for the results of the Cultural Revolution, see, Joan Robinson, "the Cultural Revolution in China", *International Affairs*, Vol. 49, No. 1 (April 1968), pp. 214-227.

<sup>193</sup> Despite this antagonism, there had been some tacit Sino-Soviet co-operation in third-world conflict-notably in the Vietnam War, where both could agree that they faced a common enemy, even though they failed to achieve 'united action'. On the contrary, there was mutual mistrust that if the US withdrew from Indochina, it would be filled by the other under the 'vacuum theory'. Refer, J. L. S. Girling, "Russia and Indochina in International Perspective", *International Affairs*, Vol. 49, No. 4 (October 1973), pp. 608-609.

military confrontation were not negative, as long as it did not threaten a general war<sup>194</sup>.

**Table 3-1: Deployment of Chinese and Soviet Army Troops**  
**along the Sino-Soviet Border after 1970**

(Number of divisions)						
Year	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975
PRC	47	51	65	70	75	81
USSR	30	33	44	45	45	43

Note: Soviet divisions were believed to be far superior in firepower and mobility to Chinese divisions.

Source: The Japanese Defence Agency, *Defense of Japan 1976*, p. 13.

This pattern of relations was very well suited to the regional security system as the USSR and US inevitably tried to prevent war with each other and to stabilize the existing balance. However, in the meantime the PRC arose as a potential third great power at least in this region in terms of the balance of power, having its own seat in the UN instead of Taiwan from 1971<sup>195</sup>, posing challenges to not only the USSR along its Asian frontier and the US along the Asian rim-lands, but also the Soviet's powerful support for revolutionary movements throughout the Third World.<sup>196</sup> Until 1971, the US was the main enemy of the PRC on the issues of Taiwan, Vietnam and Korea, encircling it with both military bases and mutual security agreements with relevant countries including Australia and New Zealand in the South, resulting in US opposition to PRC interests after the Communist victory in 1949. However, in 1969 the new Nixon administration came to power, and proceeded to relax long-standing restrictions. As a result of this, the President visited the PRC from February 21 to 28 in 1972, and then both leaders, Nixon and Mao Tse-tung, agreed to "the time-honored *Panch Shila* or five

<sup>194</sup> With the possession of the hydrogen bomb, war between East and West was no longer inevitable; at the same time peaceful coexistence and cooperation became necessary.

<sup>195</sup> Of course, it was not the matter of the admission but the representation of China, because the PRC was also a member of the UN from its foundation. Until this time, the US blocked the PRC from legitimately taking its place as one of the Great Powers. Refer, Evan Luard, "China and the United Nation", *International Affairs*, Vol. 47, No. 4 (October 1971).

<sup>196</sup> Charles L. Robertson, *International Politics since World War II: A Short History* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1975, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed.), p. 298.

principles of peaceful coexistence, endorsed normalization of relations, listed differences over policies on Vietnam, and found a suitable formula for the thorny issue of the future of Taiwan”<sup>197</sup>. These agreements were condemned by the USSR as intensifying the military means for preparation for war. Geostrategically, the USSR faced the PRC with hostility on one side, so that it tried to extend its power into South Asia to contain the enlargement of PRC influence. At the same time, it increased its efforts to mend diplomatic relations with Western Europe and the US by the SALT agreement. This triangular relationship among the three countries in this period experienced some twists and turns, but ultimately the alliance was maintained.

In the 1960s, Japan had become a major political and economic power in Asia. Its importance was in its ability to offer economic assistance to the undeveloped countries in Asia, which found it almost impossible to survive without economic aid from outside. It was likely *per se* to lead to political turmoil in that those countries could be communized via ideological attacks from the USSR and PRC. Japan provided the US with significant strategic forward bases and was also one of its most important trading partners<sup>198</sup>. However, Japan was forced to improve its relationship with the USSR and PRC in the light of three factors: military capabilities and presence in the Far East; the stability of regional security environment; and bilateral diplomatic relations. Even though a normalization of the relationship with the PRC was not achieved, and the peace treaty with the USSR was not concluded because of the territorial claim to the four islands off the coast of Hokkaido at this time<sup>199</sup>, Japan began to proceed to

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<sup>197</sup> Charles L. Robertson (1975), p. 335-336.

<sup>198</sup> In the late 1960s, Japan was the second market only to Canada, refer, Ralph N. Clough, *East Asia and US Security* (Washington DC: The Brookings Institution, 1975), p. 29.

<sup>199</sup> Yukio Satoh, “The Evolution of Japanese Security Policy”, *Adelphi Papers*, No. 178 (Autumn 1982), p. 4.

establish diplomatic relations with them.

To sum up, under the above international political conditions, the Sino-Russian conflict was of prime importance in the regional security environment, which made the US exercise its hegemony in driving power politics *via* its active foreign policy. Despite this, it remained for the US a particularly sensitive issue to prevent communist expansionism throughout the third world *via* low-intensity conflicts instead of the danger of a major war between the nuclear countries. In the long run, it was a period when the whole regional security environment was continuously developed in a way which was favorable to the US due to the ideological struggle between the USSR and PRC who had variant views about communism. Meanwhile, the US engagement in the Vietnam War continued for the ostensible reason of protecting the West, capitalist and non-communist countries, from communist expansionism. This influenced the transitions of the operational concepts of the US forces as well as the mission of the US marines in the Pacific area. Put succinctly, the regional security environment rested on the symmetrical structures in terms of mutual security, but were somewhat unbalanced because of not only the transitions of international relations but also the cultural and historical affinities and heterogeneities.

### **C. Maritime Dominion**

Maritime dominion can be seen as the ability to use the sea as an individual state or a regime by positioning advanced bases and by the law of the sea. The former usually depends on the relationship between a country that wants to employ the other country's naval base or port and a host country in terms of alliance and diplomatic relations or

security interests. The need for naval bases is, of course, continuously changing in response to modifications in strategy and the ever-growing importance of the oceans as sources of supply for edible and inedible resources. Given their global interests, both the US and USSR, needed a worldwide network of bases to sustain forward deployment and strategic mobility, to ship amphibious forces to the enemy's shore, and to show the flag and influence foreign policies. The antagonism of the host country, the split of *de facto* alliances and changes in the diplomatic relations between the host countries and the users could seriously affect the right for the bases to be used by either of the two superpowers.

In this regard, with the beginning of the Sino-Soviet dispute in the early 1960s, the PRC bases such as Dairen, Port Arthur, and Shanghai became unavailable to the USSR. The evidence of this is that it is impossible to find any official visit to the PRC base (Shanghai) after 1956 compared with the increase in Soviet naval visits throughout the Pacific area including Cambodia, Canada, Chile, Japan, Mexico, Singapore<sup>200</sup>, and the US<sup>201</sup>. This was a great handicap to the Soviet navy's influence over Southeast Asian countries via showing the flag and projecting their naval power, even though it had access to Singapore, where there was overhaul and yard work on ships from 1968 onward, and Sihanoukville in Cambodia, where there was a good will operational visit in 1969<sup>202</sup>. Instead, the Soviet navy began to enlarge its operational field in the Indian Ocean in 1968, for the purpose of reducing Western influence along the entire Indian Ocean littoral. It seems that the USSR had attempted to enlarge its interest toward the

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<sup>200</sup> The main purpose of this access was overhaul and yard work on Soviet ships.

<sup>201</sup> Bruce W. Watson, *Red Navy at Sea: Soviet Naval Operations on the High Seas, 1956-1980* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1982), p.136 and 210-14 (Appendix: Table 15-19).

<sup>202</sup> Bruce W. Watson (1982), p. 213.

Indian Ocean and the Middle East, as the US interests focused on the preservation of a noncommunist government in South Vietnam in Southeast Asia.

The latter, the law of the sea, is 'a system of rules and principles determining the legal status' of the various uses of the sea, which are concerned with 1) various areas – territorial seas, the high seas and straits, 2) various purposes – commercial, fishing and fighting, 3) and various times – peace, crisis and war.<sup>203</sup> However, it had been inconceivable to regulate the law of the sea in wartime under the authority of the UN until now, because of its complexity as witnessed by the Falklands/ Malvinas conflict of 1982 and the Iran/Iraq war of 1980-8<sup>204</sup>. Most maritime strategists have always accepted that naval strategy has been influenced by the law of the sea to some extent, particularly as strategy has evolved in response to technological developments.<sup>205</sup> However, there has been a general assumption that when international law has been influenced, this has been in relation to peacetime activities and that it was impossible to reach an agreement for wartime use of the sea through international law as demonstrated by the results of the United Nations conferences of 1958 and 1982, which indicated that such agreements regulated the law of the sea in times of peace only.

In July 1957, the USSR announced that an extensive sea area off Vladivostok, in the Peter the Great Bay, would be treated as its internal waters, and declared that free

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<sup>203</sup> P. D. Barabolya, et al., *Manual of International Maritime Law (Part I)* (Moscow: Military Publishing House, 1966), The US Naval Institute Intelligence Command (trans.), Washington, DC, p. 2.

<sup>204</sup> Whilst the impact upon non-combatant activities with very basic interference was of little influence to third states' right at sea, those of these two wars were very serious, i.e., a 200-mile 'maritime exclusive zon (MEZ)' by the UK. So, as R. R. Churchill and A. V. Lowe have pointed out, the major naval powers may not choose to give up its exclusive uses of the sea, even though certain agreements among all countries might be ratified. Refer, R. R. Churchill and A. V. Lowe, *The Law of the Sea* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999, 3<sup>rd</sup> ed.), pp. 421-428.

<sup>205</sup> For the details of the relationship between the law of the sea and maritime strategy, refer Geoffrey Till (1987), pp. 18-22.

passage would be denied without previous special admission. After that, it flouted the conclusions of the UN conference held in Geneva in 1958 in which the Western major naval powers were prepared to concede a width of six miles for territorial waters and a further six miles for exclusive fishing rights by insisting on twelve miles for territorial waters<sup>206</sup>. In addition, it ridiculously claimed the Sea of Okhotsk as being inland waters in 1959 as a result of the Yalta Treaty, which acquired for the USSR the Kurile Islands and south Sakhalin (refer Figure 1-2).<sup>207</sup> One reason for this was to protect its naval facilities<sup>208</sup> from the threat posed by a missile attack from the Western powers in time of war.

It is not difficult from the foregoing accounts to perceive the transitions of maritime dominion, which were determined by the complexity of the diplomatic relationships of the then international political system. The capabilities of the US and USSR navies could be roughly divided as follows<sup>209</sup> in terms of 'the command of the sea'<sup>210</sup> posited by Alfred T. Mahan, for the purpose of global war conditions considering not the naval strengths, but the purely geographical locations of each country's naval force:

Firstly, the US included Cam Ranh Bay in the South China Sea to its outer ring of defence (Sapporo-South Korea-Okinawa-Taiwan-Philippines) as an effect of the engagement of the Vietnam War. The western part of this line could be considered as its operational area.

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<sup>206</sup> A. D. Nicholl, Rear-Admiral, "Geography and Strategy", in M. G. Saunders, Commander, RN (ed.), *The Soviet Navy* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1958), pp. 250-251.

<sup>207</sup> Rear-Admiral E. Biörklund, "On the Perimeter", in M. G. Saunders (1958), p. 281.

<sup>208</sup> The USSR constructed the provision of mobile operational bases throughout the whole of this area.

<sup>209</sup> Refer, Patrick Wall (ed.), *The Indian Ocean and the Threat to the West* (London: Stacey International, 1975), pp. 16-17 [Map: Rival naval and air facilities and or influences].

<sup>210</sup> Hereafter, the term 'command of the sea' is used in the context of Corbett's thinking that 'Command of the sea means nothing but the control of sea communications....the primary function of our battlefleets is to seize and prevent the enemy from seizing the main lines of communication'. Not only because Mahan's definition that 'Command of the sea...was an exclusive thing: it could not be shared, and was applicable to one nation at a time' has been challenged, but also because did he believe that it is essentially a relative and not an absolute thing. Refer, Geoffrey Till, *Maritime Strategy and the Nuclear Age* (London: MacMillan, 1990, reprinted), pp. 128-131.



Secondly, the Soviets temporarily considered the Sea of Okhotsk including the Kurile islands area as its territorial waters. Furthermore, it had operational superiority in the Indian Sea including the Bay of Bengal. However, its operational manoeuvre activities were extremely limited not only in the East China Sea because of the aggravation of its diplomatic relationships with the PRC, but also in the East Sea and in the Eastern part of the Pacific Ocean from Japan<sup>211</sup>.

Lastly, the other sea areas might be decided with the *de facto* military alliances in wartime except for the potential territorial waters.

## 2. Independent Variables and Their Effects

### A. USMC

#### (1) The US Interests/ Foreign Policy

At the beginning of the Cold War, it was essential for the US to spur its efforts to decrease Soviet Power, because of the image of the Soviet Union as expansionist<sup>212</sup> in conjunction with the unstable security environment throughout the whole world and the expected dangers of prolonged competition with the USSR. As such, in 1948, the Truman administration juxtaposed them as “communism” and “democracy”, and listed three intrinsically valuable areas: Western Europe, the Mediterranean and Middle East, and the Far East, regarding the USSR as an extremely serious threat.<sup>213</sup> A good

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<sup>211</sup> Vladivostok, the main base of the Pacific Fleet, was at the end of a long supply chain, because it was remote from the Soviet industrialized area, e.g., Moscow. From a strategic point of view, ships from this base have to pass through narrow chokepoints, either the Korean Strait (a eastern waterway of Korea or the western waterway of Japan), or La Perouse (Soya) Strait between the Japanese northern island Hokkaido and the Soviet island Sakhalin, none of which would be controlled by the Soviets or their allies in time of war. For the details, see In-Soo Lim, “The Role of Naval Power in the North-West Pacific 1953-1991”, *Ph D thesis* (Aberystwyth: University of Wales, Aberystwyth, 1992), pp. 82-84.

<sup>212</sup> According to the “traditionalist” or “orthodox” school, the Cold War was a great invisible struggle, which considered the USSR as inherently expansionistic. However, a more reasonable explanation is that it was a clash between different social systems under the distorted security concept that they basically wanted to keep the *status quo*, but they did not trust each other’s intentions, thus provoking a security dilemma. Refer, Robert Jervis (2001), pp. 39-45.

<sup>213</sup> Policy Planning Staff, “PPS/23: Review of Current Trends of the US Foreign Policy”, in the US DoS,

illustration of this is the NSC 20/4 on November 23, 1948, which considered the will and ability of the leaders of the USSR to pursue policies threatening the security of the US as the greatest single danger to the US within the foreseeable future.<sup>214</sup> After Truman's victory in the election of 1948, this report was announced to the public by his Inaugural Address of January 20, 1949, he listed the following four additional central points.<sup>215</sup>

Firstly, he endorsed the United Nations,

Secondly, he applauded the European Recovery Program,

Thirdly, he announced that the United States was planning a North Atlantic defence pact,

Lastly, he announced he would embark on a bold new program of technical assistance for undeveloped areas.

In this regard, the main goal of US foreign policy at the end of the 1940s was to rescue Western Europe from communist control, so that preserving Western Europe had the first priority in terms of vital areas throughout the world in US foreign policy objectives. Indeed, it appears that successive US administrators never lost sight of the objectives laid out in the NSC-20/4 in the Cold War era. Parenthetically, as NSC-68<sup>216</sup> defined, "the fundamental purpose of the US is, of course, to assure the integrity and vitality of our free society on the basis of the Constitution". In order to do this, the policies and programs in NSC-68 were directed towards the strengthening of the free world and therefore the frustration of the Kremlin design.

On the other hand, it was historically true that many American doctrines and strategies

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*Foreign Relations of the United States 1948*, Vol. 1, Part 2 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1976), pp. 510-529 (hereafter cited as *FRUS* with appropriate volume and page numbers).

<sup>214</sup> The US National Security Council, "NSC 20/4: Note by the Executive Secretary on US Objectives with Respect to the USSR to Counter Soviet Threats to US Security" (Washington, November 23, 1948), in *FRUS*, Vol. 1, Part 2 (1948), p. 663.

<sup>215</sup> Thomas G. Paterson, et al. (1991, *1900 to Present*), p. 454.

<sup>216</sup> The US NSC, "NSC-68: United States Objectives and Programs for National Security" (Washington DC: April 7, 1950), in *FRUS*, Vol. 1 (1950).

of foreign policy were developed in the Asian rather than the European context, especially at a time before it emerged as a one of the superpowers after WWII. However, it was not clearly defined, as is shown in the above four points of Truman's report. In 1947-49, the US government evidently did not think there was an imminent threat of a hostile power gaining control over this area with its dominant positions in the fields of military and economic strength despite the fact that its political philosophy and patterns for living had very little applicability to the masses of Asian people. As a result of this, it appeared that the absolutely vital area in the Asia-Pacific region for US security included Japan and Philippines as the cornerstones of a Pacific security system.<sup>217</sup>

With the outbreak of the Korean War, this general orientation was sharply changed especially in the aftermath of the armistice agreement on July 27, 1953, between Mark W. Clark, Commander-in-Chief of the UN Command (UNC) and Peng The-Huai, Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers, and Kim Il Sung, Marshal of DPRK<sup>218</sup>, but the state of division and confrontation remained the same as before the war. The Korean War was the first major confrontation between the free world and the communists, and it produced the following ironic consequences<sup>219</sup>:

Firstly, the change in Russia's recognition that the Americans had a strong will to protect the free world from territorial and ideological expansion,

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<sup>217</sup> The Truman administration concluded that the US army, with only fourteen divisions and "twenty-division" global commitments, must be more rationally deployed in central locations to sustain a beleaguered Europe. As such, Secretary of State Acheson, in January 1950, defined the island line, Aleutians-Japan-Ryukyus-Philippines, as part of the US military perimeter. It seemed to reinforce its army in Europe. Other areas in Asia, Korea included, he thought of as part of the "commitments of the entire civilized world under the Charter of the UN". See, McGeorge Bundy (ed.), *The Patterns of Responsibility* (Cambridge: Houghton Mifflin, 1952), pp. 199-200; Fred Greene, *U.S. Policy and the Security of Asia* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1968), pp. 28-29; PPS/23.

<sup>218</sup> The reasons why the ROK government did not participate in the agreement are not only that it did not have the authority of operational control over the ROK Army, Navy and Air force, which had gone to the Commander-in-Chief of the UNC, on July 16, 1950, but also that the ROK government was seriously against the armistice. See, The ROK Ministry of National Defence (ROKMND), *Defense White Paper 2000* (Seoul: ROKMND, 2000, English version), Appendix 9 and 11.

<sup>219</sup> Fred Greene (1968), p. 30.

Secondly, the upgrading of the priority in US foreign policy interests toward Northeast Asia in order to avoid another major engagement on the Asian mainland.

Through the Korean War, the spread of communism in Asia was temporarily stopped and the foundation for the US defence commitment to the Korean peninsula was laid. Moreover, the Korean War changed the dimensions of the US-Korean relationship as well as the US policy toward East Asia in that it concluded several bilateral and multilateral security treaties in the Pacific<sup>220</sup>. Furthermore, there were states that faced special security problems stemming from partitions or territorial divisions in the Western Pacific area-Korea, Vietnam, Taiwan-where there was a possibility of creation of a regional second conflict of the same type as the Korean War. In retrospect, more than any other single event, the Korean War contributed to the shaping of postwar US foreign policy toward Northeast Asia and the relevant Pacific area. From the mid 1950s, the US began to perceive the following critical reasons for maintaining a substantial military presence in East Asia.

Firstly, the realization that an incident in the Pacific region may have as much relevance to US national interests and to the success or failure of its foreign policy as in the Atlantic region;

Secondly, the opposition to any one-power domination in the Asia-Pacific area;

Lastly, the criticality of Japan as a Western security asset in the Pacific.<sup>221</sup>

Put succinctly, the Korean War served as a major momentum for the transition of US

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<sup>220</sup> The US had mutual security and cooperation treaties with Japan (1951), the Philippines (1951), Australia and New Zealand (1952), the Republic of China (1954, lasted until 1979), and the Southeast Asia Treaty comprising Australia, Britain, France, New Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand and Pakistan (1954). All of these security commitments were signed originally in the early 1950s during and immediately following the Korean War. Refer *American Foreign Policy 1950-1955*, p. between 1788-1789.

<sup>221</sup> Gaston J. Sigur, "The US-Japan Relationship and US Policy in Asia and the Pacific", in Gaston J. Sigur and Young C. Kim (eds.), *Japanese and US Policy in Asia* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1982), pp. 3-4; Chung Min Lee, *The Emerging Strategic Balance in Northeast Asia: Implications for Korea's Defence Strategy and Planning for the 1990s* (Seoul: the Research Center for Peace and Unification, 1989), p.10.

security interests, which meant that the Korean peninsula was worthy of US security attention as an intrinsically valuable area as is posited by Michael C. Desch.

Furthermore, the US needed to undertake extended economic and military aid to Vietnam from the end of the 1950s in association with the strategic 'Domino' theory, which was initially presented by President Eisenhower. The fall of Indo-China would lead to the fall of the regional countries from Burma, Thailand, Malaya and Indonesia to India, Australia, the Philippines, Formosa and Japan. As a consequence of this view, the US Secretary of Defence, McNamara evaluated, in March 1964, that Southeast Asia had a great strategic significance in the forward defence of the US, and that the US must meet the challenge in South Vietnam in order to defend Southeast Asia.<sup>222</sup> Under this kind of firm foreign policy objective against Soviet expansionism, the US engaged in the Vietnam War. Ironically, with the full-scale engagement of the US in the Vietnam War, the US interest toward this area was highlighted in the context of its national policies for self-preservation under the justification of protecting the nations of the free-world<sup>223</sup>. In hindsight, the decades beginning with the signing of the Korean armistice in July 1953 and the firm involvement in the Vietnam War by the US could well be characterized as the highpoint of the cold war in Asia.

However, after the Tet Offensive of 1968<sup>224</sup>, which led to the enunciation of the Nixon

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<sup>222</sup> H. G. Nicholas, "Vietnam and the Traditions of American Foreign Policy", *International Affairs*, Vol. 44, No. 2 (April 1968), pp. 189-201.

<sup>223</sup> As Henry Kissinger explained, the initial motivation of the US in involving itself in the Vietnam War was that the loss of Vietnam would lead to the collapse of noncommunist Asia and to Japan's accommodation to communism. Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy* (New York: A Touchstone Book, 1994), pp. 656-658.

<sup>224</sup> The night of 30-31 January 1968 just before the lunar New Year's Day, when the South Vietnamese forces were relaxed, North Vietnam launched a surprise attack. The influence of this was massive on both the US military commanders in Vietnam, the government and public from a psychological point of

Doctrine (otherwise referred to as the Guam Doctrine) on July 25 1969 that “in responding to future Asian crises the US is going to encourage and has a right to expect that this problem will be increasingly handled by the Asian nations themselves”<sup>225</sup>, the US came to the conclusion that the war was, in the final analysis, not winnable. From this time, the US government was eager to preserve anti-Communist governments while minimizing the cost to American lives. The subsequent retrenchment of the US war effort in Vietnam followed by the withdrawal of the US 7<sup>th</sup> infantry division from South Korea in 1971 were preludes to the Nixon-Kissinger formula of initiating a gradual disengagement from Southeast Asia. From that time, the US turned from military ways to diplomatic options in solving the matter of East-West confrontation. It meant that the US began to seek an outcome, which would enable it to continue its postwar role as the protector and sustainer of noncommunist countries.

The US saw an opportunity by undertaking a fundamental rapprochement with the PRC, based on the evidence of both Mao’s comment that the PLA would not go abroad<sup>226</sup>, and the ongoing antagonism between the USSR and PRC. This improved relationship with the PRC brought a strategic windfall for the US in counterbalancing the Soviet presence and the modernization of the Soviet Pacific Fleet and a growing SSBN sanctuary in the East Asia, as mentioned in the regional security environment, without damaging the

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view, due to the activities of the mass media. After all, the request for the dispatch of more than 20,000 troops from the US HQ in Vietnam was refused. From an initial deployment of 3,500 Marines at Da Nang, the US troop strength rose to 184,000 by the end of 1965, 385,000 by the end of 1966, and 486,000 by the end of 1967, but the increase in troop strength in 1968 was kept to about 50,000. From 1968, the US faced great resistance so that it began to seek a way to withdraw from Vietnam. Refer, John Lewis Gaddis, “Flexible Response and Vietnam”, Robert J. Art and Kenneth N. Waltz (1999), pp. 222-236.

<sup>225</sup> This outline was concretized by his special message to Congress on 15 September 1970. Refer, John Whiteclay Chambers II, et al., *The Oxford Companion to American Military History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 503.

<sup>226</sup> It meant the PRC did not intend to become involved again in communist wars of liberation, refer, Henry Kissinger (1994), pp. 644-645.

continuing existence and independence of Taiwan. The US toppled the static balance of power with the USSR by readopting its foreign policy objective in terms of Quincy Wright.<sup>227</sup> Nevertheless, the fundamental Cold War structure of the balance of power system in East Asia remained firmly in place.

## **(2) Military Strategy/ Policy**

The main objective of the US military strategy in the Asia-Pacific region was to counter Soviet expansionism. In this context, the US continued its efforts to restore the regional military balance by the basic concept that there would be no peace without equilibrium. In this light, maintaining the US military presence, especially its navy and strategic air force, to counter the USSR's increased military activities was an essential part of the US military strategy in this region. However, the size of the US military presence fluctuated with the changes in the diplomatic relationships between the relevant countries, particularly in terms of the strategic triangle: the PRC, the US and USSR, and the domestic political environment.

After the end of WWII, US military strategy was based on the twin pillars of 'containment', the theme of George F. Kennan's famous "X" article in Foreign Affairs, and deterrence, in some aspects a military arm of containment, because NSC-68 and the Korean War encouraged greater emphasis on military means for opposing communism considering that the Communist threat was regarded as mainly military.<sup>228</sup> The US military strategy was also divided into two categories: nuclear and conventional options,

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<sup>227</sup> The US reformed the balance of power system in Northeast Asia by making a friendly relationship with the PRC. The antagonism between the USSR and the PRC was a good opportunity for the US to rally from its inferior position in the region. Quincy Wright explained this with the term, 'a dynamic balance of power'. Refer, Michael Sheehan (1996), p. 12.

<sup>228</sup> John Whiteclay Chambers II (1999), p. 472.

because it was confronted throughout the Cold War with the potential need to face a strategic nuclear conflict with the USSR and enter a major conflict. In reality, before NSC-68, the US defence planning had concentrated on the strategy and forces needed for a general nuclear war. At the centre of the US military strategy, there was the US concept of how many wars it should simultaneously engage in, including a conventional or unconventional and theatre nuclear war in Europe, a similar theatre wide conflict in Northeast Asia and the Pacific, and smaller conflicts in a region like the Gulf.<sup>229</sup> The size of the US military forces, including how much manpower it would keep as a forward presence in each region, depended on this basic concept of US force planning to fulfil force requirements for any future wars.

Basically, the nuclear option was a part of this concept in terms of theatre nuclear war, but it was determined by the pendulum of nuclear superiority<sup>230</sup> between the US and USSR (refer Table 1-1: the pendulum of nuclear superiority). In the 1950s when the US had a nuclear monopoly or superiority, it could deter by the option of 'massive retaliation', which however retained a degree of ambiguity. With the gap in missile technology, it was unable to guarantee the safeties of the US nuclear umbrella over the free world<sup>231</sup> and of its homeland from a Soviet nuclear attack. In this situation, the question of "how much can the US nuclear forces survive" was central, thus the US

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<sup>229</sup> Anthony H Cordesman, "US Defence Policy: Resources and Capabilities", *Whitehall Paper Serious 1993* (RUSI, 1994), p. 34-5.

<sup>230</sup> Colin S. Gray explained that the structure of policy choice for the US was determined by the three core ideas that: ① deterrence by anticipation of massive societal punishment; ② of being denied victory; ③ of US victory. See, Colin S. Gray, "War Fighting for Deterrence", *The Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol. 7, No. 1, (London: Frank Cass, March 1984), p. 5.

<sup>231</sup> The US proclaimed in NSC-68 that "Now (we) face the threat of atomic warfare...this fact imposes on us, in our own interests, the responsibility of world leadership...coupled with the probable fission bomb capability and possible thermonuclear bomb capability of the Soviet Union, the intensifying struggle requires us to face the fact that we can expect no lasting abatement of the crisis ... " Most non-Soviet countries were provided with the US nuclear umbrella during the Cold War by the NSC-68 and bilateral treaties. Refer, "NSC-68, IV, B. Objectives".



Secretary of Defence, Robert S. McNamara, changed its nuclear option to Mutual Assured Destruction.<sup>232</sup> His strategy depended on assured second-strike capability of the reserve retaliatory force, which was completed by 1967 under the basic concept of 'flexible response'. All non-Soviet countries implicitly relied upon the nuclear deterrent capability of the US.

Owing not only to the above eroding of US superiority, but also the limited use of nuclear weapons in dealing with most situations of international tension, the US conventional force level had to be re-examined, because the planned conventional force based on NSC-68 was reduced in the wake of the Korean War and because of a move to an atomic-intensive defence policy. In order to maintain strong 'general purpose forces' to deter and defend, which became a principal military instrument of foreign policy, the US adopted the so-called '2 1/2 war' concept in 1962<sup>233</sup>, which postulated the situation of two major concurrent wars in Europe and North or Southeast Asia, and a minor conflict elsewhere (see Table 3-2).

**Table 3-2: Forces Required for '2 1/2 Wars', 1962**

Theatre	No. of Divisions	No. of Tactical Fighter Wings
Major (Europe)	17	25
Major (Asia)	8	12
Minor (Cuba/elsewhere)	3 1/3	4
Total	28 1/3	41

Source: William Kaufmann, *Planning Conventional Forces 1950-1980*

(Washington DC: Brookings, 1982), p. 7.

Here, it seems that the number of divisions required for Asia had considered not only the numbers of North and South Korea's divisions<sup>234</sup>, but also the basic strategic

<sup>232</sup> Timothy Garden, *Can Deterrence Last? Peace through a Nuclear Strategy* (London: RUSI, 1984), pp. 41-44.

<sup>233</sup> Robert P. Haffa, Jr., *Planning U.S. Forces* (Washington, DC: NDUP, 1988), p. 42.

<sup>234</sup> The numbers of the Army divisions of North and South Korea were 19 and 30 (including Marines Corps divisions) respectively. At that time, the number of total armed forces of South Korea was

concept that it did not allow for simultaneous attacks in Korea and Vietnam (see Table 3-3).

**Table 3-3: The Allocation and Deployment of Major GPF in Asia, 1965 and 1973**

Classification		Strategic Concept		Remarks
		2 1/2 War	1 1/2 War	
Threat		General Attack	Conventional Attack	Exclude Nuclear War
Support		Limited Allied Support		
Priority		Vital to US		
Forces (Army/ MC Divs)	CONUS	3	2 1/3	- 2/3
	Deployed	4	1 2/3	- 2 1/3
	Reserve	-	-	
Strategic Concept		1) Holding action required while Reserves mobilize 2) Reserve reinforcement required 3) Did not allow for simultaneous attack in Korea and Vietnam	1) Nuclear capability of US strategic/ theatre forces serves as a deterrent to full-scale attack in Asia 2) Prospects for a coordinated 2-front attack on US allies are low because of the risks of nuclear war and the improbability of Sino-Soviet cooperation 3) Reserves may not have to mobilize	

Source: Robert P. Haffa, Jr., *Planning U.S. Forces* (Washington DC: NDUP, 1988), p. 78-79

This admirable plan was affected by the changing security environments as well as the domestic demands of the anti-war atmosphere derived from the Vietnam War, and was not achieved as has widely been recognized. Furthermore, the *détente* mode, like the triangular relationship, in the international security environment contributed to thwarting American foreign policy objectives and interests, which caused the weakening of US overseas commitments as represented by the Nixon Doctrine. As a result, more than half the total of US forces in the Korean peninsula and Japan withdrew.<sup>235</sup> With

600,000, which were almost double compared to that of North Korea (estimated: 352,000). See IISS, *The Military Balance 1964-5*, pp. 10 & 30.

<sup>235</sup> The US Army's 7<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division, some 20,000 troops, leaving only one infantry division withdrew from Korea, and it was not redeployed again. In stark contrast, the number of US forces personnel decreased from 41,000 to 26,500 from 1969 to 1971, but it had been increased to 65,000 with the end of the Vietnam War by the relocation plan of the US overseas forces. See, *Defence of Japan 1980*, p. 322 (Reference 48: Changes in strength of US forces personnel in Japan); Regarding the US

these reductions and redeployment of the US forces in Asia, the US reset its strategic concept for GPF from 2 1/2 War to '1 1/2 War (see Table 3-3), which meant that the pendulum of the containment policy had moved from the military to the diplomatic option.

### **(3) Maritime Strategy/ Policy**

At the end of WWII, the US Navy was a newly constructed, balanced force, prepared for and experienced in wartime operations ranging from amphibious assault to air attack and fleet defense. However, with the emergence of nuclear weapons, the US Navy met a fundamental question of its strategic value in the nuclear era, which led it into budgetary disputes with the Air force and Army. The Navy department's desire for complete independence failed and it was moved under the aegis of a new Defence Department. Despite this, it succeeded in continuously holding the Marine Corps and Naval aviation from becoming a branch of the Army and Air force respectively under the National Security Act of 1947, but the size of the US Navy had to be downsized, e.g., 105 aircraft carriers to 8.<sup>236</sup> It seemed that the main role in the nuclear strategy was to be given to the new air force and its B-36 bomber from the navy and its carriers, while retaining a tactical atomic capability. Despite the fact that the US Navy was no longer at the centre of the country's offensive strategy, the Role for Sea control, which is the Navy's main reason for existence, was still the bridge between the US and the other areas.<sup>237</sup>

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forces in Korea, refer "US, South Korea reach agreement on redeploying US troops from Seoul: Pentagon", in <<http://www.spacewar.com/2004/040723230653.s2x16k93.html>>, accessed: October 16, 2004.

<sup>236</sup> John Whiteclay Chambers II (1999), p. 490.

<sup>237</sup> The US Navy's mission in the Offtackle, the Joint Chief's 1949 war plan, was mainly defensive, a sea control campaign of running convoys for the coalition, see, George W. Baer (1994), pp. 316-317.

In relation to Soviet naval developments in the 1950s, the US Navy considered a three track strategy focusing on the role and functions of carriers and submarines: ① an attrition campaign by hunter-killer groups to destroy submarines at sea, ② the barrier strategy, waiting for the Soviet submarines at the entrances to the oceans from the Soviet home bases, ③ the carrier-air strike at the home bases. In addition to this, little attention was given to the supporting role of such as transport and escort based on the traditional role of the navy: ① supply and support US forces deployed overseas, ② supply and support US allies, in support of treaty commitments, ③ deny use of the Seas by the USSR to further its objectives or interfere with ours, ④ import the raw materials and commodities necessary to sustain US armed forces and the US war effort.<sup>238</sup> Put succinctly, with the focuses of the US strategy itself including maritime strategy in preparing for a general war with the Soviet Union, supposing a central role for nuclear weapons, the traditional roles and functions of the US Navy were extremely limited.

However, the operations in the Korean and Vietnam wars, and the employment of the Navy in the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 did much to increase the value set on it in the US. The most desperate bid, as L. W. Martin argued, was the possibility of its sharing a certain role in a strategic nuclear strike, which was regarded for a while as the only reliable meaning of future military existence, not just for its present role in limited warfare.<sup>239</sup> Yet, so far as naval forces were concerned, the US was compelled to exercise them to exert sustained influence beyond its borders or to defend the Western

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<sup>238</sup> The Department of the US Navy, *Naval Research Advisory Committee, Report on Historical Perspectives in Long-Range Planning in the Navy* (Washington, DC: Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy-Research, Engineering, and Systems, 1980), pp. 23-24; George W. Baer (1994), p. 337-339.

<sup>239</sup> L. W. Martin, *The Sea in Modern Strategy* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967), pp. 10-11.

alliance from communist expansion for obvious geographical reasons. In other words, there was no change in the basic role and functions of the US Navy as seen in the Korean War and the Vietnam War. These were 'strategic deterrence', 'sea control', and 'projection of power ashore'. Apart from the first, as evidenced in the Korean and Vietnam Wars, the relative importance and priority should have been afforded to 'sea control' and 'projection of power ashore'.<sup>240</sup> Nonetheless, the decline in numbers of the US Naval vessels, except for the realm of 'strategic deterrence', had anything but benign consequences for its naval capabilities, finally bringing about an obvious gap between its security commitments and capabilities for the pursuit of the Soviet Navy.<sup>241</sup> In this regard, the judgment of Admiral Zumwalt, CNO of the USN from 1970 to 1974, is very impressive, he said that "In 1970, when I first became CNO, ... We (USN) had just a slightly better than an even chance ... of winning a sea-control war with the Soviets... In the years since 1970 our chances for success have diminished".<sup>242</sup>

Reflecting on the prospect of imminent Soviet nuclear strategic parity, the US changed its strategic options from the deterrence of nuclear war by the threat of assured destruction to a flexible containment response. In order to do that, the US needed an invulnerable second-strike nuclear force. In having submarine-launched IRBM, *Polaris*, the US Navy took charge of the most important role in the nuclear strategic option, which put it back into the forefront of the central national strategy.<sup>243</sup> Instead, attack

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<sup>240</sup> It is necessary to differentiate more between the ability of navies to project 'influence' ashore and their ability to project 'power' ashore. The establishment of sea control would inevitably project influence ashore, and it might well do so far more effectively than striking at shore targets with piloted aircraft, cruise missiles or naval gunfire support. This should be a precondition for the projection of power, mainly amphibious forces as a spearhead echelon.

<sup>241</sup> The number of US Naval vessels in 1975 was listed as less than 500 ships including fleet oilers and ocean tugs compared with 976 at the peak of the Vietnam War and about 900 in 1964.

<sup>242</sup> *Jane's Fighting Ships 1975-1976*, p. 93.

<sup>243</sup> The desire of American determination to acquire a massive nuclear retaliation capability derived from

carriers were removed from operating as part of the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP), and shifted to a more suitable role in a limited war such as the sea-control targets and littoral and near-coastal targets.<sup>244</sup> With these changes, Polaris took a large portion of the Navy's defense budget, so that the rehabilitation and modernization programme for the ships including attack carriers proceeded very slowly, despite the fact that 72 percent of the ships were in an unsatisfactory condition in the late 1950s. For example, when Kennedy was inaugurated, there were six fleet ballistic missile submarines in operation. In the early 1960s, the Kennedy administration accelerated its programme for 41 submarines each carrying 16 *Polaris* missiles, which was completed by the middle of 1967.<sup>245</sup>

In the Western Pacific, the chains of bases available to the US from Japan in the north including those of the ROK, through Okinawa and Formosa to the Philippines in the South provided a firm maritime defence line against Communist expansion. From the end of the Korean War, the US took more responsibility as the main retaliatory striking power against Communist expansionism particularly in the fields of sea and air power in the Pacific area defending the outer ring of defence in the western Pacific. The bilateral treaties with the regional countries, each with a maritime connection, gave an obvious mission of at least keeping open the sea-lanes to the allies, which contained the USSR.<sup>246</sup>

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the launching of the Soviet *Sputnik* satellite on October 1957, which became a national obsession. As a result, the US accelerated the deployment of Air Force ICBMs and Navy SLBMs.

<sup>244</sup> George W. Baer (1994), p. 375-378.

<sup>245</sup> Instead of decommissioning the small submarines with 17 *Regulus* missiles, the US furnished its submarines with the UGM-27A *Polaris* A-1 missile (1,200 mile range), the UGM-27B *Polaris* A-2 (1,500 mile range), and the UGM-27C *Polaris* A-3 (2,500 mile range). IISS, *The Military Balance 1964-5*, p. 23.

<sup>246</sup> George W. Baer (1994), p. 332-333.

The Seventh fleet, which was born in early 1943, took the responsibility of guarding about 30 million square miles of the Western Pacific and the Indian Ocean, and was the forward deployed active naval force for fighting.<sup>247</sup> It was suitably organized to provide remarkable flexibility for quick response to any routine task or emergency (see Table 3-4 and 3-5).

**Table 3-4: The Deployment of the USN and Composition of the 7th Fleet in 1975**

Classification	Carriers	Surface Combatants	ARGs
2 <sup>nd</sup> Fleet (Atlantic)	4	67	1
3 <sup>rd</sup> Fleet (Eastern Pacific)	6	56	
6 <sup>th</sup> Fleet (Mediterranean)	2	17	2
7 <sup>th</sup> Fleet (Western Pacific)	3	25	2
Middle East Force (Persian Gulf)		2 +1 Amphibious Ships	
Detailed Composition of 7 <sup>th</sup> Fleet	3 Carriers, 4-5 Cruisers, 18-19 Destroyers or Frigates, 8 Amphibious ships, 5 Submarines, 5-6 Tow, Salvage, and Rescue ships, 1 Repair or Tender, 9-11 MLSFSs		

Notes: 1. ARGs (Amphibious Ready Groups), MLSFSs (Mobile Logistic Support Force Ships).

2. ARGs are 3-5 amphibious ships with a Marine battalion embarked.

Sources: IISS, *The Military Balance 1974-1975*, p. 7; George P. Steele, II, Vice Admiral, "Ready Power for Peace-The US Seventh Fleet, *Proceedings* Vol. 102, No. 1/875 (January 1976), p. 27.

It performed, apart from those in the Korean War, the following wartime and peacetime activities<sup>248</sup> with the main goal to support the US national and foreign objectives.

Firstly, as a wartime mission, it secured the sea-lanes, projected strong air power against the enemy ashore, conducted amphibious landings, provided naval gunfire support to Allied troops, and made an indispensable contribution by air and mine warfare in the Vietnam War<sup>249</sup>,

Secondly, as a counterinsurgency mission, it was dispatched to the South China Sea, with the strength of three carrier task groups and an embarked Marine Amphibious Ready Group, Laos in 1961,<sup>250</sup>

<sup>247</sup> The Pacific Fleet consisted of two complementary fleets, the Third and Seventh. The former covers Eastern and Central Pacific, Aleutians, Bering Sea, *etc.* Hereafter, the 3<sup>rd</sup> fleet will not be discussed if it is not necessary, because its operational area is outside the scope of my research.

<sup>248</sup> Main ideas come from George P. Steele, II, Vice Admiral, "Ready Power for Peace-The US Seventh Fleet, *Proceedings* Vol. 102, No. 1/875 (January 1976), p. 27.

<sup>249</sup> For the US, the Vietnam War was actually performed by ground forces and the air force. As such, the role and functions of the US Navy remained in the realm of being largely supportive to its sister services.

<sup>250</sup> Despite the deployment of US Naval forces in the South China Sea, the Kennedy administration decided not to intervene in Laos. The reason of this decision was that the airlift of troops to Laos would have been extremely limited because of its geographical location inland. See George W. Baer (1994),



**Table 3-5: The Main Bases and Facilities of the 7th Fleet**

Country	Name	Mission / Purpose	Remarks
Japan	Atsugi	Logistic Support for the 7 <sup>th</sup> Aviation Units	Joint facility units with Japan
	Iwakuni	HQ of USMC First Aircraft Wing	Relocated in April 1971
	Misawa	Logistic Support for the 7 <sup>th</sup> Aviation Units	Designated on Oct 1 1975
	Okinawa	Operational Marine Corps Units	The Third Marine Division
		Naval Air and Operating Base	
	Sasebo	Maintaining Base Facility/ Logistic Support	
The Philippines	Yokosuka	Logistic Support for the 7 <sup>th</sup> Fleet The Homeport of the 7 <sup>th</sup> Fleet	(1 Carrier, 2 Cruiser, 1 DS, 2 Combat Stores Ships)
	Cubi Point	Logistic Support for the Aviation Units	Part of Subic Bay Complex
	Subic Bay	Logistic Support for the 7 <sup>th</sup> Fleet	A Submarine/ Tactical Support Squadron
USA	Guam	The Reconnaissance Squadron	
Vietnam	Moc Hoa	A Naval Advanced Tactical Support Base	Closed in April 1971
	Qui Nhon	Naval Support Activities	Closed in 1971

Note: DS (Destroyer Squadron)

Sources: Paolo E. Coletta (ed.), *United States Navy and Marine Corps Bases, Overseas* (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1985); George P. Steele, II (1976).

Thirdly, as a contingency mission for crisis management, it was sent, as a part of the US Task Force (Task Force 77), which comprised twenty-five ships including five carrier battle groups, to the East Sea of Korea in the *Pueblo* incident in 1968,<sup>251</sup>

Fourthly, as a peacetime activity, it exercised to strengthen mutual defence with the military forces of the allied nations such as the Republic of China, ROK, the Republic of Philippines, Thailand, UK, *etc.*,

Fifthly, in a deterrent role, it carefully observed the forces of potential adversaries, mainly the USSR and PRC's military forces,

Lastly, in humanitarian assistance, it provided major assistance to the small Indian island nation of Mauritius, which had been hard hit by a tropical cyclone, and gave periodical flood relief to the Philippines.

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pp. 385-386.

<sup>251</sup> The *Pueblo* was a US navy intelligence collection auxiliary ship, which was captured by North Korean gunboats in international waters in the East Sea of Korea on January 23, 1968. The next day, President Johnson ordered a naval task force to go to the East Sea of Korea to press North Korea to return the ship and crews, refer, In-Soo Lim (1992), pp. 61-71; John Whiteclay Chambers II (1999), p. 580.



#### **(4) The Development of the USMC**

##### **(A) General Rise and Fall**

The status of the USMC is a service of the US armed forces that is an integral part of the Department of the US Navy. It is not a branch of the Navy which is its sister service unlike the other countries, i.e., the Royal Marines. As previously mentioned, the size of the USMC was guaranteed at least three marine divisions and three aircraft wings, with a fourth division and wing in organised reserve, by the constitutional legislation in 1952. Given the full activation of the three divisions for the Korean War from the peacetime manning level of 50 percent by the passage of the Public Law 416 as one of the amendments to the National Security Act of 1947, the so-called Marine Corps Bill, the force level was increased from the minimum level of 74,279 in the early 1950s to nearly 250,000 in 1953 at the end of the Korean War.<sup>252</sup> In the aftermath of the Korean War, the size continuously fluctuated with the events of international politics, because of the deficit in the allocated budget.<sup>253</sup>

In these circumstances, despite the constitutional regulations, the Eisenhower<sup>254</sup> administration wanted to downsize the Marine Corps divisions to regimental size units by designation of Major General David Monroe Shoup<sup>255</sup> as the 22<sup>nd</sup> Commandant of

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<sup>252</sup> John Whiteclay Chambers II (1999), p. 416.

<sup>253</sup> For example, the Eisenhower administration forced the USMC to drop to near 200,000 men by the end of FY 1956. In addition, the Congress cut \$ 100 million from the budget and refused to approve the higher manning level despite the attempts of the USMC to keep its number by reducing the procurement request. As a result, the readiness condition of the USMC in terms of personnel and materiel seriously suffered. Allan R. Millett (1980), p. 521.

<sup>254</sup> When he, Dwight D. Eisenhower, was Army Chief of Staff just after WWII, he viewed the USMC as an unwanted competitor with the Army considering shrinking budgetary resources, and favored a reduction to 60,000 men restricting its mission to performing the waterborne aspects of amphibious operations. Refer, Robert Debs Heinl, *Soldiers of the Sea: The United States Marine Corps, 1775-1962* (Annapolis, ML: USNI Press, 1962), p. 515.

<sup>255</sup> Eisenhower thought that it would be better to reduce the size of the USMC, because he joined the USMC after passing the Army ROTC at DePauw University. Apart from that, he never expected to be

the USMC.<sup>256</sup> However, the role of the USMC in overseas operations was not negligible, and amphibious operations were the main feature of most Navy and Marine Corps operations in the 1950s and 60s, e.g., Korea from 1950 to 1953, Lebanon in July 1958, and the Cuban missile crisis in October 1962<sup>257</sup>. In addition, the US depended upon a forward collective defence in Europe and Asia, which required maritime superiority. Finally, just before his resignation, Eisenhower submitted a budget for a Marine Corps of three divisions and three air wings: a total of 175,000 personnel.

With the full engagement of the Vietnam War, the formation and fundamental role of each division was not completely set up until 1969. However, the 3<sup>rd</sup> Marine division was re-reinforced by transferring some elements of the Third MAF from Vietnam, the 8,000-man Ninth Marine Brigade and a 400-man tactical fighter squadron from the First Marine Air Wing, on July 14 1969.<sup>258</sup> In 1971, Secretary of Defence, Laird, put forward the concept that the basic defence posture of the Army would be oriented toward NATO and the Middle East, and the Marines toward Asia.<sup>259</sup> As such, the majority (the 1<sup>st</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> Marine Divisions) in terms of the FMF manpower and forward-deployed forces, became Asia-Pacific oriented. As a result, whatever strategic concept the US chose, i.e., '2 1/2 war' or '1 1/2 war', the size of the USMC remained at least at the level of three divisions and three air wings, the 2<sup>nd</sup> division and 2<sup>nd</sup> Air Wing for Europe, the 3<sup>rd</sup> division, 1<sup>st</sup> independent brigade and 1<sup>st</sup> air wing for the Asia-Pacific region and the 1<sup>st</sup>

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the commandant.

<sup>256</sup> Chester G. Hearn, *An Illustrated History of the United States Marine Corps* (London: Salamander, 2002), p. 166.

<sup>257</sup> As soon as the announcement was made of a naval "quarantine" of Cuba by the Kennedy administration, the US Second Fleet, carrying the II MEB, moved into assault landing positions around the island, San Cristobal, and within eight days, the USMC assembled a task force of 40,000 men, the largest amphibious gathering since Okinawa for a single operation.

<sup>258</sup> William D. Parker, *A Concise History of the United States Marine Corps 1775-1969* (Washington, DC: Historical Division in the HQs of the USMC, 1970), p. 114; *Washington Post*, July 17, 1969.

<sup>259</sup> Francis J. West, "Marines for the Future", *Proceedings*, Vol. 104/2/900 (February 1978), p. 39.

division and 3<sup>rd</sup> air wing for strategic reserve stationed at North Carolina (Camp Lejeune), Okinawa (Camp Butler)/ Iwakuni in Japan, and California (Camp Pendleton) respectively.<sup>260</sup>

### **(B) The Marines in the Pacific**

The 3<sup>rd</sup> Marine Division was disbanded at the end of World War II, but reformed in January 1952 by reinforcing the 3<sup>rd</sup> Marine Brigade, which was formed in June 1951. It was basically sent to Japan to reinforce UN forces in the Far East, but with the withdrawal of the 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division from Korea to Camp Pendleton, it (as a reduced Division) moved to Okinawa in 1955. Prior to its move, the 4<sup>th</sup> Marine Regiment was sent to Hawaii to become the major Marine ground element of the Pacific fleet, now being known as the 1<sup>st</sup> independent Marine Brigade. The 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Air Wing participated in the Korean War being redeployed to Iwakuni in July 1956. In the aftermath of the Korean War, the 3<sup>rd</sup> Marine Division and 1<sup>st</sup> Air Wings were the nucleus of the US classic conventional deterrence against the expansionism of the communist regime as a part of the total US armed forces in the area. However, given the outbreak of the Indochina War, most combat strengths of both units were dispatched to Vietnam. Consequently, the fundamental role and functions of both were seriously diminished during the Vietnam War<sup>261</sup>. In addition, the number of US forces in Okinawa

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<sup>260</sup> NSC-68 did not regulate the size of US conventional forces. As such, the JCS calculated the need of the conventional force to be about twenty-seven Army and Marine Corps divisions, 408 warships, and forty-one Air force and Marine Corps fighter attack wings considering the limited budget. However, they were decreased to seventeen Army and Marine Corps divisions, 376 warships, and twenty-four Air Force and Marine Corps fighter-attack wings. William W. Kaufmann (1982), pp. 2-3; William W. Kaufmann (1982), p. 7; for the details of the USMC bases refer Hunter Keeter, *The US Marine Corps* (Milwaukee, WI: World Almanac Library, 2005), pp. 39-41.

<sup>261</sup> The 9<sup>th</sup> regiment and most aircraft of the 1<sup>st</sup> Air Wing were dispatched. For a while, the manning level of the latter shrank from over 6,000 to 2,700, which was fully recovered with the return of the HQs of the 1<sup>st</sup> Air Wing in April 1971 as the result of the deactivation of the III MAF. See, Paolo E. Coletta (1985), p. 171.

including the 3<sup>rd</sup> Marine Division, began to be reduced in manpower as a result of the Nixon Doctrine. Instead, the US began to deploy 2 amphibious ready groups in the Western Pacific area, which usually consisted of an amphibious assault ship (LHA-LPH) and between two and four other amphibious ships, which could embark a Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU: a battalion size). One of these expanded its operational area to the Mediterranean Sea. They conducted combined landing exercises with the alliance forces, and visited ports, i.e., the 34<sup>th</sup> MEU's exercise with a Turkish infantry battalion on the coast of Turkey southwest of Iskenderun in June 1974 and the following visits to Genoa, Livorno, and Naples.<sup>262</sup> The goal of these exercises included evacuating non-combatants from hostile areas and civil disturbance control techniques.

### **(C) Amphibious lift capability**

Despite the fact that the National Security Act in 1947 reaffirmed the USMC's primary responsibility for amphibious mission, the Navy was disinterested in amphibious mission. As such, the US Navy and administration allocated one and one-third amphibious division lift capabilities to the USMC after the Korean War by the allocation and deployment of a Major GPF plan. As a result, the USMC was always harassed by the absence of an amphibious lift capability, despite the fact that it received new landing ships such as 2 LCC ('Blue Ridge' Class), 7 LPH ('Two Jima' Class) and 2 LHA ('Tarawa' Class) until 1974<sup>263</sup>. Consequently, it is not surprising that the US amphibious lift capability at this time was slightly more than a Marine division/aircraft wing team and supporting elements (approximately 30,000 troops)<sup>264</sup>, which was

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<sup>262</sup> Edwin H. Simmons, "The Marines: Now and In the Future", *Proceedings*, Vol. 101, No. 867 (May 1975), p. 106.

<sup>263</sup> *Jane's Fighting Ships 1975-1976*, the US Amphibious Warfare Ships.

<sup>264</sup> *Jane's Fighting Ships 1975-1976*, the US Amphibious Warfare Ships.

divided about equally between the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets (refer Table 3-4).

#### **(D) Case Study: The USMC in the Vietnam War**


Under the limited war goals of the US, the USMC was engaged in the War from just after the Communist invasion of Laos at the end of 1960, the landing of the Pacific Fleet Marine Forces in Thailand on April 12 1962 and the deployment of the Medium Helicopter Squadron 362 of MAW-1 from Iwakuni to the Mekong Delta area, for example. At the request of the South Vietnam government, the two Battalion Landing Teams (BLTs), BLT 3 of the 9<sup>th</sup> MEF of the Seventh Fleet and BLT 1/3 in the 3<sup>rd</sup> Marine Division in Okinawa landed at Da Nang by the 7<sup>th</sup> Fleet and Marine KC-130s respectively, to secure the air base there to enforce containment against the implicit Soviet expansionism on March 8 1965. In the aftermath of these deployments, the USMC continuously accumulated its combat strength by creating the III MAF (refer Figure 3-1) and supported the South Vietnamese and fought against the VC in innumerable battles until its complete withdrawal in 1975. In the war, it lost 12,926 men killed and 88,594 wounded, and 252 helicopters and 173 fixed-wing aircraft<sup>265</sup>.

Apart from the activities of the USMC with its victories and defeats, and support, the Vietnam War enormously influenced the transition of the USMC from the standpoint of its role and functions, readiness, usefulness in a limited war or insurgency, size and doctrinal development. The US foreign policy objective in the Vietnam War was ultimately to defend South Vietnam from communization by North Vietnam under the justification of NSC-68, which must be secured as the first priority in the region.

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<sup>265</sup> Refer, Chester G. Hearn (2002), pp. 166-183.

**Figure 3-1: The Organisation of the USMC in the Vietnam War**



Source: William D. Parker, *United States Marine Corps 1775-1969* (Washington, DC: Historical Division, HQs of USMC, 1970), pp. 113 & 115.

Even so, given the transition of the military strategy to a flexible response in the nuclear parity era, the ultimate goals of the war were really limited not only to winning a

guerrilla war against the Viet Cong (VC) seen as the representative of a global communist conspiracy backed by the USSR and the PRC, but also to building free institutions in South Vietnam<sup>266</sup>.

The US war planners reflecting their experience in the Korean War<sup>267</sup>, carefully considered the opposition of the PRC to the US presence in Vietnam. It led to the operational area of all allied military forces being limited to South Vietnam; thus they did not invade North Vietnamese territory and restricted themselves to air bombardment.<sup>268</sup> Finally, the US failed to achieve its objectives in the Vietnam War and withdrew all its forces leaving the resultant communisation of the whole of Vietnam. As the above US War aims indicated, the use of the USMC in the Vietnam War was similar to its means of US diplomatic coercion in peacetime.<sup>269</sup> Even though for several reasons, including the ability to carry out nuclear threats, the American compellence strategy against the communists by use of conventional forces failed in terms of the highest level of strategic hierarchy, the USMC deployed in the region demonstrated its usefulness even in the nuclear era, providing a combat readiness coupled with naval sea lift capability and ground combat ability<sup>270</sup> to perform the American containment

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<sup>266</sup> Henry Kissinger (1994), p. 675.

<sup>267</sup> The decision to invade North Korea by the United Nations Command (UNC) in the ROK prompted the open involvement of the PRC in the Korean War, which led to a stalemate on the frontier for two years.

<sup>268</sup> Of course, at the initial stage of the American engagement, the US War aim was not limited, because Congress authorized the President to "take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against forces of the US". William C. Gibbons, *The US Government and the Vietnam War: Executive and Legislative Roles and Relationships. Part IV: July 1965-1968* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995), pp. 102-107.

<sup>269</sup> Coercion includes the use of forces for the purposes of deterrence and compellence. The American wish to change the communists' behaviour was not effective. Refer, David E. Johnson; Karl P. Mueller; William H. Taft, V, *Conventional Coercion across the Spectrum of Operations: The Utility of US Military Forces in the Emerging Security Environment* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2002), pp. 7-54.

<sup>270</sup> Even though it is not easy to evaluate how successful its preparedness was, the USMC had prepared to operate in a counterinsurgency environment exploring all such issues via a series of exercises called Silver Lance. Refer, Victor H. Krulak, *First to Fight: An Inside View of the US Marine Corps*

strategy.

Following the initial deployment, several steps such as the full activation of the III MAF<sup>271</sup>, were made to enlarge the size of the USMC, eliminating the disputes regarding the role and functions of the USMC as well as budgetary concerns. Before the Vietnam War, the USMC had pursued the maintenance of its manning levels relinquishing an additional procurement as well as cutting its budget demands. It is true that the role and functions of the USMC actually duplicated those of the other services as a maritime ground force having air power as well. As a result, it was threatened not only by the other services<sup>272</sup>, but also by the politicians who had concerns over the domestic economic implications of high defence costs, i.e., Eisenhower<sup>273</sup>. However, during the Vietnam War, the size grew from a strength of 190,213 in 1965 to a peak of 314,917 in 1969. Furthermore, its performance during the Vietnam War led to a guarantee of its minimum size and functions by the amendment of the National Security Act of 1947 in 1973, more specifically stating that:

“The Marine Corps, within the Department of the Navy, shall be so organised as to include not less than three combat divisions and three air wings, and such other land combat, aviation, and other services as may be organic therein... The Marine Corps shall develop, in coordination with the Army and Air Force, those phases of amphibious operations that pertain to the tactics, technique, and equipment used by landing forces. The Marine Corps is responsible, in accordance with integrated joint

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(Annapolis, ML: Naval Institute Press, 1984), pp. 179-181.

<sup>271</sup> The remainder of the III MAF and 1<sup>st</sup> Air Wing in Vietnam was deactivated at DaNang on April 14 1971.

<sup>272</sup> One superior competitor arose with the creation of the Strategic Army Corps (STRAC) transported by the US Air Forces Military Airlift Command, which could be quickly deployed by air. As such, the USMC's slogan of “the Nation's versatile amphibious force-in-readiness” seemed to be slowly losing its original meaning. However, the existence of the STRAC stimulated the USMC to modernize its FMF to react to international crises in a readiness mission.

<sup>273</sup> For example, under the Eisenhower administration's policy, the “New Look”, the USMC had little reason for self-assurance. It emphasized the importance of the Air Force's strategic forces, which had the priority to increase the defence budget by cutting the other services' conventional forces. See, Allan R. Millett (1980), pp. 518-519.



mobilization plans, for the expansion of the peacetime components of the Marine Corps to meet the needs of war".<sup>274</sup>

As highlighted, the USMC strengthened its status as an integral part for the US joint operation not just for the defence of the advanced naval bases and amphibious operations. In this regard, the Vietnam War was a turning point for the enlargement of the functions of the USMC.

The Aircraft Wings are a valuable asset of the USMC for attacking the enemy's coastal and interior military installations, capable of striking decisive blows as well as employing rapid maneuverability towards the objectives. For the first category of the Air Wing missions, the 21<sup>st</sup> Commandant of the USMC, General Randolph McCall Pate ordered the development of the concept of vertical envelopment using helicopters to move troops beyond the beachhead in line with its new air-amphibious warfare doctrine under the name of Short Airfield for Tactical Support (SATS) from 1958.<sup>275</sup> With the development of the SATS concept, it allowed the deployment of high performance, tactical aircraft ashore in an area where no airfield had existed just days before. One of the successful developments was the construction of steel matting and arresting equipment built upon a base of laterite over Chu Lai's shifting sands to provide close air support to southern I Corps and northern II corps.<sup>276</sup> Given this construction, the III MAF also enlarged its operations in Quang Tin and Quang Ngai provinces. With this success, the concept of SATS was successfully initiated.

Before the Vietnam War, the operational concept for the USMC Aviation in amphibious

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<sup>274</sup> *National Security Act of 1947, P.L. 80-253* (61 Stat. 495), as Amended through September 30, 1973 (GPO, 1973), pp. 16-17.

<sup>275</sup> Chester G. Hearn (2002), p. 163.

<sup>276</sup> Allan R. Millett (1980), pp. 568-569.

landing operations was not completely successful. As the *Doctrine for Amphibious Operations*<sup>277</sup> suggested, the USMC was in the process of developing the practical use of air assets to improve its mobility. It describes three movements by the helicopters in the process of amphibious assault landings: scheduled, nonscheduled, and on-call helicopter movements, even though it is not easy to find evidence that the USMC employed the helicopters as an assault means in a real amphibious assault landing operation before the Vietnam War. As John Glenn pointed out, the USMC in the Vietnam War very effectively employed its helicopter units in completing troop transport, re-supply, medical evacuation, reconnaissance, and gunship support missions unlike any previous war in history.<sup>278</sup> The use of helicopters to transport some elements from the carrier *Iwo Jima* to directly inland in the first major action between US troops and the VC of the III MAF at Chu Lai in August 1965<sup>279</sup> proved the possibility of them being used as manoeuvre assets in the process of amphibious landing operations. Furthermore, the USMC focused on the further development of the Fleet Marine Force to support its force-in-readiness mission. In the early 1960s, the USMC established a long-range development programme designed for the 1970s and 1980s combining ground and air units, which was called the doctrine of the “Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF)” to enhance its readiness. The success of the gradual accumulation of combat power from a FMF size via the 9<sup>th</sup> MEB to the 3<sup>rd</sup> MAF according to the progress of the crisis situation provided a cornerstone for the further development of the concept.

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<sup>277</sup> The US Department of the Navy, Office of the CNO and HQs of the USMC, *FM 31-11, NWP 22 (A), LFM 01, Doctrine for Amphibious Operations* (July 1, 1962).

<sup>278</sup> Kathleen D. Valenzi (ed.), *Forged in Steel: US Marine Corps Aviation* (Charlottesville, Virginia: Howell Press, 1987), p. 19.

<sup>279</sup> Chester G. Hearn (2002), p. 171-172.

To conclude, the basic role of the USMC in the region proved its utility in a compellence role against the expansion of the communist regime as a force-in-readiness of the whole American defence system as it had shown in the Korean War by contributing to the protection of South Korea from communisation<sup>280</sup>, although it failed in the Vietnam War for several reasons<sup>281</sup>. Without a war, it was certainly a deterrent force to suppress disputes and conflicts in the Asia-Pacific region. The Vietnam War was a great opportunity for the USMC not only to prove its ability in conventional and counterinsurgency warfare as a part of both the US forces in Vietnam and the Vietnamese military forces via numerous successful operations, but also to test its readiness and doctrines in having both ground and air components. As a result, the position of the USMC as a service contributing to a joint operation together with the other services has been taken for granted with the revision of the National Security Act of 1947.

## **B. SNI**

### **(1) The Soviet Interests/ Foreign Policy**

After WWII, the USSR emerged as one of the supreme powers in the bipolar international political system, dominating the Communist regimes of the East. The principal national aim was to maintain itself in power. The second objective was to expand its power throughout the world based on the original Leninist dogma of world revolution that the Soviet government should assist and encourage revolution in all

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<sup>280</sup> In the Korean War, the US assumed that the USSR would not tolerate a successful American initiative, despite the fact that its nuclear power was superior to that of the USSR. As such, the aim of the termination of the war was to return to the status quo ante.

<sup>281</sup> This is because South Vietnam was finally communized, despite the Marines' massive casualties and many successful operations in the Vietnam War.

industrial countries, since the “capitalist-imperialist” system was on the point of collapse due to its own inherent contradictions and class hatred. However, the industrial democracies, notably the countries of Western Europe, surmounted the very serious economic and colonial issues without collapsing. Furthermore, the will of the US to protect this region with nuclear and conventional strengths obliged the Soviet leaders<sup>282</sup> to turn their expectation of revolution toward the Third World where their ideological propaganda could work. As such, the attribute of the second aim by means of ideology had a completely different pattern compared with the imperial expansion of Tsarist Russia initiated mainly from the era of Peter the Great in the 18<sup>th</sup> Century<sup>283</sup>.

Despite the fact that the USSR had a great capacity for policy initiatives in terms of ideological and military power, its foreign policies and interests were affected by the US security interests. However, it was historically true that the Soviet role in Asia reflected serious ambivalences and contradictions. For example, as Fred Greene has written, it seems from some aspects that the Sino-Soviet dispute affected the establishment of the USSR’s foreign policy goals with regard to Japan by way of seeking to break the American-Japanese alliance<sup>284</sup>. In fact, in the USSR high commander’s view, with the steady worsening of the Sino-Soviet conflict and the PRC’s acquisition of nuclear weapons<sup>285</sup>, it was helpful to contain the Chinese threat.<sup>286</sup> Having no possibility of

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<sup>282</sup> It was likely that the risks of a conventional invasion of Western Europe were actually greater than any prospective gains.

<sup>283</sup> The RNI was officially founded in this era, but it, including the navy, virtually returned to non-existence. The priority of foreign policy shifted to the land after the death of Peter. See, Paul Dukes, *A History of Russia: Medieval, Modern, Contemporary* (London: Macmillan, 1974), pp. 94-95.

<sup>284</sup> However, the USSR confronted a basic dilemma in association with the Japanese acquisition of nuclear warheads. In any event, the relationship would break down or Japan pursues its own course. As Michael Sheehan has discussed, the USSR had to adjust and refine the balance of power in response to that phenomenon, since Japan might emerge as one of the great powers in this region given its background of military as well as economic power. See, Michael Sheehan, *The Balance of Power: History and Theory* (London: Routledge, 1996), 13.

<sup>285</sup> When the PRC tried to obtain nuclear weapons, the USSR first provided technical support. However,

tying Japan into the Communist regime, the USSR tried to loosen their relationship with the US and move Japan into a nonaligned posture. In the above circumstances, the Soviet foreign policy objectives have inevitably seen equally significant shifts toward the Pacific, in particular, in the region of Northeast Asia in order to establish a new balance of power more favourable to the USSR through the relaxation of tension with the West. According to the realist image of international relations<sup>287</sup>, the priority of the foreign policy goal was to free their hands for the growing opportunities (the Vietnam War) and the difficulties (the Sino-Soviet split) that confronted the USSR throughout Asia.<sup>288</sup> Since the military clashes on the Ussuri River in 1969, the Soviet Union had considered the PRC as its main enemy and *vice versa*.<sup>289</sup>

Nonetheless, as conceived in the Brezhnev Doctrine<sup>290</sup>, for the USSR, Eastern Europe had a major strategic purpose (the role of a Buffer Zone from their potential enemies and rivals as well as advanced land military bases), in addition to their economic and ideological importance for its long-term goal to extend influence over the Western half of Europe. In this region, the Soviet foreign policy goal was to firmly establish its sphere of influence using its armed forces, for example, the invasion of Czechoslovakia by Soviet and other Warsaw Pact forces in August 1968, so much of the West's attention

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the USSR stopped and suddenly withdrew this support as the dispute developed. Then it began to discuss with the US the limitation of the proliferation of such weapons.

<sup>286</sup> Fred Greene (1968), pp. 44-45.

<sup>287</sup> As Michael Sheehan had discussed, the realist insists that the activities of a state are inevitably focused on achieving the short term or immediate goals of security and survival rather than its long-term future vision and security. Michael Sheehan (1996), p. 8.

<sup>288</sup> ISC (the Institute for the Study of Conflict) Special Report, "The Peacetime Strategy of the Soviet Union", in *Strategic Review* (Washington, DC: US Strategic Institute, Summer 1973), p. 66.

<sup>289</sup> Ralph N. Clough (1975), p. 133.

<sup>290</sup> The Brezhnev Doctrine assisted in sustaining Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe giving a justification for Warsaw Pact states to intervene in a state that challenged to the supremacy of the Communist regime. Michael Sheehan & James H. Wylie, *The Economist Pocket Guide to Defence* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell Ltd, 1986), pp. 37-38.

had been focused on attaching great importance to Soviet foreign policy in Europe. The reason for this was that despite its long-term goal, the strategic and political conditions of Western Europe were unfavourable to both spontaneous revolution and military conquest<sup>291</sup>. As such, the Soviet leadership seemed to have a short-term objective by way of hindering closer union between Western countries including the exclusion of the US from Europe by the relaxation of tension.

With the above worsening of the international political situation, the Soviet expansionist policy rapidly moved to concentrate on the Middle East, the Indian sub-continent and South East Asia<sup>292</sup>, where the Soviet leadership appreciated that a successful subversion of a country in any of these three areas would create a momentum for further expansion. In this manner, basic foreign political and strategic interests depended on the situation and occasion, in which the industrial countries had not collapsed from within and could not be overthrown by invasion, but must be changed by way of moral or political support by providing ideological, political and military training in order to achieve the second aim.

To summarize the characteristics of the Soviet interests in this period, on the one hand, it had competed with the US as a global power but had to accept minimum obligations

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<sup>291</sup> In this period, despite the fact that the USSR and WTO allies held more powerful conventional forces, the balance of power in Europe could be maintained due to the nature of the nuclear weapons deployed mainly by the US. The reason for this is that the nuclear and conventional balances usually interact with each other. See, Michael Sheehan (1996), pp. 181-185.

<sup>292</sup> From some aspects, it seems that the USSR approached Indochina from a worry that the US power vacuum would be filled by the PRC unless suitable measures to establish countervailing Soviet influence were adopted as a part of rival competition with the PRC for the suzerain state of communism. See, J.L.S. Girling, "Russia and Indochina in the International Perspective", *International Affairs*, Vol. 49, Issue 4 (October 1973), pp. 608-609.

instead of getting any rights and privileges<sup>293</sup>. For example, in the Vietnam War where the US was actively involved with increasing intensity, the Soviet leadership hesitated to act as an intermediary in order to maintain a peaceful coexistence. Consequently, the only thing that the USSR could do for North Vietnam was to support it unofficially in the form of military advisers and technicians or providing supplies. Put simply, the Soviet autocracy did not want to be involved in the war under the justifications of avoiding nuclear war and offering protection against PRC adventurism by keeping its flexible relation with the US<sup>294</sup>.

On the other hand, it shared a sociopolitical system with the PRC, but its responsibilities as the centre of a revolutionary movement began to erode by allowing the PRC to denounce it as being an ideological turncoat. In South and Southeast Asia, it formed a rivalry with the PRC rather than the US in the late 1960s and early 1970s despite the fact that it had successfully maintained a presence there<sup>295</sup>. For example, India, which is located adjacent to the PRC, which had attacked it in 1962, and made frequent military incursions along the frontier, was not protected by a nuclear umbrella so it wanted to possess nuclear weapons. However, the Indian desire for the possession of nuclear weapons did not meet with the favour of the USSR so India realigned its policy towards a rapprochement with PRC, and furthermore criticized the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia.<sup>296</sup>

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<sup>293</sup> Vernon V. Aspaturian, "Soviet Foreign Policy", in Roy C. Macridis (ed.), *Foreign Policy in World Politics* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc, 1976, 5<sup>th</sup> ed.), p. 154.

<sup>294</sup> P. M. H. Bell (2001), p. 278.

<sup>295</sup> Roy C. Macridis (1976), p. 155.

<sup>296</sup> As Kirsch has pointed out, by examining the Soviet proposal for an Asian collective security system as represented in the edition of *Izvestia* on May 28, 1969, it seems that the Soviet security aims were to contain the PRC; to prevent Japan, India, and others from allying with China against the Soviet Union. Marian P. Kirsch (1970), pp. 461-464.

To conclude, the relaxation of tensions with the West enabled the USSR to pursue at least three main foreign policy aims with powerful economic-technological foundations and the possession of advanced technological weapons including thermonuclear warheads and ICBM delivery systems.

Firstly, to continuously pursue its own relaxation of tension with the US and the West including Japan in the context of facing challenges on two fronts that *inter alia* the conflict with the PRC (the only declared foe at that time) was the urgent matter<sup>297</sup>,

Secondly, in order to solidify the *de facto* alliance in Eastern Europe as represented by the WTO, it declared the so-called 'Brezhnev Doctrine' that communist countries must subordinate their independence to the interests of communism,

Thirdly, to enlarge its influence throughout the world by creating allies via supporting the revolutionary movements and intervening in a number of regions where the interests were not clashing with the US, e.g., the Caribbean, the Middle East and Southeast/west Asia in order to preserve and expand the Soviet system.

## **(2) Military Strategy/ Policy**

In pursuit of the above foreign policy objectives, the USSR needed strong military power to buttress its relations with selected nonaligned nations on the back of economic assistance. Given its geo-strategic position in that it occupied about half of Europe and two fifths of Asia, and that the boundary was divided into five sectors<sup>298</sup>, the Russians did not always feel free from invasion, or the perceived threats from its ubiquitous enemies, and the traditional economic and industrial inferiority compared to the West.

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<sup>297</sup> One Moscow action was an attempt to make the Mongolian People's Republic a member of the WTO in that the USSR had ratified a twenty-year mutual assistance treaty in 1966. It meant that the USSR could exploit the armed forces of the WTO in the defense of its Asian borders with the PRC. However, it failed to get the WTO members agreement to do that, in which they did not want to broaden their forces activities from a European to a global scale. Refer, Jay B. Sorenson, "Asian Defense-Soviet Style", *Far Eastern Economic Review*, Vol. 66, No. 29 (July 1969), p. 84-85.

<sup>298</sup> The five sectors are the North (the long Arctic Ocean coast), the East (the long Pacific Ocean coast; neighbours: the US and Japan), the Southeast (a long international boundary; neighbours: Mongolian People's Republic, China and North Korea), the Southwest (neighbours: Afghanistan, Iran, and Turkey), and the West (neighbours: its six COMECON partners). J.P. Cole (1974), pp. 256-278.



In this situation, it appears, as widely recognized by the historical commentators<sup>299</sup>, that the USSR pursued absolute security, whilst it threatened to create absolute insecurity for its neighbours and other states by adopting a threatening force posture. It is most likely that the concept of security was regarded as resting on the strength of its military power, considering that the Soviet security concerns had greatly evolved by its virtual encirclement after the Second World War and the Sino-Soviet split.

With regard to the size and amount of weaponry for a military force build up, it was likely that they were affected not only by Russia's traditional emphasis on 'bigness' as a symbol of 'goodness' or 'greater effectiveness', but also by the deep-rooted Russian-Soviet sense of insecurity.<sup>300</sup> There were at least two theories related to the Russian image: Mikhail V. Frunze's understanding in the 1920s in the early stages of Soviet military doctrinal development that multimillion-man armies would be necessary in the future, and the principle of 'quantity and quality of divisions' in Stalin's five permanently operating factors<sup>301</sup> asserted during the Second World War.<sup>302</sup> The latter was the decisive principle of the military force buildup in the postwar period until 1960. In this way, the buildup of Soviet military forces and weaponry was decided on the basis of the belief that, as the leading socialist state, it should possess a superior military capability in terms of size and number of arms regardless of nuclear and conventional troops, unlike the US strategic concept of examining possible future wars. The Soviet fear of insecurity, and encirclement by hostile forces, was enhanced by the series of

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<sup>299</sup> The Soviet leaders were deeply concerned with international relations, and tried to put into practice their policy of 'peaceful coexistence' in the world, when they did not possess overwhelming force. Refer, Paul Dukes (1974), pp. 2-3.

<sup>300</sup> Dennis Ross, "Rethinking Soviet Strategic Policy: Inputs and Implications", *The Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol. 1, No. 1 (May 1978), pp. 4-5.

<sup>301</sup> These were stability of the rear, morale of the troops, quantity and quality of divisions, armaments of the army, and organizational ability of command personnel in the army.

<sup>302</sup> Harriet Fast Scott & William F. Scott (1988), pp. 6-18.

alliances erected by the US in the 1950s around the periphery of the USSR and the communist camp<sup>303</sup>, the Sino-Soviet dispute in the late 1950s and by the unreliability of the Warsaw Pact alliances with the riots in East Germany and Poland.

In the post-Stalin era, the Soviet Minister of Defence, Marshall Georgiy K. Zhukov, suggested a direction for the future military force buildup in his address to the Communist Party Congress:

“In structuring the Soviet Armed Forces, we proceed from the fact that the methods and forms of future war will be different from all past wars in many ways. Future war, if it is unleashed, will be characterized by the mass use of air forces, thermonuclear, chemical and bacteriological weapons. However, we proceed from the fact of the latest weapons, including weapons of mass destruction. Without strong ground forces, without strategic, long-range and frontal aviation and a modern naval fleet, without well-organized cooperation between them, modern war cannot be waged.”<sup>304</sup>

At that time, the traditional services were considered as a fairly important means for a possible future war, seeing nuclear weapons as augmenting the traditional role of artillery. However, with the beginning of a revolution in military affairs, the Soviets tried to examine the essence, purpose, and character of a possible war and the preparation of the country and its armed forces for war. For a while, until the beginning of the 1960s under the Khrushchev regime<sup>305</sup>, the priority for military buildup shifted to the importance of the Strategic Rocket Forces and the Air Defence Forces<sup>306</sup>. This

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<sup>303</sup> For example, NATO in Europe, CENTO in the Northern tier of the Middle East, SEATO and ANZUS in the Southeast Asia, the Pacific, and the bilateral alliances with Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and the Philippines were viewed as the threat of encirclement. Raymond L. Garthoff, “Soviet Perceptions of Western Strategic Thought and Doctrine”, Gregory Flynn (ed.), *“Soviet Military Doctrine and Western Policy”* (New York: Routledge, 1989), p. 272.

<sup>304</sup> Harriet Fast Scott & William F. Scott (1988), p. 21.

<sup>305</sup> For example, he proposed in the Supreme Soviet in 1960 to reduce the armed forces by 1,200,000 men and dispose of military aviation and surface ships, though it would not be achieved. Timothy Garden (1984), p. 51.

<sup>306</sup> The Soviet doctrine stated that “The main role in the war will be played by the Strategic Rocket

priority was highlighted by the political ascendancy over the military leadership, that is, the bureaucratized nature of Soviet institutions, i.e., the *Politburo*, as well as the ultimate goal of the military force build up, 'the safety of the homeland'.

The development of the Soviet doctrine focusing on the size and composition of military forces, taking into account the possibility of waging war with conventional weapons, and the inauguration of Brezhnev to the seat of power in the Kremlin, significant resources were given to all services, although not completely in the same way, accepting the new doctrine of the possibility of wars to be fought and won with or without the use of nuclear weapons. From this time, the Soviets drove ahead to achieve radical improvement in their position in all aspects of military power. According to an analysis by Arthur J. Alexander, among the Soviet services, whilst the share of total budget spending fell by 20% from 1970 to 1975, the growth of the other services increased in the order of the SRF, Air Force, the ground forces and the Navy.<sup>307</sup> Consequently, the traditional principles for military forces buildup, 'sufficiency' and 'superiority', were influenced by the transitions in the Soviet military doctrine, that the necessity of winning a war in the nuclear era would require both masses of men and equipment, and balanced forces for the joint action of all services of the armed forces in order to survive nuclear exchanges and to fight globally on continent-wide fronts.

The goals of military force construction in association with its concept of 'absolute security' to seek world domination would be summarized as being for the safety of the

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Forces and also by troops of PVO (anti-air defence) and PRO (anti-missile defence)", see Harriet Fast Scott & William F. Scott (1988), p. 59.

<sup>307</sup> Arthur J. Alexander, "Decision-Making in Soviet Weapons Procurement", *Adelphi Papers*, No. 147/8, (Winter 1978/9), p. 5.

homeland, the inviolability of Soviet predominance in Eastern Europe, ‘friendly’ powers on the Soviet periphery, and the entitlement to a role at least equal to that of the US.<sup>308</sup>

The first goal would be satisfied by the establishment of the satellite countries on its periphery, i.e., Eastern Europe and the possession of the nuclear weapons equal to or outnumbering the US by the end of this period (refer Table 3-6).

**Table 3-6: Historical Changes of Nuclear Strength**

Classification	1964			1969			1974		
	USA	USSR	Remarks	USA	USSR	Remarks	USA	USSR	Remarks
ICBM <sup>a</sup>	834	200	+634	1,054	1,050	+4	1,054	1,575	-521
SLBM <sup>b</sup>	416	120	+196	656	160	+494	656	720	-64
Bombers <sup>c</sup>	630	190	+440	560	150	+410	437	140	+297
Total	1,880	510	+1,270	2,270	1,360	+908	2,147	2,435	-288

<sup>a</sup>: ICBM (range 4000+ mile); IRBM (1,500-4,000); MRBM (500-1,500); SRBM (under 500)

<sup>b</sup>: USA (UGM-27C *Polaris A3*: 2,880 miles, 1964, UGM-73A *Poseidon*: 2,880, 1971),  
USSR (SS-N-5 *Serb*: 750, 1964, SS-N-6 *Sawfly*: 1,750, 1969, SS-N-8: 4,800, 1972)

<sup>c</sup>: Long-range Bombers (long range: over 6,000 miles, medium: 3,500-6,000)

Source: IISS, *The Military Balance 1974-1975*, pp. 73-75.

For the second goal, it deployed massive conventional forces, more than half of the total Warsaw Pact forces in numbers of divisions and manpower needless to say together with their holdings of equipment and armament (refer Table 3-7).

**Table 3-7: The Theatre Balance between NATO and the Warsaw Pact**

Classification		NATO	Warsaw Pact	Of which USSR	Remarks (%)
Division equivalents	Armoured	18	40	24	60
	Inf, mech and airb	45	60	26	48
	Total	63	100	50	50
Combat/ direct support Troops		1,170,000	1,265,000	715,000	56
Main Battle Tanks		10,000	26,500	14,100	53
Tactical Aircraft		2,848	5,250	3,070	60

Notes: 1. Inf (Infantry), Mech (Mechanized), Airb (Airborne)

Source: IISS, *The Military Balance 1974-75*, pp. 95-100.

<sup>308</sup> Helmut Sonnenfeldt and William G. Hyland, “Soviet Perspectives on Security”, *Adelphi Papers*, No. 150 (Spring 1979), p. 16.

The justification for military intervention in its satellite communist countries was strengthened by the Brezhnev doctrine. In stark contrast, the Soviet military strength in the Far East was not enough to deter even the PRC from the standpoint of a simple comparison of the number of divisions (refer Table 3-1), if it had not possessed an overwhelming nuclear arsenal compared with the Chinese. The main reason for maintaining 'conventional superiority' would result in both a change in Soviet military doctrine that war might be controlled and not necessarily become nuclear, and the fact that a protracted conventional war would be very risky because of the weaker infrastructure of the USSR.<sup>309</sup> In this sense, the priority of Soviet military forces buildup like that of its foreign policy was given a great deal of weight in the European theatre during this period.

### **(3) Maritime Strategy/ Policy**

The Russian thinker, Alexander Herzen, more than one hundred years ago, called the Pacific "the Mediterranean of the future", a place unmarred by "mouldy prejudice, stagnant ideas, envious parochialism and stationary civilization".<sup>310</sup> With the victory over Japan in the Second World War, the US and USSR met each other across the Pacific, which began to assume an ever-growing importance in the invisible struggle between expansionists and defenders<sup>311</sup>. With the acquisitions of the strategically important potential naval bases, such as the Kurile Islands and Sakhalin, as well as the indication that the Soviet navy would be adapted to operate overseas, the naval strategy

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<sup>309</sup> Willard C. Frank & Philip S. Gillette, *Soviet Military Doctrine from Lenin to Gorbachev, 1915-1991* (West Port, CT: Greenwood, 1992), p. 8.

<sup>310</sup> Alexander Herzen, *America and Russia: In a Russian Discovery of America* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1986), p. 283.

<sup>311</sup> Whilst the US occupies a central position with respect to SLOC, the USSR/Russia is located in the Eurasian Heartland having advantageous interior lines of land communication in the area. See, Colin S. Gray (1986), p. 11.

also started to be rapidly amended<sup>312</sup>. However, not only with the geographical restraints on the use of the outlets (the Tsugaru, Tsushima and Soya straits) to the East Sea by Japan, more realistically used by the US, but also with the transition in Soviet military strategy, the USSR paid attention to improving its naval capabilities particularly in the fields of submarine and missile technology.<sup>313</sup> In fact, the US naval policy and its strength had always been the main focus of Soviet naval attention after 1945.

As most strategists have observed, Soviet naval construction mainly focused on submarines and cruisers until 1955 under the control of the Soviet Minister of the Navy, N. G. Kuznetsov.<sup>314</sup> On January 6 1956, Admiral Sergei Gorshkov replaced the intrepid Kuznetsov who had contracted an illness at that time. He directly projected the plan for the build-up of new types of submarines and warships useful in the nuclear and missile age<sup>315</sup>. Meanwhile, in about 1955-56, Nikita Khrushchev, the secretary of the Central Committee of the Party, concluded that military expenditure was enormous. It was absolutely necessary to decrease this through justifying and unifying most forms of

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<sup>312</sup> For example, the submarine building programme based on the 1948 projection planned to build a total of 1,200 submarines until 1965, but the project was curtailed to one-third of the original plan due to the main mission of the Soviet navy, the defence of the Motherland. See, John Moore, *Seapower and Politics* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1979), pp. 46-147.

<sup>313</sup> Even though the Soviet leadership did not then understand the importance of seapower, they had been affected by German submarines and the victory of the US in the Pacific. As a result, they pursued a strong navy in certain branches as a requisite fulfillment of the leading power of the Eastern hemisphere. As Western attention by the end of 1950s was concentrated on nuclear weapons, on the new range of missiles and rockets, and air strength, the USSR also invested in similar areas. See, Donald W. Mitchell (1974), pp. 475-476.

<sup>314</sup> The Soviet Ministry of Navy was reintroduced in July 1951, but the Navy was re-subordinated into the central Defence Ministry after Stalin's death. At that time, Kuznetsov's main concern was to possess enough immediately available ships, though they were not the latest ships, to raise a large number of sailors in order to operate the new ships. In this context, he deserved the credit for paving the road to Soviet naval expansion. Refer, George Katkov and Jan Kowalewski, "The Russian Navy and the Revolution", in M. G. Saunders (1958), pp. 99-100.

<sup>315</sup> Admiral Sergei G. Gorshkov was called the father of the modern Soviet Navy as well as a proponent of submarines and small missile-armed combatants. He was appointed head of the navy at the Twentieth Party Congress in 1956.

military expenditure with the support of Marshal Zhukov<sup>316</sup>. Given this reformation of the Soviet armed forces reflecting the severely critical opinion of Khrushchev about naval investment, the number of naval personnel was reduced from about 600,000 to less than 500,000 by a carefully thought-out plan concerning the value of a conventional surface navy and naval aviation.<sup>317</sup> As a result of this reformation, the USSR was able to possess technologically significant items such as atomic and thermonuclear weapons, nuclear-propelled submarines, “*Sputniks*”, as well as the reconstituted Soviet navy in terms of size, variety and progress. In the 1950s, the USSR considered the US carriers<sup>318</sup>, which were capable of attacking with nuclear bombs, as one of the primary threats. Faced by the rise of US surface and air power in distant sea areas, the priority turned to constructing nuclear submarine forces<sup>319</sup>, which were generally regarded as a strategic nuclear deterrent force due to their stealthy and nuclear-propelled manoeuvrabilities<sup>320</sup>, and antisubmarine ships, i.e., *Moskva*-class ASW programme. In addition to that, for reasons of geography, the Soviet Fleet had to be separated into four areas, the Northern, the Baltic, the Black Sea and the Far East. In the case of an all-out nuclear war, active cooperation with one another because of the distances involved would make timely help for one unique military objective impossible. In this situation, it was natural that the build-up of very rapid and powerful submarines would have

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<sup>316</sup> Zhukov was the most powerful military character of the post-war era, and tried to prevent the military affairs from being controlled by the Communist Party. However, owing to his powerful leadership, he was dismissed from his high office in October 1957. Jan Kowalewski, “the Russian Navy and the Revolution: (b) 1921 to 1958, in M. G. Saunders (1958), p. 98.

<sup>317</sup> Donald W. Mitchell (1974), pp. 477-8. The abolition of the SNI was not connected to this reduction, because it had happened in the early 1950s.

<sup>318</sup> At that time, the primary concern of the USSR was the US strategic bombers, i.e., 1,750 in 1959, but the US maritime capability was limited to conventional air strikes from carriers that would have to close to within range of Soviet shore-based air forces. Michael McGwire, “Gorshkov’s Navy: Part I”, *Proceedings*, Vol. 115/8/1038 (August 1989), p. 44.

<sup>319</sup> For example, the Echo I and II nuclear-powered guided missile (SSGN) submarines, and the Yankee I, II / Delta-classes nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs).

<sup>320</sup> Steve F. Kime, “A Soviet Navy for the Nuclear Age”, *National Security Affairs Issue Paper 80-81* (Washington, DC: NDUP, 1980), pp. 11-12.

priority over the other maritime branches.<sup>321</sup>

In conjunction with the above developments of sea power, much of which was allocated to the Far East, the USSR greatly expanded its naval bases in the Pacific area, e.g., Vladivostok (main base and headquarters of the Soviet Navy), Russki island (Submarine bases at Novich Bay), Nakhodka (the smaller submarines), Sovietskaya Gavan, Korsakov (a shipyard and submarine base), Nagayevo (submarine base and repair facilities), Petropavlovsk (submarine base), and Providence Bay.<sup>322</sup> In addition to these well-equipped and strategically located bases, the USSR could access most of the harbour facilities of the PRC and DPRK. It appeared that the USSR had obtained valuable bases in order to project its naval power into the Pacific area, which meant that the critical drawbacks of the geography of the USSR, with its limited access to the open oceans, had partly been solved.

It is still unclear whether the primary purpose of Soviet naval expansion until the early 1960s was defensive or whether it assumed a more aggressive offensive posture. In either case, it is undeniable that Soviet naval expansion seriously affected not only the countries located near the four major Soviet naval fleets<sup>323</sup>, but also the countries of the Third World. However, it is more reasonable to affirm that considering both its naval strength and its geographical position, as most strategists have argued, the entire *raison*

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<sup>321</sup> The transfer of warships from Europe to the Far East was a very difficult matter because of the limitation of sea routes. The only available passage was the Northern, some 6,000 miles long, which is only open in the summer season. In order to overcome this limitation, the USSR developed icebreakers, e.g., the icebreaker *Lenin* that was able to cut a way through nearly nine feet of ice, but it was not a satisfactory situation. See, Rear-Admiral A. D. Nicholl, "Geography and Strategy", in M. G. Saunders (1958), pp. 244-246.

<sup>322</sup> M. G. Saunders (1958), pp. 276-277.

<sup>323</sup> Geoffrey Kemp, "Maritime Access and Maritime Power: The Past, the Persian Gulf, and the Future", in Alvin J. Cottrell and Associates (eds.), *Sea Power and Strategy in the Indian Ocean* (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1981), pp. 51-52.



*d'être* of the Navy was to protect the mainland of the Soviet Union from aggression particularly in the form of an assault from the sea. Consequently, despite the fact that the Soviet leadership perceived the importance of maintaining a substantial naval power, the navy's missions by then were: (1) territorial defence against bombardment and amphibious assault; (2) area defence against incursions into Soviet sea-space, by enemy surface units and submarines; (3) reinforcement and support of the Army.<sup>324</sup> These missions motivated the massive construction programme focusing on cruisers, destroyers and submarines, but this was curtailed since their mission of area defence was able to be performed by ships armed with cruise missiles via the success of the techno-scientific revolution in the military affairs rather than the large gun-armed surface combatants.

Even so, in totally altering the balance of the roles and functions of the Soviet navy in this period, two major difficulties had to be faced. The first was a wider debate about the question of *détente*: about arms control, the importance of the Third World, and a whole range of defence issues concerning deterrence, e.g., the risk and likelihood of nuclear war, the type and length of war. The second was the problem of the cleavage between the naval and domestic political leadership which appeared in opposition to Gorshkov, and which had rejected the naval leaderships' advocacy of seapower. As a result, the characteristics of Soviet naval development and its role could be summarized as a reflection of the compromise between the extreme positions of the Soviet leadership biased in favour of nuclear and techno based military services such as the Strategic Rocket Forces.

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<sup>324</sup> John Jordan, *An illustrated Guide to the Modern Soviet Navy* (London: Salamander Books Ltd, 1982), p. 6.

In addition, there were two schools of thought within the Soviet navy about the best option to meet the demands of defending Russia against attack from the sea during the 1960s<sup>325</sup> as represented in the magazine, *Morskoi sbornik*. Whilst one, represented by Gorshkov, favoured a well-balanced mix of naval forces, submarines, aircraft, surface ships and amphibious forces, who thought that a well-balanced fleet would be effective in both nuclear and non-nuclear war, the other, e.g., Professor Admiral Panteleev and Admiral Kharlamov, asserted that the Soviet navy could discharge its mission with nuclear submarines and aircraft given the background of their contention that “the concentration of large numbers of different types of forces is sometimes simply wasteful and sometimes it is just not possible”.<sup>326</sup> In the 1967 article in *Morskoi sbornik* entitled “The development of the Soviet naval art”, Gorshkov provided the counterargument in the above context based on “The naval history” and “The Leninist principles of Soviet Military Science”. At the time, the Soviet navy was contesting the US’s unhindered use of the seas for the projection of its military power. Consequently, it was necessary for the Soviet navy to keep a more assertive posture, so it required more ships on station and in continuous deployment and at forward bases as well as power projection forces.

Furthermore, in the aftermath of the article, there was increasing use of naval forces for specifically political purposes in more distant regions of the world; the Mediterranean after the six day war on 5 – 11 June in 1967, the Indian Ocean from 1968, the Caribbean and West Africa from 1969 and South East Asia in 1970. As a result, the sharp increase in Soviet naval forces was a natural consequence and it brought about a somewhat

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<sup>325</sup> Michael K. MccGwire, “Advocacy of Seapower in an Internal Debate”, in Robert G. Weinland; Michael K. MccGwire; James M. McConnell, “Admiral Gorshkov on ‘Navies in War and Peace’ ”, *Center for Naval Analyses Report, No. CRC 257* (Arlington, Virginia: Center for Naval Analyses, September 1974), pp. 21-36 (hereafter cited as *CRC 257*).

<sup>326</sup> *CRC 257*, p. 57.

severely overstretched build-up from 1967 onwards (see Table 3-8). In the end, there arose the second round of a full-dress debate about the roles, functions and missions of the Soviet navy, which began from the early 1970s.

**Table 3-8: A Comparison of the Soviet Naval Strengths in 1964 and 1975**

Classifications	Component	1964	1975	Remarks
Manpower	Naval Air/ NI/ Total	n.a /n.a / 460,000	75,000/17,000/475,000	+17,500
Submarines	Nuclear/ Diesel	30 / 400	70 / 175	+40/ -225
Surface	Cruisers	20	32	+12
	Destroyers	105	78	-27
	FPB with SSM (not all)	400	438	+38
	Other vessels	1,900	903	-997
Naval Aircraft		800	715	-85
Deployment	Northern Fleet	150 Sub	160 Sub (80 SSN), 56 MSCS	
	Baltic Fleet	70 Sub	30 Sub, 50 MSCS	
	Black Sea Fleet	50 Sub	20 Sub, 60 MSCS	
	Pacific Fleet	120 Sub	100 Sub (40 SSN), 55 MSCS	

Notes: 1. n.a (not available), FPB (Fast Patrol Boats), SSM (Surface-to-surface Missiles), MSCS (Major Surface Combat Ships)

2. Its expansion was not impressive in numbers of vessels, because many ships were retired from their active services. However, the Soviet Navy improved its quality, i.e., its increase of the SLBM to 720 (in 70 nuclear submarines).

3. The number of deployment means average strengths only.


Sources: IISS, *The Military Balance 1964-1965*, pp. 5-6; *1974-1975*, pp. 9-10.

In accordance with this development, the Soviet Pacific Naval forces increased in activities as well as in scale (see Figure 3-2).<sup>327</sup> First of all, they enlarged their operational range to the East China Sea and most of the Western Pacific area including near Alaska (the Aleutian Islands area of the US) and Hawaii. It exercised for the first time on a global scale with the *Okean-70* manoeuvres in April 1970 involving the participation of some 30 cruisers and numerous aircraft of the Pacific fleet, which

<sup>327</sup> The Japanese Defence Agency, *Defence of Japan 1976* (English Version), pp. 17-18.

stretched as far south as the neighbourhood of Guam.<sup>328</sup> Two more similar large-scale oceanic exercises were also held in the summers of 1971 and 1973.

**Figure 3-2: Outline of Soviet Navy's Ocean Manoeuvres in the Western Pacific**



Source: The Japanese Defence Agency, *Defence of Japan 1976*, p. 18.

Next, intelligence ships including scientific research vessels and fishing survey ships operated routinely around Japan and most of the Pacific area to gather information. Their activities in the East China Sea could be interpreted as threatening the East coast of the PRC as a result of their dispute. Lastly, whilst naval ships made port visits to only 2 countries, the PRC and Indonesia in the late 1950s in the Asia-Pacific region, they visited about 14 countries and 20 ports in this period, including the US (Honolulu, San

<sup>328</sup> According to an analysis by Michael K. McGwire, the exercise implied the Soviet navy's readiness to repel attacks on Russia and to launch its own strikes as well as the reference to 'US imperialism' being limited to Southeast Asia. See, *CRC 257*, p. 36.

Francisco, Seattle) and Japan (Tokyo, Yokohama), but excluding the PRC and Indonesia.<sup>329</sup> Judging from this string of movements and manoeuvres, the Soviet Navy had developed to the level of a “blue water” navy.

#### **(4) The Developments of the SNI**

##### **(A) General Rise and Fall**

Meanwhile, the naval infantry units subordinated to the coastal defence units were reorganized as one of the official branches of the Soviet Navy in the relevant fleet in 1961<sup>330</sup>. Gorshkov perceived the greatest potential threat to their homeland as being from the US maritime power in the Pacific area as an anti-Soviet “oceanic strategy” with both heavy reliance on submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs)<sup>331</sup> and a maritime power projection capability shown in the Inchon amphibious landing in the Korean War after a thorough strategic consideration of the causes of the German navy’s failure in WWII and the history of landing operations until the post-war period<sup>332</sup>. In this regard, to ensure the ability of each fleet to fulfill its operational-strategic missions, the capabilities of the balance of the navy were required so that they could apply the use of their forces jointly or individually, depending on the specific mission and capabilities. As a result of the scrutiny by the naval leadership, they concluded that a necessity for

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<sup>329</sup> Bruce W. Watson (1982), p. 210 (Table 15).

<sup>330</sup> As continuously discussed, in the construction of a new type of the navy, there were implicitly two fundamental issues to be resolved between the USSR and its Third World goals: the geographical isolation of the USSR from the Third World states and the military power of the US. In order to compensate for these factors, cooperation was essential, not only among the various branches of the navy including amphibious forces and Naval Infantry, but also with the ground and air forces. Thus, the new issue in the organization of the Navy was taken into consideration in bringing ashore amphibious landing forces through the sea route. In this connection, the recreation of a fully fledged amphibious force was a prerequisite for modern warfare as a useful means of maritime power projection. V. D. Sokolovskii, *Soviet Military Strategy*, in Harriet F. Scott (ed.), *Soviet Sources of Military Doctrine and Strategy* (New York: Crane and Russak, 1975, 3<sup>rd</sup> ed.), pp. 134-135.

<sup>331</sup> Bruce W. Watson (1982), p. 5.

<sup>332</sup> S. G. Gorshkov (1979), pp. 217-219.

amphibious operations could arise in the future, and that each fleet needed to be prepared to carry out such missions, which would be the *raison d'être* of the SNI as part of the Soviets' drive to achieve their position in all fields of military forces.

The SNI was grouped in brigades attached to each of the four Soviet Fleets. In this period, it is difficult to find any evidence that it had an international policing role. It had two basic missions as an amphibious force like the other marines such as the UKRM and USMC: to defend important naval bases and installations against enemy attack, and to project force against enemy coastal axes either independently or in conjunction with Soviet ground and airborne forces. As Soviet military doctrine and maritime strategy suggested, its wartime mission was to protect and secure the land flanks of interest to their navy and ground forces as an auxiliary force to overcome the obstacle of the sea. In fact, the SNI made 110 tactical amphibious assault landings, four landings on an operational scale, and no landings at a strategic level, during both offensive and defensive operations in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-5.<sup>333</sup> The Soviets extracted the following four lessons from those amphibious landing operations<sup>334</sup>:

Firstly, heavy fire support of an amphibious assault landing to suppress enemy defences opposing the landing is essential,

Secondly, there is a great need for speed in getting the troops ashore from the landing ships on to the beach,

Thirdly, one of the major problems in an amphibious assault landing is posed by the difficulties of coordination between supporting ships and the assaulting force itself,

Fourthly, it is very important to get a beachhead position very quickly established once the troops are all ashore.


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<sup>333</sup> C.N. Donnelly, et al., "Soviet Amphibious Warfare and War on the Northern Flank", *Consultant Report STC CR-57* (Sandhurst: Soviet Research Center in RMA, 1985), p. 34 (hereafter cited as *STC CR-57*).

<sup>334</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 35.

Given these lessons, the SNI regiment was heavily organized from the first by having tank battalion, sappers and NBC sections (refer Figure 3-3).

**Figure 3-3: Organisation of the SNI Regiment**



Sources: Andrew W. Hull, "Soviet Naval Infantry", *Marine Corps Gazette* (July 1980), p. 66.

However, the amount of manpower was relatively smaller than the others, i.e., the numbers in the SNI battalion were between 350 to 400 men, whilst a rifle battalion, which was making up the main body of the tactical assault force together with the SNI, was approximately 600 men. It did not have artillery sections, because, as Andrew W. Hull has analysed, "the Soviets felt that it could rely on shipborne ordnance and artillery organic to ground forces units for any necessary artillery support"<sup>335</sup> during the amphibious landing operation. Consequently, even though the USSR reorganized the SNI brigades attached to each of the four fleets, its actual optimum amphibious landing size was a battalion, on occasions a company group, as an initial assault force or at most for independent tactical assault.<sup>336</sup>

<sup>335</sup> Andrew W. Hull, "Soviet Naval Infantry", *Marine Corps Gazette* (July 1980), p. 66; IISS, *The Military Balance 1974-75*, p. 10.

<sup>336</sup> C. N. Donnelly (1985), p. 42.

## (B) Amphibious Lift Capability

In fact, the Soviet amphibious lift capability to support assault operations was really limited to the tactical level. Until 1963, the Soviets had in service 10 Russian LST Type, 4 Russian LCG Type and 71 small landing craft.<sup>337</sup> With the reorganization of the SNI, the Soviets steadily constructed their own models of amphibious ships such as the *Polnocny*-class LSMs (1963 – 73, eight tanks or eight to ten APCs and a company of the SNI), the *Alligator*-class LSTs (1966-75, 39 medium tanks or a battalion), and the *Vydra*-class LCUs (1967-72, 4 Tanks, half company). Moreover, it realized the usefulness of the air cushion vehicle (ACV) in transporting troops and combat vehicles at the initial phase of an amphibious landing. As a result the first Soviet LCAC, the *Gus*-class and the *Aist*-class entered into service in 1969 and in 1970 respectively.<sup>338</sup> As a result of the steady improvement of the amphibious lift capability, the Soviets theoretically made it possible to carry all their SNI troops and equipment in wartime (refer Table 3-9), but its operational range was limited to the sea adjoining its homeland. While in 1963 the Soviets did not have any amphibious ships capable of sustained employment on the open ocean, at the end of this period, it had 14 such ships in service.

**Table 3-9: Amphibious Lift Capability for the SNI in 1974**

Classifications	Pacific	Baltic	Black Sea	Northern	Total
Alligator	4	4	3	3	14
Polnocny	15	20	20	10	65
MP 2, 4, 6, 8 LSV/M	10	10	10	10	40
Vydra MP 10 LCT	45	40	30	15	130
Total	74	74	63	38	249

Source: E. P. Takle, "Soviet Naval Infantry", *RUSI/RMAS Research Centre Bulletin*, p. 30; *Jane's Fighting Ships 1975-1976*, pp. the USSR's amphibious forces.

<sup>337</sup> *Jane's Fighting Ships 1962-63*, p. 421. However, according to Dr Milan Vego, the USSR had in service 133 relatively modern LSMs/LCUs and approximately 100 small landing craft, see Milan Vego, "Soviet Amphibious Forces", *Navy International* (May 1983), p. 274.

<sup>338</sup> Milan Vego (1983), pp. 274-275.



### (C) Activities and Missions

The SNI participated in numerous small unit and large-scale exercises in this period. For example, it deployed on a worldwide scale during the *Okean-70* exercise, but the amphibious landing in the Arctic during the *Okean-70* exercise was specially mentioned in *Morskoi sbornik*<sup>339</sup> (June 5, 1971). The reason was that the landing on the Rybachiy Peninsula of a reinforced battalion size of the Black Sea naval infantry demonstrated its indispensability and improved skill by landing on difficult terrain after a relatively long voyage under adverse weather conditions<sup>340</sup>. As such, despite the purpose of this exercise being to demonstrate the navy's readiness to repel attacks on Russia, and to launch its own strikes<sup>341</sup>, the real ability of the SNI remained at the level of tactical amphibious landing operations. To conclude, it seems that the SPFNI retained its original roles and functions such as the defence of naval bases and its homeland by deploying along the Sino-Soviet border and the islands near Vladivostok, and also for tactical amphibious landing operations in wartime.

Given this limited capability, as Bradley Hahn has summarized, the SNI had the following missions<sup>342</sup>:

- Firstly, conduct amphibious landing on a tactical level,
- Secondly, hold captured beachheads against counterattack,
- Thirdly, support prolonged river crossings,
- Lastly, defend naval installations at home and abroad.

As such, the role and functions of the SNI in this period remained as an auxiliary branch

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<sup>339</sup> This was published under the aegis of the Soviet MoD and served as the navy leadership's principal medium of mass communication.

<sup>340</sup> Bradley Hahn (1984), p. 20.

<sup>341</sup> CRC 257, p. 36.

<sup>342</sup> Bradley Hahn, "The Soviet Union's Rapid Deployment Force", *Pacific Defence Reporter* (April 1984), p. 18.

of the navy to support the other services in wartime, thus it was unable to conceive of any policing role.

### **3. Conclusions**

With the impact of the emergence of the nuclear parity era, the numerous strategies propounded concerning the methods of conducting a future thermonuclear war had varied from massive retaliation to flexible response. In accordance with this strategic concept, the goal of possessing nuclear weapons was changed from the necessity for a first strike on the basis of the principle of nuclear sufficiency to selective capability for a second strike response. In this regard, the foreign policy goals of the two superpowers are well summarized by the two Doctrines: the Brezhnev and Nixon Doctrines. They did not want to lose their spheres of influence or face each other directly anywhere in the world in military terms. Furthermore, the US slowly retreated from its firm position of defending its allies from the establishment of an additional communist government or anywhere in the Western hemisphere according to the Nixon Doctrine, which was the reflection of its weakening effect of its domestic anti-war public opinion and the economic situation as well as the developments of economic and defence capabilities among its allies. In addition, a regional security environment favourable to the US had been established by an amicable settlement with the PRC, which was clearly a geographical alliance to cover the threat of the USSR located at the forefront of the Asia-Pacific region. This was good evidence that diplomatic success could cover the deficiency of military power by reshaping the strategic configuration.

It seemed that the emergence of nuclear weapons debilitated the role and functions of the navy and amphibious forces, but it was only temporary. With the increase of the nuclear capacity of the two superpowers, the importance of conventional forces including both navy and amphibious was also relatively augmented because of the changing characteristics of the security strategy, which reflected fears of a mutual disaster. At the end of this period, the number of USSR nuclear arms was superior to that of the US (refer Table 3-6). Each was continuously developing new and improved systems within the limits agreed in the ABM treaty, which provided a rationale for the two superpowers to improve their nuclear capabilities. Ironically, the emergence of nuclear weapons and the fear of mutual destruction even in a major conventional war between the two blocs highlighted the necessity of maritime power, particularly because of its indirect use as an instrument of both domestic and foreign policy in peacetime together with the development of the law of the sea.

The primary role and function of the US forces in the region was changed in order to focus on security commitments compared with the prevention of direct military threats to the US in the Second World War and following with the emergence of the USSR as the supreme state of the communist world. The presence of American personnel, civilian and military, had considerable significance in terms of its defence commitments with its alliances. In fact, the actual deployment of military manpower provided psychological and diplomatic reassurance, a capacity for effective military action, an ability to react quickly in a crisis, and a secure platform for extended military endeavour. However, it is also undeniable that the presence of American forces aroused the American public with fears of a massive involvement in a major war, which led to the announcement of the Nixon Doctrine.

The main characteristics of the Soviet attitude regarding the use of force could be summarized as an ambitious but cautious approach to involvement in any kind of direct military conflict with the US. It meant that its ability to operate in distant areas was really restricted, as it faced the Western alliance forces from Europe to the Far East. The USSR did not have a sufficient surface navy, and it had submarines mainly for home water control, that is, for defence against enemy attack. The Soviet maritime operational environment was really poor, because each ship or submarine had to pass through the East Sea (Sea of Japan) and its straits. However, the massive construction of numerous Soviet nuclear submarines slowly began to compel the US Navy to a reassertion of their sea control mission. In other words, the USSR emerged as a maritime power at the level of competing with the US in blue water.

In the circumstances that the land frontiers was firmly fixed, the sea, as a gateway towards the Third World, was the only way for the USSR to enlarge the communist hemisphere in line with its foreign policy objectives in the confrontation between the two blocs. In this sense, the purpose of the Soviet naval force buildup began to change from the defence of its homeland to a means of projecting its power towards the rest of the world. At the end of this period, it demonstrated that its naval power was capable of operating throughout the world's oceans as was seen from the large-scale naval exercises. The success in building up a blue-water navy raised the Soviet status in the eyes of the international community enabling it to compete with the US throughout the world via sea routes.

The Vietnam War was a good example of indicating the future shape of military confrontation between the two superpowers in the nuclear parity era. Whilst the reaction

of the PRC and USSR against the US attack beyond the 38<sup>th</sup> parallel in the Korean War was not carefully examined by the military and political leaders of the UN alliance, the military objectives of the Vietnam War were limited, reflecting the transition of military strategy by carefully considering the possible reaction of the PRC and the USSR so as not to provoke direct military involvement with them. The Vietnam War clearly represented the phenomenon of a war in the nuclear age, when the interests of the superpowers, who possessed massive retaliation capability, directly clashed. In some aspects, it had taken note of the characteristics of the Cold War, which would end without a major war between the nuclear powers.

A complex result of the independent variables hamstrung the role and functions of the amphibious forces, seriously restricting their ability to insist on compliance to their urgent demands, i.e., the USMC in the Vietnam War and the deployment of SNI on the Russo-Sino border. However, from the military strategic point of view, both had the *raison d'être* to maintain their amphibious forces as their military and maritime strategy/ policy suggested. The geostrategic encounter via the sea required an amphibious force, because the worth of amphibious operations had been proved over a long period of history in that success in an amphibious landing operation would constitute the cornerstone of final victory or prove a decisive turning point in the war. Whilst the marines were for the US a useful means of reacting to any kind of regional crisis as the sign of maintaining its defence commitments, the build-up of the SNI included at least a two-fold purpose: an instrument to defend its homeland and naval bases, and its usefulness in wartime to recover any of its territory lost in an attack by the western alliance. It is difficult to imagine that the Soviets intended to practically use the SNI for amphibious landing operations in a war against the PRC to land at a point on

the Chinese eastern coastal area, i.e., Shanghai, in order to compel the PRC to wage a two-front war, although this was not completely out of the question. All in all, it appears that the resurrection of the SNI was one outcome in the process of the rise of total Soviet power to safeguard its interests as well as pursuing the expansion of the Communist world.

# Chapter IV. Until the Demise of the Cold War<sup>343</sup>

## 1. General Factors

### A. International Security Environment

After the end of the Vietnam War, international relations slowly went through a phase of bipolar antagonism between the two military blocs, because, the ideological differences were still the main criteria for judging every political crisis during this period. Despite the fact that the superpowers had experienced *détente*, it was not surprising that the ideological and power-political confrontation between East and West brought about a pre-eminent position for the two superpowers within their spheres of influence as well as the division of the world. With the communization of the Southeast Asian countries, Vietnam, Cambodia (renamed Kampuchea), and Laos, the Soviet and the PRC leaderships turned their interests to Africa in order to enlarge their influential area via economic aid, e.g., the completion of the Tanzanian railway in 1975 by the PRC, on the bases of ideological struggle and military intervention<sup>344</sup>.

The USSR, on the strength of its massive military power as a political instrument, had

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<sup>343</sup> The USSR was officially dissolved with the Minsk declaration by the Presidents of Russia, the Ukraine and Belorussia on December 8 1991. However, as most political commentators said, the Cold War was terminated with the unification of Germany on October 3 1990. Herein, the dividing line was decided. Nonetheless, in reality, Gorbachev's liberalizing reforms of foreign and domestic policies, *glasnost and perestroika*, opened up space for change in the security environment. In addition, the aim of US foreign and security policy under President George Bush was changed to an attitude of warm relaxation. Thus, the events of the following independent variables here would have been focused before that.

<sup>344</sup> Until 1977, the PRC aided a total of 29 African countries, whilst the USSR helped only 22 countries even though the scales of aid were different, see P. M. H. Bell (2001), p. 322.

extended its influence in various parts of the world and particularly in the Middle East. It had been maintaining friendly relations with the radical Arab nations including Iraq, Syria and Libya, continuously providing them with military aid. In addition, the USSR had placed under its influence Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia and South Yemen, sending them military advisers and civilian engineers as well as extended military and economic assistance. At a time when the US and its allies worried about the growing influence of the USSR in the above region, the USSR embarked on military intervention in Afghanistan, which heightened the tension between East and West, and which made the Middle East security environment more fluid and unstable.<sup>345</sup> Thus, the characteristics of this period can be delineated as the major powers continuously pursuing a way of enlarging their areas of influence. Regarding the tendencies of the driving force of the two superpowers' foreign policies toward the Third World, the USSR had a more aggressive policy than the US, as seen in the invasion of Afghanistan, but to the extent that the USSR avoided any situation likely to involve direct military confrontation.

Nonetheless, their ability to act unilaterally in their own power-political interests decreased, because they were always confronted with a rival regime or country by a series of self-fulfilling prophecies in which defensive actions provoked countermeasures. As G. H. Snyder and P. Diesing have argued, the US and USSR could not help but perceive each other as rivals, since the other was the only state that posed a serious military threat to its own security.<sup>346</sup> Throughout the experiences of *détente*, the US realized that the USSR had not abandoned its original objective of expansionism by

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<sup>345</sup> *Defence of Japan 1980*, pp. 38-40.

<sup>346</sup> G. H. Snyder and P. Diesing, *Conflict among Nations* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988), p. 420.



evaluating not only the deployment of new Soviet missiles after the SALT I agreement, but also its widespread activism in the Third World<sup>347</sup>. In the meantime, the US deployed their nuclear arsenals in 27 countries surrounding the USSR and Warsaw Pact countries in which there were, according to Simon Duke's report, approximately 7,000 nuclear warheads in 1979.<sup>348</sup> The critical momentum, which changed the US attitude toward the USSR from friendship to antagonism was the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979<sup>349</sup>, which was viewed as an action to threaten Western interests in the Middle East as an extension of Soviet expansionism. This triggered the return of Cold War policy in the US from the end of the Carter administration, onwards.<sup>350</sup> For example, the SALT II agreement, signed in Vienna in June 1979, was not ratified by the US Senate due to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

Nonetheless, the political protocols between the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries were continued. The characteristics of security in Europe were that both military blocs made unilateral gestures of arms reductions initiated by the Mutual and Balanced Forces Reduction (MBFR) negotiations launched in Vienna in 1973 among 23 NATO and Warsaw Pact members, and the Conference on the Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) held in Helsinki in 1975, which developed into the Conference on Confidence-and-Security Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CDE) in Stockholm in

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<sup>347</sup> Phil Williams, "US-Soviet Relations: Beyond the Cold War?", *International Affairs*, Vol. 65, No. 2 (Spring 1989), pp. 276-277.

<sup>348</sup> Simon Duke, *United States Military Forces and Installations in Europe* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), p. 69.

<sup>349</sup> It seems that the USSR had a strong interest in Afghanistan because of both its borders and its long historic involvements via trade, military aid, and economic assistance. As such, the improvement of Afghan-American and Afghan-Pakistani relations was viewed as a great threat to Soviet security itself.

<sup>350</sup> This confrontational strategy developed under Jimmy Carter and was expanded by Reagan because of the deployment of the SS-20 from 1977 throughout Europe. With this, all NATO European capitals were under direct threat from Soviet theatre nuclear forces, refer Thomas M. Nicholas, "Carter and the Soviets: The Origins of the US Return to a Strategy of Confrontation", *Diplomacy & Statecraft*, Vol. 13, No. 2 (London: Rank Cass, June 2002), pp. 21-42.

1985. The main purposes of these activities could be concluded as not only the normalization of East-West relations, but also the ratification of the territorial *status quo* by reducing the possibilities of the outbreak of war through increasing the transparency of military activities, which was conducive to assuaging the possibility of one bloc's misinterpreting the actions of another. The results of these kinds of efforts were to inhibit opportunities for surprise attack and political intimidation; thus ultimately to enhance regional stability in terms of security.<sup>351</sup> Although it was impossible to practically mitigate the level of military tension, it did mean that both blocs realized the certain result of war, which would bring mutual disaster. It appeared at least externally that a real war involving the unrestricted use of both nuclear and conventional weapons was highly unlikely.

## **B. Regional Security Environment**

The vacuum of the US influence in the Asia-Pacific region derived from the withdrawal of the US military forces from Vietnam (1975), Thailand (1976), and force reduction in South Korea (1976), and the abrogation of the US-Taiwan defence pact in 1978, which became an arena of competition between the USSR and the PRC as each sought to enlarge its own influence. During the Vietnam War the Vietnamese fought each other over ideology, but a united Vietnam would pay due regard to the prism of Sino-Soviet ties by their giving support to the North Vietnamese in waging the revolutionary war. However, the worsening relationship between the USSR and PRC did not allow things to move in that direction. So, the PRC repeatedly denounced Vietnam as the 'Cuba of

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<sup>351</sup> John Borawski, "The Stockholm Conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures in Europe", *Arms Control*, Vol. 6, No. 2 (September 1985), p. 115.

Asia', but the USSR ratified the Soviet-Vietnamese friendship treaty in November 1978.<sup>352</sup> After that, Vietnam invaded Cambodia on Christmas day 1978 with the support of Soviet military equipment and advisers on the ground<sup>353</sup>. This Soviet-Vietnamese intimacy brought about the Chinese invasion of northern Vietnam in February 1979, which was, as most political commentators had doubted, the result of China's ambition to be seen as the regional hegemon.<sup>354</sup> In the long run, the US power vacuum created further competition between the USSR and PRC in the Indochina peninsula, which gave the countries of the western bloc in the region, such as Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan, great fears of a possible American retreat from the region.

In order to allay this suspicion, the US encouraged far greater cooperation between non-communist countries in the region. An organization for this purpose was the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), which was formed by Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines and Singapore in August 1967 as an anti-Communist regional organization to promote some sense of political and economic solidarity. With the retreat of the US military forces from Vietnam, the influence of this organization in the region became so powerful that it would underpin the movement for regional autonomy.<sup>355</sup> However, with time, the political stance of the organization was shaken during the Cold War era by mutual suspicions, e.g., a struggle between Indonesia and

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<sup>352</sup> Roger Buckley, *The United States in the Asia-Pacific since 1945* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 159 – 161. This war ended with the Vietnam announcement on May 25 1988 that it would withdraw 50,000 troops from Cambodia by the end of the year.

<sup>353</sup> Former French Indo-China had been divided into four political units: Laos (independent 1949), Cambodia (independent 1953), and North and South Vietnam (partitioned in 1954). The situations of Laos and Cambodia were almost similar to that of Vietnam before unification. Hence, when the Vietnamese troops entered Cambodia, they were welcomed by the Kampuchians.

<sup>354</sup> Roger Buckley (2002), p. 161.

<sup>355</sup> Amitav Acharya, "A New Regional Order in South-East Asia", *Adelphi Papers*, No. 279 (August 1993), p. 11.

Malaysia for dominance, as well as resistance from the superpowers to the USSR's pressure to accept the unified and communized Vietnam as a member<sup>356</sup>. In other words, ASEAN's efforts to promote regional peace and stability were undermined by the constraints imposed by the prevailing patterns of inter-state relations and superpower rivalry.

In terms of the transitions of the balance of power, the invisible struggle between the PRC and USSR still remained very intense<sup>357</sup>. The USSR regarded the efforts for an improvement in Sino-American and Sino-Japanese relations as an attempt at forming an international network in East Asia designed to contain it. This deterioration, including the Soviet interventions in Africa as well as the inferiority of the PRC's nuclear strength, allowed the strengthening of ties between the US and the PRC, and the weakening of Soviet antagonism towards the US.

Japan became an economic giant and ultimately one of the world's largest creditors with the growing economic interdependence of nations across the world. It had the resources, the wealth, and had been moving towards assuming leadership in Asia by utilizing its resources for defence or providing aid to the poor countries of Asia. Furthermore, its defence expenditure reached over \$ 11 billion in 1983 as the second in the region after the USSR (\$ 23 bn), and overtaking the PRC (\$ 7.79 bn) notwithstanding the relatively small numbers of its active military forces (Japan: 240,000, the USSR: 5,115,000, the

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<sup>356</sup> Roger Buckley (2002), pp. 158-159.

<sup>357</sup> The USSR deployed 450,000 troops formed into 46 divisions, and 2,060 planes, about a quarter of the entire ground forces and air forces respectively, in the regions along the Sino-Soviet border. In the realm of naval forces, it assigned about one third of the entire vessels of the Soviet navy, 785 ships with a total displacement of 1.52million tons. In contrast, from the PRC point of view, the Sino-Soviet border and the Sino-Vietnamese border were regarded as its main fronts. So, it deployed about 65 divisions and 41 garrison divisions with a combined force of 1.5 million, nearly half of its 129 divisions. See, *Defence of Japan 1980*, pp. 47-71.

PRC: 4,000,000).<sup>358</sup> With a series of four defence buildup plans to establish an effective defence capability, it could maintain an appropriate scale of military forces including modernized maritime and air forces capable of coping with any type of aggression and thereby deterring aggression.<sup>359</sup>

More importantly, Japan and the US rebuilt and improved their relationships from 1975 in contrast with 1971, when the US changed its policy towards China without previously warning Japan. In addition, Japan and the PRC signed a Treaty of Peace and Friendship on August 1978 on the basis of the principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit and peaceful coexistence.<sup>360</sup> Indeed, Japan could become the strongest power in Asia politically as well as in the world economically. Thus, by the end of the 1980s, there were four major powers in this region. The system of the balance of power had moved from being two opposing blocs to a triangle<sup>361</sup> or a quadrangle.<sup>362</sup>

### C. Maritime Dominion

Geo-strategically, the location of Vietnam is not only at the end of the western Pacific as an intersecting point between the Pacific and Indian Ocean, but is also on the sea route

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<sup>358</sup> IISS, *Military Balance 1985-1986*, pp. 17, 112, 170-172.

<sup>359</sup> *Defence of Japan 1980*, pp. 94-97.

<sup>360</sup> Documentation, "Sino-Japanese Relations: Treaty of Peace and Friendship", in *Survival* (November/December 1978), p. 263.

<sup>361</sup> Sino-US relations in this period can be regarded as being at a pragmatic stage, because their relations included at least one important element of friction that the PRC pursued a 'one-China policy' and the US was willing to support Taiwan, for historic, and partly economic and strategic reasons.

<sup>362</sup> Michael Mandelbaum (ed.), *The Strategic Quadrangle: Russia, China, Japan and the US in East Asia* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1995), p. 6.

between South and East Asia. The Soviet-Vietnamese friendship treaty in November 1978, and Soviet support in the Sino-Vietnamese War such as the protection of Vietnamese ports in that Soviet naval ships visiting the Vietnamese ports of Haiphong, Da Nang, Ho Chi Minh City, and Cam Ranh Bay, deterred Chinese air and naval attacks on those ports, and enabled the USSR to open an advanced naval base at Cam Ranh Bay<sup>363</sup>. This represented a significant shift in the balance of maritime power in the South Pacific, the Indian Ocean, and in South and Southeast Asia, not only because the Soviet potential for disrupting the Western sea lanes from Japan to the Middle East was greatly increased, but also because the Soviet navy was now in a position to respond much more rapidly to Indian Ocean crises.

After the Second World War, the US established an overseas bases structure to resolve conflicts in the Atlantic and Pacific (not for the remote Indian Ocean) in order to defend the two frontiers, Europe and the outer ring in the Western Pacific as a part of a containment policy. The Johnson administration prohibited US naval ship visits to South African ports and ended the joint naval exercises with the alliance, which resulted in the gradual withdrawal of US maritime forces from advanced naval bases such as Simonstown on the Cape of Good Hope.<sup>364</sup> The Western Indian Ocean was very important in terms of the protection of the oil traffic in which the US and the Western Pacific countries, i.e., Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, were vitally interested. As seen from the above international security environment, the USSR and PRC had been checked in their ambitions by a limited US presence throughout the post-World War period. Considering the USSR's maritime strategic configuration, it was a cornerstone for

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<sup>363</sup> Bruce W. Watson (1982), pp. 139-140.

<sup>364</sup> Anthony Harrigan, "Security Interests in the Persian Gulf and Western Indian Ocean", Patrick Wall (ed.), *The Indian Ocean and the Threat to the West* (London: Stacey International, 1975), p. 23.

enlarging the Soviet Pacific Fleet; at the same time being a starting point for the maritime arms race in the Indian Ocean and the second Cold War, which meant the end of *détente* between East and West.

From this time, the other major powers, notably Japan, and the PRC, slowly enlarged the radius of their maritime activities in the Western Pacific. Apart from the USSR, Japan actively moved toward maritime force-building in order to protect its sea lanes from the Middle East, a vital necessity for a complex economy tied to global markets. Japan was at the head of others in the naval arms build-up in that it constantly improved its naval capability focusing on the qualitative domain (see Table 4-1).

As regards hardware, the only significant increase in terms of the changes of quantity happened with regard to FFHs/FFs, which increased from 34 to 60 during the 1980s. Whilst the Japanese Maritime Self-Defence Force (JMSDF) decommissioned the old type of submarines and destroyers, it commissioned two new classes of submarine and DDGs, the Harushio, and the Hatakaze. In addition, despite the significant decrease in aircraft numbers, it acquired 59 P-3C maritime reconnaissance aircraft. With these kinds of new commissions and acquisitions, according to IISS, the Japanese Navy was the world's fifth largest as regards its absolute capabilities and its shape and posture (after the two superpowers, UK and PRC).<sup>365</sup> During the 1980s, the US urged Japan to increase its defence spending due to the US trade deficit with Japan and the outset of the second Cold War.<sup>366</sup> The US was unable to properly defend its allies in the Western

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<sup>365</sup> IISS, *Military Balance 1989-1990*, p. 236.

<sup>366</sup> The US considered Japan as the greatest potential for expanded military efforts by any ally in the region. The US needed a steady and substantial increase in Japanese self-defence capabilities to enable Japan to work more effectively with the US in performing common security interests in the region, see, The US DoD, *Annual Report Fiscal Year 1982 (hereafter ARFY)*, Jan 19, 1981, p. 87. For the US trade

Pacific, because the plan to put two carrier battle groups (CVBGs) in the Indian Ocean had drawn a deployed CVBG from both the 6<sup>th</sup> Fleet in the Mediterranean and the Western Pacific area of the 7<sup>th</sup> fleet<sup>367</sup>. Consequently, it was natural to concede some part of maritime dominion to others.

**Table 4-1: Japanese Naval Development in the 1980s**

Classification	Component/Class	1980	1990	Remarks
Manpower	Naval air/Total	12,000/44,000	12,000/44,000	
Submarines	<i>Harushio</i>		2	+2
	<i>Yuushio</i>	2	10	+8
	<i>Uzushio</i>	7	5	-2
	<i>Oshio</i>	5		-5
	Subtotal	14	17	+3
DDGs/ DDHs/ DDs	<i>Hatakaze</i>		2	+2
	<i>Tachikaze</i>	2	3	+1
	<i>Amatzukaze</i>	1	1	
	<i>Akizuki</i>	2		-2
	<i>Harukaze</i>	2		-2
	<i>Ayanami</i>	7		-7
	<i>Murasame</i>	3		-3
	Subtotal	17	6	-11
FFH/FF	<i>Shirane</i>	2	2	
	<i>Haruna</i>	2	2	
	<i>Asagiri</i>		8	+8
	<i>Hatsuyuki</i>		12	+12
	<i>Abukuma</i>		4	+4
	<i>Takatsuki</i>	4	4	
	<i>Yamagumo</i>	6	6	
	<i>Minegumo</i>	3	3	
	<i>Yubari</i>		2	+2
	<i>Ishikari</i>	1	1	
	<i>Chikugo</i>	11	11	
	<i>Isuzu</i>	4	4	
	<i>Katori</i>	1	1	
	Subtotal	34	60	+26
Patrol/Torpedo		9	9	
Mine Warfare		40	47	+7
Naval Air	Aircraft/Hel	120/76	99/72	-21/-4

Notes: DDG (Destroyer with area SAM), DDH (Destroyer with hel), FFH (Frigate with hel), FF (Frigate)

Source: *Military Balance 1981-1982*, pp. 82; *1991-1992*, pp. 166-7.

deficit, see US Congress Senate, Committee on Finance, *United States-Japan Trade Relations: Hearings before the Committee on Finance, 101<sup>st</sup> Congress Second Session*, April 25, 1990.

<sup>367</sup> ARFY 1982, p. 85.



In addition to the Japanese movement, the PRC angrily responded to the Soviet use of Cam Ranh Bay due to its antagonism against the USSR and Vietnam, and it began to seek a way to enlarge its maritime scope in the Western Pacific, e.g., the Spratly Islands Dispute, many of which were under Vietnamese control<sup>368</sup> as part of its policy to pursue a position more independent of superpower politics. As Table 4-2 shows, the Chinese maritime strength grew both quantitatively and qualitatively during this period.

**Table 4-2: The Chinese Naval Development in the 1980s**

Classification	Component	1980	1990
Manpower	Naval Air / Marine / Total	30,000/28,000/298,000	25,000/6,000/260,000
Submarine	SSBN / SSB	0 / 1	1 / 1
	SSN / SS	2 / 83	4 / 60 (1SSG)
PSC	DDG / FF(G)	11 / 16	19 / 37
FAC	Missile / Patrol	164 / 24	200 / 77
	Gun / Torpedo	336 / 285	385 / 190
Naval Air	Aircraft / Hel	700	824 / 61

Sources: *Jane's Fighting Ships 1980-1981*, pp. 98-109; *1990-1991*, pp. 106-130; *Military Balance 1990-1991*, pp. 148-152.

As previously mentioned, the Chinese navy was the third largest in the Western Pacific as well as the fourth in the world, but it was an important element in the balance of power in this region as it was certainly one of the fastest growing navies. The strongest point of the PLAN (People's Liberation Army Navy) was that it had nuclear ships, 1 SSBN and 4 SSN, in the Western Pacific apart from the superpowers. All in all, the maritime balance of power in the Western Pacific also moved from being between two opposing blocs to a triangle. It could be affirmed that the relatively weakened American naval power derived from the naval arms race in the Indian Ocean, because the US had to transfer some of the Pacific fleet from the Western Pacific to the Indian Ocean.

<sup>368</sup> Regarding the Spratly Islands Dispute, refer, Bradford L. Thomas, "The Spratly Islands Imbroglia: A Tangled Web of Conflict", *Peace Research Centre Working Paper*, No. 74 (Canberra: Australian National University, April 1990).

However, the US Navy was assisted by the buildup of the Japanese naval forces, who helped to cover the exit of the Soviet vessels from their home bases to the Western Pacific area in the event of a global war. In addition, the PRC was seeking to gain an advantage over the two bloc's maritime dominion.

## **2. Independent Variables and Their Effects**

### **A. USMC**

#### **(1) The US Interests/ Foreign Policy**

The American capacity to respond to an aggressive Soviet foreign policy in the Third World declined largely as a result of the divisive and emasculating impact of the Vietnam War, whilst the Soviet capability to take advantage of opportunities in the Third World increased. In the aftermath of the withdrawal from Indochina, congressional and public opposition to the use of military force including commitment abroad caused a great atrophy of American foreign policy based on its military power. In short, the US extension of nuclear and conventional deterrence was clearly less credible than it had been previously, particularly where its interests were not at stake. In this situation, as the focuses of the Cold War competition between the two blocs had moved towards the Third World, the US leaders were looking to regional powers like Iran, Japan, Somalia to assist the US in preserving its global interests and began to project its policy objectives with nonmilitary means, i.e., human rights under President Carter at the initial stage of his presidency<sup>369</sup>.

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<sup>369</sup> Thomas G. Paterson, et al. (1991), pp. 618-619.

However, US foreign policy turned into active reaction to the Soviet intervention<sup>370</sup> particularly under the Reagan administration, which considered the USSR as the source of international insecurity. As a result of the Reagan belief that public opinion had changed in now favouring a more militarized, interventionist foreign policy, the US openly began to support anti-communists who were battling the Soviets or Soviet-backed governments, i.e., the CIA's support of Islamic rebels in Afghanistan and anti-Communist insurgents and terrorists in Angola, Cambodia, and Ethiopia<sup>371</sup> in accordance with a strong military forces buildup policy.

As the Asia-Pacific countries remained relatively outside the short-term US foreign policy focuses due to the counter actions against the active Soviet policy in the Third World even under the Reagan administration, the suspicion of the Asian noncommunist countries about the US willingness to defend them from Soviet territorial expansionism raised a fundamental question about the Nixon-Kissinger formula to withdraw US military forces from abroad. In some aspects, the closer Sino-American relations had contributed to the increase of Soviet military deployments in the Far East. In this regard, the strategic configuration in East Asia could now be identified as being triangular involving the Japanese-American partnership, the USSR and PRC, since the PRC was aligned, but not allied. The basic goal of the Nixon administration was also to prevent the further extension of the communist sphere. To do so, it anticipated that the tacit alliance brought about by the rapprochement with the PRC could work as a block

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<sup>370</sup> One of the major turning points of US foreign policy was the huge blunder of the modernizing of Soviet nuclear forces in Europe in 1977, the deployment of the SS-20, a mobile, three-warhead missile with an extended range covering all NATO European capitals. Thomas M. Nichols, "Carter and the Soviets: The Origins of the US Return to a Strategy of Confrontation", *Diplomacy & Statecraft*, Vol. 13, No. 2 (June 2002), p. 29.

<sup>371</sup> Thomas G. Paterson, et al. (1991), pp. 645-647.

against the USSR, which was the only country capable of dominating Asia. In the long run, the interests of US foreign policy focused on keeping its dominant position in world politics, and keeping its original interests in the Pacific area via Nixon's triangular diplomacy, notwithstanding its withdrawal from Vietnam<sup>372</sup>.

As Admiral John S. McCain Jr., US Navy (Ret) said in an interview with *Strategic Review*<sup>373</sup>, the US considered the ROK comparable to the Republic of Vietnam in strength, independence, freedom and geo-strategic location to the allies. The doubts of Asian countries about the possibility of the withdrawal of the US commitment in East Asia forced the US to change the priority of its foreign policy objectives, in particular, toward the Korean peninsula. The withdrawal of the US forces from Vietnam meant that the US policy to solve regional problems using major power diplomacy had failed. Of course, the Nixon administration and onward recognized that if the Korean peninsula was communized by an invasion of North Korea, it would have had a disastrous impact on Japan<sup>374</sup>, which was regarded as the most important strategic balancer in the region.<sup>375</sup> The Korean peninsula was a strategic key: and at the same time a symbol of the US will against latent suspicions, whilst Taiwan was relatively safe because the Shanghai *Communiqué* signed by Nixon operated as a road map for Sino-American relations. In this regard, as mentioned earlier, US foreign policy was exercised in two

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<sup>372</sup> The withdrawal of the US military forces from the Vietnam War seemed for a while to be 'American exceptionalism' inferring that its positive foreign policy for the defence of the non-communist world had come to an end. See Michael Dunne, "US Foreign Relations in the Twentieth Century: from world power to global hegemony", *International Affairs* 76, I (2000), p. 39.

<sup>373</sup> Admiral John S. McCain Jr., USN (RET.), "Our Pacific Interests", *Strategic Review*, Vol. I, No. 1 (Spring 1973), p. 15-16.

<sup>374</sup> Most of the Annual Reports in the 1980s considered Japan as one of the most dynamic of the democracies and the keystone of the US security position in the Far East. The next countries were the Philippines, ANXUS partners-Australia and New Zealand-and South Korea. See, The US DoD, *Annual Report Fiscal Year 1981*, p. 50.

<sup>375</sup> Seung-Young Kim, "American Elite's Strategic Thinking towards Korea: From Kennan to Brzezinski", *Diplomacy & Statecraft*, Vol. 12, No. 1 (March 2001), pp. 196-197.

ways: strengthening the regional community, by which it would be said that in some aspects a tacit alliance against the Soviet Union was coming into being, and also a security commitment within the *de facto* bipolar alliance.

Nonetheless, the basic diplomatic mind-set of the US foreign policy represented by the Nixon Doctrine did not change, because, as Kissinger wrote, “there was no significant conceptual difference between the various assessments of the international environment by the Nixon, Ford and Reagan Administrations. All were determined to resist the Soviet geopolitical offensive and considered history to be on the side of the democracies”<sup>376</sup>. There was, however, an enormous difference in their approach toward the USSR, which mainly consisted of the military means largely represented by the Reagan administration’s policy of militant anticommunism<sup>377</sup>. To summarize, the US foreign policy objectives in this period toward East Asia were almost the same as those objectives summarized by Gaston J. Sigur.

## **(2) Military Strategy/ Policy**

The military buildup initiated by President Carter, which was expanded by President Reagan decisively reflected not only the Soviet Expansionism throughout the Indian Ocean and the Middle East Asia (Gulf), but also the US failure to stop the shift in the balance of strategic nuclear power in favour of the USSR. The US changed to the ‘global war’ strategy with the strategic goal of sufficiency. This meant that the US should maintain strategic nuclear forces with the level of sufficiency to deter general

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<sup>376</sup> Henry Kissinger (1994), p. 766.

<sup>377</sup> According to Frank L. Klingberg’s analysis, the main US foreign policy objective was to turn back to the ‘Cold War’ spirit of America’s military buildup in response to the Soviet expansionism from 1980. See, Brian M. Pollins & Randall L. Schweller, “Linking the Levels: The Long Wave and Shifts in US Foreign Policy, 1790-1993”, *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 43, No. 2 (April 1999), p. 434.

war and GPF levels had to recalculate on the basis of a global war, because the US-Soviet military balance had deteriorated to a dangerous degree.<sup>378</sup> Furthermore, the doctrine of 'flexible response' had not provided practical options at the operational level; thus it demanded greater accuracy and a wide range of target options.<sup>379</sup>

Consequently, the Reagan administration made the modernization of nuclear forces the major factor in its defence policy by strengthening all three legs of the strategic triad (the Peacekeeper missile, strategic bomber, TRIDENT II missiles) as well as strategic command, control and communication (C<sup>3</sup>) systems<sup>380</sup>. As widely known, the most controversial initiative of the US in this era was the Strategic Defence Initiative, SDI or 'Star Wars', which was directed by President Ronald Reagan in March 1983, which was an extraordinary plan to introduce a comprehensive system for anti-missile defence<sup>381</sup>. Notwithstanding, until the end of the Cold War, the US was unable to achieve the goal of superiority through the relative numbers of nuclear weapons, although in specific capabilities it was in the ascendancy (refer Table 4-3).

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<sup>378</sup> Kevin N. Lewis, "The Discipline Gap and Other Reasons For Humility and Realism in Defence Planning", Paul K. Davis, *New Challenges for Defence Planning* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1994), pp. 104-106. And, from the Kennedy administration, US military planning was based on five elements: NATO, South Korea, a strategic reserve, flexibility, and mobilization. Refer, Maurice A. Mallin, *Tanks, Fighters & Ships: US Conventional Force Planning Since WWII* (New York: Brassey's 1990), p. 126.

<sup>379</sup> Timothy Garden (1984), pp. 45-46. Because, as Table 4-3 shows, the US deployed about two-thirds of warheads in submarines, which meant that it had invulnerable second strike capability, but less accuracy from the first strike. In stark contrast, the USSR held about two-thirds of its warheads in land-based missiles, which were vulnerable to a pre-emptive attack. P.M.H. Bell (2001), p. 349.

<sup>380</sup> Casper W. Weinberger, *Annual Report to the Congress Fiscal Year 1985* (Washington, DC: DoD, 1984), pp. 6-7.

<sup>381</sup> The basic concept of the SDI was knocking out in-coming ballistic missiles by updating the existing anti-ballistic missile technology, which had performed for around twenty years. As such, it was not quite new, but President Reagan's speech meant that the administration would accelerate related researches to catch up with the USSR's technology. Refer, Christopher Lee, *War in Space* (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1986), pp. 115-133.

**Table 4-3: Comparison of the US and USSR's Missiles and Warheads**

Classifications		1970		1980		1990	
		USA	USSR	USA	USSR	USA	USSR
Missiles	ICBM	1054	1465	1039	1330	990	1710
	SLBM	656	229	576	937	624	930
	Total	1710	1694	1615	2267	1614	2640
Warheads	On ICBMs	1054	1465	2139	4388	2440	6955
	On SLBMs	656	229	4880	1897	5376	3162
	Total	1710	1694	7019	6285	7816	10117

Note: ICBM: inter-continental ballistic missile; SLBM: submarine-launched ballistic missile

Source: P. M. H. Bell, *The World since 1945* (London: Arnold, 2001), p. 501

In the field of conventional forces, US military strategy focused on developing a course of action for Southwest Asia, whilst it began to reduce its commitment to Northeast Asia by a way of encouraging allies to take on more of the responsibility for defending themselves and thereby contributing to the defence of the region.<sup>382</sup> The priority of Northeast Asia seemed less important than Southwest Asia and the Middle East in this period.<sup>383</sup> With the increase of the Soviet maritime potential in the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf, the strengthening of maritime capabilities to project power rapidly and effectively to those regions emerged as one of the salient features of US strategy. To inspire and restore confidence in US power, the “Carter Doctrine”<sup>384</sup> on 24 January 1980 extended US policy commitment to these regions. As such, the US attempted to acquire military capability in the region to respond effectively to “threats across the

<sup>382</sup> In 1977, President Jimmy Carter announced that he would withdraw all US troops from South Korea, but the plan drew fire and only 3,400 troops ultimately returned before the plan was cancelled by President Ronald Reagan.

<sup>383</sup> The annual report to the congress from fiscal year 1983 described the Southwest and Africa as secondary among the priorities of national security policy toward regions. See, Caspar W. Weinberger, *Annual Report to the Congress Fiscal Year 1983* (Washington DC: DoD, 1982), pp. II-19–20.

<sup>384</sup> Carter declared, “the US would consider any attempt by an outside force (the Soviet Union) to gain control of the Gulf region an assault on US vital interests that would be repelled by military force if necessary”. Consequently, the Carter administration expanded military aid to Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Israel, and Pakistan.

entire spectrum of conflict".<sup>385</sup> In order to do that, the US created the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF) for contingency situations, which consisted of one Marine Amphibious Force, three Army Divisions (the 82<sup>nd</sup> Airborne, 101<sup>st</sup> Airmobile, and 24<sup>th</sup> Mechanised), a variety of smaller combat and supporting units (200,000 men), and seven tactical fighting wings. However, the US allocated its forces up to five Army and two Marine Corps divisions, and 10 tactical fighter wings due to an increase of continuous tension.<sup>386</sup>

The salient feature of the conventional strategy in the Reagan administration is shown by the following four initiatives accepting the consensus among US military planners that conventional forces were becoming more crucial than before because the USSR had achieved nuclear parity.

Firstly, an increase in the Navy's fleet from about 450 warships to more than 600,

Secondly, an imprecise plan to pressure peripheral Soviet interests around the world in order to gain military leverage in other areas of critical interest to the US,

Thirdly, a move to accelerate development and procurement of 'smart' battlefield weapons and to increase the stockpile of war materials needed in a protracted conflict in Europe,

Fourthly, steps to increase the level of training and combat readiness of existing conventional forces.<sup>387</sup>

However, the Reagan administration did not greatly alter the basic defence programme of its predecessor towards Asia-Pacific. One of the distinguishing points was that whilst the Nixon administration had considered the PRC as a major counter-weight to Soviet military power in Asia as the USSR viewed it as the only major military threat, the

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<sup>385</sup> *The US DoD Annual Report, Fiscal Year 1984* (Washington, DC: GPO, 1 February 1983), p. 37.

<sup>386</sup> Congressional Budget Office, *Rapid Deployment Forces: Policy and Budgetary Implications* (US Congress, February 1983), p. XV.

<sup>387</sup> William P. Snyder & James Brown, *Defence Policy in the Reagan Administration* (Washington, DC: NDUP, 1988), pp. xvii-xviii.



Reagan administration saw Japan as playing a major role in future military planning for the region<sup>388</sup> reflecting the changing characteristics of the balance of power system. Even so, the US retained the policy of developing diplomatic ties with the PRC while continuing to press Japan for greater defence commitments.

### **(3) Maritime Strategy/ Policy**

The US naval strategy of the Carter administration, apart from deterring strategic nuclear war, reflected the '1 1/2 war' concept and the strategic configuration in East Asia, where it was possible to deter both a full-scale Soviet attack by the US strategic/theatre nuclear capability and a regional conflict, conventional war, by the forces of the *de facto* alliance and the implicit geopolitical alliance, the PRC. Thus, the maritime priority rapidly moved on from the defence of Central Europe to the defence of the SLOCs from the Indian Ocean to the Middle East. In this situation, it was natural that the US maritime strategy shrunk back to the realm of a defensive role, i.e., the protection of SLOCs and supplies to the allied forces, not the concept of Sea Control and Power Projection.<sup>389</sup>

From 1979, there were great debates not only on the role and functions of each service, but also on the direction for future naval force buildup within the Navy. The former was derived from the defence budget competition among the services, because the highest percentage of defence funding from the early 1970s was allocated to the Navy


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<sup>388</sup> Paul H. B. Godwin, "The United States and Asia: The Success of Continuity?", in William P. Snyder & James Brown (1988), p. 51.

<sup>389</sup> When Admiral Elmo Zumwalt became CNO in 1971, he assessed the navy's missions: ① 'Assured Second Strike Capability by *Polaris* and *Poseidon* ballistic missile submarines', ② Sea Control, ③ Projection of Force. As a result, the surface ships including carriers were continuously reduced, i.e., carriers from 23 in 1968 to 13 in 1973, amphibious assault ships from 157 to 65. Refer, Maurice A. Mallin (1990), p. 206-207.

Department reflecting the enlargement of their roles in strategic deterrence<sup>390</sup>. At this time, the Navy operated in most of the distinct natural mission areas-Land War, War at Sea, and Strategic Deterrence (see Figure 4-1) even under the defensive strategic concept, which was really a natural phenomenon considering both the global geo-strategic configuration between the two blocs, and the characteristics of naval power.

**Figure 4-1: Existing Relationships of the US Armed Forces and Missions**



Source: John L. Byron, *Reorganisation of US Armed Forces* (Washington, DC: NDUP, 1983), p. 6.

The latter was actually a competition between the branches, most likely between attack carriers based on an offensive naval role posited by Admiral Thomas B. Hayward and submarine (cruise missile) based on the defensive principle of dispersion advocated by Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt (see Table 4-4). However, between them there was no actual difference from the aspect of contributing to the ultimate national strategic goal of deterrence, they were opposite sides of the same coin. Nonetheless, how to define naval

<sup>390</sup> Refer, Donald C. F. Daniel, "Beyond the 600-Ship Navy", *Adelphi Papers* 261 (Autumn 1991), p. 7 (Figure 1: Percentage allocation of spending authority, from 1948 to 1990).

strategy was the most important factor in determining a future naval forces buildup, because it provided the very cornerstone of the PPBS cycle as the first “P”<sup>391</sup>.

**Table 4-4: Comparison between the Offensive and Defensive Schools**

Classification	Offensive (Goal: Deterrent)	Defensive (Goal: Deterrent)
Claimants	Thomas B Hayward, James Watkins, John Lehman, Gerald E. Miller	Elmo R Zumwalt, John Chafee, Melvin R. Laird
Main Forces	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Attack Carriers, Marine Corps</li> <li>• High End Equipments: Large Carrier Platforms, Warships, Amphibious Ships, Manpower</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Submarines, Cruise Missiles</li> <li>• Low End Equipments: Small V/STOL Carriers <sup>392</sup>, SBN, Targeting Sensors, Long Range Missiles, Torpedoes</li> </ul>
Operational Concepts	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Projecting Power is the best way to gain Control of Seas</li> <li>• Prefer deep-strike actions</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Maintaining Sea Control is at risk</li> <li>• Big Ships are vulnerable to missiles</li> </ul>
Basic Logic	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Soviet Naval Strength is defensive</li> <li>• US geopolitical position demands the long-range, global sea-control, and power projection missions</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Soviet Navy is armed with Long-range Missiles and Torpedoes</li> </ul>
Principles	Sea Control, Power Projection, Presence, Concentration	Sea Denial, Dispersion

Note: V/STOL (Vertical or Short Take-off and Landing)

Sources: Summarized from George W. Baer (1994), pp. 400-417; *etc.*

Among the four initiatives of the Reagan administration, a larger Navy buildup was the most ambitious and costly project, which meant that the offensive school won at least outwardly. The US maritime strategy quickly moved to emphasizing the sea control missions calling for a limited purchase of large, multi-purpose warships capable of the power projection mission.<sup>393</sup> From 1975, the US Navy considered 600 ships, or 500 ships in a buildup plan, the minimum number required to meet its varied missions. At the end of the 1970s, the US adopted the latter with the announcement of Defence Secretary Brown in 1978 that a 525-ship fleet would be adequate to meet these missions

<sup>391</sup> John Allen Williams, “The US Navy Under the Reagan Administration and Global Forward Strategy”, in William P. Snyder & James Brown, (eds., 1988), p. 279.

<sup>392</sup> Regarding the utilities of V/STOL, refer Gerald G. O’Rourke, “Why V/STOL?”, *Proceedings*, Vol. 102, No. 1/875 (January 1976), pp. 39-45.

<sup>393</sup> Robert P. Haffa (1988), pp. 69-70.

in the 1980s, based on 12 large, nuclear-powered aircraft carriers.<sup>394</sup> However, with the emergence of the Reagan administration, it declared that it would build up to 600 ships<sup>395</sup> before the end of the decade (refer Table: 4-5) to secure its North Atlantic and Pacific SLOCs, to contain Soviet naval forces in their home ports, and to project military power to any area where the Soviets might contest its vital interests.<sup>396</sup> The fundamental aim of the maritime strategy assumed an American ability to fight simultaneously in both Europe and the Far East thus forcing the Soviets to fight on terms favourable to the US. More specifically, as Admiral James D. Watkins wrote, there were the following objectives of the US Navy buildup:

Firstly, deny the Soviets their kind of war by exerting global pressure, indicating that the conflict will be neither short nor localized,

Secondly, destroy the Soviet Navy,

Thirdly, influence the land battle by limiting redeployment of forces, by ensuring reinforcement and resupply, and by direct application of carrier air and amphibious power,

Lastly, terminate the war on terms acceptable to the US and to our allies through measures such as threatening direct attack against the Soviet homeland or changing the nuclear correlation of forces.<sup>397</sup>

In this regard, it is difficult to see that the offensive school completely won, because, as is seen in Table 4-5, the buildup of the navy was intrinsically planned to meet the threat from the USSR Navy under the national goal of deterrence. In order to do that, the US

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<sup>394</sup> Samuel F. Wells, Jr., "A Question of Priorities: A Comparison of the Carter and Reagan Defence Programmes", *Orbis*, Vol. 27, No. 3 (Fall 1983), pp. 641-666.

<sup>395</sup> On the basis of this decision, there was a pessimistic view that the US Navy had a less than 50 percent chance of prevailing in a major US-Soviet war, and that SLOCs to its allies geopolitical friends (i.e., the PRC) across the Western Pacific might not be maintained in a major conflict due to the decrease of the number of ships resulting from the retirement of the old ships dating from WWII from nearly 1,000 in 1968 to 480 ships in 1981, see Francis J. West, Jr., "US Naval Forces and NATO Planning", in Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, inc, *Naval Forces and Western Security* (Washington, DC: Pergamon, 1987), p. 1.

<sup>396</sup> Caspar W. Weinberger, *Annual Report to the Congress Fiscal Year 1987* (Washington, DC: DoD, 1986), pp. 50-51.

<sup>397</sup> James D. Watkins, "The Maritime Strategy", in the Maritime Strategy, *Proceedings* (January 1986, supplement), p. 14.

Navy was unable to disregard the low-end ships designed for point-specific sea control to satisfy low-to middle level peripheral conflicts,<sup>398</sup> and to ensure a balance of forces adequate for credible deterrence. As Table 4-5 shows, the real buildup of the ships focused on the low-end ships despite the new maritime strategy.

**Table: 4-5: Aggregate USN Programme by Specific Contingency/ Number of Ships (600-ship Navy) and the Strengths in 1990**

Contingency	CV	Aegis	CG	DD	FFG	Amp	URG	SSN	MCM	Aux	Total
Murmansk	4	8	24	9	25	51	16	4	9	15	165
Thrace	2	4	12	-	8	-	8	2	-	4	40
Persian Gulf Base Denial	2	4	12	6	14	34	8	2	6	9	97
Atlantic SLOC	4	8	24	5	61	-	16	34	-	15	167
Pacific SLOC	2	4	12	2	26	-	8	32	-	9	95
Totals	14	28	84	22	134	85	56	74	15	52	564
Overhaul	3	5	13	4	21	-	-	19	65	-	-
Total	17	33	97	26	155	85	56	93	15	52	629
Plus 25 fleet ballistic nuclear submarines (SSBNs), yielding a force of 654											
Strengths (1990) <sup>a</sup>	14	4 <sup>b</sup>	77	59	100	65	56	93	29	41	538
Difference <sup>c</sup>	-3	-29	-20	+33	-55	-20	0		+14	-11	-91
Plus 43 fleet ballistic nuclear submarines (SSBNs), yielding the force of 581(-73)											

Note: <sup>a</sup>: This is study purpose only, which does not include patrol and coastal combatants (30), because the 600-ship force referred to ocean-going units only. The types of ship classifications of Haffa and IISS do not match correctly.

<sup>b</sup>: This is the number of Battleships.

<sup>c</sup>: The goal is continuously changing according to the arms reduction talks and other factors. For the last goal for the 600-ships, refer Frank C. Carlucci, *Annual Report to the Congress FY 1989*, February 18, 1988, p. 192.

Source: Robert P. Haffa, Jr., *Planning U.S. Forces* (Washington, DC: NDUP, 1988), p. 72; IISS, *The Military Balance 1990-1991*, pp. 19-20.

In accordance with its new maritime strategy<sup>399</sup>, the US systematically increased its military naval presence including the capability for power projection reflecting the

<sup>398</sup> George W. Baer (1994), p. 419.

<sup>399</sup> With a revision concerning Soviet strategic thinking, the first priority of the US Navy missions was to destroy the Soviet submarines before they sailed into the open ocean.

improvement of technology in the Asia-Pacific region. Furthermore, it increased its naval patrolling in the Northwest Pacific to deliberately put military pressure on the eastern flank of the USSR. As a well known US military specialist, William Arkin wrote, "The US Navy has always had a preference for the Pacific Ocean over the Atlantic and Europe.... (in particular) during the Reagan administration, the Pacific maritime preference has resulted in an even more aggressive outlook and strategy... the maritime strategy in the Pacific was specifically intended to take advantage of Soviet military weakness in the region"<sup>400</sup>.

It is not easy to calculate how much capability or how many ships including submarines and aircraft were sent to reinforce the 7<sup>th</sup> fleet in this period (refer Table 4-6). According to the Chief of Naval Operations, the 7<sup>th</sup> fleet ships were kept at a stabilized level of 55 ships logging 18,000 out-of-area ship days at the end of the 1970s compared with its 200-plus ships and 62,400 out-of-area ship days in 1969.<sup>401</sup> Basically, the number of ships and activities of the 7<sup>th</sup> Fleet was significantly diminished. Its basic structure had, however, a paramount flexibility to reconstitute itself as a reaction force in accordance with operational demands in a crisis or war situation. Because, if it met an emergency, it would be augmented as required according to the stage of crisis from the 3<sup>rd</sup> fleet (the other Pacific fleet) and others by an order from the command authorities using the flexibility of organization and manoeuvrability of ships as in the cases of the *Pueblo* Incident, the Vietnam War, and Cuban missile crisis (refer Figure 4-2). In addition to this reinforcement, in a contingent situation, it would closely operate with the Japanese MSDF, whose main role was to assist the blockade of the US Navy by closing the

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<sup>400</sup> William M. Arkin, "The Nuclear Arms Race at Sea", *Neptune Papers*, No. 1 (Washington, DC: Greenpeace-Institute for Policy Studies, October 1987), pp. 13-14.

<sup>401</sup> The US CNO, *Understanding Soviet Naval Deployments* (Washington, DC: GPO, 1981, 4<sup>th</sup> ed.), p. 16.

Tsushima, Tsugaru and Soya straits, and to cooperate in ASW.


**Table 4-6: The Strengths of the 7th Fleet in 1985 and 1990<sup>402</sup>**

Classification	1985	1990	Remarks
Pacific Fleet	Reinforced from the others or Sum of the 3 <sup>rd</sup> and 7th	8 SSBN, 3 SSGN, 37 SSN, 3 SS, 7 CV/CVN, 100 PSC, 44 Amph.	
3 <sup>rd</sup> Fleet	3 SSBN, 25 SSN, 4 Carriers, 72 PSC, 26 Amph.	5 CVBGs, 1-2 BSAG, 4 URG, 1 Amph Group.	+1 Carrier
7 <sup>th</sup> Fleet	20 SSN/SS, 3 Carriers (1 hel), 23 PSC, 6 Amph.	2 CVBGs, 0-1 BSAG, 1 URG, 1 Amph Group.	-1 Carrier
Indian Ocean	Dets from 7 <sup>th</sup> Fleet 1 Carrier battle Group (6 PSC)	Dets from 7 <sup>th</sup> /2 <sup>nd</sup> Fleets	

Note: BSAG (Battleship Surface Attack Group), Dets (Detachment), PSC (Principal Surface Combatants), URG (Underway Replenishment Group).

Sources: IISS, *The Military Balance 1985-1986*, p. 11, 14; *1989-1990*, p. 26.

**Figure 4-2: The Basic Structure of the US Seventh Fleet**



Note: P & R (Patrol and Reconnaissance Force)

Source: Kensuke Ebata, "The US 7<sup>th</sup> Fleet", *Navy International* (November 1983), p. 691.

Its paramount objective for defence posture was the readiness to meet and defeat any potential enemy. In order to do that, it could be reorganized out of accordance with its basic structure by forms of detachment or reinforcement. The realm of its activities was

<sup>402</sup> Wartime disposition of the US naval fleets was completely different from this strength. While the US deployed 5 CVBGs, 2 BSAGs, and 4 URGs in the Western Pacific and Indian Ocean, there were only 2 CVBGs and 1 URG under the 3<sup>rd</sup> fleet, refer Frank C. Carlucci (1988), p. 193.

almost the same as those of the previous period except for not only the wartime mission in the Vietnam War, but also crisis response in the forms of detachment and readiness for the RDJFT, as an added mission.

#### **(4) The Development of the USMC**

##### **(A) General Rise and Fall**

The success of diplomatic means in its global containment strategy, the amicable settlement with the PRC, and the decline in the possibility of a war in Northeast Asia convinced the US to concentrate on defending Europe for the time being just after the Vietnam War. At that time, most civilians, the officers of the DoD and defence analysts of institutions such as Brookings<sup>403</sup> (not the other services' experts) were sceptical of the roles and functions of the USMC in the European theatre. Given the growing threats derived from the development of PGMs and the Warsaw Pact's modernized ground and air units, they assumed that amphibious landing operations had become obsolete emphasizing the following five points regarding the force structure of the USMC:

- Firstly, US military commitments outside Europe and its surrounding waters were highly unlikely,
- Secondly, Marine ground forces did not possess adequate tanks and antitank weapons for European and the Middle East Asia warfare,
- Thirdly, Marine Corps fixed-wing aviation duplicated Air Force and Navy tactical air and starved the ground FMF of funds and high-quality personnel,
- Fourthly, the Corps' dependence on heavy-lift troop-carrying helicopters made its tactical mobility questionable on battlefields affected by bad weather and intense anti-air defence,
- Lastly, the Navy's diminished interest in gunfire support ships and amphibious lift would prevent the FMF from reaching the battlefield on time and then landing against serious opposition.<sup>404</sup>

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<sup>403</sup> A good example of this is Martin Binkin and Jeffrey Record's book, *Where Does the Marine Corps Go from Here?*.

<sup>404</sup> Quoted without quotation marks from Allan R. Millett (1980), p. 608. The main purpose of this



In this era, the most obvious mission for the USMC was to focus on defending NATO. As a result, a MEU size of the Atlantic FMF began for the first time to exercise in Norway and northern Germany in 1975, which became an annual event and expanded its numbers to brigade size. In reality, the force structure of the USMC was not suitable for being seriously tailored for the NATO war scenario in terms of mobility, fire power, and tactical coordination, because it would have to fight either in the environment of sustained armoured combat in the Jutland area or Arctic mountain warfare in Northern Norway.<sup>405</sup> In order to maintain the *status quo* and try to survive a protracted period of budgetary austerity, on the one hand the USMC projected to modernize its tank force (adopting the M-60 A1), artillery, antitank units, and anti-aircraft missiles, but it was uneasy about solving all the above problems. On the other hand, it highlighted its contributions in Third World areas, i.e., the activities of the 34<sup>th</sup> MEU in the Mediterranean, and countering Soviet projection forces outside Europe<sup>406</sup> being capable of reaching anywhere in the world, to express US concerns or interests, and for directly attacking a hostile force in a contingent situation as well as maintaining its efficacy in terms of cost-effectiveness<sup>407</sup>.

In addition to these efforts, it introduced new concepts for amphibious landing operations, the MAGTF and the Over-the-Horizon (OTH), in order not only to minimize the mistrust about the possibility of amphibious operational landings in the era of the PGMs, but also to rationalize its possession of an air component. The former provided

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criticism was to cut the defence budget by reducing duplicable functions of the armed forces in the post-Vietnam War era.

<sup>405</sup> Francis J. West (1978), p. 41.

<sup>406</sup> *Ibid.* As the '1 1/2 War' strategy suggested, the policy-makers assumed that ground forces except for Navy and Air Force in a future Korean War would not be employed.

<sup>407</sup> At that time, it provided 15 percent of the US divisions and 12 percent of its tactical aircraft wings, despite the fact that it used only 3.6 percent of the total defence budget.

for combined arms at all levels of Marine unit deployment, which was based on existing battalion, regimental, and divisional structures within the Corps. The purposes of this were to solve the fundamental problems of both the paucity of amphibious lift capability, and the difficulties of full mobilization to meet a high-density conflict requiring a full divisional size from the peacetime employment of the MAB size. The compositions of MAGTF are various according to the required mission as MAU, MAB and MAF, each comprises four elements: Command, Ground Combat, Aviation Combat, and Combat Service Support Elements.<sup>408</sup>

The latter called for launching assaults from points over the horizon, where the opportunity for surprise was greater and the vulnerability of the US ships was less. The critics focused on the point that an opposed landing capability would be essential given the development of the C<sup>4</sup>I system, thus an unopposed landing site might not be available in a modern war. The OTH concept implied the avoidance of opposed landings by using enough flexibility and speed, even though the situation on the enemy's shore might change (refer Figure 4-3).

In order to accomplish this, the USMC additionally needed to procure both the heavy lift hovercraft, LCAC, which enabled the crossing of 70 % of worldwide coastal areas compared with 17% of the existing landing craft,<sup>409</sup> and the V-22 Osprey 'tilt-rotor'. However, it seems that this OTH concept did not come true until the end of the Cold War, because its plan to procure the new equipment was delayed by reliability


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<sup>408</sup> For the details, see The Advanced Amphibious Study Group, *Guidelines for Forming a Composite MAGTF* (Washington, DC: USMCHQ, 1985, 3<sup>rd</sup> ed.).

<sup>409</sup> Peter A. Wilson, "The Marine Corps in 1995", *Proceedings*, Vol. 111/11/993 (November 1995), p. 55.

problems,<sup>410</sup> and costs<sup>411</sup>. Meanwhile, with the worsening security environments and following the revisions of US strategies and policies, these critics faded away from the centre of strategic and policing attention leaving the fundamental issues of the USMC to be improved.

**Figure 4-3: The Employments of the Landing Asset under the OTH Concept**



Source: Michael Evans, "Allied Amphibious Operations in the Forward Maritime Strategy",  
*Navy International* (September 1989), p. 375.


In the late 1970s, domestic support for the military establishment and the naval support for an enhanced power projection capability needed to react to the naval arms race in the Indian Ocean and the Southwest Asian region enabled the USMC to maintain a viable operational doctrine in order to face sophisticated opponents in the Third World. Given the creation of the RDJTF, the USMC emphasized the development of both the maritime prepositioning ship (MPS) concept to deploy heavy equipment in potential crisis areas, and a mechanized heavy amphibious brigade to be prepositioned in the

<sup>410</sup> It planned to possess at least 90 LCACs, but the additional procurement after the first 9 in 1985 was delayed. As such, it got only 14 LCACs in 1989. IISS, *The Military Balance 1989-1990*, p. 19.

<sup>411</sup> The V-22 *Osprey* programme was still in the R & D stage. The cost estimated at about 40 billion dollars was too high, and it also had a great problem in developing new material for the rotating engines. James L George, "US Amphibious Forces: The Evolutionary Revolution", *Navy International* (October 1986), p. 612.

forward deployed logistic ships. These concepts reduced the reaction time to a matter of days instead of weeks or more if transported by amphibious shipping.<sup>412</sup> The 7<sup>th</sup> Marine Amphibious Brigade was activated in May 1980, and the prepositioning ships consisting of seven vessels and tankers at Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean were deployed. As such, the Maritime Pre-positioned Forces (MPFs) came into being in the Mediterranean Sea and on the island of Guam in the Pacific Ocean in the 1980s, which offered strategic flexibility. Three squadrons of cargo ships, each capable of lifting almost all a MEB's combat equipment and about thirty days supplies, were positioned strategically one for the Atlantic, another for the Indian Ocean, and the third for the Pacific.<sup>413</sup> The MAB was the most likely form of employment for Marines in either low-intensity or medium-intensity as the equivalent of the SNI regiment (refer Figure 4-4).

**Figure 4-4: The Basic Organisation of the MAB**



In addition, with the growing unconventional threats within the Third World, the USMC began to create special operational forces by order of the Deputy Secretary of Defense William H. Taft in late 1983. Under this direction, the FMFLant conducted a pilot programme on June 14 1985. The results were successful, because it had “an inherent

<sup>412</sup> Before the deployment of the MPS, the majority of equipment and resources was planned to be moved by air during the first 30 days of a crisis, but the amount of a full month's airlift equaled that of the first 10 ships' arrival. Stuart L. Perkins, *Global Demands: Limited Forces, US Army Deployment* (Washington, DC: NDUP, 1984), p. 50.

<sup>413</sup> Peter A. Wilson (1995), p. 55.

capability to conduct a broad spectrum of special operations in a maritime environment, particularly when a requirement exists for the insertion of surfaceborne or helicopterborne forces from the sea”<sup>414</sup>. Thus, the USMC devised a special operations capable (SOC) training programme, which was conducted by all FMFs that had to be operating under the MAU (SOC)<sup>415</sup> by January 1988. A MEU carries 15 day’s worth of food, fuel, and ammunition. The USMC had six MEUs, which rotated on routine deployments to the Mediterranean and the Pacific Rim, and to which the two forward-deployed MEUs were formally designated, one in each theatre.<sup>416</sup> It seems that the USMC’s initial intention of developing all MAGTF sizes to be capable of special operations was limited only in activating the MEU (SOC) size during the Cold War.

After the end of US combat involvement in the Vietnam War, the strength of the USMC remained relatively constant. As Table 4-7 shows, whilst the percentage of the combat forces was about 58 percent in 1976, it increased to 76 percent absorbing the personnel of the logistics into the combat service support groups as a result of the doctrinal development of the MAGTF. Furthermore, the force troops such as the artillery and tank battalions except for the naval forces, had been organized into the relevant size of the MAGTF to reinforce its fire support capability. In reality, although an infantry regiment had three battalions, each battalion was composed of four rifle companies unlike that of the US Army. This force structure would be regarded as the backbone of the USMC having the strongest combat power compared with the composition of the US Army’s

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<sup>414</sup> Harry M. Murdock, “MAU (SOC): A Powerful Maritime Force”, *Marine Corps Gazette* (August 1987), p. 67.

<sup>415</sup> This concept was changed in 1988 into MEU (SOC). However, it seems that they were both simultaneously employed for a while.

<sup>416</sup> Kathleen D. Valenzi (ed.), *Strike Force: US Marine Corps Special Operations* (Shrewsbury: Airline, 1991), p. 30.

light division.<sup>417</sup>

**Table 4-7: A Comparison of the Manpower between Fiscal Year 1976 and 1987**

Classification		1976		1987		Remarks
		Number	% (approx)	Number	% (approx)	
Combat Power	Land Forces	51,100	26	105,900	57	+ 54,800
	Tactical Air Forces	37,000	19	32,300	17	- 4,700
	Force Troops	24,900	14	900	2	- 24,000
	Subtotal	113,000	58	139,100	76	+ 26,100
Support Forces	Base Operating Support	22,000	11	21,300	11	- 700
	Other Supports	61,300	31	26,300	13	- 35,000
	Subtotal	83,300	42	47,600	24	- 35,700
Total		196,300		186,700		- 9,600

Sources; Department of Defence, *Manpower Requirement Report for FY 1976* (February 1975), p. XII-7;  
*FY 1988* (February 1987), p. V-7.

### **(B) Amphibious Lift Capability**

Until the end of the 1970s, the Navy doubted the concept of amphibious landing missions because of concerns about the cost-effectiveness of the amphibious lift capability. The US projected a major and long-needed modernization and expansion programme to improve its amphibious lift capability under the goal of 75 amphibious ships capable of simultaneously carrying MAF-plus-MAB, but the goal was not achieved until the demise of the Cold War (refer Table 4-8). In this period, the main effort was given to developing the LHD multipurpose assault ship and the LSD-41 Cargo Variant to carry the LCACs. Although the first LHD was commissioned in May 1989, this was invented to embody the new doctrinal development with helicopter and V/STOL capabilities as well as well deck space for three LCACs. To replace the ageing

<sup>417</sup> A heavy MAB is of similar size to the US light division in personnel, i.e., 13,000 of the 7<sup>th</sup> MAB versus 10,200 of the 7<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division.

LSD 28 ‘*Anchorage*’ class, the 3 “*Whidbey island*” class LSDs were commissioned by 1987.

**Table 4-8: Deployable Amphibious Ships (FY 1987)**

Classifications		Quantity	Carrying Capacity	Pacific	Atlantic
LCC	Command Ship	2	700 Troops (200 Officers), 3 LCPs, 2 LCVPS	1	1
LHA	Assault Ship	5	1,703 Troops, 6 LCM 6s, 4 LCU, Harrier AV-8B VSTOL fixed wing aircraft in place of some helicopters as required, 19 Ch-53 D Sea Stallion or 26 CH-46 D/E Sea Knight Heli	3	2
LPH	Assault Ship	7	1,746 Troops, 4 AV-8B harriers, 11 CH-53D or 20 CH-46 D/E	3	4
LKA	Cargo Ship	5	360 Troops, 10,000 ton stores	3	2
LPD	Transport Dock	13	930 Troops, 9 LCM 6s or 4 LCM 8s, Up to 6 CH-46 D/E	7	6
LSD	Dock Landing Ship	10	“ <i>Whidbey Island</i> ” Class: 450 Troops, 2 or 4 LCACs or 21 LCM 6s, AV-8B Harrier, Ch-53 Serious Size “ <i>Anchorage</i> ” Class: 366 Troops, 3 LCUs or 4 LCACs, 1 LCM, 1 LCPL, 1 LCV	5	5
LST	Tank Landing Ship	18	400 Troops, 500 ton Vehicles, Helicopter Platform Only	9	9
Total		60		31	29

Sources: Michael H. Decker, *Proceedings* (November 1987), p. 76; Caspar W. Weinberger, *Annual Report to the Congress Fiscal Year 1987* (February 5, 1986), p. 179-183, *Jane's Fighting Ships 1989-1990*, IISS, *The Military Balance 1987-1988*.

Despite these improvements, as Michael H. Decker has analysed, the amphibious lift capability was limited to carrying the three amphibious MABs, which included 12 amphibious ships to carry the 4 MEU SOCs deployed in the Pacific (2) and Atlantic (2) Oceans.<sup>418</sup> To supplement the paucity of amphibious lift capability, it employed the Maritime Prepositioning Ships, the 5 LKAs, which were converted from relatively new commercial ships. There were 3 squadrons, and each carried the equipment of a Marine Amphibious Brigade.

<sup>418</sup> Michael H. Decker (1987), p. 76.

### **(C) The Marines in the Asia-Pacific region**

Just after the Vietnam War, the only reason in the US policymakers' judgment to keep the US presence in the Western Pacific Region was its effect upon Asian perceptions and regional stability, because they thought that the USSR did not have the forces to invade Japan as a result of a strategic configurative assessment in association with the Sino-Soviet confrontation, the improvement of Sino-American relations, and the termination of the Vietnam War. Furthermore, the US forward deployed forces were the most prepared to face a regional conflict, nonetheless they were also the most costly in terms of resources or defence budget. Hence, given these reasons, the US reorganized its forces in the Western Pacific Area, i.e., the withdrawal of the 700 troops in Taiwan and reinforcing the strength of the seventh fleet. The Table in Figure 4-5 shows the US presence in the Western Pacific excluding Hawaii, which would cover most oceans except for the Atlantic. This force structure was basically not changed by the termination of the Cold War. Although the marines occupied 19 % of the total American strength, the 3<sup>rd</sup> Marine Division was not given much attention in terms of developing its readiness during the 1980s. The only major event was the establishment of the 31<sup>st</sup> MEU (SOC) stationed in Okinawa as a quick response standing MAGTF under the command of the III MEF, which would be reinforced by the 1<sup>st</sup> independent MAB in Hawaii, and the I MEF in California. From these perspectives, it is not difficult to deduce the following basic roles and functions.


### **(D) Roles and Functions of the US Marines**

The basic role could be characterized as a deterrent force against Soviet expansionism and any contingent regional conflict, i.e., an invasion of North Korea, by the US defensive commitment to the countries in the region and its foreign policy goals



determined by the NSC-68. At the first stages of this period, the marines' role was limited to deterring the North Koreans as a result of the American strategic environment assessment, but it was expanded to deter the Russians given the reinforcement of their forces in the Far Eastern and Pacific TVDs. As the fundamental role was upgraded to the level of compellence with the onset of the Vietnam War, this deterrent role would automatically be upgraded to compellence or defence to repel aggression. Furthermore, as the US foreign policy objective implied, it contributed to the deterrence of the emergence of any dominant military power.

**Figure 4-5: The US Military Presence in the Western Pacific Area**



Source: The Japanese Defence Agency, *Defence of Japan 1980*, p.64

The marines' presence itself had a great psychological impact on the protection of both

US and allied interests and the advent of any potential adversary, as Colin Gray has observed, “a strong US military posture in Japanese and South Korean territory, with considerable offensive potential, is a vitally important constraint upon Soviet freedom of action”<sup>419</sup>. In this sense, it could be regarded as the most important strategic balancer, even though it seemed a little aggressive because of its character of being a maritime power projection force in a high state of readiness. Furthermore, it worked as a stabilizer in protecting the Asian allies from political disturbance, particularly after the end of the Vietnam War. The redeployment of the marines in Japan, which was the unique ground force component in Japan capable of forcibly entering a landmass at any point in response to a friendly government’s request for assistance, demonstrated the American will to defend its allies from the threat of the communist world.

The US marines’ presence in the Western Pacific enhanced the Navy’s sea control ability by assuring the Navy that the islands or land areas were under US control. The marines were stationed in most of the strategic spots in defending the SLOC from the homeland via the East Sea (Sea of Japan), the East China Sea and the Indian Ocean to the Persian Gulf as well as constraining the USSR and its allies from the sea, i.e., Okinawa, Subic Bay, the Marianas, and Hawaii. This function was the most likely to be passed over, but it protected the naval assets and advanced bases regardless of peacetime or wartime by providing a security detachment, according to the regulation of the amended National Security Act of 1947.

The distinguishing peacetime functions came from its characteristics of force-in-readiness to react anywhere, anytime by an order of the National Command Authority.

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<sup>419</sup> Michael E. Decker (1987), p. 78.

In this sense, it could be regarded as a means for developing the foreign policy objectives by performing various missions, such as crisis intervention (the 32<sup>nd</sup> MEU in Beirut as a component of the Multinational Peacekeeping Force), search and rescue operations (the rescue operation of a detachment of the 3<sup>rd</sup> Marine Division for the American container ship '*Mayaguez*' in May 1975), humanitarian and disaster relief, and evacuation of civilians from a dangerous area (the 32<sup>nd</sup> MAU in Lebanon in 1982), in the realm of the MOOTW as the Nation's force-in-readiness envisioned by the amended National Security Act of 1947. The employment of the USMC in this region was affected by the nature of US geographical factors in association with the distance from its responsibilities as well as its allies and enemies. Whilst the purpose of an army presence was relatively limited to defending its stationing country, i.e., the 2<sup>nd</sup> Infantry Division in Korea against an invasion of North Korea, the marines were able to react to most regional political issues which needed military means.

The marines contributed to the improvement of diplomatic relations by ratifying bilateral military-to-military relations. For example, an organizational structure, the Joint Planning Committee (JPC) and the Ground, Air and Maritime Planning Subcommittees (GPSC, APSC and MPSC), was created to implement the "Guidelines for Japan-US Defence Cooperation" in 1979. The 3<sup>rd</sup> MEF is the only effective counterpart of the Japanese Ground Self Defence Force (JGSDF) based in Japan as distinct from any other American services. At the initial stage, the USN/USMC planners did not want to be involved in any bilateral activities, because they thought that it would interfere with the primary mission as an amphibious force readily available for

commitment anywhere in the Asia-Pacific region.<sup>420</sup> However, this attitude was changed emphasizing the importance of the American military presence in Japan with the Soviet military buildup in the Pacific in the early 1980s. As a result, they began to improve their mutual relationship via combined exercises, officer exchanges as well as the commander of the III MEF acting as ‘Deputy Co-Chairman’ of the GPSC. Therefore, this combined relationship plays a major role in the development of the diplomatic relationship between the two countries by assuring and strengthening the mutual defence posture.

The wartime functions were to establish lodgements ashore in support of naval or land campaigns, to secure flank areas, or to seize the initiative in counteroffensive operations,<sup>421</sup> under the command of the US Pacific Fleet to ultimately take hegemony in a war. The stationing base, Okinawa, is the very important strategic point in Northeast Asia forming a natural barrier to the East China Sea and the approaches to Korea as well as Japan’s southernmost main island of Kyushu in association with the marines’ main character of maritime projection function. According to the operational concept, a MEU, most likely the 31<sup>st</sup> MEU (SOC), would first proceed to the battlefield, and would deploy in several hours, and would be reinforced by a MEB (in the Pacific Fleet) in several days, and by a MEF in several weeks. If there were a war in the Korean peninsula, this operational concept would work efficaciously, because it might prevent escalation into a global war as it did in the Korean and Vietnam Wars.

However, if there were a war in Japan, it would escalate into a global war, considering

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<sup>420</sup> Ernest G. III Beinhart, “The United States Marine Corps and the Japanese Self Defense Force”, *CSC Report 1985* (May 28, 1985), p. 31.

<sup>421</sup> Caspar W. Weinberger (1987), p. 182.

the importance of Japan in US foreign policy objectives as well as Japan's status in international politics. In this case, the most likely scenario was a counterattack against at least a regimental size of a spearhead echelon of Soviet theatre operational landing forces on the northern part of Japan, when the JSDF had failed to repel the aggression under the terms of the Guidelines for Japan-US Defence Cooperation. In order to counterattack, it would be necessary to form the MEF size of MAGTF supported by the Navy's Task Force within a short time, so as not to lose the initiative considering the characteristics of manoeuvre warfare in a modern war. However, if strictly assessing the US Navy's amphibious lift capability, the possibility of a counterattack operation would have been really doubtful, not only because its amphibious lift capability with a rapid reaction was extremely limited, but also because the American priority of defence focused on the European theatre rather than Japan under the 'swing strategy'. On the contrary, if a war was initiated in other areas, in Europe or the Indian Ocean, the marines of a MEB or MEF could have conducted amphibious raids on Petropavlovsk, the Kuriles, or elsewhere against Soviet naval bases to seize a secure key position on land in order to support the strategic naval goal of blockading the Soviet Navy in its territory.

Comparing the roles of the marines' presence with those of the previous era, its fundamental roles of deterrence and defending the free world from Soviet expansion had not changed. With their return from the Vietnam War, their defensive posture contributed enormously to not only the defence of Japan and South Korea, but also deterring a threat from any potential enemy reflecting the reinforcement of the Soviet forces in the region. However, with the priority of the US foreign policy objectives and the increasing possibility of waging a global war against the USSR, the defence priority

was focused more on Japan rather than on South Korea. Its peacetime and wartime functions should be separated from these roles. A major change was the establishment of the posture of force-in-readiness to perform various missions in terms of the MOOTW.

## **B. SNI**

### **(1) Soviet Interests/ Foreign Policy**

With Nixon's visit to Moscow in 1972 and the agreement of the ABM treaty, the USSR felt that it had finally attained the longstanding foreign policy goal of 'equality' with the US in terms of international political influence throughout the world. It appears that it regarded *détente* as a giant step toward the Soviet-American condominium, so that Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko stated on April 4 1974 during the 24<sup>th</sup> Party Congress of the CPSU that "Today, there is no question of any significance which can be decided without the Soviet Union or in opposition to it".<sup>422</sup> Along with the enunciation of Gromyko's solemn remark, it pursued an active foreign policy to expand its political influence throughout the Middle East Asia and Africa, i.e., the Soviet-Cuban venture in Angola, which in its view was not of vital interest to the US.

Despite the fact that these kinds of Soviet intervention were regarded by the Americans as Soviet imperialism being again on the march as well as a symbol of American weakness,<sup>423</sup> the USSR pursued even more actively its foreign intervention to expand its influence by rendering support to any nonaligned regime or national liberation

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<sup>422</sup> "Gromyko's Report to the 24<sup>th</sup> Congress", *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, No. 23 (April 20, 1974), p. 12.

<sup>423</sup> Vladimir Petrov, "New Dimensions of Soviet Foreign Policy", Franklin D Margiotta (ed.), *Evolving Strategic Realities: Implications for US Policymakers* (Washington, DC: NDUP, 1980), pp. 16-19.

movement of its choosing. The Soviet leaders began to emphasize that the 'global ideological struggle' with the adversary must go on<sup>424</sup>. For example, a member of the Politburo, Mikhail Suslov, insisted in the 1970s that "support for national liberation movements would lead to the ultimate victory of socialism over imperialism"<sup>425</sup>. However, the ideological struggle was at that time not only being waged against the US and other imperial countries, but also against the PRC. Consequently, as it supported 22 countries in Africa to counter the enlargement of the PRC's influence, it had to resume the arduous and costly efforts to enhance its image as one of the world powers 'equal' to the US.<sup>426</sup> One of the reasons for the Soviet decision to intervene in Afghanistan, its ally since the late 1950s, was Kabul's tense relations with Pakistan, which was seen as a close ally of the PRC<sup>427</sup>. In this way, the Soviet invasion resulted in the struggle for hegemony in the Third World among the major powers including the PRC.

Although the USSR's primary region of competition with the US lay in the European heartland, the priority of its foreign policy goals was slowly moving in the direction of the Asia-Pacific area, which was the source of a potentially critical challenge to Soviet power and prestige.<sup>428</sup> In a triangular or quadrangular balance of power system, the Soviet foreign policy options in the Far East were inevitably limited. Japan's growing potential in both economic and military capabilities, North Korea's tilt towards the PRC, the Sino-Japanese and Sino-US rapprochement caused the regional balance of power to

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<sup>424</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 19.

<sup>425</sup> P.M.H. Bell (2001), p. 322.

<sup>426</sup> Franklin D. Margiotta (1980), p. 20.

<sup>427</sup> To lose Afghanistan to hostile forces would have meant that the USSR and its allies would be encircled by assorted enemies, from Japan to Norway. In the Soviet view, it was unable to abandon Afghanistan, since it had a substantial strategic value in maintaining a presence in the region along with Ethiopia and South Yemen, and as its immediate neighbour. See, *ibid.*, pp. 30-34.

<sup>428</sup> Chung Min Lee, *The Emerging Strategic Balance in Northeast Asia* (Seoul: RCPUK, 1989), p. 93.

shift in favour of the US.<sup>429</sup> As previously discussed, the priority of the Soviet interests in the Asia-Pacific region remained the isolation of the PRC by trying to avoid jeopardizing relations with the West, notably the US and Japan. One of the visible fruits was the Soviet-Vietnamese Friendship Treaty in November 1978. However, it failed to create a further network of bilateral treaties between the USSR and individual Asian countries in the Western Pacific area. It meant that, in the Soviet perception, all of the remaining Southeast Asian countries including the members of ASEAN had close military ties with the US.

In the late 1970s, there were two urgent matters of concern to the USSR regarding its foreign engagements in the Western Pacific region, arising from ideological and politico-strategic disputes between communist countries. The first was its continuous dispute with the PRC, which it was unable to normalize despite efforts, and which was closer to the US as a geographical partner in the East Asia together with Japan and South Korea.<sup>430</sup> The second was the PRC's confrontation with Vietnam, which was its principal ally in Southeast Asia. It supported the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea and tried to deter the Chinese invasion into Vietnam. In addition to these, the four Northern territories dispute with Japan remained serious. Given the situation of the complex interconnection of international relationships, it was unable to expand its influence in the Pacific anymore. With regard to this security environment, the USSR would fundamentally have a strong interest in removing the PRC, Japan and Korea from any active support for US forces or war efforts. From the above perspectives, the

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<sup>429</sup> J. Pollack & J. Solomon, "The Sino-Soviet Conflict and American Security Concerns", *the Rand Papers P-6288* (Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, January 1977), pp. 3-4.

<sup>430</sup> President Ford emphasized America's special ties with Japan and the joint US-PRC opposition to any hegemony in Asia in the "Pacific Doctrine" in December 1975. Refer, Arnold L. Horelick, "Soviet Policy Dilemmas in Asia", *Asian Survey*, Vol. 17, No. 6 (June 1977), p. 509.



political goals of the USSR were extremely urgent to improve relations with the PRC at the expense of US/PRC ties, to prevent Japan from increasing its contribution to Western security, to unify Korea under communist rule, and to expand Soviet influence in Southeast/west Asia and the Indian Ocean<sup>431</sup>. After all, the foreign policy objectives in the region were decided by a combination of national security concerns and a desire to increase its influence.

## **(2) Military Strategy/ Policy**

In some aspects, the Soviet military force buildup in this period is not easily explained by the principle of 'sufficiency' or 'superiority' in the fields of the number of troops and quantity of arms. Initially, the Brezhnev regime acquired its prestige in the international community by the most impressive military buildup, modernizing its nuclear and conventional military capabilities to exploit the post-Vietnam paralysis in the US. In other words, the intention of the military buildup by the Brezhnev regime was to use military power as a leverage to secure Western cooperation, which resulted in expanded military intervention such as that in Afghanistan.

In the field of nuclear strategy, the USSR declared in 1977 and 1982 that nuclear weapons would not be employed first, which was called a 'no-first-use of nuclear weapons',<sup>432</sup> reflecting the US nuclear strategy of 'flexible response'<sup>433</sup>. At that time,

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<sup>431</sup> *Soviet Military Power* (Washington, DC: GPO, March 1983, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed.), p. 35.

<sup>432</sup> The USSR declared that it would not be the first to initiate nuclear war, G. Holden, *The Warsaw Pact: Soviet Security and Bloc Politics* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989), p. 58; Willard C. Frank & Philip S. Gillette (1992), p. 9.

<sup>433</sup> The flexible response strategy is a product of the US attempts to avoid a nuclear holocaust by choosing a controlled and deliberate course of action for military response and action. See, Russell F. Weigley, *The American Way of War*, ch. 17: 'Strategies of Deterrence and of Action: The Strategy Intellectuals', pp. 436-440. The shift of the US nuclear strategy from massive retaliation to flexible response contributed to create a more favourable climate for arms control negotiations.

this was really arguable, because it may have implied that the USSR had no interest in nuclear war-fighting or that it retained it in reserve.<sup>434</sup> Although that was not to say that it ruled out its first use of nuclear weapons at all levels, it appears that the possibility of a global nuclear war was enormously diminished considering the nuclear strategies of the two superpowers. However, when the Reagan administration began to introduce the new anti-missile defence system, SDI, the USSR could not disregard it and faced a dilemma almost impossible to resolve, because it could not afford to match it because of the unbearable cost, despite its repeated declarations of its confidence in being able to compete. With the projection of the SDI in the US, a new dimension of nuclear strategy beyond the ideas of mutual vulnerability and mutual deterrence represented by the ABM treaty was initiated<sup>435</sup>.

From the beginning of the 1970s under the Nixon Doctrine, the US began to turn to greater reliance on local paladins such as Israel, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Japan, and South Korea, which began to be tightened into a more directly anti-Soviet encirclement. Furthermore, the Sino-US rapprochement was seen by the Soviets as the US drawing a more direct confrontational encirclement in the Asia-Pacific region. The implications in the military dimension of this encirclement were considerable, because the possibility of waging a two-front war became more realistic. As previously discussed, the USSR established an overwhelming superiority in terms of conventional forces in the European theatre and both blocs began to negotiate the MBFR. In stark contrast, the

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<sup>434</sup> It was nothing more than a declaratory statement, because it had a plan to employ nuclear weapons from the very start in the event of war with 12,000 tanks and 25,000 armored personnel carriers. Refer, James O. Jackson, "The Secret Plan for WWII", *Time* (July 4, 1994), pp. 22-23.

<sup>435</sup> The USSR viewed the SDI as the result of the US intention to regain the option of a counterforce first strike by threatening to foil a Soviet retaliatory strike. In the Soviet view, it was not feasible, so it considered the SDI as an attempt to establish a political or even military use of a coercive first-strike capability. Raymond L. Garthoff (1989), pp. 247-250.

Soviet view of its security in the Far East was really depressing, because it had to contend with a politico-military alignment between the West and the PRC in conditions where, unlike the Eastern Europe, it had virtually no buffer states, except for the Mongolian People's Republic, which occupied the centre of the Sino-Soviet boundary. This threat perception was well represented by the warning of Marshal Ogarkov, then Chief of the General Staff, at the conference of senior Soviet officers in mid-1980 that "Broadening military contacts with China and increasing the supply of military equipment and technology, the Western powers count on pushing Peking toward openly aggressive actions against our country and the states of Southeast Asia"<sup>436</sup>.

In the stalemate of the security environment in the Asia-Pacific region, it pursued a strong military buildup policy coupled with an aggressive foreign policy objective. The Soviet leadership viewed its military power as a key means of accomplishing political and military objectives. Indeed, the Soviet security policies focused on the need to involve the political and military strategy of regional actors more directly, or to deny the benefits of Japan, the PRC and the US alignments<sup>437</sup>. As such, the USSR established the theatre command structures: the Western Strategic Command, controlling Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces west of the Urals and the Eastern Strategic Command, controlling Soviet Forces east of the Urals.<sup>438</sup> Fundamentally, the Soviets were compelled to perform a two-front war, if a war in Europe occurred or *vice versa*, because it was possible to imagine that it would escalate into a global war. As such, the USSR

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<sup>436</sup> Gregory Flynn (1989), pp. 273-274.

<sup>437</sup> Leszek Buszynski, "International Linkage and Regional Interests in Soviet Asia-Pacific Policy", *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 61, No. 2 (Summer 1988), p.214.

<sup>438</sup> College Station Texas, "Organizing for War: The Soviet Military Establishment Viewed Through the Prism of the Military District", *The College Station Paper Series, No. 2: MDA 903-80-C-0335, Project RF 4264* (September 1983), pp. 56-57.

abandoned the ‘Swing Strategy’ (one theatre prepared to reinforce the other in a crisis)<sup>439</sup>, and reorganized the theatre of military operations geographical concept (*Teatr Voennykh Deistvii*, abbreviated TVD) for wartime operations east of the Urals in 1979 (see Figure 4-6). This establishment was intended to allow the Far East Theatre comprising the Transbaykal, Far Eastern and Mongolian Military Districts (MDs) to fight independently without reinforcement at least for the initial stages of combat. It made a significant contribution to the establishment, expansion and consolidation of Soviet power in the Far East against both Japanese and Chinese encroachment. However, it did not mean, as most analysts agreed, that the USSR pursued an offensive strategy against the PRC-US military alignment<sup>440</sup>. The purpose of military buildup in the Far East TVD might be for deterrence, but it needed to maintain a sufficient level of war-fighting capability.

**Figure 4-6: The Soviet TVD Boundaries**



Source: The US GPO, *Soviet Military Power* 1985, p. 12.

<sup>439</sup> For the details of the Soviet strategic operational models, refer Graham H. Turbiville and David M. Glantz, “Soviet Military Strategy: Context and Prospects (1990)”, Willard C. Frank & Philip S. Gillette (1992), pp. 326-330.

<sup>440</sup> Gerald Segal, “Sino-Soviet Relations after Mao”, *Adelphi Papers*, No. 202 (Autumn 1985), p. 17.

In this context, it appears that as Harry Gelman has discussed, the Soviet military buildup in Far East implied the following purposes<sup>441</sup>:

Firstly, to defend its homeland from the PRC's hostility. It deployed a number of Soviet divisions from the *Pamirs* to the Pacific, about 50 in the 1980s, and created the Far East Theatre of Military Operations (TVD) at the end of 1978 in order to upgrade operational efficacy of very widely dispersed forces against multiple potential adversaries. Furthermore, Soviet tactical airpower in Siberia and Far East was designated against China.

Secondly, to deter the US and Japanese forces. The Soviet buildup of the Pacific fleet was directed primarily against US and Japanese forces, and secondarily against the PRC. To defend its SSBNs in the Sea of Okhotsk bastion was a very important strategic configuration in terms of the withholding strategy within the nuclear strategy.

Thirdly, to put pressure on available US naval resources and to raise the political costs in the Far East of any US inclination to shift forces elsewhere, most likely to the Indian Ocean, in time of crisis, but it also affected the US option to assist NATO in time of war. Put succinctly, it did not have a pragmatic ally in the region, so it tried to overcome the stalemate via the buildup of strong armed forces to defend and deter all potential adversaries.

To conclude, the purpose of the Soviet military buildup was to seek measures to safeguard its security beyond its eastern borders considering the deep feeling of insecurity over its eastern territory.

### **(3) Maritime Strategy/ Policy**

Along with the developments of the Soviet Navy and of the favourable nature of the maritime environment in terms of advanced base facilities, it seems that the Soviet naval leadership prudently reevaluated the role and place of a navy within the system of the component services of the armed forces to exalt the prestige value of the navy as a part of projecting the military and nonmilitary objectives of the state. As Soviet military theory supposed that strategic offense was the most important strategic stance of its

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<sup>441</sup> Harry Gelman, "The Soviet Union, East Asia and the West: the Kremlin's Calculus of Opportunities and Risks", *Adelphi Papers* No. 217 (Spring 1987), pp. 4-5.

armed forces, one of the fundamental aims of the Soviet naval force buildup in the previous era (until the end of the Vietnam War) focused on rocket-firing submarines in the previous period which was to create a threat to US maritime dominance at sea, and which could threaten US naval forces by exploiting the submarine's original characteristics of stealth.<sup>442</sup> Given this achievement, the Soviet leaders slowly began to accept the basic theory of Gorshkov on the role and functions of seapower that any nation which aspires to global dominance needs to take control of the sea. It meant that the Soviet Navy tried to reemerge as an added instrument of political-military power to affect both international and regional power politics together with the active foreign policy objectives of the USSR, shedding the limited role of a force useful purely for protection of the sea flanks of the Soviet Army.

Gorshkov illuminated the role and place of navies within the system of component branches of the armed forces from 1972 to 1973 via 13 articles in *Morskoi sbornik*. Here, he insisted that:

“If the USSR maintains a large and modern navy commensurate with its interests as a Great Power, and exploits the political influence potential provided by such a navy, it will be able to implement its policies more effectively both in peacetime and in wartime”.<sup>443</sup>

The focal point of this was divided into two categories: ‘the role and places of navies in wars’ and ‘navies’ employment in peacetime as instruments of state foreign policy’. And, his theory contained the following five fundamental theses<sup>444</sup>:

Firstly, given the increasing importance of the oceans as an arena of potential military conflict,

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<sup>442</sup> Andrei A. Kokoshin, *Soviet Strategic Thought, 1917-91* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1998), pp. 170-172.

<sup>443</sup> *CRC* 257, p.19.

<sup>444</sup> Without quotation marks, cited from *ibid.*, pp. 2-3.

and the navy's special military features of high maneuverability, capability for covert concentration, and relative invulnerability to the effects of nuclear weapons compared with ground forces, the wartime importance of the navy is increasing,

Secondly, despite the introduction of nuclear weapons and the advent of *détente*, the armed forces have not lost their historic importance as instruments of state policy in either wartime or peacetime,

Thirdly, given the increasing economic and hence political importance of the oceans, and the navy's special political features, the peacetime utility and importance of the navy are increasing, which gives it a unique position compared to the other branches of the armed forces as an instrument of foreign policy,

Fourthly, the structure of armed forces and the roles and places of their component branches can and do change, which are situationally dependent, e.g., maritime states must have navies as well as armies,

Lastly, there is a necessary link between the acquisition and maintenance of armed forces and the goals of the state policies. To achieve those goals, command echelons must have a shared understanding of the relative capabilities and optimal modes of employment of each branch of the armed forces.

On the basis of the above theses, the roles of the Soviet Navy in peacetime and wartime can be summarized as one of the instruments of state policy in peacetime and a powerful means for achieving the political goals of an armed struggle in war. The former would be considered as an added dimension to the role of the Navy with the enlargement of the Soviet political, military and economic investments in non-Communist countries of the Third World particularly from the mid-1960s. In order to do that, as Gorshkov said, "the diversity of the missions confronting us has brought about a requirement for numerous classes of surface ships each with its specific inventory of equipment",<sup>445</sup> it was necessary not only to make a substantial and sustained increase in the construction of ocean-going surface ships, but also to obtain base facilities in foreign states.

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<sup>445</sup> James M. McConnell, "Gorshkov's Doctrine of Coercive Naval Diplomacy in Both Peace and War", *CRC* 257, p. 105.

However, it seems that his view was accepted almost at the end of the Vietnam war around the middle of 1974 as Marshal Grechko explicitly stated in the *Voprosy istorii KPSS* (Questions of CPSU History), "International functions of the armed forces had been given 'new content', and clearly implied that this was the protection and promotion of the overseas interests of the Soviet Union".<sup>446</sup> In the 1970s, the use of the Soviet SSBNs was changed to the role of deterrent against nuclear escalation, from that of war fighting in the event of a general war in the 1960s. However, even for the deterrent purpose of nuclear submarines, he wanted to be able to counter the carriers directly by deploying them, equipped with the SS-N-21 *Sampson* SLCM and SS-NX-24 SLCM, which would enable them to threaten high-value targets, to their forward patrol areas.<sup>447</sup>

Gorshkov considered the increase in surface warship construction as an essential component for being a blue water navy to protect Soviet interests abroad. From this time, the priority was shifted from its predominantly antisubmarine focus to a more balanced capability by projecting the construction of the *Kiev*-class carriers and *Ivan Rogov*-class amphibious ships. As a result, it rapidly closed the extant gaps in the fields of aircraft carriers and amphibious forces lift capability, which extended its peacetime ability to support Soviet interests overseas with its deployments, operations, and overseas presence via most of the historic shipping choke points<sup>448</sup> such as the crossroads of the Caribbean, Aden in the Indian Ocean, and Cam Ranh Bay in Southeast

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<sup>446</sup> Before that time, the strategic stance of the USSR would have been defensive rather than offensive. Because Brezhnev and Grechko stood on the opposite side of the cleavage with Gorshkov judging from their statements that "the missions of the Soviet armed forces is to defend the Soviet Union *per se* and the entire 'Socialist Commonwealth', refer, *CRC* 257, p. 25.

<sup>447</sup> D. Conley, "Soviet Maritime Strategy", *Proceedings*, Vol. 115/9/1039 (September 1989), pp. 49-52.

<sup>448</sup> Robert J. Hanks, *The Unnoticed Challenge: Soviet Maritime Strategy and the Global Choke Points* (Washington, DC: Corporate Press, 1980), pp. 21-41.



Sea beyond the Eurasian land mass (refer Table 4-9).

However, the construction programme of larger surface ships was resumed about 1983, reflecting the view of the General Staff<sup>449</sup> that the Gorshkov theory had to be limited to the combat employment and structuring of the navy, except for the *Ivan Rogov* landing ship programme because of the threat to the Kuriles chain.<sup>450</sup> As a result, Gorshkov's ambition to include the defence of Soviet interests in distant areas in peacetime was retrogressed. In addition to this, according to McConnell's analysis of the Soviet Navy missions, Gorshkov's assertion about the role of the SSBNs, an initial, deep-strike for a true strategic reach in the first moments of a general war was not accepted by the Soviet leadership.

**Table 4-9: The Naval Balance between the US and USSR in 1987**

Classification	Atlantic and Mediterranean			Pacific and Indian Ocean		
	USSR	US	Remark	USSR	US	Remark
Aircraft Carriers	0	7	-7	0	7	-7
Hel & VSTOL Carriers	3	6	-3	2	6	-4
Major Combatants Over 2000 Tons	94	106	-12	44	105	-61
Major Combatants Under 2000 Tons	90	0	+90	36	0	+36
Attack Submarines	185	54	+131	77	42	+35
Naval Aircraft	854	1,016	-162	461	1,016	-555

Source: Tom Gervasi, *Soviet Military Power* (London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 1988), pp. 8-9.

As such, the Soviet navy's missions were limited to the level of defensive roles:① to hold a force of ballistic-missile submarines in reserve for a secondary strike (called a

<sup>449</sup> As indicated in the growth of the Soviet defence spending that the Soviet Defence Expenditure from 1981-1984 remained the same at 17.054 bn Roubles lower than the 17.43 bn of 1976, the construction programme might be limited because of economic reasons. Refer, IISS, *The Military Balance 1985-1986*, pp. 17-20.

<sup>450</sup> Michael McGwire, "Gorshkov's Navy: Part II", *Proceedings*, Vol. 115/9/1039 (September 1989), p. 44.

‘Withholding strategy’)<sup>451</sup>, ② to protect the insurance reserve in waters near home, ③ to protect the homeland against enemy seaborne air strikes, ④ to interdict the SLOCs of the Western allies.<sup>452</sup> However, as Gorshkov wrote, “The Soviet Navy, in the policy of our Party and state, acts as a factor for stabilizing the situation in different areas of the world, promoting the strengthening of peace and friendship between the peoples and restraining the aggressive striving of the imperialist states”<sup>453</sup>, the Soviet Navy was certainly built for the purpose of “force projection” into the Third World at the initial stage of this period.

In stark contrast, given the address of the General Secretary of the Communist Party, Leonid Brezhnev, about the importance of foreign policy in the Asia-Pacific Area at the party congress in March 1976, reflecting the fear of encirclement, the Soviet Pacific Fleet began to reinforce troops in the four southern islands of the Kurile chain and to build support facilities<sup>454</sup> to use the Sea of Okhotsk for the deployment of SSBNs.<sup>455</sup> At the highest point of the second Cold War, in the mid 1980s, the priority of the Soviet Pacific fleet Navy was upgraded compared with the other three fleets, reflecting the mood of arms control in Europe<sup>456</sup>, the naval arms race in the Indian Ocean, its adherence to the Sino-Soviet dispute, and the importance of the Sea of Okhotsk as a base for SSBNs (refer Table 4-10). In addition to some ports in North Korea<sup>457</sup>, the

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<sup>451</sup> Refer, Michael Sheehan & James H. Wyllie (1986), p. 262.

<sup>452</sup> James M. McConnell, “Strategy and Missions of the Soviet Navy in the Year 2000”, in James L. George (ed.), *Problems of Sea Power as We Approach the Twenty-First Century* (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, 1978), pp. 39-67; George W. Baer (1994), p. 420.

<sup>453</sup> S.G. Gorshkov (1979), p. 277.

<sup>454</sup> For example, a conventional submarine was reported some nine miles north of Petropavlovsk at the small port of Bitchivinka, and some Yankee SSBNs replaced at ports on Peter the Great Bay because of the increase of the number of Delta SSBNs. Norman Polmar (1991), pp. 418-420.

<sup>455</sup> Michael McGwire (September 1989), p. 42.

<sup>456</sup> In some aspect, the priority of the European theatre was relatively downgraded, resulting from the judgment that commanding the Norwegian Sea was too difficult, see George W. Baer (1994), p. 423.

<sup>457</sup> In 1975, North Korea permitted the Soviets to use the port of Najin on the northeast coast and in the

opening of an advanced base, Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam<sup>458</sup>, as a support base, provided a bridge role between Vladivostok and the Soviet bases in the Indian Ocean, i.e., Barbera in Somalia. This expanded the Pacific fleet's operational radius throughout the Pacific and Indian Oceans.

**Table 4-10: The Naval Strengths of the Pacific Area in 1987**

Classification	Strategic Forces	Pacific Fleet	Abroad (Regular Deployment)	
			Indian/Yemen	Vietnam
Submarines	32 (385 SLBM)	76: 26 SSGN/SSG, 50 SSN/SS	0-1	2-4
PSC		82: 2 Carriers (V/STOL, <i>Kiev</i> -Class) <sup>a</sup> , 14 Cruisers, 13 DD, 22 FF, 31 Corvettes	1-2	3-4
OSC		140	1-2	3-4
MCMV		96		
Amphibious		21 (included 2 <i>Rogov</i> LPD)	1	0-1
Auxiliaries		135	6-8	9-12

Notes: PSC (Principal Surface Combatants), OSC (Other Surface Combatants), MCMV (Mine Counter-Measure Vessel).

<sup>a</sup>: *Minsk* (assigned in 1979) and *Novorosiysk* (assigned in 1984)

Source: IISS, *The Military Balance 1987-1988*, pp. 44-45.

Nonetheless, as the role of the Soviet navy remained at the level of the defence of its homeland first<sup>459</sup>, the missions of the Pacific fleet were, as Robert S. Wood defined, five fold<sup>460</sup>: ① the protection of its ballistic missile submarines as a strategic nuclear reserve force, ② the establishment of a maritime defence perimeter around the Soviet Union, ③ the destruction of US ballistic missile submarines as they departed their

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early 1980s Wonsan, Hungnam on the east coast and Nampo and Haeju on the west coast were added to the Soviet access list. See, Norman Polmar (1991), p. 44.


<sup>458</sup> The value lay in its proximity to the Persian Gulf, the Indian Ocean, the PRC and East Asian countries as located 2,200 nautical miles southwest of Vladivostok.

<sup>459</sup> Soviet planning for the Far Eastern Theatre envisioned Far East TVD and the Pacific TVD. In wartime, the USSR employed intermediate High Commands of Forces in TVDs, which had a ground force asset as well as navy and air force assets. As a result, the naval operation of the Pacific fleet was inevitably subordinated to the Far East TVD in wartime. The Soviet aim in the region for a global war was to deter the PRC's entry against the USSR, that is, to avoid land war in Asia, refer, Tom Gervasi (1988), pp. 18-21.

<sup>460</sup> Robert S. Wood, "Soviet Naval Operations in the Pacific During a Global War", Dalchoong Kim & Doug-Woon Cho (eds.), *Korean Sea Power and the Pacific Era* (Seoul: IEWS Yonsei University, 1990), pp. 38-39.

Pacific base at Bangor, Washington, on the way to their operating areas, ④ the interdiction of the sea lines of communications, especially to and from Japan and Korea, and ⑤ the protection of their own sea lines of communications such as those to Petropavlovsk. In addition to these defensive missions, it had the potential capability to perform any kind of offensive mission consisting of large submarine and surface forces supported by two *Kiev*-class VSTOL carriers as well as the undeniable amphibious lift capability including two *Ivan Rogov*-class ships (refer Figure 4-7).<sup>461</sup>

**Figure 4-7: The Organisation of the Soviet Pacific Fleet**



Sources: John Jordan, *Modern Soviet Navy* (London: Salamander, 1982), p. 12; Norman Polmar, *The Naval Institute Guide to the Soviet Navy* (Annapolis, ML: USNI, 1991), p. 16.

Put succinctly, it had to oppose the PRC, the US and their allies (South Korea, Japan, etc.) in war, and perform operations and deploy its power throughout the Pacific and Indian Oceans to support the growth and development of national liberation movements and socialist revolutions by the expansion of Soviet influence in the Pacific region as the peacetime mission of the Gorshkov theory had suggested. Of course, the Pacific

<sup>461</sup> Norman Polmar (1991), p. 19.

fleet including naval forces abroad was controlled by the Far Eastern TVD with its establishment in 1978.<sup>462</sup>

In order to achieve this, it continuously enlarged its operational radius and expanded the Soviet naval forces participating in exercises via filling a naval power vacuum in the wake of the US withdrawal. For example, a reported 220 ships and 400 aircraft participated in the global scale exercise Okean 75 under unified Moscow control via satellite<sup>463</sup> compared with the Okean-70 (refer Figure 3-2). The purposes of this exercise would be not only to demonstrate its anti-SLOC operation capability in order to give a chilling warning against any future Western political or military action in the Third World, but also to convince Soviet leaders of its ability to pursue Soviet interests abroad during the latter stages of five-year economic plans.<sup>464</sup> And, as Table 4-9 and 4-10 show, the Soviets established a significant naval presence in the Indian Ocean and the Western Pacific, which provided political leverage against the regional countries including Japan and the members of ASEAN, and which provided a credible sea denial capability able to compete with the US in terms of maritime dominion in most of the Western Pacific and Indian Oceans. For the first time, the Soviet Navy participated in a Crisis Response operation in the Sino-Vietnamese War of 1979, and defended a Communist state against the PRC by dispatching two major battle groups to the South China Sea off Vietnam and to the East China Sea off the Chinese coast.<sup>465</sup>

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<sup>462</sup> David C. Isby, *Weapons and Tactics of the Soviet Army* (London: Jane's, 1988), pp. 16-18.

<sup>463</sup> Defence of Japan (1976), p. 17.

<sup>464</sup> Andrew W. Hull, "Their Surface Forces", *Proceedings*, Vol. 108/10/956 (October 1982), pp. 57-58. After that, this size of exercise was not undertaken again until the end of the Cold War probably because of the deployments in the Indian and Western Pacific Oceans and the change of strategic view focusing on the ground forces for the defence of the homeland.

<sup>465</sup> Bruce W. Watson (1982), pp. 138-139.

Despite the fact that the number of Soviet ships visiting Pacific area ports had increased to 156 by 1980<sup>466</sup>, the number of visiting ports and days spent in port were significantly decreased due to the influence of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Notwithstanding the above activities and operations, it was difficult to reverse the inferior position of the Soviet Pacific Fleet. In the long run, the Gorshkov theory was ended as an uncompleted masterpiece of maritime strategy due to the geo-strategic restraints and unchangeable mind-set of the high military / political commanders as well as a deficiency in economic support.

#### **(4) The Development of the SNI**


##### **(A) General Rise and Fall**

Given the transitions in the military and maritime environments in association with the active foreign policy objectives, the USSR needed the capability of conducting amphibious landings in order to undertake eventual war against the US and to show its ability to intervene in the Third World to support its interests overseas by constructing a large transoceanic amphibious capability. Reflecting the peacetime employment of the Soviet Navy, the peacetime mission of the SNI, overseas presence stationing would be in place at the start of a conflict, and so was added to the fundamental role and functions. From 1979, the SNI was enhanced by its burgeoning equipment inventory and personnel numbers. As a result, at the end of the Cold War, it was made up of approximately 18,000 troops, and its strength, organic firepower, and mobility including numerous artillery echelons such as artillery and rocket companies was improved (refer Figure 4-8).

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<sup>466</sup> Gerry S. Thomas, "Their Pacific Fleet", *Proceedings*, Vol. 108/10/956 (October 1982), p. 87.

**Figure 4-8: Composition of the SNI Regiment**



Sources: Louis N. Buffardi, *The Soviet Naval Infantry: DDB-1200-146-80* (Washington, DC: Defense Intelligence Agency, August 1, 1979), pp. 3-4.

The primary mission of the SNI was amphibious assault, which could be accomplished through landings of various types such as strategic, operational, tactical, reconnaissance and sabotage landings depending upon the scale and mission of the landing. The secondary mission of the SNI was mainly considered as coastal defence in which its doctrine paralleled that of the ground forces.<sup>467</sup> The concept of strategic landing was conducted in support of theatre forces in opening up a new front of military operations, whilst the operational landing was made to assist ground or naval forces in a coastal

<sup>467</sup> Louis N. Buffardi, *The Soviet Naval Infantry: DDB-1200-146-80* (Washington, DC: Defence Intelligence Agency, August 1 1979), p. 13.

region to surround and destroy the enemy in that area. The tactical landing and reconnaissance and sabotage landings were conducted by a battalion or less, operating independently or in conjunction with ground force units. A distinction was made between them according to the purpose of employment.

### (B) Amphibious Lift Capability

At the initial stage of this period, the Soviet amphibious lift capability for the SNI still remained at the level of tactical amphibious landing operations, even though it was deployed simultaneously in the North, South, West and East of the Soviet Union in the *Okean-75* exercise. As a part of the construction programme of larger surface ships, in 1975 the first of the highly-capable *Ropucha*-class LSTs, and in 1978 the first Soviet LPD *Ivan Rogov*, powered by two gas turbines, entered service. In 1987, a total of 190 amphibious landing vessels for the SNI, some 84 amphibious landing ships and more than 100 landing craft, were listed by the IISS (refer Table 4-11).

**Table 4-11: Soviet Landing Ships and Craft in 1987**

Classifications		Quantity	Carrying Capacity	Pacific
LPD	<i>Ivan Rogov</i>	2	One full battalion, six Ka-25 helicopters, 30 APCs and 20 tanks, and three <i>Gus</i> - and two <i>Lebed</i> - class LCACs	2
LST	<i>Ropucha</i>	23	10 tanks and 190 troops	8
	<i>Alligator</i>	14	39 medium tanks or APCs or a third of regiment	5
LSM	<i>Polnocny</i>	45	6 tanks or 8-10 APCs and 180 troops	6
	<i>MP-class</i>	n.a	10 tanks or 12 APCs and 200 troops (half battalion)	2
LCU	<i>Vydra</i>	15	250 tons	few
	<i>SMB-1</i>	15	250 tons	
LCM	<i>Ondatra</i>		50 tons or 1 tank	
LCAC	<i>Aist</i>	20	Four light tanks plus 50 troops or 3 APCs plus 100 troops	<i>Aist</i> , <i>Gus</i> , <i>Lebed</i> - class: 24 others: few
	<i>Tsaphya</i>	1	25 troops	
	<i>lebed</i>	20	2 light tanks or 120 troops	
	<i>Utenok</i>	2	1 tank or 25 troops	
	<i>Gus</i>	31	24-36 men	
	<i>Orlan</i>	1	1 tank or 25 troops	
Total		190+		

Sources: IISS, *The Military Balance 1987-1988*, p. 38, *Jane's Fighting Ships 1989-1990*; 2003-2004



In addition to the above formal amphibious ships, the Soviet sealift capability was based primarily on its large merchant fleet, more than 1,700 ships in the forms of barge carriers, roll-on/roll-off cargo ships, and roll-on/float-off ships, whose combined deadweight tonnage exceeded 22 million.<sup>468</sup> Considering the fact that these ships were frequently used to transport arms and the forces of friendly states in support of Soviet foreign policy objectives, if the Soviets had wanted to project its forces via sea routes, it might not have caused them serious problems in terms of sealift capability.

Given the improvement in the amphibious life capability, the new operational concept of the Operational Maneuver Group (OMG) that the Soviet forces would attempt to use to wreak destruction rapidly throughout the enemy's areas, the SNI had come to practice more ambitious operational assaults such as "Comradeship-In-Arms 1980", *Zapad-81* and *Schchit-82*, pushing large forces at high speed deeper into the enemy rear by widespread use of hovercraft and helicopters under the missions of operational and strategic landings. A strategic landing was not conducted by the SNI until 1979. In these exercises, the SNI demonstrated its upgraded ability for strategic amphibious landings as the main part of multinational forces in which Polish and East German marine forces comprised the first wave of any major assault<sup>469</sup>. The implication of these exercises was that it demonstrated its readiness to take advantage of opportunities for expansion, and to support Soviet foreign interests in the world.<sup>470</sup> However, considering the locations of the SNI adjacent to the very hot points of a possible major war with the Western alliance, the transition of military strategic thinking that a direct confrontation with the

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<sup>468</sup> *Soviet Military Power 1987*, pp. 97.

<sup>469</sup> *STC CR-57*, p. 74.

<sup>470</sup> Dominik George Nargele, "Their Naval Infantry", *Proceedings*, Vol. 108/10/956 (October 1982), pp. 152-153.

US could be avoided, and the compositions of the projection forces of the USSR and US<sup>471</sup>, it was likely that the SNI did not conceive of a mission to conduct a large-scale amphibious landing operation at a point far away from the homeland.

### (C) The SNI in the Pacific

In the above situation, the strength of the Soviet Pacific Fleet NI (SPFNI) in 1984 increased from one regiment with about 4,000 troops to one division with 7,000 troops comprising two infantry, one tank and artillery regiments, as the largest among the four fleets.<sup>472</sup> In addition, the amphibious lift capability of the Soviet Pacific fleet was enormously reinforced by the deployment of the *Ivan Rogov*-class dock landing ship (LPD)s, “*Ivan Rogov*”, being the first amphibious ship over 10,000 tons in the Soviet Navy in 1979, and the “*Aleksandr Nikolaev*” with the increase of the SNI in 1984, to increase amphibious lift capability.<sup>473</sup>

**Table 4-12: The De(Em)ploymments of the SPFNI**

Size	Place	Mission
Div HQs, Main Forces	Vladivostok	Strategic Reserve
Elements (n.a)	Slavyanka (Sino-Soviet border)	Defence
1 Regiment and <i>Spetsnaz</i> bde	Petropavlovsk	Naval Base Defence
1 Battalion	Simushir Island & Etorofu Island (the Kurile Chain & Northern Territory)	Defence / Deterrence
1 Detachment	Cam Ranh Bay	Support Foreign Policy
1 Battalion	Dahlak archipelago (Ethiopia, Red Sea)	Support Foreign Policy

Sources: “Soviet Naval Infantry and Amphibious Lift in the Pacific”, *Armed Forces* (October 1988), p.

448; etc.

<sup>471</sup> The SNI was a relatively very small size compared with the airborne troops (10 air assault brigades and 7 airborne divisions). The US possessed two divisions, an air assault and airborne division each. *The Military Balance 1987-1988*, p. 17 & 34. It means that the Soviets focused on short distance operations where airpower could cover the troops. Actually, the Soviet Pacific Fleet Air Force strike assets (over 90 Backfire and Badger aircraft armed with cruise missiles), Soviet Air Force strike platforms (Backfire and Bear G armed with AS-4 and AS-6 cruise missiles), and 250 tactical aircraft (i.e., Fencer) were serious medium- and long-range threats to the Western Allied Forces around Japan, the Kuriles, and the Kamchatka peninsula. Refer, The US GPO, *Soviet Military Power* (1988), p. 123.

<sup>472</sup> For the details of the reorganization of the SPFNI, refer *Armed Forces* (October 1988), pp. 446-448.

<sup>473</sup> Naotoshi Sakonjo, “Superpower Naval Rivalry in the Pacific”, *NUPI Report*, No. 128 (June 1989), p. 46.

As such, the SPFNI was the most suitable means for not only an offensive strategic counterforce projection against the US alliance and PRC, but also an intervention force to achieve its foreign policy objective, the expansion of Soviet influence throughout the Third World (see Table 4-12).

#### **(D) The Roles and Functions of the SNI**

The SPFNI was deployed throughout the Northern territory-four islands off the northern coast of the Japanese island of Hokkaido-this was Moscow's intention to support its claim to the islands with military force. In this regard, it was employed for the purpose of political coercion against Japan. Moreover, it operated as a forward defence force, since these islands had a strategic value forming not only a gateway between the Sea of Okhotsk and the Pacific Ocean, but also a defensive barrier protecting the Eastern USSR and being a vital link for securing Pacific Fleet operations<sup>474</sup>. As a valuable political and military means, the SPFNI was dispatched to support the Rene government in the Seychelles, when it was threatened by internal disruption. This kind of contingency mission was continued by the routine deployment of Soviet amphibious ships with SPFNI embarking to Third World areas, and by a near continuous presence in the Western Pacific and Indian Oceans as well as by conducting joint amphibious landing exercises with relevant countries, i.e., Syria in the Mediterranean in 1981 in which the SNI of the Black Sea Fleet participated.<sup>475</sup>

The Soviet Pacific Fleet also performed large-scale amphibious landing operations in the Western Pacific Area. For example, the strategic purpose of the Soviet amphibious

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<sup>474</sup> *Soviet Military Power 1983*, pp. 51-52.

<sup>475</sup> *Soviet Military Power 1985*, pp. 103-104.

landing to simulate an attack on Japan's Hokkaido Island aimed at controlling the Soya-misaki and Nemurokaiko straits was apparently to secure the Sea of Okhotsk as a sanctuary for 'Delta III' SSBNs in time of tension or war.<sup>476</sup> This was the largest landing exercise until then, and probably aimed to demonstrate its amphibious capability to the Western allies and the countries in the region in order to gain some advantage in pursuit of its interests overseas. In fact, at that time, the Western military planners expected that a world war would begin with the Soviets seizing the North of the Japanese island of Hokkaido or other Pacific islands. The 79<sup>th</sup> Motor Rifle Division based at Leonipovo-Sakhilinsk and the 342<sup>nd</sup> Motor Rifle Division at Yuzhno-Sakhilinsk were believed to be second echelon formations for such operations, which would be delivered by the Soviet Pacific merchant fleet.<sup>477</sup> In this case, the mission of the SNI was to form the spearhead echelon of a large-scale offensive operation.

It appears that in having respectable global capabilities, the SPFNI significantly benefited from Gorshkov's theory of a balanced naval force for peacetime and wartime missions compared with others. Of course, as he wrote that "the goals of a war were achieved mostly by taking over the territory of the enemy, successful operations of a fleet against the shore brought a better result than the operations of fleet against fleet"<sup>478</sup>, the goal of the SNI expansion in the region would be to counter the triangle alliance of Japan, the PRC and the US. However, with the enlargement of Soviet naval power, the USSR was able to employ it as a means for developing Soviet interests overseas by their

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<sup>476</sup> Kensuke Ebata, "Soviets Simulate Attack on Japan", *Jane's Defence Weekly*, Vol. 4, No. 13 (September 28, 1985), p. 664.

<sup>477</sup> The Soviet Pacific merchant fleet had a capacity to transport up to seven motorized divisions in a single lift operation, see Armed Forces (October 1988), p. 450; Mark L. Urban, "Power Projection by Sea: The Role of Soviet Naval Infantry", *Defence* (March 1983), pp. 154-155.

<sup>478</sup> S.G. Gorshkov (1979), p. 214.

naval presence and exercises throughout the Pacific and Indian Oceans. The SPFNI was also greatly expanded, and was dispatched and participated in operations as a part of the Soviet naval power and of joint services military training manoeuvres. Although, Gorshkov did not mention the role of the SNI in peacetime, the political significance of the embarked SNI is represented by the words that:

“The symbolic presence of amphibious and SNI units has far outweighed whatever combat impact they could bring, but in superpower politics, symbolism has often assumed great significance. One side or the other can ‘send messages’ to its opponent or to an ally with displays such as these”<sup>479</sup>

To summarize, a fleet with the SNI embarked would make an intention clearer than if the fleet only comprised battleships. The expansion of the SNI brought about a synergy effect between the construction of surface ships and submarines in peacetime. In the long run, it could be said, the SNI was one of the most useful means of gaining political influence in the Asia-Pacific region indicating its superpower status.

### **3. Conclusions**

The foreign policy of the USSR toward the Third World became more aggressive within the scope of not provoking the US so that a small intervention would not escalate into a direct military confrontation as seen in the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, which was not one of the intrinsically critical areas of US foreign interests. On the contrary, the Carter administration and its successors attempted to re-establish US predominance by changing the agendas of world politics in the light of both nuclear parity and the aftermath of the Vietnam War. Yet, the exclusion of the use of force by the US Congress

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<sup>479</sup> *Armed Forces* (October 1988), p. 448.

in the areas where its interests were not critical, inhibited more active military intervention or defence against the USSR's expansionism in the Third World as seen in the cases of Ethiopia and Somalia<sup>480</sup> except for maybe the unique case of Lebanon. As in these cases, notwithstanding the changes of its foreign policy toward the Third World, the US also did not want to raise a direct military confrontation with the USSR throughout the world. They shared a common interest in wanting to avoid war and nuclear confrontation despite political and ideological conflicts. Consequently, it was not surprising that it proved possible to avoid a third world war.

In this period, Soviet military forces had been increasingly employed by the Soviet leadership in projecting foreign policy interests, which supported the expansion of Soviet influence through ideological propaganda and economic assistance. However, its over-intervention and the budget investment in its military arsenal including the technology for the anti-ballistic missile system in order to pursue strategic parity, was beyond its capacity and contributed significantly to the disintegration of the USSR itself. If its goal remained the preservation of its influence at the level of *status quo*, its military power would be sufficient, as the former Soviet Minister of Defense Andrei A Grechko explained:

At the present stage, the historic function of the Soviet Armed Forces is not restricted merely to their function of defending the Motherland and other socialist countries. In its foreign policy activities, Soviet state policy actively, purposefully opposes the export of counterrevolution and the policy of oppression, supports the national

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<sup>480</sup> With the naval arms race in the Northwest Indian Ocean area particularly from 1978, the US needed to establish an advance military base in this area. But, Ethiopia was a pro-Moscow country militarily and politically so that the US did not do so, despite the fact that it had provided substantial food aid which in 1985 amounted to almost \$300m to solve the problem of the dire food shortage. And, it provided military assistance to Somalia, but it did not go beyond keeping the balance of power in the horn of Africa, because of the hostility between Ethiopia and Somalia. See, Donald Petterson, "Ethiopia Abandoned? An American Perspective", *International Affairs*, Vol. 62, No. 4 (Autumn 1986), pp. 627-644.

liberation struggle, and resolutely resists imperialist aggression in whatever distant region of the planet it may appear.<sup>481</sup>

In stark contrast, the US reacted not immoderately, but very rationally to the Soviet activities, i.e., the organization of the RDJFT for the Indian Ocean. This is not to say that the US had stopped the buildup of its conventional forces, but that it had concentrated its force procurement on long-range, mobile forces, since the threat was an ocean away, which led to an emphasis on the buildup of the navy and air force in the planning process. In reality, the procurement efforts to possess a 600-ship Navy including the expansion of carrier battle groups, increased the focus of attention on the readiness of all three services, i.e., the effort of the US Air force to expand long-range air transport capabilities.

The main security concerns in the Asia-Pacific region at this time interlocked the USSR-PRC-US triangle with their corresponding allies. Any shift in political relations between two sides in the triangle was immediately felt by the third side, which sooner or later took some compensatory steps.<sup>482</sup> It appears that the strategy of every country in the region was fundamentally aimed at maximizing its own interests and increasing the power of its own position, which made it clash in varying degrees of intensity with the interests and positions of any other country in the region. A good example of this is the improvement in US-PRC relations, which was the key foreign policy objective of the US in order to preserve its hegemony established in the period after WWII, because

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<sup>481</sup> Dimitri K. Simes, "Assessing Soviet National Security Strategy", in Terry L. Heyns (ed.), *Understanding US Strategy: A Reader* (Washington, DC: NDU, 1983), p. 214.

<sup>482</sup> According to Thomas Hayward's remark, interestingly, China was perhaps more in control of the strategic focus of this triangle than either the US or USSR. See, Thomas B. Hayward, "Strategic Implications of Soviet-US Relations on the Asia Pacific Region", paper presented at the Soviet-American Conference on the Asia-Pacific Region, (Moscow, June 1988), p. 21.

it had begun to lose its initiative with the withdrawal from Vietnam, despite the demonstration of a massive military capability. In this connection, the USSR had two prime security concerns. Firstly, there was the sanctity of the Sino-Soviet border, where both sides faced each other and weapons were targeted in a more serious confrontation than any other in the European theatre. Secondly, the safeguarding of its satellite countries in and around Southwest and Southeast Asia was a crucial task for the USSR considering the sign of the weakening of US influence after the Vietnam War.

The Soviet basic military capabilities improved during the 1970s and provided the USSR with rough strategic parity, in some aspects quantitatively outnumbering the US, i.e., the number of nuclear weapons and ships, as well as a new conventional capability. The Asia-Pacific area was the region where the arms race continued particularly in terms of naval armaments, although other armaments, including nuclear, were also on the increase. In terms of nuclear strategy, despite the fact that the US had maintained a sea-based nuclear presence with the Seventh Fleet, there was no declaratory retaliation policy like the flexible response policy of NATO. As Norman Friedman has pointed out, the US naval forces in the Far East deterred the Soviets from massing sufficient forces to attack Japan, and reassured the PRC, and as a result, it indirectly helped to keep the very large Soviet army and air forces tied down on the Chinese border.<sup>483</sup>

The presence of the US naval force was perceived by the USSR as the main force for its encirclement by Japan, the PRC, South Korea, and the US, which served to keep it essentially in a landlocked condition in terms of the 'naval power' described by Colin S.

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<sup>483</sup> Norman Friedman, *The US Maritime Strategy* (London: Jane's, 1988), p. 121.



Gray<sup>484</sup>. In these circumstances, the USSR was forced to respond to the US naval power projection<sup>485</sup>, because any general war between the two blocs, particularly in Europe, could instantly trigger a worldwide naval war from the Pacific to the Atlantic theatre. The purpose of the Soviet naval buildup concentrating on the fields of aircraft carrier and amphibious forces was at least ensuring the establishment of an equally favourable balance of power in the Asia-Pacific region. As most political commentators have analysed, the reinforcement of the SPF did not largely influence the PRC and ASEAN, because the former possessed adequate resources for strategic self-sufficiency as a potential ally of the US and the latter had realized that Marxism was not the best way to bring rapid economic growth.<sup>486</sup> As the Cold War ended without the outbreak of a real war, considering the geo-strategic environment of this region, it is impossible to believe the assumption that the ultimate goal of the Soviet military forces buildup in the region was to create a war against the US and its allies even if it had an offensive military strategy.

In this period, the US maritime strategy was clearly concerned with sea control for the SLOCs and power projection, whilst the USSR never lost the concept of using its naval power to pursue its interests as an instrument of its foreign policy. It does not mean that their respective use of maritime power was completely different, that is, 'two sides of a coin'. Without the capability to protect the SLOCs, the power projection itself might not be guaranteed. This is the reason why Gorshkov tried to construct a balanced force.

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<sup>484</sup> Colin S. Gray (1986), p. 9.

<sup>485</sup> Of course, there was another critical reason for the USSR, as Christopher Coker has pointed out, "the USSR may well have concluded that it needed to build up its strength in the area to restore the global correlation of forces, because US enthusiasm for playing the China card and rearming Japan had not diminished". Put simply, the increase of the USSR naval power projection capability was the reflection of the US-USSR military rivalry in the Pacific. See, Christopher Coker, "The Myth or Reality of the Pacific Century", *The Washington Quarterly* (Summer 1988), p. 13.

<sup>486</sup> Gerry S. Thomas (1982), pp. 86-87.

However his experiment ended like an unfinished masterpiece because of the unbearable economic cost. Strictly speaking, the Gorshkov theory was logically to construct a balanced naval force. In the 1980s, the Soviet Navy had reached the level of being an ocean-going fleet capable of competing with the US Navy.

Until the end of the 1970s, the US enjoyed an advantage over the USSR in nearly all the important areas which constituted a maritime balance, and these advantages were slowly reduced over the 1980s as the USSR continued to augment and improve its naval forces. According to the analysis of James F. Dunnigan, the SNI ranked second only to the US among the world's amphibious forces, it was a distant second with a quality rating of 70 points compared with the 106.2 of the US.<sup>487</sup> As Roger M. Jaroch has analysed<sup>488</sup>, even though it was possible for the SNI to deploy only regiments/brigades, the SNI narrowed the gaps compared with the abilities of the MAB in the field of ship-to-shore movement, and weapons and equipment by the strengthening of its organization compared with that of the previous era (refer Figure 3-3, Figure 4-8). According to his analysis, the SNI had surpassed the US Marines in the field of the portion of forces deployable by amphibious lift and the ability to cross obstacles and beaches. Of course, the former was supposed only in the case of its employment in the European theatre, where its objectives were located relatively close to its home base. Even so, it was true that the SNI had developed a capability to compare with the USMC, which meant it had brought itself up to the level of a global maritime projection force.

As Figure 4-9 shows, the Soviet amphibious lift capability, apart from the overall


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<sup>487</sup> James F. Dunnigan (1982), pp. 202.

<sup>488</sup> Roger M. Jaroch, Lieutenant Colonel (USMC), "Amphibious Forces: Theirs and Ours", *Proceedings*, Vol. 108/11957 (November 1982), pp. 41-48.

maritime balance between the US and USSR, was certainly smaller than that of the US not in terms of the number of ships, but of the full load and submerged displacement. Between 1965 and 1987, the Soviet amphibious ship tonnage more than doubled, whilst its numbers remained at the same level. This suggests that the SNI was structured appropriately for its mission of supporting the flanks of the ground forces as well as seizing key objectives and the strategic straits near the periphery of the Soviet landmass. This is evidenced from its exercises that were all “limited in size, scope and duration; and ...were all conducted inside the range of land-based air and logistic support”<sup>489</sup>, whilst the USMC remained the most valuable strategic forces capable of reacting by undertaking any kind of mission anywhere anytime in the world under any conditions.

**Figure 4-9: US and Soviet Navy Force Level Comparison**



Source: The US GPO, *Soviet Military Power: An Assessment of the Threat* (1988), pp. 128-129

<sup>489</sup> Neville H Cross, "Soviet Naval Assault Forces", *Navy International* (November 1990), p. 415.

Even though the Soviet Studies Research Centre (SSRC) in the Royal Military Academy at Sandhurst estimates that the ability of the SNI to back the carrier-based air force would enable the Soviets to develop a longer range amphibious capability on an operational or strategic level<sup>490</sup>, its ability to project its power beyond the reach of their land-based aviation was restricted by the deficiency in the Soviet ability to provide carrier-based air support<sup>491</sup> compared with that of the US. In stark contrast, the US constructed larger amphibious ships to project power at great distances from American shores capable of carrying manpower and equipment including aircraft assets, reflecting the doctrinal development of the OTH concept. Consequently, the USMC's ability in conjunction with the US Navy enabled the US not only to extend its military power at almost any point of the Eurasian rim, but also to exert a greater influence worldwide, in areas that were vital to the USSR's interests, as well as deter their presence throughout the Western Pacific and Indian Ocean.

To conclude, in geo-strategic terms, the two superpowers' interests covered great distances from the both their countries except for the two frontiers of Europe and the Far East, i.e., Indian Ocean, the Middle East, and Western Africa. The US power projection forces remained generally superior to those of the USSR in terms of long-range power projection capability<sup>492</sup> despite the Soviet development of airlift capacity, amphibious shipping assets including the extension of the SNI organisation, and its basic infrastructure.<sup>493</sup> However, with the enlargement of the Soviet Navy throughout

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<sup>490</sup> *STC CR-57*, p. 83.

<sup>491</sup> According to the Japanese analysis, the range of the SS-20 missile and operational radius of the Backfire Bomber covered most of the possible conflict area in the Western Pacific and Indian Ocean, including the entire Japanese archipelago, the Korean peninsula, and Taiwan. See, *Defence of Japan 1980*, p. 56.

<sup>492</sup> *Soviet Military Power* (1988), pp. 131-132,

<sup>493</sup> One of the most important preconditions for amphibious landing operation in wartime is local air and

the Pacific and Indian Oceans to support the Soviet foreign policy objectives towards the Third World, the embarkation of the SNI on Soviet ships had significantly influenced other states' attitudes towards the USSR in terms of a peacetime role<sup>494</sup>. Here, it is assumed as a principle that amphibious forces would be an attractive means for pursuing foreign policy objectives when a country has an open sea route to project its power via ocean either in wartime or peacetime. It is one of the main reasons why a state develops amphibious forces.

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maritime superiority to soften-up the enemy's shore forces and to guarantee the free manoeuvre of the task forces.

<sup>494</sup> According to an analysis, some cadres from the SNI acted as military advisors in the use of riverine and coastal amphibious techniques to North Korean, Vietnam and Kampuchean military leaderships, see Bradley Hahn (1984), p. 16.

# Chapter V. In the Post-Cold War Era

## 1. General Factors

### A. International Security Environment

From the late 1980s, the two superpowers began to move towards a peaceful relationship with a clearer agreement about what was or was not an appropriate stance toward the other in order to terminate the longstanding confrontation of the Cold War. The highlight of this was the proclamation of the Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev that the USSR would unilaterally reduce its conventional forces by 500,000 men –removing six divisions from Eastern Europe, declared at the UN on December 7, 1988<sup>495</sup>, following the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty in Geneva in December 1987. This kind of concession by Gorbachev on arms control and proposals for cutting the armed forces to levels of “sufficiency” rather than maintaining parity with the US<sup>496</sup> caused a rapid relaxation of tension throughout the world. Despite the fact that Gorbachev faced an increasingly difficult domestic situation, the improvement of the security situation between East and West proved irreversible; it was a natural phenomenon of that time.

Meanwhile, the reunification of Germany, which had been a fundamental cause of conflict in Europe, was a turning point for the end of the Cold War, and facilitated a major process of multilateral integration and peaceful cooperation in Europe, i.e., the

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<sup>495</sup> Blackwill. D.R. & Larrabee. S.F. (eds.), *Conventional Arms Control and East-West Security* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1989), p. xxiv.

<sup>496</sup> Matthew Evangelista, “Norms, Heresthetics and the End of the Cold War”, *Journal of Cold War Studies*, Vol. 3, No. 1 (Winter 2001), p. 9.

treaty on European Union signed in Maastricht in December 1991, the Partnership for Peace (PFP), and NATO's enlargement.<sup>497</sup> It meant that the East-West confrontation in Europe, the most dangerous area for a possible nuclear war in the world, had come to an end. In addition to this, NATO representing North America and Western Europe clearly emerged as one of the most powerful structures in the world in the field of security and defence.

These kinds of changes in the distribution of power and influence, and the peace making movement within Europe in the international system pushed the US and USSR to improve their relations. More specifically, the Soviet-American rivalry within the bipolar structure had broken down, and the international system of the 1990s seemed to slowly move toward polycentrism or uni-polycentrism under the influence of the US. Notwithstanding this, Russia remained one of the dominant military powers. The confirmation of this belief took place during the Gulf War of 1990-91. In this war, the two superpowers were in close cooperation with one another, so that the USSR did not use its veto on behalf of Iraq. As a result, this war did not escalate into a general war, and was eventually terminated by the efforts of the US, Allies, and the UN. The second attestation would be the series of the Strategic Arms Reduction agreements (START) I (May 23, 1992, entering force December 5, 1994), II (Jan 3, 1993), START III guidelines agreed by Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin at the Helsinki Summit (March 1997) and the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) programmes. The successor state of the USSR, Russia, which could not afford to maintain its nuclear arsenals effectively,

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<sup>497</sup> S. George and I. Bache, *Politics in the European Union* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 122-124.

proposed deeper cuts to the level of 1,000-1,500 warheads.<sup>498</sup> Moreover, most of the former states of the USSR, where nuclear warheads had been deployed or held during the Cold War era, needed some help from the US to dismantle their nuclear arsenals as a part of the CTR agreement<sup>499</sup>. Meanwhile, Presidents Yeltsin and Bush signed the Washington Charter, which stated that 'Russia and the US do not regard each other as adversaries and are developing a relationship of partnership and friendship'<sup>500</sup>. However, as most strategists expected, Russia has never abandoned its nuclear option, which it needs to preserve its prestige in world politics.<sup>501</sup>

Nonetheless, outwardly, the most significant evidence of the demise of the military alliance in the Cold War occurred in the War on Terror against Afghanistan in 2001. In this war, most states, not only the US's Cold War alliances, Russia which was the main rival during the Cold war period, and China which is a new potential enemy in the new post Cold War era, but also most Islamic countries expressed their sympathies and promised positive support including the authority to use their military assets. In particular, NATO invoked Article Five<sup>502</sup>, its mutual defence clause, for the first time, in its more than 50-year history. This movement was clearly seen as possibly opening up a collective response from most countries in the world against a new kind of war as

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<sup>498</sup> CNN, <<http://www.cnn.com/2001/ALLPOLITICS/02/09/nuclear.review/index.html>>, accessed: September 23, 2003.

<sup>499</sup> For example, the US is planning to contribute a total sum of \$ 2.7 billion to Ukraine. See Office of Assistance Secretary of Defence (Public Affairs), "Correction: United States and Ukraine Extend Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Agreement", *News Release No. 365-99* (August 5, 1999).

<sup>500</sup> The Washington Charter includes expanded political dialogue at all levels; co-operation in multilateral institutions; regional co-operation; co-operation in non-proliferation and on measures to counter terrorism and drug problems. Paul D. Wolfowitz, "The US -Russian Strategic Partnership", in Stephen Sestanovich (ed.), *Rethinking Russia's National Interests* (Washington, DC: CSIS, 1994), pp. 64-7.

<sup>501</sup> Refer below, "The Russian Interests and Foreign Policy".

<sup>502</sup> NATO Secretary General, Lord Robertson, "on the North Atlantic Council Decision On Implementation Of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty following the 11 September Attacks against the United States", *Statement to the Press* (September 12, 2001).



declared by US President Bush and the alliance.

The end of the Cold War has made the possibility of a world scale war using total resources including the nuclear arsenals of a country or its allies almost impossible as the confrontation structure between East and West has collapsed. Nonetheless, various conflicts deriving from religious or ethnic discord, which had happened during the Cold War era, have now become preeminent, e.g., the Timor Civil War (1975-1999) between the pro-Indonesian faction and Indonesians (volunteers) vs. the faction claiming the immediate independence of Timor (leftist faction), the Middle East War (I: 1948-49, II: 1956, III: 1967, IV: 1973) between Israel vs. Egypt and Syria, or intensified and increasingly complicated, e. g., the Chechen Conflict (1994- ) with the Russian government vs. the Chechen armed forces. Moreover, the international community has a serious concern about the transfer or proliferation of mass destruction weapons (nuclear, biological and chemical weapons), including ballistic missiles and other delivery vehicles, which are feared to aggravate regional conflicts<sup>503</sup>.

With these changes, the dominance of the superpowers began to be challenged by the resistance of the Third World to military intervention. The superpowers also recognized this. The collapse of bipolarity facilitated the restoration of the UN's original roles, the objectives of its establishment: securing peace, promoting economic progress and the attainment of human rights, establishing a new world order on the issues of the Third World as well as mediating in regional conflicts which masqueraded under the justifications of the protection of the human rights, environmental issues and the need of poorer or weaker countries. The good examples of these categories were the US and UN

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<sup>503</sup> *Defence of Japan 1996*, pp. 3-4 and 228-238.

led operations in Somalia (1992-1995), and the UN operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina (1992- )<sup>504</sup>. The Gulf War could be classified as one of the US and UN led operations.

To conclude, the characteristics of this period could be put forward that “low politics” involving human rights, anti-colonialism, racism and economic prosperity slowly began to predominate, replacing “high politics” such as military/ national/ security/ strategic/ ideological concerns in consideration of national interests. Consequently, the superpowers should have adopted a more pragmatic and low-key approach to most internal and international issues occurring throughout the world. The superpowers recognized what they could or could not do in solving those conflicts. In the field of the military, the operations led by the US and UN have significantly increased. Put simply, it could be summarized that the international system itself has changed from a survival game of ideological/ military confrontation between the two blocs to the punishment of rogue states, preservation of the *status quo* and human rights.

## **B. Regional Security Environment**

After Gorbachev came to power in the USSR, there also appeared a change in the security situation in this region reflecting the transformation of most aspects of Soviet foreign policy. In this regard, Gorbachev’s Vladivostok speech on July 28<sup>505</sup>, 1986 responded to the most important point of the Chinese demands that was to withdraw a substantial part of Soviet troops from the Soviet-Chinese border, which had been declining in numbers since 1990 after the announcement of Gorbachev about a

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<sup>504</sup> However, during the Kosovo War, Russia opposed the NATO air strikes on Serbia. It participated in the UN peacekeeping operations in Kosovo after the war to preserve its national interests.

<sup>505</sup> Ramesh Thakur & Caryle A. Thayer (eds.), *The Soviet Union as an Asia-Pacific Power* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1987), pp. 201-205.

unilateral reduction of Soviet military forces in the Far East in May 1989. The withdrawal from Mongolia was completed in 1992; only 3,000 administrative troops remained<sup>506</sup>; the reduction of the ground forces from the border unilaterally by Russia was from 450,000 to 190,000 troops<sup>507</sup>. It meant not only that their readiness posture was at a lower level than before, but it also saw the end of the antagonism between the Russians and Chinese which had commenced in the late 1950s.

The collapse of the USSR caused Russia and the PRC to reexamine and adjust their foreign policies so that they moved quickly to establish treaties with other countries as well as those within their own blocs, e.g., the PRC with the former Soviet republics. The ROK established diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union in September 1990 and with the PRC in August 1992. Moreover, after the Japanese Emperor visited the PRC for the first time in history in November 1992, the PRC and Japan agreed to initiate a bilateral security agreement in May 1992. Diplomatic relations between the US and Vietnam, which had been broken since the Vietnam War, were normalized in July 1995. The decisive point is that relations between Russia and the PRC, which had long been sour, have now substantially improved. Regarding these kinds of improved relationships, the security environment in this region was seen as moving in a peaceful direction like that in Europe. Nonetheless, the critical issues, such as the Northern Territories dispute between Japan and Russia, and the division of the Korean peninsula, remain unsettled.

The Korean peninsula remains one of the two divided countries in East Asia (the other is the PRC and Taiwan, which is viewed by most politicians and strategists as having

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<sup>506</sup> IISS, *The Military Balance 1992-1993*, pp. 89-90.

<sup>507</sup> *Defence of Japan 1996*, p. 30.

been integrated into one country,<sup>508</sup> even though each has its own political entity as an independent state), where local stability and security are closely intertwined with the regional and global interests of the four major powers, in what may be called, a quadrangle. However, the concept of a *de facto* alliance has significantly changed concerning the surrounding four major powers. As Russia pronounced in the early 1990s<sup>509</sup>, the PRC is also slowly changing its position following the nuclear crisis of 1994 in the peninsula regarding the DPRK's desire that in a war situation it would dispatch the PLA to a Korean war as it did in the Korean War in the 1950s. The PRC's Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesman announced in the latter part of 1995, "China does not believe the friendship treaty is a treaty requiring the dispatch of military forces"<sup>510</sup>. Furthermore, Vice Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan (later the Foreign Minister by 2001) said on an official visit to South Korea that the PRC-DPRK treaty was a "dead document"<sup>511</sup>. Judging from these kinds of statements, both are considering the DPRK as a neighbour rather than an ally to prepare to join in a future war, especially if the DPRK initiates such a war. However, it seems that the reason that they do not abrogate the mutual treaties completely<sup>512</sup> is to strengthen their influence in the Korean peninsula on issues such as the nuclear negotiations as a last resort in a worst-case

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<sup>508</sup> Of course, Taiwan wants to maintain contact with the PRC as a relation of "state-to-state", whilst the PRC considers it as a wayward province. The Chinese position is that this is a domestic matter in which nobody can intervene. See, *Financial Times*, July 24, 1999, p. 2.

<sup>509</sup> After ratifying their diplomatic relationship, ROK and Russia are continuing a high level of political dialogue by way of deepening partnership relations. However, as seen in the dialogues of the high level politicians of Russia and DPRK, they have agreed to the gradual renewal of the ACMAT which articulated that if each party met a war situation, the other party must immediately support it. V. I. Denisov, "Russia and the Problem of Korean Unification", Tae-Hwan Kwak (ed.), *The Four Powers and Korean Unification Strategies* (Seoul: Kyungnam University Press, 1997), pp. 39-41.

<sup>510</sup> Global Security Organisation. "Oplan 5027 Major Theater War", on <<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/oplan-5027-1.htm>>, accessed: August 30, 2004.

<sup>511</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>512</sup> According to the Chairman of the ROK Joint Chief of Staff, Jong-Hwan Kim, at the Parliamentary Inspection of the MoD on Oct 5, 2004, Russia amended the automatic military intervention article in the ACMAT to a matter for consultation in Feb 2000, but the PRC has not amended it up to today. *Chosunilbo*, "中, 한반도 유사시 북에 제한적 군사력 지원[the PRC will provide limited military forces support to the DPRK in a war situation]", October 6, 2004.

scenario.

During the 1990s, most nations in the region had initiated proposals for a new multilateral security structure reflecting the fluctuation in the major power relations between Japan, the PRC, Russia and the US. The strategic options facing countries across the region have become much more complex than has been generally appreciated. With the Asian economic crisis as well as the demise of the Cold War, every nation's security concerns have focused on seemingly boundless economic growth first. The next issue is the growing problem of North Korea's nuclear weapons programme, which became a global issue after May 1994<sup>513</sup> and which cannot be solved easily. In terms of the *de facto* military alliance, North Korea is continuously losing support so that it has almost been quarantined from the outside world. Because of this, it has firmly held on to the nuclear option and would not discard the nuclear option, but prefers to use it as a last resort in negotiations with others as well as gaining external respect. Lastly, even though it has almost been in abeyance because of the rise of the war on terror initiated after September 11, 2001, the US plan to establish a Theatre Missile Defence (TMD) system together with its bilateral alliance with Taiwan provoked a political reaction from the PRC<sup>514</sup>. In reality, the US steadily surveyed the Chinese intentions regarding their efforts to modernize their military forces and improve their power-projection

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<sup>513</sup> Robert A. Manning & James J. Przystup, "Asia's Transition Diplomacy: Hedging Against Futureshock", *Survival*, Vol. 41, No. 3 (Autumn 1999), pp. 45-46.

<sup>514</sup> The Chinese Defence White Paper in July 1998 described, "Hegemonism and power politics remain the main threats to global peace and stability...the enlargement of military blocs and the strengthening of military alliances have added factors of instability". China's State Council, *Defence White Paper 1998*, Beijing, July 1998; Russia and China have strongly disagreed with the Bush Administration nuclear policy concerning the large-scale missile defence so that they have consistently warned that the NMD is a threat to Russia and China, see *Washington Post*, 'Missile Defence: A Global Approach', April 8, 2001, p. B07.

capabilities all of which would be spurring concerns.<sup>515</sup>

The regional security environment can be summarized as an era in which there is no certain rival to the major powers, whilst the Korean peninsula remains divided, and there are still about 1,765,000 active armed forces personnel facing each other: 1,082,000 of North Korea and 683,000 of South Korea<sup>516</sup>. In this period after the demise of the Cold War, the nuclear and conventional forces are not in balance so that, according to Snyder's explanation, North Korea is trying to compensate for its inferiority in terms of alliance strategy by making nuclear weapons a top priority<sup>517</sup>. This is still a very heated issue. However, it is not easy for the US to solve this issue unilaterally, whether peacefully or by forceful means, because the balance of power system in the Cold War has not completely disappeared. It means that the interests of the major powers concerning the two Koreas have not been satisfactorily settled, regarding not only the Korean peninsula, but also Northeast Asia.

The balance of power system in the Northeast Asian region is becoming more dynamic and autonomous, but less predictable than it was during the Cold War, because this region is still the intersecting point of the struggle for world power. The PRC has not completely become a capitalist country, because its lingering conservative orientated leadership has pursued a more ideologically-based foreign policy and increased

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<sup>515</sup> The US DoD, *Report of the Quadrennial Defence Review* (May 1997, Section II), p. 3.

<sup>516</sup> IISS, *The Military Balance 2000-2001*, pp. 202-203.

<sup>517</sup> Because, the nuclear issue in the Korean peninsula was initiated on November 16 1990 at the request of the North Korean ambassador to UN which proposed the simultaneous nuclear facilities inspection of USFK and North Korea for allowing IAEA inspection just after the unification of Germany. Refer, regarding the chronology of major events related to North Korean nuclear issues, see, *The Korean Defence White Paper 2000*, p. 302-302. Regarding Snyder's explanation, see Michael Sheehan (1996), p. 181.

confrontation with its neighbours<sup>518</sup>, whilst most of the others, notably those in Eastern Europe except for a few countries such as North Korea, have given up their political identities based on ideology<sup>519</sup>. Japan's strategic behaviour driven by nationalism has rekindled historical concerns long held by other Asian states. The territorial dispute between Japan and Russia has remained, which is not an issue to be solved via multilateral or bilateral security politics. Even though Russian armed forces are no longer able to threaten their neighbours, because of the worsening economic situation with its financial constraints and uncertainties, it tries to remain a major nuclear power by modernizing its nuclear capabilities.<sup>520</sup> As mentioned above, this region is still dominated by the confrontation between the two Koreas. As such, surprisingly it appears that there is no further development in the military dimension compared with that of the Cold War era unlike the diplomatic atmosphere of reconciliation as well as the pursuit of economic advantage as a foreign policy objective. Consequently, the modernization of armed forces in East Asia has continued<sup>521</sup>, running counter to the world trend of arms reduction, particularly in Europe.

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<sup>518</sup> William T. Tow, "Reshaping Asia-Pacific Security", *The Journal of East Asian Affairs*, Vol. VIII, No. 1 (Winter / Spring 1994), p. 90.

<sup>519</sup> In the aftermath of the ending of the Cold War, the US and the other Asian countries assumed that the PRC would replace the role of the USSR in the Cold War in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. In this context, it was true for a while that a future US-Chinese Cold War could not be ruled out, which came from either a function of the pathological need for an enemy in the post-Soviet age or a worry about its own capacity to shape international relations into the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Michael Cox, "New China: new Cold War?", Ken Booth (ed.), *Statecraft and Security: The Cold War and Beyond* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 240-243.

<sup>520</sup> As IISS observed, there is considerable doubt whether the Russian military would be able to fight effectively, because the military budget would depend heavily on economic development, see IISS, *Strategic Survey 1992-1993*, p. 73; Regarding the Russian nuclear submarines, see, Barbara Starr, "USN Keeps an Eye on Old Foes and Allies", *Jane's Defence Weekly*, Vol. 19, No. 21 (May 22, 1993), p. 8; and refer the subchapter V. B: RNI, particularly the Russian military and maritime strategy/policy.

<sup>521</sup> IISS concluded that there is an arms race in the region. As it pointed out, the most interesting factor is that most of the improvements to capability involve naval and air forces which are suitable for projecting military force in a region. For the details of regional trends and each country's arms procurement, see, IISS, *The Military Balance 1993-1994*, pp. 146-149; *2003-2004*, pp. 145-149; see below Table 5-1.

### C. Maritime Dominion

With the collapse of the Cold War order, the crucial change in terms of maritime dominion is the absence of Russia, the most powerful rival, from the competition, so that maritime hegemony has been gained by the US-Japan alliance<sup>522</sup>. Moreover, the US-Japan Mutual Security Treaty was redefined to revitalize the strategic alliance in April 1996, in which the Japan Prime Minister Hashimoto and US President Bill Clinton considered its role as the keystone of US hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region and agreed to expand it by enlarging the areas of cooperation.<sup>523</sup> However, because low politics now assumed greater importance than high politics, the traditional concept of the 'command of the sea' in wartime also became almost obsolete<sup>524</sup>. In stark contrast, the 'command of the sea' for the protection of the SLOC in peacetime is rapidly emerging as the most important issue.

In reality, Japan had realized from the first that among the regional countries, it had a strategic weakness in the protection of its SLOC. As such, Japan went public with its resolve to overcome its vulnerability to the interception of oceangoing trade. Prime Minister Suzuki Zenko's statement in May 1981 declared that Japan would attempt to defend its sea lines of communication (SLOC) to a distance of 1,000 nautical miles.<sup>525</sup> Despite this recognition, during the Cold War, this programme was viewed as

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<sup>522</sup> Positively, as long as nuclear weapons are concerned, it is difficult to say so. However, as IISS and the Japanese Defence Agency analysed, it is true that Russian Naval forces' activities in the Far East are at an extremely low level. *Defense of Japan 1996*, p. 37.

<sup>523</sup> The National Institute for Defence Studies, Japan (JNIDS), *East Asian Strategic Review 2000* (Tokyo: NIDS, 2000), pp. 122-124.

<sup>524</sup> As noticed, the US and USSR/Russia were interested in SLOC from mainly the military standpoint in the Cold War, but South Korea was also interested in SLOC mainly from an economic standpoint because of its limited naval capabilities in the confrontation with North Korea.

<sup>525</sup> Nihon Kaijyo Jieitai, "Japan Maritime Self Defence Force", <<http://www.fas.org/irp/world/japan/jmsdf.htm>>, accessed: October 6, 2004. Actually, this category of JSDF's roles and missions were legitimized as part of US strategies to contain the USSR in the 1980s.



“unrealistic, unauthorized, and impossible” even within the Japanese Defence Agency, because of constitutional and other legal restrictions, which allowed only limited activities such as surveillance assistance, intelligence sharing, and search-and-rescue support to US naval forces. This programme led to a naval arms race in the region. For example, as Eric Heginbotham wrote, this kind of Japanese movement toward a blue water navy has been a major rationale for naval expansion during the post-Cold War era, because most South Korean military planners are implicitly considering that Japan, which is currently a neighbouring democracy, would be a potential threat after Korean unification.<sup>526</sup> As explained in the regional security environment, the security dilemma would be the fundamental cause of a naval arms race, because a state, as William T. Tow has discussed, assumes that “other states hostile to itself develop or procure new weapons systems with the intent of coercing it into submission”<sup>527</sup>.

In addition to this, with the growing threat of maritime piracy to commercial shipping<sup>528</sup>

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<sup>526</sup> Eric Heginbotham, “The Fall and Rise of Navies in East Asia: Military Organisation, Domestic Policy, and Grand Strategy”, *International Security*, Vol. 27, No. 2 (Fall 2002), pp. 92-93.

<sup>527</sup> William T. Tow (1994), p. 116. The antagonism between the Japanese and Koreans based on historic relations is not simple. According to the recent joint survey of Korea, China and Japan conducted by Korean Dongailbo, Japanese Asahi-Shinmun and the Chinese Academy of Social Science Research Center, 63 percent of Koreans and 64 percent of Chinese disliked Japan whilst 8 percent of each country’s population liked Japan. The Japanese also disliked Korea and China, 22 and 28 percent. Regarding the Japanese bid for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council, 87 % of Koreans and 84 % of Chinese opposed this. Concerning the Japanese Self-Defence Force’s involvement in non-combat overseas duties, 68% of Koreans and 93 % of Chinese opposed this. Of course, these results might reflect the recent conflicts between the three countries such as the history textbook problem and the Japanese claim to the Korean controlled Dokdo Islands. However, it could be said that these kinds of unfavourable results can be produced at anytime, and will be a potential cause of a future conflict. See, *Dongailbo*, April 27, 2005.

<sup>528</sup> The definition of piracy defined by the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea is violence on the high seas, defined as beyond any state’s 12-nautical-mile territorial waters. Most commercial ships of the East Asian countries are sailing through the Strait of Malacca between Malaysia and Indonesia, which is the world’s most piracy infested channel. More than two thirds of the attacks reported to the International Maritime Bureau (IMB), a division of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), are occurring in Asian waters. See, The USCINCPAC Virtual Information center (VIC), *Primer: Piracy in Asia* (VIC, 31 Oct 2003), p. 2; Ali M. Koknar, “Piracy and Terrorism are joining forces and creating troubled waters for the maritime industry”, <<http://www.securitymanagement.com/library/001617.html>>, accessed: October 04, 2004.

and the economic traffic of the sea, the protection of SLOC in peacetime and the territorial authority of the islands on the high seas came to be at stake among the countries in the region. In this regard, Japan and the PRC are competing to develop tacit alliances along the sea-lanes linking East Asian economies with the Persian Gulf and Indonesian oil. Furthermore, the competition for potentially oil-rich sea beds surrounding the Spratly and Paracel islands in the South China Sea has led to military confrontations and fueled an intense regional arms race involving the PRC and five lesser powers, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, The Philippines, and Vietnam.<sup>529</sup> Naval forces have emerged as an integral part of achieving a nation's interests in association with protection of SLOC and territory within and outside a state's territorial waters. During the Cold War, it was possible for each state to get support from the *de facto* alliance, but changed regional/ maritime security environments demanded that each country acquired sufficient naval forces to protect its own interests using its own resources. There were other causes, but this was the main reason for a naval force build-up in each country (refer Table 5-1).

As Table 5-1 shows, it is difficult to find any evidence of arms races in the quantity of main arms, but it is true that the numbers of manpower in most countries except for China, Philippines and Taiwan, have increased. To speak more precisely, the strengths of the navies of the countries surrounding the straits of Malacca and involving countries which are party to the islands dispute have been enlarged. One remarkable fact is that the Thai Navy obtained the *Chakri Naruehet*, a 10,000-ton Spanish-built-aircraft carrier equipped with eight Sea Harrier fighters and six Seahawk Helicopters on March 20,

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<sup>529</sup> The US Energy Information Administration (EIA), "South China Sea Region", <<http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/schina.html>>, accessed: October 6, 2004.

1997. This was the first instance of the acquisition of an aircraft carrier among East Asian countries. Most countries are modernizing their ships while decommissioning old ships. According to Eric Heginbotham's analysis, since 1980, the aggregate East Asian naval tonnage has increased by 69 percent, while the average age of warships has decreased<sup>530</sup>.

**Table 5-1: Naval Developments in the Major Asian Countries**

Classifications		1985	2002	Remarks
China	Manpower (AF / Total)	86,500 / 350,000	10,000 / 250,000	-76,500 / -100,000
	Surface / Sub / Air	56 / 110 / 800	63 / 69 / 517	7 / -41 / -283
Indonesia	Manpower (AF / Total)	12,000 / 36,950	12,000 / 40,000	0 / 3,050
	Surface / Sub / Air	13 / 2 / 43	17 / 2 / 17	4 / 0 / -26
Japan	Manpower (No AF)	44,000	44,400	400
	Surface/ Sub / Air	49 / 14 / 148	54 / 16 / 171	5 / 2 / 23
Malaysia	Manpower (AF / Total)	2 Commandos / 9,000	1 Commando Unit/ 12,000	- 1 Com U/ 3,000
	Surface / Sub / Air	3 / 0 / 0	4 / 0 / 6	1 / 0 / 6
Philippines	Manpower (AF / Total)	9,600 / 28,000	7,500 / 24,000	-1,900 / -4,000
	Surface / Sub / Air	7 / 0 / 0	1 / 0 / 8	-6 / 0 / 8
Taiwan	Manpower (AF / Total)	39,000 / 77,000	30,000 / 62,000	-9,000 / -15,000
	Surface / Sub / Air	36 / 2 / 12	32 / 4 / 52	-4 / 2 / 40
Thailand	Manpower (AF / Total)	13,000 / 32,200	18,000 / 68,000	5,000 / 35,800
	Surface / Sub / Air / AC	13 / 0 / 30 / 0	13 / 0 / 52 / 1	0 / 0 / 22
Vietnam	Manpower (AF / Total)	N. R. / 12,000	27,000 / 42,000	N.R. / 30,000
	Surface / Sub / Air	8 / 0 / 0	6 / 2 / 0	-2 / 2 / 0

-Note: Surface (Principle Surface Combatants only), Sub (Strategic and Tactical Submarine), Air (Aircraft and Helicopter), AF (Amphibious forces)

Sources: IISS, *The Military Balance 1985-1986*, pp. 111-137; 2002-2003, pp. 145-168.

To summarise, it appears that the Japan-US alliance still has regional maritime superiority in the event of the outbreak of war, despite the fact that the US naval forces

<sup>530</sup> Eric Heginbotham (2002), p. 86.

were withdrawn from Subic Naval Base and Cubi Point Naval Air Station in the Philippines by the end of 1992<sup>531</sup>. This arrangement may not work properly in peacetime, because it is not easy for the Japan-US alliance to protect or intervene on each other's behalf. The last course of action for minor powers is to build up their own naval power to fill the power vacuum formed by the US force reduction. So, the main reason for a naval arms race would be a combination of the end of the Cold War, the development of a regional multi-polarity, the importance of SLOC protection, and an insecure maritime environment, i.e., maritime piracy, including remote islands territorial disputes caused by the uncertainty of the law of the sea.

## **2. Independent Variables and Their Effects**

### **A. USMC**

#### **(1) The US Interests/ Foreign Policy**

With the concessions of Gorbachev, US foreign policy under President George Bush was changed to a relationship of relaxation with the USSR compared with that of Ronald Reagan. Moreover, with the ending of the Cold War, there was no overriding ideological challenge or preeminent rival like the USSR. This environment provided an

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<sup>531</sup> The Philippine Senate rejected the renewal of the Base agreement, and set in motion a total US withdrawal. However, the US-Philippine mutual defence treaty is still working. Most military personnel were disestablished, and 1,200 were transferred to Guam Base, which included VRC-50 (the airborne logistics support squadron for the US Seventh Fleet), Naval Special Warfare Unit One (SEALs), Explosive Ordnance Disposal Unit Five, and personnel from a number of other units such as the Ship Repair Facility and the Naval Hospital. The high values of the Subic/ Cubi Point facility, as a US Asia-Pacific military "footprint", were not only bridge bases of logistics and training between the Western Pacific (Guam and Hawaii) Fleet bases and Japan or South Korea (its geographical location), but also the availability of all major training and logistics functions at a single site. See, Global Security Organisation, "Subic Bay Naval Station", in [http://golbalsecurity.org/military/facilities/subic\\_bay.htm](http://golbalsecurity.org/military/facilities/subic_bay.htm), accessed: October 12, 2004.

opportunity for the US to shape a new global order, which was articulated by the Clinton administration centered on a traditional liberal worldview on the basis of the assumption that major international war was unlikely. US diplomatic and military powers assumed the status of unique superpower throughout the world for the first time in history, which meant that the US was urged to embrace its responsibilities throughout the world as a uniquely reliable country.<sup>532</sup> Nonetheless, the US was unable to manage all regional challenges by itself, because of the dynamics of power politics. For example, as is seen in Kosovo<sup>533</sup>, the support of allies and the UN Security Council were a critical precondition for US military intervention in the post-Cold War world, because the others, notably Russia, were deeply reluctant to accept any UN action in association with NATO attacks on Slavic forces.<sup>534</sup>

In this sense, it seems that the image of US global interests and objectives are entwined in the themes of the end of the Cold War and the putative New World Order. Consequently, the US inevitably took a step forward for world peace together with the rest of major world powers, as the statement of President Bush on Feb 13, 2001 shows when he declared that, "Transatlantic security and stability is a vital American interest, and our unity is essential for peace in the world... Nothing must ever divide us".<sup>535</sup> It meant that whatever identities, e.g., 'free market', 'globalization', 'humanitarian intervention' and 'democracy promotion' the US advocated, or whatever strong

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<sup>532</sup> The US National Security Strategy described this situation: "Never has American leadership been more essential to navigate the shoals of the world's new dangers and to capitalize on its opportunities", see The US White House, *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement* (February 1996), p. 1.

<sup>533</sup> Regarding US responses to the New International System, refer, Karl K. Schonberg, "Paradigm Regained: The New Consensus in US Foreign Policy", *Security Dialogue* 2001 PRIO, SAGE Publications, Vol. 32(4), p. 439-452.

<sup>534</sup> Carl M. Cannon, "From Bosnia to Kosovo", *National Journal*, Vol. 33, No. 14 (April 3, 1999), p. 880.

<sup>535</sup> The White House Office of the Press Secretary, "Remark by the President to the Troops and Personnel", in <<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/release/20010213-1.html>>, February 13, 2001.

diplomatic or military power the US has, it was not easy to intervene in other countries' domestic matters without firm support from the other major powers. In this regard, one of the central thrusts of US foreign policy objectives to perform the US national Security Strategy in the post-Cold War is to strengthen and adapt the security relationship, because it realized that it could not always accomplish its foreign policy goals unilaterally with the divergent interests of international actors. Consequently, there is no doubt that not only the North Atlantic Alliance and its original Cold War alliance in the Asia-Pacific region, but also that partnership with Russia and good relations with the PRC would play an important role in US foreign policy.

In the diplomatic and geo-strategic senses, the Asia-Pacific community is ranked second top among the strategic priorities set out by President Clinton in his 1997 State of the Union Address<sup>536</sup>. It seemed that Soviet disintegration and its receding military powers marked the end of the *de facto* alliance's military confrontation in the context of East *versus* West conflict, but it is difficult to completely disregard the historical relationships and geopolitical components of the Cold War order. The curiosity of this situation was the puzzle of why the US did not redefine the concept of the alliance despite the fact that it diplomatically employed the PRC as a potential friend against the Soviet threat. In stark contrast, the American interests emerged as the extension of the Cold War by the strengthening of the relationship with the old alliance. Here, there might be many reasons, as most politicians and US officials have observed, that: ① the uncertain regional security environments including the Russians' formidable nuclear arsenal as well as the possibility of the rise of a new potential enemy, most likely the

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<sup>536</sup> White House (1997), p. 5.

PRC substituting the USSR, ② economic engagements, ③ the importance of the Pacific Ocean which is a major commercial and strategic artery of the US as a maritime power, ④ the influence of the forward-deployed military presence, which enhanced its diplomatic influence<sup>537</sup>, etc. In addition to the above interests, the increasing importance of low politics demanded the addition of some more categories such as the promotion of human rights and the threat of widespread dangerous technologies in relation to Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), and also the protection of the environment.<sup>538</sup>

Traditionally, Japan occupied the most important position in US national security interests in Asia, because, in strategic terms apart from being an economic ally, the US bases in Japan formed the linchpin of America's forward military presence in Asia. It seems that the US wants Japan to play an active role as a security partner in the international arena by urging it to improve interoperability and intelligence sharing for future Japanese activities, particularly for PKO missions<sup>539</sup> by dispatching Japanese forces abroad. The guidelines for Japan-US defence cooperation were passed by the Japanese Diet on May 24, 1999, in which it confirmed that the Japan-US security arrangements would continue to play a key role in achieving peace and stability in the region surrounding Japan. This made it possible for the JSDF to provide rear area support to the US forces operating pursuant to the alliance and for the US forces to continuously deploy or use the current bases in Japan, because it broadly confirmed the

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<sup>537</sup> Paul H. Kreisberg, "American Security in the Asia-Pacific", in Dora Alves (ed.), *New Perspectives for US-Asia Pacific Security Strategy: The 1991 Pacific Symposium* (Washington, DC: National Defence University Press, 1992), pp. 29-33; School of Hawaiian Asian & Pacific Studies (SHAPS), "A Strategic Framework for the Asian Pacific Rim, Report to the Congress 1992", in <<http://www.shaps.hawaii.edu/security/report-92.html>>, accessed: October 13, 2004.

<sup>538</sup> The US White House, *A National Security Strategy for a New Century* (May 1997; December 1999), pp. 1-3.

<sup>539</sup> Patrick M Cronin & Michael J. Green, "Redefining the US-Japan Alliance", *McNair Paper 31*, INSS (Washington, DC: NDU, November 1994), p. 3.

US policy of maintaining some 100,000 military personnel in the Asia-Pacific region.<sup>540</sup>

Whilst the US is lingering in ratifying clear rules for operational cooperation including acquisition and cross-servicing agreements (ACSA), base access, and host nation support<sup>541</sup>, it is hurrying to bind Japan as its closest ally in the Asia-Pacific region. It means that the grade of a future war in the Korean peninsula has been classified not as a confrontation between two opposite blocs, which might rapidly escalate into a global war but as a regional conflict. Put succinctly, the Korean peninsula is no longer the cornerstone of the defence of Japan. In other words, the strategic value of the Korean peninsula in US strategic interests is less important than it was during the Cold War. Instead, even though it is not publicly known what the US geo-strategic appraisals of each country in the region are, it might be true that Taiwan occupies a higher position than South Korea, just after Japan, considering the geopolitical environments (although there is no evidence), and supposing that history repeats itself (for example, Secretary of State Acheson's "island defence line" in 1950). The threat caused by North Korea apart from its nuclear development programme is not particularly dangerous from the standpoint of the US. Consequently, dismantling North Korea's nuclear programme has been taken into the top priority consideration, in which the US wants the regional major powers to help implement the ratification of an agreement aimed at a peaceful settlement.

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<sup>540</sup> The Japanese National Institute for Defence Studies (2000), pp. 119-138.

<sup>541</sup> On July 24 2004, the US and South Korea finalized an agreement to redeploy all US troops located in camps, north of Seoul, to facilities in the Pyungtaek, some 50 miles south of Seoul, but a final decision will be decided by the respective national leaders at a later date. The relocation of the US forces in South Korea will proceed with the program as arranged by the new US doctrine, which seems that the US forces in the region will enlarge their operational range from not just the Korean peninsula, but to all the Asia-Pacific area as a stabilizer in the region. It seems, however, that the US strategic interests toward South Korea have not completely settled down even up to the present day. See, USINFO, "US Troop Relocation Shows Strength of US-Korean Alliance", in <http://usinfo.state.gov/eap/Archive/2004/Jul/28-373014.html>, accessed: August 19, 2004.



All in all, as the US national security strategy has stressed the importance of diplomacy, the strategic importance of each country to the US may be continuously changing according to the reaction of each relevant country in the following categories:

Firstly, how much can it contribute as an ally to maintaining the US forward presence and preserving the balance of power in Asia?

Secondly, how much can it play a more active role in partnership with the US to address new threats, such as the non-proliferation of NBC weapons, contribute to the war on terrorism, PKO, SLOC defence, and even the protection of human rights and the preservation of the environment for the security of the world, not just of the region?<sup>542</sup>

The US will continuously pursue a security policy on the basis of its bilateral relations with each country separately, which means that its executive method may be completely different from that of the Cold War era.

## **(2) Military Strategy/ Policy**


US defence policies have changed enormously reflecting the demise of the Cold War, as it no longer expects a confrontation between superpowers. In the European theatre, NATO has given up its nuclear strategic option, *to use nuclear weapons first*, which was a pragmatic course of action in deterring the Soviet and Warsaw Pact's threatened invasion. Instead, the US developed *the New Triad*, in which it clearly announced that the purpose of the New Triad is "holding at risk an adversary's assets and capabilities that cannot be countered through non-nuclear means". It means that if any threat is countered by non-nuclear means, the US will not use its nuclear arsenals. Of course, this was always the case, even during the Cold War. Moreover, the strike capabilities, one of the elements of the New Triad, include both non-nuclear and nuclear bombs (refer

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<sup>542</sup> The National Security Strategy released in September 2002 describes that "Our new strategy will pursue an international partnership...this partnership will require the contributions of our allies...A continued willingness on the part of the US to act as a security partner and leader will be an important factor in sustaining cooperation in many areas", <<http://www.fas.org/man/docs/bur/part01.htm>>, accessed: August 30, 2004.

Figure 5-1).

**Figure 5-1: The New Triad**



Source: Donald H. Rumsfeld, *Annual Report to the President and the Congress 2002*, p. 85.

During the Cold War, apart from the European theatre, the US was heavily involved in Asian security problems. However, the US forces in Asia have been cut back<sup>543</sup> and some bases have been eliminated, i.e., the Subic and Clark Air Bases in the Philippines. With these kinds of US force withdrawals, most Asian states felt that the strength of the remaining US forces would be nothing more than a stabilizing factor in the Asia-Pacific region in association with the regional potential causes of a future conflict.<sup>544</sup> Hence, the US Defence Secretary reaffirmed to the US Asian allies in Tokyo on November 22, 1991 that US security policy in Asia continues to be guided by the following six basic principles:<sup>545</sup>

<sup>543</sup> About 12% of the total of permanently forward deployed personnel in Japan and Korea: 15,250 at the end of 1992, Phase I, were withdrawn as a part of the adjustment of the US force structure. Among the three phases, only the first was accomplished, after that the second and third were postponed due to the rise of North Korea's nuclear threat. See, SHAPS (1992).

<sup>544</sup> John R. Faust, "East Asia's Emerging Security System", in *The Journal of East Asian Affairs*, Vol. VIII, No. 1 (Winter/Spring 1994), pp. 85-86.

<sup>545</sup> SHAPS (1992), p. 7.

- ① Assurance of American engagement in Asia and the Pacific,
- ② A strong system of bilateral security arrangements,
- ③ Maintenance of modest but capable forward-deployed US forces,
- ④ Sufficient overseas base structure to support those forces,
- ⑤ Our Asian allies should assume greater responsibility for their own defense,
- ⑥ Complementary defence cooperation.

The above principles are shaping the US' post-Cold War security role in East Asia: at the same time specifying the duties of the other allies based on the Nixon Doctrine.

The US perceives a clear need to structure its military forces to address less severe, but more disparate and numerous threats occurring throughout the World. In terms of the force package associated with a strategy and force requirement, in the context that there is no certain major threat to the US, it considered 'rogue states', such as Iraq and North Korea, as major opponents based on the Cold War military posture. In this regard, the US military strategic concepts have moved from a 'global confrontation with the USSR to the identification of 'regional' threats to world peace.<sup>546</sup> Accordingly, reorganizations of basic strategic concept and force structure were required. As a result, the US DoD proclaimed a reduction in its active duty Army force structure from 18 divisions to 12; Air Force from 36 fighter wing equivalents to about 26, Navy from 547 ships to only 451; and also cutback reserves and civilian personnel, as well as cancelling 100 weapons programmes.<sup>547</sup>

In the aftermath of President Clinton's inauguration, the new US Secretary of Defence,

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<sup>546</sup> There was no certain enemy of the US capable of being a threat in terms of military strength and intention until the terrorist attack on September 11, 2001. Some strategists regarded the PRC as a greater danger, but did not want it to be because of its economic interests. Hence, Ian Roxborough expressed as "A miasma of ambiguity shrouded American strategic debate", see Ian Roxborough, "Globalization, Unreason and the Dilemmas of American Military Strategy", *International Sociology*, Vol. 17(3), (London:SAGE, September. 2002), pp. 341-342.

<sup>547</sup> Dick Cheney, *Annual Report to the President and the Congress* (Washington, DC: DoD, February 1992), p. 1.

Les Aspin, began to consider a new military strategy, a so called “Win-hold-Win” approach, that if the US was confronted with regional conflicts in the Persian Gulf and in the Korean peninsula simultaneously, it would prioritize winning in the Gulf and rely upon existing US force deployments and South Korean Forces to “hold” invading North Korean forces until it could shift forces previously engaged in another conflict to Northeast Asia. This, “Win-hold-Win” strategy, has been cancelled for two reasons: ① limited capability: engagement in a war does not allow one to defend its interests in another region, and ② the difficulty in predicting precisely what threats it will confront in ten to twenty years time. In the long run, the US military force buildup strategy under the Clinton government was “Two Nearly Simultaneous Major Regional Conflicts” (refer Table 5-2). The latest setup for the US military forces buildup under the George W. Bush administration is specified to react to every possible conflict in the world. As a result, even though, the forces requirement is not higher than that of the previous administration (refer Table 5-3), the US developed its new concept to the “1-4-2-1” principle, which is to defend its homeland, deter in four places, counter attack in two, and if necessary, go to the enemy’s capital in one of the two.<sup>548</sup>

With the above plan, the US is developing its strategic lift capability to deploy forces when and where it needs its forces reflecting the environment. It plans to deploy its forces abroad because of the antagonism of certain countries. It wants to improve its forces so that they are capable of being ‘dual tasked’, whilst enormously reducing its force levels compared with that of the Cold War<sup>549</sup>.

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<sup>548</sup> The US DoD, *QDR 2001* (Washington, DC: US DoD, September 30, 2001), pp. 20-21.

<sup>549</sup> Regarding force cuts, reductions, and cancellations in addition to those called for by the Bush Programme during FY 1995-FY 1999 as the result of the Bottom Up Review, see Anthony H Cordesman, “US Defence Policy: Resources and Capabilities”, *Whitehall Paper Series 1993* (London: RUSI, 1994), p 42.

**Table 5-2: Major Regional Conflict (MRC) Force Options**

Forces		Win 1 MRC	Win 1 MRC & Hold in 2 <sup>nd</sup>	Win in 2 NS MRCs	Win in 2 NS MRCs With Reserve
Army	Active	8 divisions	10 divisions	10 divisions	12 divisions
	Reserve	6 division equivalents	6 division equivalents	15 enhanced readiness brigades	8 division equivalents
Navy (Carrier battle groups)		8	10	11 (1 reserve/ training carrier)	12
Marine Corps	Active	5 active brigades			
	Reserve	1 division			
Air Force	Active	10 fighter wings	13	13	14
	Reserve	6	7	7	10

Note: NS (Nearly Simultaneous)

Source: Anthony H Cordesman, "US Defence Policy: Resources and Capabilities", *Whitehall Paper Series 1993* (London: RUSI, 1994), p. 38.

However, it is very doubtful whether this strategy could be successfully implemented if required. The US ability would be limited to the reduced forces level<sup>550</sup>, and the results of the impact of force cuts in reducing the US contingency capability have not been fully anticipated. It is, however, true that maintaining a two war's force, the "Win-and-Win" strategy is helping to "ensure that the US will have sufficient military capabilities to deter or defeat aggression by a coalition of hostile powers or by a larger, more capable adversary than is expected today"<sup>551</sup>. By doing so, the US will be able to remain the military giant of the present world by keeping strategic arms and high quality conventional weapons and troops. Finally, it decided on the major elements of force structure in order to carry out its strategy, reflecting improvements in operational concepts and organizational arrangements to protect the full spectrum of combat capability to the maximum extent possible (see Table 5-3).

<sup>550</sup> William T. Tow (1994), p. 99.

<sup>551</sup> The US White House (1996), p. 15.

**Table 5-3: Major Elements of Force Structure (Active/Reserve)**

Services		FY 1997	FY 2003	QDR
Army	Active Divisions	10	10	10
	Heavy Armored (Light) Cavalry Regt	n. a	n. a	1/1
	Enhanced Separate Brigades	n. a	n. a	15
Navy	Aircraft Carriers	11/1	11/1	11/1
	Air Wings	10/1	10/1	10/1
	ARGs	12	12	12
	Attack Submarines	73	52	55
	Surface Combatants	128	131	116
Air Force	Active Fighter Wings	13	13	12+
	Reserve Fighter Wings	7	7	8
	Reserve Air Defense Squadrons	10	6	4
	Bombers (Total)	202	187	187
Marine Corps	MEF	3/1	3/1	3/1

Source: William S. Cohen, *Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review* (Washington, DC: US DoD, May 1997), Section V: Forces and Manpower; Donald H. Rumsfeld, *Annual Report to the President and the Congress 2002*, p. 55.

It appears that there is no change in the US military strategy toward East Asia compared with that of the Cold War as long as the current politico-strategic connection is not transformed, because the threat of North Korea is still the same, as well as the fact that the US declared ‘protecting critical bases of operations (US homeland, forces abroad, allies and friends)’ as the first priority among the Six Operational Goals in its defence policy<sup>552</sup>.

### (3) Maritime Strategy/ Policy

With the shift in military strategy to focus on regional conflicts, the demand for naval power to prevent the outbreak of war and to maintain its maritime superiority<sup>553</sup> in terms of the protection of SLOCs is even more complicated, because to answer the

<sup>552</sup> Donald H. Rumsfeld (2002), pp. 17, 68-70.

<sup>553</sup> Actually, this has two meanings in the US Navy: ① the unimpeded use of the seas and ② to deny an opponent the option of a single-theatre strategy, which means that the US Navy does not allow an opponent to attack the US Navy at a point of his choosing without moving to threaten him in areas where he may be more vulnerable. See, Carlisle A. H. Trust (admiral of the US Navy), “Maritime Strategy for the 1990s”, *Proceedings*, Vol. 116/5/1,047 (May 1990), p. 99.

fundamental question of how much is enough in terms of military planning itself would also not be easy. It seems that the military planners are taking the naval composition of Operation Desert Storm in the Persian Gulf War<sup>554</sup> as a model to plan a future naval force options in the littoral area, where the US Navy could face threats from mines, supersonic cruise missiles, diesel submarines, or maritime terrorism. There were about 547 total deployable battle force ships in FY 1990, which were reduced to 435 in FY 1997 (refer Table 5-4), and even more at the present stage.

**Table 5-4: Naval Force Structure (FY 1990/97) and Current Structure**

Classifications	1990	1997 (Plan)			2001 (Real Strength)		
		Plan	Dif	% (Red.)	No	Dif	% <sup>c</sup>
Strategic Forces	39	24	-15	38	18	-21	54
Aircraft Carriers	16	13	-3	19	12	-4	25
Surface Combatants	175	143	-32	20	118	-57	33
Attack Submarines	93	79	-14	15	72	-21	23
Amphibious Ships	60	49	-11	19	40	-20	33
Mine Warfare Ships	6	15	+9	+150	26	+20	+230
Other Support Ships	127	96	-31	25	125 <sup>a</sup>	-2	1.8
Mobilization Force Category A	31	16	-15	49	31 <sup>b</sup>	0	0
Total Ship Battle Forces	547	435	-112	20	424	-105	23

Notes: <sup>a</sup>: The sum of the numbers of Combat Logistic Force (5) and Military Sealift Command (120)

<sup>b</sup>: The number of the Ready Reserve Force (RRF) ships at readiness of 4 days. If all the RRF and National Defence Reserve Fleet (NDRF) are concerned, it reaches some 127.

<sup>c</sup>: Compared with the strength of 1990.

Sources: Dick Cheney, *Annual Report to the President and the Congress* (February 1992), p. 75; IISS, *The Military Balance 2002-2003*, pp. 18-21 (US Part I).

This naval force structure was established on the basis of President George Bush's four basic guidelines of the new national military strategy (deterrence, forward presence<sup>555</sup>, crisis response and reconstitution) in his Aspen speech on August 2, 1990. Among them,

<sup>554</sup> The US contributed 165 ships to the coalition fleet including six carrier battle groups with associated air wings among the total of 228 ships (21 from the UK, 42 from other allied states). The main tasks of the navy were sealift, mine sweeping, close air support for ground forces, and deception, see Jeffrey McCausland, "The Gulf Conflict: A Military Analysis", *Adelphi Papers* No. 282 (November 1993), pp. 36-40.

<sup>555</sup> The concept of 'forward defence', as Soviet-focused, in the Cold War era has now changed to the regionally focused 'forward presence'.

the first three were closely related to the basic precepts of the Naval Force Structure for the 1990s<sup>556</sup>. In the context of the new national military strategy, 'Win-and-Win (Two Nearly Simultaneous Major Regional Conflicts)', the US Navy needed to consider naval strategy and forces in both structural and regional aspects. In the context of the former, there was no critical change, because the Navy continuously needed to keep command and control, support, and the traditional flexibility of naval forces in crisis response as well.

However, in the latter, naval power projection forces, especially carrier battle groups and amphibious ready groups, are more valuable<sup>557</sup> reflecting the changing characteristics of the security environments from 'high politics' to 'low politics'. As Table 5-4 shows, the reduction percentage of the naval strategic force is relatively higher than the others, whilst the number of mine warfare vessels has increased by 20 (230%), reflecting the lessons of the Gulf War. As US Navy Commander P. Kevin Peppe recognized<sup>558</sup>, the naval strategic force (nuclear-powered attack submarines) is continuously losing some areas of warfare employment. The SSBN fleet consists of 18 Ohio-class submarines, and the last one, the USS Louisiana, was commissioned in 1997. In accordance with the START II treaty, four submarines will be retired, leaving 14 SSBNs armed with D-5s (giving a total of 336 SLBMs)<sup>559</sup>. In addition to this, it is observed that the focus of naval force buildup has shifted from holding numerous active ships to mobilization posture for a crisis response at the level of a regional conflict.

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<sup>556</sup> For the specific meanings of these, refer Carlisle A. H. Trust (1990), pp. 95-98.

<sup>557</sup> Stan Weeks, "Crafting a New Maritime Strategy", *Proceeding*, (January 1992), pp. 30-36.

<sup>558</sup> P. Kevin Peppe (Commander of US Navy), "Centurion: The Changing Future of the Force", *Proceedings*, Vol. 118/4/1,070 (April 1992).

<sup>559</sup> Donald H. Rumsfeld, *Annual Report to the President and the Congress 2002*, pp. 90-92; William S. Cohen, *Annual Report to the President and the Congress* (April 1997), pp. 208.



With the challenge of specific regional balances instead of Soviet containment, there are the following several highlighted implications<sup>560</sup> for the US Navy buildup:

Firstly, to be better prepared to deal with humanitarian peacetime missions such as humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, maritime intercepts, capable of making a major contribution,

Secondly, must lead the way in rethinking the role of global (as well as strictly regional) multinational military operations and formal coordinating mechanisms, that is, the US maritime forces must be prepared to rely upon joint and combined operations by providing a timely and powerful expeditionary response through the full range of combat operations as well as operating platforms for follow-on forces throughout the full spectrum of any conflict as a critical component of the joint force,

Thirdly, with the limits of the US military access to overseas bases, the US Navy must be prepared to deploy as a forward presence force by extending and developing its fundamental qualities of decisiveness, sustainability, responsibility, combat readiness and capability, and agility, under the concept of the Maritime Pre-positioning Forces (MPF),<sup>561</sup>

Fourthly, must be tailored with an eye to the need for residual tailored forces for the US-Soviet context, in other words, the US Navy should be ready to activate if a global threat reemerges<sup>562</sup>.

With these implications, the Navy's publication, *Naval Warfare*, defined its basic roles of promoting and defending the American interests by maintaining maritime superiority, contributing regional stability, conducting operations on and from the sea, seizing or defending advanced naval bases, and conducting such land operations on the basis of

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<sup>560</sup> Refer, Donald H. Rumsfeld (2002), pp. 127-137 (Report of the Secretary of the Navy); Carlisle A. H. Trust (1990), pp. 92-98; Stan Weeks (1992), pp. 35-36.

<sup>561</sup> According to the latest news, the US Navy is trying to develop the next stage of the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) programme in order to meet the changing requirements for the vessel, which include maximum speed (objective value is 50 knots or greater), aviation capability, high-speed endurance (with a threshold range of 3,500nm and an objective of 4,300 nm). See, Jane's, "Littoral Combat ship designs continue to evolve", *International Defense Review (IDR)* (May 15, 2003); "US Navy Selects Three Finalists for Littoral Combat Ships", *IDR* (August 21, 2003).

<sup>562</sup> The Russian Navy still has the world's largest submarine fleet equipped with nuclear-armed SLBMs, torpedoes, and ASW missiles. However, the US is worried about the breakdown of the established system, and is concerned to prevent rogue states from accessing former Soviet nuclear weapons rather than the reconstitution of an integrated Soviet naval capability of Cold War proportions; see, Robin Ranger and David G. Wiencek, "Watching the Old Enemy", *Proceedings*, Vol. 118/4/1,070, (April 1992), pp. 48-53.

warfighting readiness.<sup>563</sup> Among these, the third is eminently highlighted under the concept of littoral warfare<sup>564</sup> after the post-Cold War era, substituting for the concept of nuclear strategic deterrence. It seems that the role of nuclear weapons has been regressed to a last resort among the evolving instruments of US foreign policy objectives. Littoral warfare is, of course, not performed only by carrier battle groups or surface ships and amphibious forces. All branches of the navy are basically expected to participate in any kind of small conflict, whether their roles are smaller or larger in the phases of operation. Put simply, it means that the priority and operational demands of the US naval buildup have been changed.

From the standpoint of the US, which wants to ban the proliferation of atomic weapons, if it plans to deter a regional conflict or challenge with its nuclear arsenal, it provides a *raison d'être* for the non-nuclear countries in the world to obtain a nuclear arsenal. This would be the dilemma of US naval force construction. Consequently, it is implying that projecting power and engagement battles against shore-based land forces would be the basis of current and future navy missions. This represents a shift away from the navy's usual emphasis on the control of the seas as a nation separated from the other continents by the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. Thus, not only must it procure forces to fight a war, it must still devote considerable resources for acquiring the means for sending troops and materials to a conflict. In this sense, the carrier battle groups and amphibious ready groups are the most suitable means for evolving foreign policy objectives abroad.

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<sup>563</sup> The US Department of Navy, *NDPI: Naval Warfare* (March 28, 1994), p. 15.

<sup>564</sup> With the demise of the USSR, the primary role of Navies has changed from Open Ocean Operations (Blue Water) to that of gaining access into and subsequently operating within the Littorals. It indicates that the main means of waging a naval war comes back to the level of conventional warfare as it existed as a form of limited war in the Cold War. Regarding the history of littoral warfare in the Cold War, see, Charles E. Myers, "Littoral Warfare: Back to the Future", *Proceedings*, Vol. 116/11/1,053 (November 1990), pp. 48-55.

In November 1992, the US navy announced its vision of the role of US sea power in the post-Cold War era under the name of “...From the Sea” as a Navy and Marine Corps White Paper via Proceedings, in which it emphasized a fundamental shift from open-ocean warfighting on the sea towards joint operations on land conducted from the sea. It outlined that US naval power for the next century would be resized and reshaped to concentrate on crisis management and warfare in the world’s littoral regions reflecting the transition of the transoceanic National Security Strategy.<sup>565</sup> The following publication, “Forward...From the Sea” addressed the naval contribution to national security highlighting the unique capabilities inherent in naval expeditionary forces as evidenced by operations in Somalia, Haiti, Cuba, Bosnia and Iraq. It demonstrated its readiness to prepare for new challenges for the force---forward deployed, ready for combat, and engaged to preserve the peace as an instrument for American worldwide leadership.<sup>566</sup> As Admiral Jay L. Johnson (USN, CNO) articulated, the naval operational concept for the 21<sup>st</sup> century is “to carry out expeditionary operations by conducting forward naval operations both to ensure unimpeded use of the seas and to project American influence and power into the littoral areas of the world as a visible tool of US foreign policy.”<sup>567</sup> In the long run, the priority of the naval operation has moved toward ‘expeditionary warfare’ operations in the littorals and away from large ‘open ocean’ conflicts in order to align with the Navy’s new orientation.<sup>568</sup>

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<sup>565</sup> Sean O’Keefe (Secretary of the Navy), Frank B. Kelso (CNO), Carl E. Mundy (CMC), “... From the Sea: Preparing the Naval Service for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century”, *Proceedings*, Vol. 118/11/1,077 (November 1992), p. 93; “... From the Sea” (Washington, DC: DoN, September 1992), <<http://www.nwdc.navy.mil/Library/documents/fts.asp>>, accessed: April 3, 2003.

<sup>566</sup> J.M. Boorda (CNO) & Carl E. Mundy (CMC), “Forward...From the Sea” (Washington, DC: DoN, September 19, 1994).

<sup>567</sup> Admiral. Jay L. Johnson, Forward...From the Sea: The Navy Operational Concept (March 1997), <<http://www.chinfo.navy.mil/navpalib/policy/fromsea/ffseanoc.html>>, accessed: April 3, 2003.

<sup>568</sup> William Y. Frentzel II, John M. Bryson and Barbara C. Crosby, “Strategic Planning in the Military:

Despite the strain on its stretched naval bases, the US remains the paramount naval power in the Asia-Pacific region, and is the only naval power capable of achieving the forward deployment of substantial nuclear and conventional forces. Replacing the bases in the Philippines, in November 1990, it signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with Singapore for increased port access by US warships, which was upgraded by President Bush's visit in 1992 allowing the redeployment of 200 troops from the Philippines to coordinate the US Seventh Fleet's supply ship logistics.<sup>569</sup> In addition, it has agreed a Memorandum of Understandings (MOUs) with Indonesia, Thailand, and the Philippines (the previous availability of Subic Bay, but not at the same level of the Cold War era), to disperse its naval assets in the theatre. Nonetheless, it is undeniable that with time, particularly if a stable security regime is shaped, the US Navy would find more difficulty in accessing allied ports and bases.<sup>570</sup> In this regard, it is clear that the US naval facilities in Japan have become more critically important in terms of the geostrategic environment, considering the PRC's ambition to have a modern powerful navy,<sup>571</sup> and the remnants of Russian naval power.

Even though the US-Soviet conflict has been replaced by regional contingencies as a central focus of national strategy, little change has occurred in the roles of the US naval

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The US Naval Security Group Changes its Strategy, 1992-1998", *Long Range Planning* 33 (2000), p. 406.

<sup>569</sup> William T. Tow, "Regional Constraints on the Role of Navies", Hugh Smith and Anthony Bergin (eds.), *Naval Power in the Pacific: Toward the Year 2000* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publisher, 1993), pp. 50-51.

<sup>570</sup> With growing anti-nuclear movements, some countries are refusing to introduce nuclear weapons into their area, i.e., the 13-member South Pacific Forum, consisting of Australia, New Zealand, and a number of smaller islands states in Melanesia and Polynesia. As a result, the Bush administration declared in September 1991 that all sea-based tactical nuclear weapons would be removed from US naval surface ships, attack submarines and land-based naval aircraft. *Ibid.*, pp. 44-47.

<sup>571</sup> For example, the PRC Navy's Project 094 nuclear-powered strategic missile submarine and the attempt to purchase a late-version Project 636 Kilo-class submarines as well as some surface combatant ships, i.e., *Sovremennyy*-class guided-missile destroyers.

forces deployed in the Pacific areas despite the fact that the US naval strength had been severely reduced as a result of the changing security environment (see Table 5-5).

**Table 5-5: The Changing Naval Strengths in the Pacific**

Classification	1990	2002	Remarks
Pacific Fleet	8 SSBN, 3 SSGN, 37 SSN, 3 SS, 7 CV/CVN, 100 PSC, 44 Amph.	8 SSBN, 27 SSN, 6 CV/CVN, 54 PSC, 20 Amph+1AG, 62 MSC	-3 SSGN, -10 SSN, -3 SS, -1 CV/CVN, -46 PSC, -24 Amph
3 <sup>rd</sup> Fleet	5 CVBGs, 1-2 BSAG, 4 URG, 1 ARG	3 CVBGs, 4 URG, 1 ARG	-2 CVBGs
7 <sup>th</sup> Fleet	2 CVBGs, 0-1 BSAG, 1 URG, 1 ARG	1 CVBG, 1 ARG	-1 CVBGs

Sources: IISS, *The Military Balance 1990-1991*, pp. 19-20; 2002-2003, p. 26 US Part I.

Owing not only to the importance of this region for US security and prosperity, but also the absence of any substitute forward-stationed maritime presence as a stabilizer for the complex regional maritime security environment, it is imperative for the US Navy to play a substantial role until a new strategic environment favourable to the US and others is shaped. For example, the USS *Nimitz* (CVN-68) and USS *Independence* (CV-62) were dispatched to solve tensions in the Taiwan Strait in March 1996 as a flexible deterrent force.<sup>572</sup> The roles and functions of the US Navy in the Pacific are still as broad as those of the Cold War era, and will not be diminished for a long while.

#### **(4) The Development of the USMC**

##### **(A) General Rise and Fall**

As Table 5-2 shows, there was no change in the active force structure of three MEFs, each comprising a command element, a division, an aircraft wing, and a service support group, which will be supported by one Reserve division/wing/service support group<sup>573</sup>.

<sup>572</sup> William S. Cohen (1997), pp. 255-257.

<sup>573</sup> In the immediate aftermath of September 11, the USMC reactivated the 4<sup>th</sup> Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) as an antiterrorism organization within Marine Corps Forces, Atlantic. Refer, The HQ

The active strength of the USMC downsized to 173,031 in 1998 from 193,735 in the Cold War era as a result of President Bill Clinton's "top-to-bottom" review of the armed forces. The reduction ratio of the USMC personnel including reservists was the lowest among the services. Put simply there was no serious reduction in the marines' active force level from the Cold War. Given the transition of the attribute of a war from high- to low-intensity conflict, most threats to international insecurity occur on land. As such, the US, as the unique military power and an insular state surrounded mostly by oceans, which provide power projection routes, needs a powerful maritime projection force capable of seizing the initiative, not just by firepower, i.e., the PGMs, but by a human factor beyond the concept of 'fleet to shore', the ability to react to a political event in far distant areas beyond the seas, which the US political calculations deem essential to the defence of vital US interests. In other words, a demand for an operation on land rather than at sea has enormously increased due to the challenges and opportunities of a rapidly changing world as a result of the disappearance of the powerful enemy, the USSR. Consequently, even under the concept of "Two Nearly Simultaneous Major Regional Conflicts", the USMC is an essential component of American military power.

Despite the revision of US maritime strategy, the employment of the USMC for an amphibious landing operation was seen as peripheral to the other services' role and functions, because of its vulnerability in transit to a relevant theatre. In other words, it was not easy to manoeuvre there without being detected by the enemy, which was the critical factor in improving amphibious capability in a global war situation from the point of view of classical military strategic thinking. However, given the fact that

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of the USMC, *Concepts and Programs 2003*, p. 41.

amphibious operations are a kind of naval operation<sup>574</sup>, not only for the marines themselves, but the responsibility to keep full dimensional protections, such as information superiority, air and maritime superiority, theater air and missile defence, delivery of naval fire, and logistics for joint operations in the littorals, lays on the navy.<sup>575</sup> From this perspective, the definition of the amphibious force is “the forces that are specially organized, trained, and equipped to deploy aboard, operate from, and sustain themselves from amphibious ships”<sup>576</sup>. Put succinctly, they are specially designed to project land combat power ashore from the sea.

Nonetheless, given the new security environment, the role and functions of the USMC have greatly increased with the importance of the demand for expeditionary forces to manoeuvre via sea routes and being capable of reaching most strategic points in the world. The composition of the USMC comprising amphibious and air-landed forces coupled with the navy’s strategic manoeuvrability can offer a self-contained capability with strategic and operational reach, which is seen as a highly significant political and military tool.<sup>577</sup> As evidence of the enlargement of the USMC’s role and functions, in addition to the above marines’ leading role for the naval doctrinal developments and the minimum reduction of active personnel compared with the other branches of the Navy, the possibility is that the marine officer can command the entire forces regardless of

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<sup>574</sup> The *NDP 1* stated, “The ability to engage the enemy at sea decisively will always remain paramount to naval forces” (*NDP 1*, p. 29), and the *MCDP 1-0* stated that there is a support relationship between the amphibious task force commander (Navy) and the LF commander (Marines or Army). As such, the *JP 3-02* describes that the relationship between them will be decided on the basis of mission, nature and duration of the operation, force capabilities, Command & Control capabilities, battlespace assigned, and recommendations from subordinate commanders (*JP 3-02*, p. II-3). To conclude, usually the CATF has the responsibility to control the whole amphibious force before the LF establishes a command post.

<sup>575</sup> In order to do this, the USN has embraced the concept of net-work centric warfare comprising networked sensors, command centers, and forces, which enables them to gain an advantage over the enemy in an amphibious landing operation.

<sup>576</sup> *MCDP 1-0*, p. 2-6.

<sup>577</sup> Robert Ross, “The Role of Amphibious forces in a Changing World”, *RUSI* (April 1996), p. 21.

naval task or landing force. Before this change, the relationship between the command of the amphibious task force (CATF) and the command of the landing force (CLF) was parallel; each had the responsibility to control its respective components. Nonetheless, the CATF, a Navy officer, was responsible for the operation and exercises over the entire force necessary to ensure the success of the operation<sup>578</sup>. However, even though the basic concept is the same as before, the new joint doctrine opens a way by which a Marine officer can control the entire force by defining several considering factors.<sup>579</sup>

In order to satisfy the national and naval expectations, the USMC has continuously developed the concept of the MAGTF to enhance its utility in a changing world by both remaining flexible and preparing to conduct operations across the entire spectrum of conflict. The USMC published the first *MAGTF Master Plan (MMP)* in 1989, and following the updated *MMP* in 1991, which identified its force deployment goals for the period 1990-2000 to enhance the FMF as a national instrument. Under these plans, the MEU (SOC) programme has made tremendous advances to be flawlessly organised into a MEB or MEF. One successful fruit of this effort was the assimilation of the 11<sup>th</sup> MEU (SOC) into 5<sup>th</sup> MEB, one of the units designated to conduct an amphibious assault into Kuwait, during the Gulf War.<sup>580</sup> A MEU (SOC) was the most potent forward deployed asset, which trains, according to *Marine Corps Order 3120.9A: Policy for MEU (SOC)*, to conduct 28 missions in four major operational areas-Amphibious Operations, Direct Action Operations, MOOTW, and Supporting Operations.<sup>581</sup> On November 10, 2001,

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<sup>578</sup> Marine Corps Landing Force Manual 01 (1962), pp. 23-24.

<sup>579</sup> *MCDP 1-0* (2001), pp. 2-6 and 2-7.

<sup>580</sup> Victor D. Lance, "MAGTF (SOC): Time to Make it Happen", *Marine Corps Gazette* (July 1992), p. 57. In this war, an actual large-scale landing operation was not executed, because the Iraqis deployed 6 divisions to the coast of Kuwait and Iraq. Here, the USMC's mission can be classified as a supporting role for the General Schwarzkopf's left hook.

<sup>581</sup> Darrin Denny & Daniel Q. Greenwood, "The MEU (SOC) Programme in Transition", *Marine Corps*



the Commandant signed the document establishing the new warfighting capstone concept of 'Expeditionary Manoeuvre Warfare (EMW)', which provides the foundation for the way that the Marine Corps will conduct operations within the complex environment of this new century. Here, it articulated the basic operational concept for the MAGTFs; MEF for major theatre war, MEB for smaller-scale contingencies, and MEU (SOC) for promoting peace and stability. In order to do that, it demands the each MAGTF have the ability to serve as a JTF headquarters or as a functional or service component commander of a JTF.<sup>582</sup>

In order to have the ability as an EMW force, the USMC together with the Navy further developed its operational doctrines of the "Operational Manoeuvre from the Sea (OMFTS)"<sup>583</sup> and "Ship-to Objective Manoeuvre (STOM)". According to MCDP 1-0, the OMFTS applies manoeuvre warfare to expeditionary power projection in naval operations as part of a joint or multinational campaign. It is designed to allow the NEF (Naval Expeditionary Force including marines) to move up and down a littoral, and focuses on breaking the cohesion and integration of an enemy's defences while avoiding attrition-style head-on attacks via creating the condition that the battlefields are not imposed by the enemy.<sup>584</sup> The gist is to seek the enemy's vulnerable points using the sea as manoeuvre space, which generates overwhelming tempo and momentum, to allow the landing force to build combat power ashore by making the relevant MAGTF

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*Gazette* (June 2000), p. 60.

<sup>582</sup> The HQ of the USMC, *Expeditionary Manoeuvre Warfare: Marine Corps Capstone Concept* (November 2001), p. 6-7.


<sup>583</sup> This concept was introduced by the NDP-3, Naval Operations in the early 1990s as the common doctrine for both the Navy and Marine Corps. This attempts to create favourable situations to control or alter events.

<sup>584</sup> Terry C. Pierces, "Taking Manoeuvre Warfare to Sea", *Proceedings*, Vol. 121/4/1, 106 (April 1995), p. 75.

free from the danger of enemy attack.<sup>585</sup> In this sense, it is close to a purely naval operation, even though it is employed in amphibious warfare.

In striking contrast, the STOM is the tactical implementation of the OMFTS to achieve the JFC's operational objectives by the MAGTF. The difference between the aims of "ship-to-shore movement" and the STOM is that the latter pushes the MAGTF into multiple objectives regardless of ashore or inland with sufficient strength minimizing the time consumption before the enemy is prepared to defend them (see Figure 5-2). The objectives are certainly the enemy's centres of gravity, but those are various according to the attack echelons or the enemy's strength. In modern warfare, to win a war, war planners do not neglect efforts to identify the enemy's centre of gravity, which could be one or many. As the USMC's basic operational concept of the MAGTFs suggested, these objectives are likely to depend on the enemy's strength and operational goal.

**Figure 5-2: Operational Objectives**



Source: *MCDP 1-0*, p. 2-17

<sup>585</sup> *MCDP 1-0*, p. 2-15.

The STOM seems certainly to have enlarged the opportunities to access and destroy the enemy's centre of gravity via taking the initiative in the operation by maximizing its flexibility and mobility of organization. The merit of this concept is to force the enemy to defend all its important points, which embodies the basic principles of war, concentration and dispersion. Whilst it constrains the enemy to be decentralized, the USMC chooses the time and space that it wants to fight by keeping operational depth<sup>586</sup> and flexibility in selecting the objectives and avoiding the sore spot at the water's edge. Because, as George Armand Furse has pointed out, "the enemy's (the attacker's) great difficulty in amphibious operation is to land...we (the defender) should meet him as he quits the transports, and prevent his landing"<sup>587</sup>, the attacker has the great disadvantage at the water's edge.

This operational manoeuvre concept development reflects the demise of the Cold War and the transition of the security environment. The demands of low-intensity conflicts, even though they are also applicable to medium- and high-density conflicts, increases the possibility of its employment in a context in which the enemies are relatively not strong enough. To practically use this, the USMC must possess enhanced capabilities in C<sup>4</sup>I, mobility, logistics, firepower and protection to overwhelmingly exceed those of the enemy's assets.<sup>588</sup>

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<sup>586</sup> The USMC together with the Army projects the HIMARS programme to provide the MAGTF with deep-strike and organic indirect fire support by engaging targets at long range with high volumes of fire in all weather conditions, which will be capable of being airlifted by C-130 aircraft. See, *Concepts and Programs 2003*, p. 16.

<sup>587</sup> Theodore L. Gatchel, *At the Water's Edge* (Annapolis, ML: NIP, 1996), p. 4.

<sup>588</sup> For the specific meanings, see Charles C. Krulak, "Operational Manoeuvre From the Sea", *Proceedings*, Vol. 123/1/1,127 (January 1997), pp. 29-30; and for the efforts and progress of the procurement of the USMC, refer *USMC Concepts & Issues 2000* and *Concepts and Programs 2003*, p. 138. According to the latter, the procurement of the Osprey still remains the USMC's number one aviation acquisition priority.

## (B) Amphibious Lift Capability

Despite the rebirth of the Navy and Marine Corps as the most suitable military means for foreign policy objectives, and their requirement for readiness, the most serious problem as in the previous period is the deficiency in the amphibious lift capability mainly derived from decreased defence spending. Despite the demise of the Cold War, 6 of the *Wasp*-Class LHDs, 4 of the *Whidbey*-Class LSDs, and 4 of the new Harpers Ferry-class LSDs were commissioned between 1990 and 2001. With these additional commissions replacing the old ships such as the 5 LKAs and 18 LSTs<sup>589</sup>, the whole amphibious lift capability remains almost at the same levels as the Cold War, less than 2.5 MEB AE<sup>590</sup> by possessing almost 40 of the deployable amphibious ships.

**Table 5-6: Deployment of the Deployable Amphibious Ships (2002)**

Classifications		Quantity	San Diego, CA	Sasebo, Japan	Little Creek, VA	Norfolk, VA	Gaeta, Italy
LCC	<i>La Salle</i>	1					1
	<i>Coronado</i>	1	1				
LHA	<i>Wasp</i>	7	2	1		4	
	<i>Tarawa</i>	5	3			2	
LPD	<i>Austin</i>	11	5	1		5	
LSD	<i>Harpers Ferry</i>	4	2		2		
	<i>Whidbey</i>	8	2	2	4		
	<i>Anchorage</i>	3	2		1		
Total		40	17	4	7	11	1

Source: The US Navy, *Fact Files* quoted from Progressive Management, *Amphibious Warfare* (CD: ISBN 1-59248-119-1).

As Table 5-6 shows, the amphibious ships are deployed in the Pacific (21) and Atlantic (19) Oceans. Currently, the amphibious force planners hope to complete the 12-ship LPD-17 *San Antonio*-class and to replace the *Tarawa* (LHA) class with the LHA (R), which is intended to fully exploit the enhanced capabilities of MV-22, STOVL JSF, and

<sup>589</sup> Among these, five decommissioned LKAs and four LSTs are kept in an inactive reduced maintenance (ROS), refer, *Jane's Fighting Ships 2003-2004*, The US Amphibious Forces.

<sup>590</sup> As Table 5-3 shows, the goal is to sealift 12 ARGs, which is almost the same as 3 MEBs.

upgraded LCAC, to achieve at least the capability of 2.5 MEB AE.<sup>591</sup> No additional change in the 3 MPSs is observed in terms of their main operational concept.

### **(C) The Marines in the Pacific**

Reflecting the importance of the Asia-Pacific region in American foreign policy, two-thirds of the operational forces are basically assigned to this strategically critical theatre. However, it seems that there is no definite boundary between the Atlantic and Pacific Forces in the case of major war, as is seen in the “Operation Enduring Freedom”, in which the elements of I, II and III MEFs are conducting combat operations in the CENTCOM area of responsibility. However, in other cases the marines usually cover the areas of the Pacific and Indian Oceans. As a consequence of the demise of the Cold War, they are reacting to almost every conflict or regional issue and participating in exercises with Japan, Korea, Russia, and Thailand to measure and improve the interoperability of multinational forces.<sup>592</sup> Furthermore, their functions in the region are more clearly highlighted in the following case studies in conjunction with American interests.

### **(D) Case Study 1: Peacekeeping Operation in East Timor**

#### ***Outline of Operation***

The peacekeeping operation in East Timor underscored their importance as a stabilizer in keeping regional order and as a means of supporting American interests in the region. During the Cold War, the US skated over the issue of the massacre of the East Timorese

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<sup>591</sup> *Concepts and Programs 2003 II*, p. 16.

<sup>592</sup> Refer, F.G. Hoffman, “The US Marine Corps in Review”, *Proceedings*, Vol. 123/5/1,131 (May 1997), pp. 92-94; *Concepts and Programs 2003 II*, pp. 88-99.

even at the height of the genocide in the late 1970s, because it wanted to keep close and friendly relations with Indonesia. However, as one of the US foreign policy objectives, human rights, indicated, it began to support a successful resolution at the UN Human Rights Commission by conditioning major arms sales to Indonesia from the early 1990s<sup>593</sup>. But, Indonesia did not want to agree to the independence of East Timor considering it as its 27<sup>th</sup> province, because it is very valuable in economic and strategic terms.<sup>594</sup> In the long run, the East Timorese conducted a referendum in August 1999 under the UN authority, and voted overwhelmingly in favour of independence from Indonesia.

But, the result was opposed by armed militias and therefore East Timor descended into chaos. In order to solve this disorder, the UN authorized a peacekeeping operation forming an Australian-led coalition called International Forces East Timor (INTERFET) involving 18 participating countries.<sup>595</sup> The USMC was considered a means of diplomatic coercion and participated in the whole peacekeeping operation until the final day of operation, December 4, 2002.

### ***US Goals for Military Intervention***

The US considers conflict and instability throughout the world as threats to US economic welfare and security. Nonetheless, it has a basic principle to deal with a regional conflict originating in the Nixon Doctrine that the primary responsibility, as

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<sup>593</sup> "US Policy toward East Timor", <<http://www.etan.org/timor/uspolicy.htm>>, accessed: December 10, 2004.

<sup>594</sup> It has offshore reserves of oil and natural gas worth billions of dollars, and offers a gateway for commercial, political, intelligence and military operations throughout the Indonesian islands.

<sup>595</sup> Nick Beams, "Australia Prepares Military Intervention in East Timor: What are the Real Motives?" (September 8, 1999), in <[www.wsws.org](http://www.wsws.org)>.

President Bill Clinton reaffirmed, lays with the regional countries. As such, it wanted to be involved at a minimum level by not taking the main responsibility for military activities in East Timor, so as not to make the relationship with Indonesia worse. The US policy towards East Timor was very ambiguous as President Clinton said,

“I am especially encouraged that Asian nations will be taking the primary responsibility... (regarding Indonesia) the future is important to us not only because of its resources and its sea lanes, but for its potential as a leader in the region...(regarding East Timor) our fundamental values are also at stake...the violence is abhorrent (in terms of) human decency and democracy”.<sup>596</sup>

It seems that the Clinton administration was forced to dispatch its force by the Congress, not only because it is the only power to practically be able to do so, but also because the phenomenon in East Timor was contrary to its proclaimed foreign policy principle of supporting ‘human rights’<sup>597</sup>. Consequently, the US intention to dispatch its troops to the INTERFET had the following basic goals: ① restoring order, ② maintaining a minimal US military presence on the ground, ③ transferring the main responsibility to the UN authority as soon as possible.<sup>598</sup>

### ***Evaluations of US Marines Activities***

In the light of the above goals, the US Marines explicitly and implicitly acted as a means of calming the chaotic situation throughout the whole process, before and after

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<sup>596</sup> Linda D. Kozaryn, “US Limits Assistance to East Timor”, *Defence Link News* (American Forces Information Services), <[http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Sep1999/n09171999\\_9909162.html](http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Sep1999/n09171999_9909162.html)>.

<sup>597</sup> As the only superpower, it seeks to spread its value to other states in order to make matters certain. In doing so, it has experienced many difficulties, i.e., the military intervention in Somalia. As such, it considers three broad approaches: participating in a multilateral intervention, unilaterally, and backing the other party to reestablish friendly leadership to its policy. Steven R. David, “The Necessity for American Military Intervention in the Post-Cold War World”, in The Aspen Strategy Group, *The United States and the Use of Force in the Post-Cold War Era* (Queenstown, ML: The Aspen Institute, 1995), p. 49-58.

<sup>598</sup> Brigadier General Philip M. Mattox and Lieutenant Colonel William A. Guinn, “Contingency Contracting in East Timor”, <<http://www.almc.army.mil/ALOG/issues/JulAug00/MS565.htm>>, accessed: October 12, 2004.

the referendum. Firstly, they might have a readiness to react to any Indonesian intervention which might disrupt the referendum proceeding satisfactorily, judging from the American intention to have a substantial military involvement including the marines. The logic of the plan was that the relevant countries or the regional community in general have not demonstrated an ability to successfully manage this kind of military intervention. However, it was rejected by the Australian authority so as not to offend the Indonesian military, which seemed more likely to accept 'culturally akin' troops formed with ground troops from Pacific and Asian countries.<sup>599</sup> It is not easy to judge how much the US plan contributed to preventing Indonesian military intervention in the referendum. Even so, it is conceived that the US plan itself representing its will implicitly influenced the Indonesian decision not to use its military during the process of the referendum. As the force-in-readiness, the FMF in the Pacific Fleet and the marines in Okinawa formed the major part of the military force in the US plan<sup>600</sup>. Consequently, the US plan demonstrated the marines' utility as a crisis response force in terms of compellence among the other roles of its armed forces by keeping its readiness to be dispatched at any time.

Secondly, it proved its utility in a limited way under the second goal of being a minimum presence on the ground using its air component and maritime characteristics. Owing to the lack of an existing road network, heavy-lift helicopter support was the most critical item. The four Ch-53 Sea Stallion helicopters from MARFORPAC's 31<sup>st</sup> MEU, later replaced by those from the 11<sup>th</sup> MEU, were deployed not only to assist with

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<sup>599</sup> Mike Head, "US Pushes for Military Involvement in East Timor (August 7, 1999)" and "Plan to Send 15,000 US Marines to East Timor (August 12, 1999)", in World Socialist Web Site <<http://www.wsws.org>>, accessed: December 10, 2004.

<sup>600</sup> In the planning stage, the US established US Forces INTERFET (USFI), which was commanded by a Marine Corps Brigadier General, and which included personnel from mainly USPACOM.



transportation of supplies, logistics, civilians and planners, but also to search for evacuees<sup>601</sup>. In this operation, the mother ships of the helicopters, the USS *Peleliu* and *Belleau Wood*, functioned as forward operation bases without adding to the US presence on the ground.<sup>602</sup> In addition, in the transition from the Australian-led INTERFET to the UN Transitional Administration East Timor (UNTAET), a portion of the 31<sup>st</sup> MEU deployed to East Timor in January 2000 to assist rebuilding the war-torn area, moving tons of construction supplies.<sup>603</sup> Here, a large commercial hotel barge moored in Dili Harbour was employed to provide billeting, food, and water for the troops. Even though it was not an ideal situation for a long-term operation, it proved that the marines supported by the Navy would be a very useful component as a limited military presence on the ground.

Lastly, we consider its function in the process of the reconstruction of East Timor under the UNTAET, which of course includes the 31<sup>st</sup> MEU's assistance mentioned above. According to BBC News, about 70% of the country's infrastructure was destroyed during the violence after the referendum and thousands of people lacked proper housing and essential amenities.<sup>604</sup> As such, the US supported East Timor in every possible way to help it achieve statehood via the USGET. In this process, the USMC was sent as part of the whole support programme, in which humanitarian assistance projects were conducted mainly by visiting US military units. In this process, one of the remarkable episodes was the three days, from November 17<sup>th</sup> to 19<sup>th</sup> 2002, when humanitarian

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<sup>601</sup> Steve Nelson, "11<sup>th</sup> MEU (SOC) Marines Assist in Repatriation of East Timorese", sourced from The US DoD (November 29, 1999) in <<http://www.reliefweb.int>>, accessed: October 12, 2004.

<sup>602</sup> Philip M. Mattox and William A. Guinn (2000), p. 2.

<sup>603</sup> Bryce R. Piper (31<sup>st</sup> MEU), "Intense, Rewarding Year Closes for 31<sup>st</sup> MEU", <<http://www.c7f.navy.mil/news/2000/12/13.html>>, posted on December 22, 2000.

<sup>604</sup> *BBC News*, "US Promises East Timor Support", May 17, 2001.

assistance projects to provide relief focusing on the repair and renovation of village schoolhouses and medical facilities were undertaken by nearly 500 sailors and marines of the USS *Belleau Wood* (LHA 3) ARG and 11<sup>th</sup> MEU (SOC) as a part of the USGET took place<sup>605</sup>. They provided assistance with interior and exterior painting, installing insect and security screening on windows, assembling school desks and chairs and constructing doors and awnings. This was, as Sgt Brian J. Griffin wrote, the softer side of a 'Warrior' as a means of supporting the state's peacetime interests by keeping a "force-in-readiness". The marines are well organized to react in any kind of mission even if it is a nonmilitary operation as in this case.

### **(E) Case Study 2: The Operational Plan for the Korean Peninsula**

#### ***Background of a Future Korean War***

Despite the fact of the dissolution of the Cold War international system, the Korean peninsula still remains divided. Thus the amount of armaments is at its highest level ever in terms of allocation of resources in comparison with national income not just the number of military forces and their firepower. The two Koreas occupied the lower end of the international and alliance hierarchy as the spearhead of the eastern front during the Cold War. Their international or regional influence was absolutely limited because of their confrontation. Furthermore, the two superpowers were determined to maintain hegemonic control over the two Koreas, since, if they failed, it would have resulted in an enlargement of their adversary's influence. As a result, their vital interests were

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<sup>605</sup> Carrie Batson, "Marines, Sailors Complete Humanitarian Assistance in East Timor", *Navy Newsstand*, Story No. NNS021206-06 (December 6, 2002). In <<http://www.news.navy.mil>>, accessed: October 12, 2004.

restricted, as medium or small states, by the limiting factors<sup>606</sup> such as their existence as political entities or their territorial integrity, or their unification in an appropriate way whether by peaceful or forceful means.

Despite the very considerable military power of South Korea, it always feels its insecurity, not only because the Seoul metropolitan area is so close to the frontier that it is located within the range of North Korean long range shells and guns, but also because North Korea still has unacceptable ambitions, i.e., the seeking of nuclear weapons, which may cause nuclear proliferation to the other regional countries, such as Japan. Regarding the acquisition of nuclear weapons, most sources<sup>607</sup> have claimed that they are a unique means for the right of defence of North Korea, strictly speaking from a surveillance of the current political system led by NDC Chairman Kim Chong-il. This is, as previously mentioned, a result of the collapse of the Communist alliance system, the northern triangular relationship which comprised North Korea, the PRC and USSR during the Cold War. Nonetheless, it is difficult to say, whether North Korea could expect any support from the old alliance in the event of any future war judging from the strategic configuration of Northeast Asia and the attitudes and interests of the participating countries in the 'six-parties talks' to solve North Korea's nuclear development issue. It may be dependent on the characteristics of a war, how it is initiated and for what kind of purpose, or whether it has been agreed by all the parties.

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<sup>606</sup> J. R. Hill, Rear Admiral, *Maritime Strategy for Medium Powers* (London: Croom Helm, 1986), pp. 9-11.

<sup>607</sup> For example, the Chosun Central Communication of North Korea reviewed on June 9 2003,, "Our nuclear deterrent capability is not a means of threatening, but is a unique way", and the Chosun Central Broadcasting Station commented on June 25 2003, "We will further accelerate to establish a self-defensive nuclear deterrent capability as a complementary measure against the American strategy of isolating and squeezing us". Refer "a collection of North Korean statements in association with nuclear weapons", *Dongailbo*, July 14, 2003.

In this situation, in early 2003, when the North Korean nuclear matter reached a climax in international politics, the US Marines operational plan for a future war in the Korean peninsula as part of the introduction of OPLAN 5027 Major Theatre War, which is the US-ROK Combined Forces Command (CFC) basic war plan, was leaked by an internet service provider, the global security organization, labeling the top of each plan or appendix “secret for training only” for the purpose of militarily compelling North Korea.<sup>608</sup> This exposure of its secret military plan would be interpreted as a compelling action by thus notifying North Koreans that if they continued along this path, it would result in disaster, though it did not threaten the real use of force.

Considering the unfeasibility of this goal which is North Korea’s abandonment of its nuclear weapon development programme, on account of the irrational behaviour of the North Korean leadership, makes the American leadership feel that the four or six party talks are less effective and even irrelevant than the policy of showing the possibility of the real use of force, which would therefore be seriously considered as a more viable option by the US. Consequently, as the regional strategic configuration has suggested, the possibility of a future outbreak of war in the Korean peninsula could be dependent on a pre-emptive strike on suspected nuclear or biochemical weapons facilities by the US. The great difficulty experienced by North Korea in maintaining their current ruling system is derived from both a hardline posture of containment or punishment by the surrounding countries, notably Japan, the South Korea, and the US, as well as the possibility of an insurrection from the inside. In either case, North Korea would almost certainly initiate an offensive action against South Korea.

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<sup>608</sup> See, “OPLAN 5027 Major Theater War”, in <<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/oplan-5027.htm>>, accessed: March 5, 2003.

### *The Origin of the Likelihood of a Future Korean War*

However, the fundamental root of the North Korean threat is their reliance on an aggressive national security policy toward South Korea on the basis of an unchangeable ideology. North Korea still dreams of unifying the Korean peninsula under its rule (Kim's control)<sup>609</sup> by any (forceful) means; it has been the prime national goal from the very birth of the regime. In order to achieve this goal, it established in 1962 the four pillars of its military policy, the militarisation of all the people<sup>610</sup>, fortification of all territory, officialisation of all troops, and modernization of all equipment. On these basic principles, it continuously tries to upgrade its military power as a revolutionary force armed with Kim's *Juche* (self-reliance) thought. However, given the change in the strategic configuration and the severe economic decline since at least the mid-1990s, it seems that North Korea realizes that it is no longer possible to reunify through the conquest of South Korea.<sup>611</sup>

As a corollary, the defence of its territory including the current ruling system against foreign invasion by, in its own terms, "the imperialist aggressors (the US) and their lackey running dog (South Korea)"<sup>612</sup> has become the equally important goal at the present time. In this regard, it began to diversify its diplomatic relationships with the

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<sup>609</sup> Its military strategy/ policy is based on the ideological tenet of Kim, Il Sung's *Juche* (self-reliance) and the strengthening of the three revolutionary capacities, in North and South Korea, and relationships with international revolutionary power). As such, the KPA is a means for the communisation of the Korean peninsula. Gang-Nyung, Kim, *남북한 정치 외교론*[An Essay on North and South Korea's Politics and Diplomacy] (Seoul: DaeWangsa, 2000, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed.), pp. 203-206.


<sup>610</sup> According to the DPRK's detailed rules of activities in wartime, which was distributed in April 2004, it can mobilize and unify all resources including the Labour Party, military, civilians and their assets within 24 hours after the outbreak of a war. *Hankookilbo*, January 6, 2005.

<sup>611</sup> Homer T. Hodge, "North Korea's Military Strategy" (US Army College, Spring 2003).

<sup>612</sup> Chong-sun Kim, "Military-First is Road to Victory of Anti-Imperialist, Independent Cause", *Nodong Sinmun* [Labor Newspaper], June 19 2002, p. 6. The DPRK is continuously pursuing the breaking of the US-ROK alliance. In order to do that, as a part of the revolutionary strategy toward South Korea, it frequently employs this term via its media to influence the South Korean people.

Western countries including Japan and the US from the early 1990s,<sup>613</sup> in order to keep its current political system and escape from economic poverty. Nonetheless, as long as it does not give up its first primary goal, the main feature of its military force build up is certainly offensive for the purpose of performing the permanent task of revolutionary warfare. The offensive propensity of its military strategy<sup>614</sup> based on conventional forces<sup>615</sup> including the missiles capable of threatening the neighbouring countries (refer Figure 5-3), is one of the main causes of why the six parties talks are not flowing smoothly.

**Figure 5-3: North Korea's Missile Threat**



Source: *Chosunilbo*, February 15, 2005.

The other may be, as mentioned above, the particular and associated interests of the

<sup>613</sup> Regarding the changing attitude of its diplomacy, refer Gye-Dong, Kim (2002), pp. 119-152.

<sup>614</sup> It seems that North Korea considers that this is the last resort to ensure regime survival and achieve reunification on its terms, despite the reorganization of the international political order.

<sup>615</sup> For the details of its supposed conventional attack plans, see "OPLAN 5027 Major Theatre War-West: Phase 1-DPRK Attack", in <<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/oplan-5027-1.htm>>; Centre for Korean Affairs, *North Korea's War Plan Against the US* (April 22, 2003).

participating countries. It is not clear whether North Korea possesses 1-2 nuclear bombs or not, despite the fact that most experts have estimated that this is the case, and that some North Korean officials have approved proceeding to the last stage of extracting plutonium from 8000 nuclear fuel rods. However, according to the ROK *Defence White Paper 2004*, it had extracted some 10-14 kg of plutonium<sup>616</sup> before 1992, when the IAEA began to investigate. No other country officially approves of North Korea's efforts to possess its own nuclear bombs. Judging from the strategic configuration in the region and the strengths of ROK-US military power, it would be difficult to imagine another Korean War, if Jung-il Kim is a rational leader. Nevertheless, owing to its massive conventional forces<sup>617</sup> and missile capability<sup>618</sup>, it is natural that the alliance takes up a strong defence posture.

### ***Defensive Posture of the ROK-US Alliance***

The prime attribute of the ROK defence policy is a defensive attitude. As the cease-fire agreement implies, the Korean War is not completely over. Despite this, it seems that the South Koreans do not feel that they are in an ongoing war. On the contrary, as the current president Rho said in Los Angeles when he visited the US for the ROK-US summit talks, they think that competition between the two Koreas is over. On the basis of this awareness, the goals of the "Participatory Government" are to achieve "Democracy with the People", "A Society with Balanced Development", and an "Era of

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<sup>616</sup> "White Paper 2004, North Korea added about 1000 field artilleries", *Chosunilbo*, February 5, 2005.

<sup>617</sup> Most of its conventional forces including massive numbers of artillery pieces, particularly its longer-range systems, have been positioned close to the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) that separates the two Koreas.

<sup>618</sup> According to the latest information, North Korea has developed the newest Scud missile (namely Scud-ER, estimated range 600-1000km), which can threaten Japanese territory and the US bases in the region. However, *Daepodong* I (2500km) and II (6700Km), which can reach Japan and a part of the US, are not yet deployed even though they completed test-firing a few years ago. *Chosunilbo*, February 15, 2005. Considering the term, 'tolerance of casualties' in a war or crisis, this missile capability makes it difficult for the countries in the Six-Parties Talks to take only a forceful line.

Peace and Prosperity in Northeast Asia”.<sup>619</sup> Under these national goals, the goal of its defence policy is to “firmly establish a defence posture to ensure peace”<sup>620</sup>. As a result, the concept of a ‘main enemy’, which mainly pointed to the Korean People’s Army (KPA) and Kim’s political system, not the innocent people, and which had been formally declared in previous ROK *Defence White Papers* for about the last 10 years<sup>621</sup>, was abolished in the *Defence White Paper 2004*.

However, unlike these public statements, the defence system is not simple. As most strategists and military commentators have analysed, the combat strength of the ROK armed forces still remains at a level of about 70 per cent compared with that of the KPA.<sup>622</sup> Nobody says that this strength is sufficient as a defensive military power, because the cost of a future war will be inestimable considering the geopolitical structure and the infrastructure of South Korea. Hence, the aim of the ROK forces buildup is to possess a sufficient deterrent power to avoid an outbreak of war.

Nonetheless, the ROK armed forces are not able to perform independent operations, because the US-ROK Combined Forces Command (CFC)/ the UN Forces Command

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<sup>619</sup> The ROK Ministry of National Defence, *Participatory Government Defence Policy 2003* (p. 34), in <<http://www.mnd.go.kr>>, accessed: February 25, 2005.

<sup>620</sup> *Ibid.*


<sup>621</sup> North Korea and some South Koreans have criticized the term as an obsolete way of thinking. Hence, it disappeared from the book, *Defence White Paper 2004*, after the heated controversy of the last 4 years.

<sup>622</sup> The war potential capacity of the ROK armed forces compared with that of the KPA reached 65 % in 1988, and 75% in 1997. Generally, it still remains around 70%, even though a recent study said that it has reached the level of 90 %. But, the latter did not consider North Korea’s NBC capabilities. Refer, Taig-Young. Ham, “남북한 군비경쟁 현황과 군사력 평가[the Present State of Arms Race between North and South Korea, and an Evaluation of their Military Powers]”, in 남북한 군사력 평가와 적정 군사력 수준[South and North Korea’s Military Strength Evaluation and an Appropriate Level of Military Power], The 26<sup>th</sup> Scientific and Civilian Forum for South and North Korea’s Military Strengths (April 23, 1999), p. 7.



(UFC)<sup>623</sup>, which was created in November 1978, has the operational authority in wartime. In this regard, it is sufficient to say that the US holds the key to deter an invasion by North Korea on the basis of the ROK-US Mutual Defence Agreement in November 1954. As a corollary, the USFK has remained a symbol of the ROK-US alliance and continues to contribute to the peace and stability of the Korean peninsula (refer Figure 5-4). In addition, the US will augment its forces including the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marines, to approximately 690,000 troops in wartime.<sup>624</sup>

**Figure 5-4: Organisation of the USFK**



Source: The ROK MND, *Participatory Government Defence Policy 2003*, p. 56.

The basic concept of the alliance's wartime plan<sup>625</sup>, the OPLAN 5027, comprises at least the following three phases: Phase 1-DPRK Attack, Phase 2-ROK Defence, and Phase 3-the Alliance's Counterattack. It seems that this plan has slightly changed with time, according to the buildup of the ROK armed forces and the transition of the security environment. For example, on the one hand, as the posture of both parties and the combat strength ratio suggests, it does not plan to defend the present line of the

<sup>623</sup> The commanding general of the USFK in South Korea commands both organisations.

<sup>624</sup> *Participatory Government Defence Policy 2003*, p. 57. However, this number is, as most strategists have pointed out, a sum of available forces, because it is possible only when there is no any other conflict in the other region. Refer, “미국이 동아시아 군사전략과 한국의 딜레마[The US Military Strategy toward East Asia and Korea's Dilemma]”, in <<http://www.donga.com>>, accessed: July 10, 2004.

<sup>625</sup> The following statements are summarized from the [globalsecurity.org](http://www.globalsecurity.org) for study purposes. As such, it is possible that these do not represent the real plans. For the details, refer <<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/oplan-5027.htm>>.

DMZ in the first phase. Given the gradual buildup of ROK military power, it is possible to defend against a North Korean invasion at FEBA Bravo (20-30 miles below the DMZ), which is reflected in the OPLAN 1994. On the other hand, the updated Japan-US defence cooperation guidelines in 1996, which reflected the nuclear crisis of 1994 in North Korea, allows the US to prepare for a Korean war by stationing its military forces in Japan.

Before this agreement, the Japanese hesitated to allow US forces unconditional access to the US bases in Japan for a Korean war, i.e., the Japanese Diet's refusal to ratify the conclusion concerning the Korean clause agreed at the Nixon-Sato summit in November 1969. In fact, despite the fact that the ROK has not ratified a mutual defence treaty with Japan up to the present day, *de facto* security ties have been formed from the 1950s by the triangular relationship with the US. With the update, the OPLAN became more clearly focused on offensive operations into North Korea. With this, the OPLAN 1998<sup>626</sup> included a preemptive attack; hence it considered an activity prior to Phase I (a North Korean attack). As a result, it comprises four phases: activities prior to a North Korean attack, halting the initial North Korean assault, regrouping for a counter-attack, and finally a full scale invasion of North Korea to seize Pyongyang. After all, the OPLAN seems to be changed annually, and is decided in the light of all available resources and the transitions of the security environment.

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<sup>626</sup> This plan reflected the US antagonism against the DPRK, because Pyongyang seemed to walk away from the Geneva agreement in 1994. Thus, the Clinton government and the Congress slowly began to lose confidence that North Korea would abide by the agreement. For a pre-emptive strike, the planners pinpoint targets including Pyongyang and beyond. Of course, the target of high priority was the North Korean artillery corps, which could hit Seoul to inflict severe damage. As geographical factors show, Seoul is a kind of hostage to the DPRK being threatened by massive artillery pieces. Richard Halloran, "New Warplan Calls for Invasion of North Korea (November 14, 1998)", <<http://www.nyu.edu/globalbeat/asia/Halloran111498.html>>, accessed: March 5, 2003.

### ***Missions and Tasks of the USMC***

Considering the geography of the Korean peninsula and the history of the allied forces in the Korean War who conducted two major amphibious operations, one on each coast, Inchon (west) and Wonsan (east), the wartime functions of the USMC are not to be discounted in the above defence concept. In this regard, the alliance created the Combined Marine Forces Command (CMFC) in the early 1990s as in the case of the Japan-US alliance. In peacetime, the USMC maintains a headquarters in Seoul under the name of USMARFORK to provide immediate command representation to COMUSFK, UNC/CFC, COMCMFC, and the Commandant, ROKMC. The Commander of the USMARFORK functions as the deputy Commander of the CMFC in peacetime.<sup>627</sup> However, as the UNC/CFC has the operational authority in wartime, COMMARFORPAC would be designated as Commander of the CMFC in order to command the Marine Forces Component. Currently, according to the sources provided by the [globalsecurity.org](http://www.globalsecurity.org), the function of the USMC in wartime is to plan to launch an overland offensive north toward Wonsan from the east coast by a US MEF (in division strength) and the 82<sup>nd</sup> Air Assault Division along with ROKMC divisions.

However, according to Richard Halloran's study, it is natural that the entire resources of the USMC would flow into the Korean peninsula. Of course, this may be possible when there is no conflict in any other region. Even so, judging from the entire US Navy's amphibious lift capability (2.5 MEB) and the US force structure and its deployment plan, the USMC would react in serial order with its available troops considering their geographical locations. The order may be as follows: the 31<sup>st</sup> MAU, the 3<sup>rd</sup> Marine

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<sup>627</sup> Refer, US Marine Corps Forces Korea (USMARFORK) and Combined Marine Forces Command (CMFC) in <<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/usmc/usmarfork.htm>>, accessed: August 30, 2004.

Division in Okinawa, the MEB in Hawaii, the MPS in Guam and the 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division in California, and if possible or needed, the 2<sup>nd</sup> Marine Division in North Carolina. Given the forward deployment of the KPA near the DMZ and the development of the covert military movements, the warning time has been shortened to about three days or less.

From this perspective, the functions of each echelon would be defined considering both Figure 2-2 (the Relationships among the Roles, MOOTW and War), and the US force availability over time<sup>628</sup>, in the case of a war being started by a North Korean attack. Firstly, the function of the 31<sup>st</sup> MAU would be deployment to South Korea in the escalation stage as a deterrent or compelling force to stop an anticipated North Korean attack. Secondly, the 3<sup>rd</sup> Division would be deployed at Phase I within C+30 days<sup>629</sup>, and participate in the operations to halt and contain the enemy offensive by seizing key terrain, inflicting additional casualties, and rebuffing further attacks. Thirdly, the MEB in Hawaii and the 1<sup>st</sup> Division will be deployed in Phase II between C+30 and 60 days as build up forces to participate in Phase III (Counteroffensive operation). Here, the 3<sup>rd</sup> Marine Division is, for example, a forward presence force in Japan, and can be considered as a crisis response force to tackle any conflict in the Korean peninsula. In this way, according to the location of the crisis, their functions may vary in terms of their nominal responsiveness to contingency needs.<sup>630</sup> In line with this plan, the related USMC staff and troops periodically participate in the ROK-US Combined Exercises

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<sup>628</sup> For study purposes, the force availability over time refers to the study by the RAND. See, Fred Frostic and Christopher J. Bowie, "Conventional Campaign Analysis of Major Regional Conflicts", Paul K. Davis (1994), p. 367.

<sup>629</sup> 'C day' is the time at which US forces deploy. This will be decided by the US President or other commanding authority; thus it could be before or after the outbreak of a war.

<sup>630</sup> Refer, Bernard D. Rostker, Bruce W. Don, and Kennedy Watman, "Assessing the Structure and Mix of Future Active and Reserve Army Forces: A Classic Problem in Defence Analysis Revisited", in Paul K. Davis (1994), pp. 638-646.

such as the Ulchi-Focus Lens (UFL), Foal Eagle (FE), and Team Spirit (T/S).<sup>631</sup>

### ***Evaluations of the USMC's Role and Functions***

It seems that the OPLAN, particularly the plan to employ the USMC, was specified after the end of the Cold War and facilitated by the North Korean nuclear crisis reflecting the transitions of the new security environment. The basic concept of the OPLAN 5027 in the Cold War might have been the same as this, but it would have been difficult for the USMC to be employed in a similar way to the above specific mission and tasks considering US interests regarding Japan. This is because North Korea might have started a war with certain support from the USSR not just from the PRC. In this case, the USSR might have contained the US action by threatening Japan in order to help North Korea. If so, it is really doubtful whether the US would commit the 3<sup>rd</sup> Marine Division in a Korean War in a global war situation like the 1<sup>st</sup> Division in the last Korean War. Generally speaking, there is a great disharmony between the plan and the real forces availability, as the US forces buildup has never met its planned requirements. Nonetheless, it is true that it became a more realistic plan with the changes in US interests (banning the proliferation of nuclear weapons and support for human rights), and the strategic configuration in the post-Cold War period.

As the function of each set of forces indicates, it seems that the USMC is well organized and situated to react to a Korean war. However, there is a great possibility that a Korean war would not escalate into a regional war. Although it might become a regional war, it is plain that the plan may not be executed as planned due to both the difficulty of amphibious landing operations against a relatively strong military force line of the KPA

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<sup>631</sup> For the details of the exercises, refer, "Military Exercises", in the ROK MND's homepage.

as in the Gulf War, and the lack of amphibious lift capability. The realization of this amphibious landing operation depends on how rapidly the US achieves both the activation of the RRF and the mobilization of commercial sealift,<sup>632</sup> and the establishment of air and maritime superiority by neutralizing the DPRK's defence forces and the PGMs. The latter is an indispensable precondition for the use of its new manoeuvre doctrine, the OMFTS and STOP. In case these preconditions are not satisfied, its mission will remain as a grand scale deception to support the speedup of the ground components' advancement by locating in one or several optimum positions.

For all that, the USMC is one of the main components of the alliance forces regardless of defensive or offensive operations. At the same time it is a means of diplomatic coercion by deploying it adjacent to North Korea's coastal area, when the US wants to actively compel North Korea's negative behaviour, such as the continuous projection of its nuclear programme and the suppression of human rights. However, real military action is, in fact, not easy because of the convoluted interests of the surrounding countries. Moreover, the effects of military action are also unpredictable because of the considerable military strength of the DPRK, which is in contrast with the Third World countries.

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<sup>632</sup> The US holds about 78 ships under the RRF, which can be activated by the date of scheduled activations of 4, 5, 10, and 20 days. In addition, there are about 315 ships, US-flag (198) and effective US-controlled (EUSC) ships, which are potentially available to augment military sealift. Refer IISS, *The Military Balance 2002-2003*, p. United States 21.

## B. RNI

### (1) The Russian Interests/ Foreign Policy

A turning point in the aggressive Soviet foreign policy was the 27<sup>th</sup> Soviet Communist Party Congress presided over by Mikhail Gorbachev, promising major changes in Soviet policy. Here, he made significant progress towards consolidating power by changing the members of the Politburo and Secretariat, and outlining a new direction of its priorities focusing on domestic growth and modernization rather than foreign policy objectives at that time.<sup>633</sup> After that, he made major progress in the relaxation of the tension between the East and West by pursuing a cooperative Soviet foreign policy.<sup>634</sup> However, the disintegration of the Soviet Union was a political earthquake, which meant the end of the rivalry of the two superpowers and their opposing ideologies. Moreover, Russia joined NATO's PFP on June 24, 1994 and entered into an economic partnership with the EU. It meant that the aggressive Soviet foreign policy objectives were also completely terminated, despite the fact that there were some stalemates on key problems such as the NATO expansion programme<sup>635</sup>. Russia succeeded to the prestige of the USSR in international relations, but it has had to come to terms with a great deal of change, both in reality and in self-perception.

It is not surprising that the supreme priority of Russia's foreign policy course is the

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<sup>633</sup> Francis T. Miko, "The 27<sup>th</sup> Soviet Party Congress and the West", *Survival* (July/August 1986), pp. 291-304.

<sup>634</sup> Paul Marantz, "From Lenin to Gorbachev: Changing Soviet Perspectives on East-West Relations", *Occasional Papers*, No. 4 (CIIPS, 1988), pp. 81-83.

<sup>635</sup> Basically, Russia had two negative points of view: ① use of force, deployment of conventional and nuclear weapons in the territories of the new members, ② NATO's new strategic concept to use the forces outside of the NATO area applied by the Washington Treaty without the sanction of the UN Security Council. Refer, "The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation", approved by the President of the RF, V. Putin (June 28, 2000), <<http://www.mid.ru/mid/eng/econcept.htm>>, accessed: April 23, 2001.

protection of the interests of the individual, the society and the state.<sup>636</sup> For a while, it perceived the US as a threat, and was worried by the strengthening of the tendency to establish a unipolar world structure under American economic and force domination throughout the world. Russia's security concept *vis-à-vis* the West has clearly changed, particularly in respect of the US. Alexei Arbatov, a member of the Russian Duma, said, "whereas in the past... Russia had no opponents or enemies in the world, now... one of the primary possible threats to Russian security and foreign policy interests is the policy of the US"<sup>637</sup>. However, judging from its declaration of strong support for international organisations and the rule of international law, Russia has shown pragmatism by recognizing its strength relative to that of the US today. It means that it is no longer in a position to militarily challenge the US, that is, it may not compete with the US by placing itself as a curb on US military hegemony in the international community. Even so, as it recognized that the weakening of its political, economic and military influence in the world is a fundamental threat, its foreign policy objective is to preserve its sovereignty and strengthen its position as a great power and as one of the influential centres of a multipolar system. In addition, it may have aspirations to regain control over most of the successor states of the former Soviet Union, notably Georgia, Abkhazia and Belarus, into a single political system.<sup>638</sup> However, it is a complex process, because it has to take into account the interests of both sides, Russia and the others.

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<sup>636</sup> "The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation", <<http://www.in.mid.ru>>, accessed: March 24, 2004; The priority tasks formulated by the minister of foreign affairs, E.M. Primakov, included the creation of favorable external conditions for strengthening the territorial integrity of Russia, the settlement of regional conflicts, and the development of fruitful intergovernmental relations, and the distribution of weapons of mass destruction, refer Press conference of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of RF, E.M. Primakov, "Press Centre MFA RF (January 12)", *Diplomatic Bulletin MAFRF*, No. 2 (February 1996), C.3.

<sup>637</sup> C.P. Bleek, "Russia adopts New Security Concept; 'Appears to Lower Nuclear Threshold'", *Arms Control Today* (January/February 2000), in <<http://www.armscontrol.org/ACT/janfeb00/rujf00.htm>>, accessed: April 20, 2001.

<sup>638</sup> "Putin on Russia's Foreign Policy Priorities", *CDI Russia Weekly*, <<http://www.cdi.org/russia/287-4.cfm>>, accessed: November 23, 2004.



Consequently, it is not easy to adopt an aggressive foreign policy objective like that of the Soviets in the Cold War within the near future.

In line with this, Russia has undergone an enforced change of emphasis in its foreign policy. It no longer has any great influence in Africa or Southeast/west Asia because it has dropped its commitments to non-democratic allies in the Third World<sup>639</sup>. However, it has not given up its influence in the Middle East, and is seeking to build its relationship with Iran<sup>640</sup> for broad economic reasons not just for arms sales. Nonetheless, it is not easy to uphold its influence as in the days of the USSR, since the countries in the Middle East have become strongly tied to the West both politically and economically. Currently, the uncertain security environment raised by the War on Terror could provide a chance for Russia. But it is unlikely to stand in opposition to the US, because its economic and political ability to do that is critically limited.

The Asia-Pacific perspectives of Russian foreign policy are more complex, reflecting the longstanding historic relations with China, Japan, and the two Koreas. There are four central features of the RF foreign policy<sup>641</sup>: ① the normalization of the Sino-Soviet conflict, and the enhancement of economic trade, particularly in the field of arms exports,<sup>642</sup> ② broadening its economic relations with East Asian states, particularly

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<sup>639</sup> P. Shearman (ed.), *Russian Foreign Policy since 1990* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995), p. 130.

<sup>640</sup> Russia had been closely involved in the completion of a nuclear reactor at Bushehr in Iran, which was suspected by the US as leading to Iran acquiring nuclear weapon technology. Refer, E. Blanche, "Russia Steps up Mid-East Arms Drive in", *The Middle East* (July/August 2001).

<sup>641</sup> Robert Legvold, "Russia and the Strategic Quadrangle", Michael Mandelbaum (1995), pp. 32-46; Rajan Menon & Henri J. Barkey, "The Transformation of Central Asia: Implications for Regional and International Security, *Survival*, Vol. 34, No. 4 (Winter 1992-93), pp. 68-89; V.I. Denisov, "Russia and the Problem of Korean Unification", Tae-Hwan Kwak (1997), pp. 38-41.

<sup>642</sup> It seems that mutual trust between the two states has become firmly established by ratifying the Treaty of Good-Neighborliness, Friendship and Cooperation on July 16, 2001, in which both state that the sides have no territorial claims on each other. In 2003 trade reached around the 15 billion dollars. Igor Ivanov, "Russia in Asia and Asia in Russia", *Daily News Bulletin* (MFA RF Information and Press,

with Japan and South Korea<sup>643</sup>, ③ admitting the *status quo* of the existing balance of power system, that is, regional stability<sup>644</sup> and ④ keeping its influence in Central Asia and Southeast Asia by limiting the enlargement of Chinese influence. Russia actually wants to preserve its influence throughout the region as a pole of economic power not as a military behemoth, but its economic weakness and the uncertainty of its domestic political situation constrains it. With regard to its internal economic weakness, Russia would fundamentally have a strong interest in drawing support from the Asia-Pacific countries rather than keeping a confrontational attitude like the USSR in the Cold War, not only because it does not consider any of the other three major powers to be an adversary, but also because it has given greater emphasis to the development of the Far East as a modern high-tech industrial area in order to improve its gross economic capability.

## **(2) Military Strategy/ Policy**

Given the transition of the foreign policy objectives and the domestic demand to reduce its military burden, Gorbachev introduced the concept of 'reasonable sufficiency' as a guidance for the military buildup to maintain adequate levels of defence. This concept was militarily articulated by the Berlin declaration of the WTO in May 1987 that "the alliance's military doctrine would henceforth be defensive, guided by the principle of reasonable sufficiency"<sup>645</sup>. The subsequent withdrawals of Soviet forces amounting to

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January 28, 2004), in <<http://www.shaps.hawaii.edu/fp/russia/2004/200401-r-in-asia.html>>, accessed: October 13, 2004.

<sup>643</sup> In some aspects, Russia's choice of South Korea over North Korea would mean its turn toward a pro-Western-centric Asia-Pacific policy, but now it tries to keep its influence by participating in the Six-party talks aimed at ending North Korea's nuclear programme.

<sup>644</sup> It seems that Russia considers the US military presence as an indispensable factor of stability, a constraint on Japanese militarization and a counterbalance to Chinese military power as well as a threat.

<sup>645</sup> Elaine M. Holoboff, *The Crisis in Soviet Military Reform* (London: Brassey's, 1991), p. 2; *Pravda*, May 30, 1987.

700,000 including families from Eastern Europe caused some fundamental problems, such as the lack of houses and the psychological turmoil of the troops caused by losing the justification of their defending communist values. Furthermore, the Soviet Union itself began to disintegrate into a number of separate republics, which asserted their right to establish national military forces. Given these situations, there were many debates about the direction of military reform and reductions including the emergence of republican forces, and the creation of the CIS in 1991, but this principle, 'reasonable sufficiency' has been taken for granted from that time as the basis of Russian military reform<sup>646</sup>.

The goal of the reform concept was, according to General Mikhail A. Moiseyev, Chief of the General Staff and First Deputy Minister of Defence in 1991, "to create a mechanism for safeguarding the country's security, ensuring effective military organisational development, and bringing the USSR armed forces into line with the level of the real military threat and the new political, economic and social conditions, which covered all spheres of defense organisational development".<sup>647</sup> In addition, the CFE Treaty also limits the numbers of the principal combat systems available to the successor states of the former Soviet Union<sup>648</sup>. This military reform was planned to be completed in three stages: ① the first stage (up to 1994): to implement and take measures to cut nuclear and conventional arms as well as to complete troop withdrawals from overseas, ② the second stage (1994-1995), to complete the cuts in the armed

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<sup>646</sup> Whilst Gorbachev imposed doctrinal changes as well as budget and force cuts, the Yeltsin government more vigorously pursued these policies. See, Brian D. Taylor, "Russian Civil-Military Relations After the October Uprising", *Survival*, Vol. 36, No. 1 (Spring 1994), pp. 5.

<sup>647</sup> William H.J. Manthorpe, "The Soviet View", *Proceedings*, Vol. 117/2/1,056 (February 1991), p. 104.

<sup>648</sup> The CFE treaty is limited only to the ATTU zone. Russia received 48 % of the tanks (6,400), 48 % of artillery systems (11,480), 67 % of the combat aircraft (3,450) and 57 % of the strike helicopters (890) among the overall quotas for the European part of the former USSR.

forces and the formation of a strategic armed forces grouped on Soviet territory, ③ the third stage (1996-2000), to complete the 50% cuts in strategic arms and the technical reequipping of army and naval forces.

In March 1992, the RF decided to create its own independent armed forces taking control of most of the former Soviet military establishment, and appointing a Russian Federation Minister of Defence (Pavel Grachev) in May as well as Russian commanders for the services in August.<sup>649</sup> By doing this, Russia emerged as a strong military superpower instead of the USSR, accepting the basic plan of the military reform. Considering the preconditions for creating its own military forces such as Russian budget allocation, material and technical support<sup>650</sup>, it is natural that the reduction in their military strength was no longer in doubt, regardless of nuclear and conventional forces. It is clear that the dramatic collapse of the Soviet military system has profoundly changed the global strategic balance.

The revision of Soviet military strategy under the conditions of Soviet-American strategic parity created the idea of 'nuclear sufficiency', which proclaimed that it would be meaningless to possess a nuclear arsenal beyond the capability of Mutual Assured Destruction. In other words, it realized that a much lower level of nuclear weapons would diminish the danger of an accidental nuclear strike and increase the security of the world.<sup>651</sup> From this perspective and its limited ability to afford the maintenance

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<sup>649</sup> Roy Allison, "Military Forces in the Soviet Successor States", *Adelphi Papers* No. 280 (October 1993), p. 18.

<sup>650</sup> In September 1992, the ceiling for military manpower (1% of the state's population) was set in the Russian Law on Defence. Considering the population of Russia at that time (148,041,000), it means that it must cut down to 1.5m. Grachev started to implement the plan to reduce to 1.5 military men by the year 2000. IISS, *Strategic Survey 1992-1993*, p. 73.

<sup>651</sup> Seweryn Bialer, "New Thinking and Soviet Foreign Policy", *Survival*, Vol. 30, No. 4 (July/August

of its nuclear arsenal, Russia has projected a number of cooperative security programmes with the US such as 'Strategic Offensive Arms Elimination', 'Nuclear Weapons Storage Security' in which they have focused on containing the threat of nuclear proliferation from Russia and other former Soviet republics.<sup>652</sup>

The nuclear stance of the RF has been clarified by the Russian Federation Military Doctrine of April 21, 2000 replacing the Presidential Decree no. 1833 of November 2, 1993<sup>653</sup>, in which the political nature of nuclear weapons was stressed. Whereas the version of 1993 allowed the first use of nuclear arms only in the case of aggression by a nuclear-weapons power or a non-nuclear power with a nuclear-armed ally or collaborating with a nuclear state, under the 2000 doctrine it is allowed in the cases of both large-scale aggression utilizing conventional weapons and all weapons of mass destruction attacks.<sup>654</sup> The long-term goal would be a 'minimal deterrence, eventually, total nuclear disarmament'. In this connection, Russia has reacted positively to the reduction of strategic offensive nuclear arsenals, because it needs the support of the US in reducing its nuclear weapons and in maintaining its security systems to prevent nuclear materials from being stolen.

However, it has strongly disagreed with the US on the matter of large-scale missile defence. Russia has openly opposed this, and declared its readiness to compete with the

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1988), p. 297.

<sup>652</sup> Kenneth N. Luongo, "The Uncertain Future of US-Russian Cooperative Security", *Arms Control Today* (January/February 2001), in <<http://www.armscontrol.org/ACT/janfeb01/luongojanfeb01.htm>>, accessed: April 25, 2001.

<sup>653</sup> Brigitte Sauerwein, "Russia's Military Doctrine: Addressing New Security Requirements", *International Defence Review*, Vol. 027/001 (Jan 1, 1994), pp. 5-7.

<sup>654</sup> Arms Control Association, "Russia's Military Doctrine", *Arms Control Today* (May 2000).

US in the field of any new missile defence technology.<sup>655</sup> In this sense, it seems that Russia considers nuclear weapons as a bargaining chip. To summarize, as widely recognized, Russia's economic conditions are currently very uncertain and difficult, so that the new national security concept places a great reliance upon nuclear weaponry. To make sure of its deterrence capability, Russia still places the top priority on the development of offensive and defensive strategic components. For example, it has deployed a regiment of modernized (SS-27) Topol-M ICBM<sup>656</sup> by January 1999, which has enhanced its combat potential. It appears that there are no alternatives to nuclear weapons in order to maintain its position in the international community considering the poor state of its conventional forces.

Military reform is the major preoccupation of the RF conventional armed forces, which continue to be in a state of deep crisis<sup>657</sup>. According to a source provided by IISS, it has reduced its manpower and its armaments abiding by TLE ceilings in the ATTU zone<sup>658</sup>. Some military reform tasks have been accomplished. Firstly, there are four services in the RF armed forces unlike five in the USSR, not only by merging the former Strategic Rocket Forces, the Military Space Forces, and the Missile and Space Defence Forces into a new service, the Strategic Missile Troops, but also by integrating the former Air Force and Air Defence Forces into a new air force branch of the armed forces.<sup>659</sup>

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<sup>655</sup> Yuri Karash, "Russia says Leave ABM Treaty Alone, Missile Defence will not Work", <[http://www.space.com/missionlaunches/missions/russia\\_abm\\_010212.html](http://www.space.com/missionlaunches/missions/russia_abm_010212.html)>, accessed: April 15, 2001.

<sup>656</sup> IISS, *The Military Balance 2003-2004*, p. 88-89.

<sup>657</sup> They are in disarray because of a lack of funds, the country's decade-long economic crisis, with ground troops rarely going on field exercises, warplanes grounded and navy ships stuck in harbours. For example, the annual flying time of Russian pilots is 15-20 hours annually compared to 150-180 hours in many NATO countries and more than 40 percent of Russian helicopters are unserviceable. Refer, Stanislav Lunev, "Russian Military Reform – One Step Toward Dictatorship" (December 1, 2000), in <<http://www.newsmax.com/scripts>>, accessed: December 01, 2004.

<sup>658</sup> Refer, IISS, *The Military Balance 2003-2004*, p. 231.

<sup>659</sup> Walter Parchomenko, "The State of Russia's Armed Forces and Military Reform", *Parameters: US Army War College Quarterly* (Winter 1999-2000), pp. 99-102.

Secondly, it has reduced the MoD forces to 960,600 by 2003, and will continuously reduce this even more.<sup>660</sup> Thirdly, it has reshuffled the top echelons of the military establishment, the TVD, and reduced the number of military districts to six (Leningrad, Moscow, Volga-Ural, North Caucasus, Siberian, and Far East MD), and given them the enhanced status of operational-strategic commands.<sup>661</sup> Put succinctly, there is no doubt that the strength of the RF armed forces will continuously be reduced, and the RF will largely rely upon its nuclear forces rather than conventional power in pursuing its interests abroad. As the nature of the military doctrine is clearly defensive, the RF has been obliged to look inwards much more than outwards with the complexity of its military-economic relations.

### **(3) Maritime Strategy/ Policy**

Despite the continental nature of Soviet interests and strategy, the Soviet Navy under Gorshkov had developed the capability of supporting Soviet foreign policy in the Third World by constructing numerous surface ships and amphibious capability during the Cold War era. In order to do that, the USSR invested the largest share of defence resources into its naval buildup. However, with the adoption of 'defensive doctrine' and acceptance of the 'reasonable sufficiency' principle, the Soviet Defence Council reached consensus on cutting naval resources<sup>662</sup>, which was not appropriate under the defensive

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<sup>660</sup> The Russian armed forces consist of MoD and non-MoD security forces (paramilitary forces or shadow armies, i.e., Interior Troops, Railway Troops, the Border Guards Service, *etc.*), which are attached to 15 government agencies. All are under the control of the RF Armed Forces General Staff, which is the main organ of operational command coordinating and organizing the collaboration of both in performing missions in the defence sphere. Refer, Arms Control Association (May 2000), "Leadership of the State's Military Organisation" part. The ultimate goal of manpower varies according to the sources, i.e., the deputy director of the Carnegie Moscow Center, Dmitry Trenin (350,000, Dmitry Trenin, "Russia's Military in Crisis", *Briefing Papers*, Vol. 2, Issue 9 (September 2000)), *BBC News* (900,000, August 23, 2000, 21:17 UK), *Col. Stanislav Lunev* (2.5 million of both by reducing 600,000).

<sup>661</sup> Walter Parchomenko (1999); IISS, *The Military Balance 2003-2004*, pp. 93-94.

<sup>662</sup> William H.J. Manthorpe, "Why is Gorbachev Pushing Naval Arms Control?", *Proceedings*, Vol.

doctrine. However, as naval armaments were excluded from the TLE, the USSR or CIS did not expect to reduce them at the initial stages, and planned, according to the words of General Mikhail A. Moiseyev, to “maintain at a level of ‘defence sufficiency’ comparable to the real threat to its interests through the qualitative renewal and improvement of system and means for command, control, and all kinds of support”<sup>663</sup>. The demand to reduce the naval armaments in the RF came not only from its domestic situation, i.e., a declining economy, the cost of operating large older ships, and the decline in the defence budget, but also from the bids of relative republics for geographical reasons, i.e., the Ukraine’s bid to take the whole Black Sea Fleet and Lithuania’s bid for the Baltic Fleet. Apart from the latter, the former is currently influencing the structure of the Russian Navy.

In fact, it is still true that the Russian Navy is second only to the US Navy in terms of numbers of ships, armaments, and manpower. It is a nuclear superpower at sea keeping 20 operational and non-operational SSBNs with 332 missiles, at the level of the START I declaration on Jan 31 2002.<sup>664</sup> However, it is true that the Russian Navy has dramatically declined as the CinC Admiral Vladimir Kuroyedov said, “it is just over a quarter of the Soviet Navy in size”<sup>665</sup>. In addition, in July 2002, Russia closed its last overseas naval base, Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam.<sup>666</sup> In this way, owing to the economic conditions, it is almost impossible not only to operate, maintain, and train the current naval power, but also to build an additional shipbuilding programme except for a

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115/1/1031 (January 1989), p. 76.

<sup>663</sup> William H.J. Manthorpe (1991), p. 104.

<sup>664</sup> IISS, *The Military Balance 2003-2004*, p. 89.

<sup>665</sup> Mikhail Tsyarkin, “Rudderless in a Storm: The Russian Navy, 1992-2000”, Anne C. Aldis & Roger N. McDermott, *Russian Military Reform 1992-2000* (London: Frank Cass, 2003), p. 163.

<sup>666</sup> *Ibid.*



strategic deterrence capability. For example, in December 2000, Russian government funds were released to continue construction of the 19,400-ton SSBN (the *Bulava* SLBM), which is a development of the *Topol*-M (SS-27) ICBM.<sup>667</sup> In addition to this, there was a new commission of a surface ship, the heavy nuclear missile cruiser the *Gepard*, which joined the Navy in 2002 after 11 years at the shipyard<sup>668</sup>. It means that the priority for its strategic capability enhancements remains the development of offensive and defensive components focusing on a minimum level of nuclear submarine forces sufficient to defend its interests. However, their activities and exercises are unable to meet regular levels compared with those of the US Navy (only 13 Russian SSBNs are operational).

Despite its economic difficulties, Russia certainly requires a navy considering its international position as a military power as well as its lengthy maritime border. The roles and functions of the Russian Navy will not be changed very much, even though it is natural to reduce the whole strength of the navy regardless of nuclear and conventional forces or peacetime and wartime missions. In other words, the priority of the fundamental missions would be changed in the orders of Coastal Defence, Strategic Deterrence, and others.<sup>669</sup> Not surprisingly, the role of the navy as a peacetime instrument of foreign policy has disappeared with the withdrawal from blue-water operations and a forward presence<sup>670</sup>. It is unlikely to invest money to procure

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<sup>667</sup> For the details, refer, A. D. Baker, III, "World Navies in Review", *Proceedings*, Vol. 127/3/1,177 (March 2001), pp. 35.

<sup>668</sup> Mikhail Tsypkin (2003), p. 180.

<sup>669</sup> Norman Polmar, "Russia's Navy Will Remain Strong Beyond 2000", *Proceedings*, Vol.123/3/1,128 (March 1997), pp. 64-65.

<sup>670</sup> No new surface ships have been laid down since 1991 and, apparently, no new starts are anticipated before 2005. Currently, one of the most important interests of RF regarding surface ships is how to sail them abroad. Refer, A.D. Baker III, "World Navies in Review", *Proceedings*, Vol. 123/3/1,128 (March 1997), p. 88.

additional naval weapons and to enlarge the composition of the Russian Navy in terms of organization and combat power to match its only potential rival, the US.<sup>671</sup>

In relation to the decline of the whole Russian armed forces, the Pacific fleet is also in transition. In fact, there have been visible symptoms of the reduction in the naval power of the Pacific fleet. For example, constraining naval forces in the Pacific was the primary goal of a series of Gorbachev's arms control proposals, his speeches in Vladivostok (1986) and in Murmansk (1987), his interview with the Indonesian newspaper *Merdeka* (1987), and the seven Soviet peace proposals carried by the Soviet news agency TASS.<sup>672</sup> It means that the USSR did not have sufficient economic resources at least to pursue an arms race anymore. Reflecting the lack of necessary funds resulting from Russia's severe economic conditions, the Pacific fleet has also continuously reduced its strength in quantitative terms and its activities since 1992 (refer Table 5-7).

**Table 5-7: The Changes in Strengths of the Russian Pacific Fleet**

Classification	92	02	Remarks
Submarines	86 (21 SSBN)	8 (3 SSBN)	-78
PSC	54 (1 Carrier, 13 cruisers)	8 (1 Carrier, 5 DDG, 2 FFG)	-46
OSC	55 (Patrol and Coastal Combatants)	30	-25
MCMV	78	8	-70
Amphibious	21	4	-17
Auxiliaries	225	57	-168

Sources: IISS, *The Military Balance 1992-1993*, p. 97; 2002-2003, p. 92

Its total strength is less than the Northern fleet, where Russia deploys 10 SSBNs, 10 PSC including 1 carrier. After all, the mission of the fleet would be limited purely to the

<sup>671</sup> Refer, Peter Sutcliffe and Chris Hill, "An Economic Analysis of Russian Military Reform Proposals: Ambition and Reality", Anne C. Aldis & Roger N. McDermott (2003), pp. 278-295.

<sup>672</sup> A number of these proposals included: limitation of additional deployment of nuclear weapons, an invitation to consult on holding the line on naval force strength, mutual withdrawals from the Philippines (US) and Cam Ranh Bay (USSR), prevention of incidents in the open seas and air space, and an international conference on making the Indian Ocean a zone of peace. William H.J. Manthorpe, "The Soviet View", *Proceedings*, Vol. 114/11/1029 (November 1988), p. 137.

defence of its homeland with the relaxed military tensions with the PRC and US. Nonetheless, it is considered that SSBNs are maintaining their readiness posture, while the others have become less active as a whole. Any future development is hypothetical, because of the unstable and inconsistent domestic political and economic conditions in Russia. The greatest attention has been given to the keeping of only adequate numbers of SSBNs capable of deterring any kind of attack against Russia.

Reflecting the relaxation of tension among the countries in the region, Russia is strengthening its co-operative maritime policy with its old foes, Japan, South Korea, the PRC, and the US by signing agreements such as defence protocols. There have been increased port visits to Boston (US), Pusan (South Korea), Qingdao (China) and Tokyo (Japan) since 1993. In addition to this, as a part of maritime co-operative measures, the Russian naval officers joined the British and Americans in a joint peace game-RUKUS 94-held at the US Naval War College for the sake of advancing mutual understanding in co-operative security concepts.<sup>673</sup> After that, the Russian Pacific fleet participated in a number of search and rescue operations with the US Pacific fleet in 1994 and 1996, and the Japanese MSDF in 1994 in the East China Sea or the East Sea (Sea of Japan).<sup>674</sup>

#### **(4) The Transition of the RNI**

##### **(A) General Rise and Fall**

During the 1990s, the RNI participation in a number of the joint US-Russian and Russo-Japanese amphibious exercises to practice disaster-relief techniques and search and

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<sup>673</sup> Barry Coombs & Les Sim, "The Russians Are Here", *Proceedings*, Vol. 121/3/1,105 (March 1995), pp. 68-69.

<sup>674</sup> Duk-Ki Kim, *Naval Strategy in Northeast Asia* (London: Frank Cass, 2000), pp. 120-121.

rescue operations were observed. The RNI was functioning as a means of the co-operative Russian maritime security policy rather than as a force for power projection from the sea to the enemy's shore. As Norman Polmar has written, however, there is plenty of possibility of giving up the naval infantry (an offensive function) in the interests of maintaining other naval functions<sup>675</sup>, the RNI had significantly decreased in terms of manpower, organisation, and amphibious lift capability compared with that of the USSR (see Table 5-8).

**Table 5-8: Reductions of the SNI/RNI and Amphibious Lift capability**

Classification		1990 (SNI)	1992 (RNI)	2002 (RNI)	Remark
Total	Manpower	15,000	12,000	7,500	-7,500
	Organisation	1 inf div, 4 indep bde (1 reserve), 4 fleet SF bde		1 inf div, 3 indep bde, 3 fleet SF bde	
	Amphi Ships	77: 3 LPD, 38 LST, 36 LSM	80: 3 LPD, 41 LST, 36 LSM	22: 1 LPD, 20 LST, 1 LSM	-58
Pacific Fleet	Manpower	7,000		2,500	-4,500
	Organisation	1 div HQ, 3 inf, 1 tk and 1 arty regt		1 div HQ, 3 inf, 1 tk, 1 arty bn	regt→ bn
	Amphi Ships	21		4	-17

Notes: arty (artillery), bde (brigade), div (division), indep (independent), inf (infantry), tk (tank).

Sources: IISS, *The Military Balance 1990-1991*, pp.37-43; *1992-1993*, pp.95-97; *2002-2003*, pp.90-93.

### **(B) The RNI in the Pacific**

It appears that the main mission of the RNI is the defence of its homeland as they are under the operational control of the relevant MD. As Table 5-8 shows, Russia retains a minimum capability of the RNI in its Pacific fleet in the form of the least organized division, under the operational control of the Far Eastern MD, but subordinated to the Pacific fleet<sup>676</sup>, for the purposes of both actual operations and a basis for possible future rebuilding.

<sup>675</sup> Norman Plomar (1997), p. 65.

<sup>676</sup> IISS, *The Military Balance 2002-2003*, p. 93.

The possibility of an actual amphibious landing operation relates to the maritime territorial dispute with Japan. Russia is considering its territorial claims against the RF, i.e., the northern islands dispute with Japan, and interference in Russian internal affairs as a prime external threat by putting it in first place in its military doctrine. In this sense, it may not be merged into the Coastal defence units as was the case after WWII. Within the next decade, Russia will not again build up its amphibious forces as it did in the Cold War era since it has moderate and non-aggressive foreign policy goals. A reemergence of the RNI will depend on the changing characteristics of Russian foreign policy interests and resources in the region. To conclude, the abandonment of an aggressive foreign policy, the disappearance of its overseas interests coupled with the miserable economic conditions caused the decline of the RNI.

### 3. Conclusions

With time, the US policy has shifted from 'containment' of the USSR to 'strategic engagement' with Russia. As Robert Art has written, the American strategy in the post-Cold War could be elaborated, formalized under the rubric of "selective engagement" by aiming to continuously preserve its hegemonic global position, which greatly depends on its military power.<sup>677</sup> As the legal successor state of the USSR, the RF showed for a while a realistic perception by approaching the West by way of nonmilitary means, i.e., economic cooperation, but with the armed conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and Chechnya, it changed the priority of its national security by deciding to use military assets, particularly nuclear arms, as the unique means for conflict resolution as well as

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<sup>677</sup> Barry R. Posen, "Command of the Commons: The Military Foundation of US Hegemony", *International Security*, Vol. 28, No. 1 (Summer 2003), p. 5.

for deterring external threat. In the meantime, Russian nuclear policy manifested two different approaches. On the one hand, the weakening economic situation resulted in striving for more US help and agreement to dismantle their nuclear arms including those in the other states of the former USSR, i.e., START and the CTR programmes. On the other hand, its policy is characterized not only by straining the US policy of the SMD in order not to relatively weaken its nuclear status compared with that of the US, but also by keeping a nuclear arsenal sufficient to deter any kind of external threat under the principle of 'reasonable sufficiency' as a defensive means to maintain its status as a great power. Nonetheless, a future nuclear war between the two nuclear superpowers seems too far away to be taken into a realistic consideration in international politics. Furthermore, the RF took a pro-American course after the terrorist attacks of September 11 2001<sup>678</sup>, even though it is difficult to say that they have completely ruled out the possibility that the other will become a potential adversary in the future.

Despite the end of the Cold War, there are longstanding rivalries in the Asia-Pacific region, for example explicitly, India and China, India and Pakistan, Vietnam and China, Russia and Japan, and implicitly China and Korea, Korea and Japan, except for the tensions in the divided countries China and Korea as well as certain unstable factors, i.e., territorial disputes. Given their geographical positions and possible causes of conflicts, any conflict in the region as well as their dependence on the SLOCs for trade, a future conflict would be in the maritime dimension. It is inconceivable that force will be used for territorial integration purposes like the annexations before the Cold War. The US would play a pivotal role in ensuring regional stability as the world's only superpower,

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<sup>678</sup> Marcel de Haas, "The Development of Russia's Security Policy, 1992-2002", in Anne C. Aldis and Roger N. McDermott (2003), p. 17.

but it is difficult to intervene without a legal basis i.e., the UN Charter. With time, the interests of countries will be increasingly determined by economic relations rather than military.<sup>679</sup> In addition, in the post-Cold War era, as seen in the American foreign policy objectives, defending its own interests becomes the most important foreign policy objective rather than defending its allies. For example, according to a result of polls on North Korean matters, the American public gives more support to a US intervention in order to preempt a North Korea nuclear threat than to the defence of South Korea from North Korean aggression, thus reflecting the priority of the US interests.<sup>680</sup> Nonetheless, it seems that military forces having bureaucratic characteristics are the unique means for politicians to be able to use any kind of international political event even in low-intensity and nonmilitary conflicts as a means of diplomatic coercion as well as of direct conflict solution.

Whilst the non-aggressive foreign policy and the fundamental changes of the military and maritime strategies/policies have caused the reduction of power projection forces in Russia, the responsibility of the US for the stability of the world and its geo-strategic location demands the active employment of the USMC under the cooperative maritime policy in the post-Cold War era for the purpose of protecting possible conflicts ranging from the MOOTW and low-intensity conflicts via a medium regional war to a potentially high-density major war. The most significant change in the role and functions of the USMC is its utility for American foreign policy objectives originating

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<sup>679</sup> As Lawrence Freedman has discussed, "We are all becoming part of an increasingly homogeneous global economy sharing the same cultural experience and normative values, with international institutions available to sort out our residual difference", it seems that economic values are superior to military ones. Lawrence Freedman (1998), p. 764.

<sup>680</sup> Andrew Kohut and Robert C. Toth, "The People, the Press, and the Use of Force", the Aspen Strategy Group (1995), pp. 153-154.

from the US geo-strategic location and its responsibility in the international community as the most dominant military power<sup>681</sup> in the world. In order to overcome its remote geo-strategic location, the US has ratified many agreements with regional powers, i.e., the MOUs, for the Navy and Marines in order to access additional bases worldwide substituting for the closed bases with the effects of the demise of the Cold War or the antagonism against the US presence by the relevant regional population, i.e., Subic Bay. Furthermore, it continuously keeps not only a marine presence, but also the MPSs, three brigades' worth of unit equipment and supplies, in the key three regions to reduce the reaction time in order to respond to regional contingencies, and it develops its sealift capability<sup>682</sup>.

The most important point of the USMC as a means of achieving foreign policy objectives lies in its structural flexibility consisting of ground, air and supporting components, which are able to reorganize into a suitable size, ranging from MEU to MEF size, in order to meet any kind of conflict and operation regardless of military or nonmilitary demands to dispatch it. Consequently, it is certain that the Navy-Marine Corps team<sup>683</sup> reemerges as one of the most important ingredients of pursuing US

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<sup>681</sup> Nonetheless, as seen in the Persian Gulf War, it is not easy to drive an international political issue in any region merely by its own military power, even though it possesses larger military forces equipped with the newest war-machines to perform a war in any area regardless of space, open sea and ground than any other military power in the world. Hence, legal justifications to intervene in regional politics rather than a calculation to avoid escalation into a major war are extremely necessary in the post-Cold War era in order to get military or political support from other world or regional major powers. In this sense, it is difficult to see the current international political system as purely a 'unipolar era'. This results in the development of WMD and the divergence of the international-political dynamic relationship between different entities by pursuing their own interests first.

<sup>682</sup> During Desert Shield, the airlift capacity, only 2300 tons a day during the first 56 days of operations, did not meet the expectation that it could deliver nearly 6,000 tons a day because of the limitation of airfield capacity. Consequently, the US has developed maritime pre-positioning for Army unit equipment as a new element in its mobility posture. Refer, David Kassing, "Strategic Mobility in the post-Cold War Era", in Paul K. Davis (1994), pp. 668-677.

<sup>683</sup> Instead of this term, the USN began to use the term "Naval Expeditionary Forces" from 1992 to express the overall combat organization of the Navy-Marine Corps team. Given the movement of the



foreign policy abroad in the post-Cold War era. This is because most cases of conflicts demand joint (together with the other services) or combined (together with military forces of the other countries) operations<sup>684</sup>. Thus, the current goal of the USMC construction, as the Concepts and Programs 2003 II describes, is not just to focus on modernizing and upgrading the legacy of its military systems and platform, but also to prepare for executing joint and combined operations in a dramatically enhanced network environment.

Nonetheless, there is a possibility that the USMC may not fulfill a large-scale amphibious landing operation like the case of the 5<sup>th</sup> MEB in the Persian Gulf War. However, as Clausewitz pointed out, the importance of the combination of all armed services or branches,<sup>685</sup> full participation of all available services and branches can promote combat efficiency in modern war and can provide operational flexibility to the commander. The function of the USMC in the Persian Gulf War could be described as grand scale deception<sup>686</sup>. The Marines were located in optimum positions to draw the Iraqi forces to the coast of Kuwait; hence they could contribute to speeding up the main forces' advancement, Schwarzkopf's ground components. If there had been no marines, it might have resulted in a crippled offensive posture by not using the maritime

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main naval battlefield from the high seas to ashore, it seems that the relationship between the USN and USMC has been strengthened.

<sup>684</sup> Currently, the term, Multinational Operations, is commonly employed to describe military actions conducted by forces of two or more nations usually undertaken within the structure of a coalition or alliance.

<sup>685</sup> Even though the services and branches in his era were not developed like those of modern armed forces, he highlighted that a lack of branches could cause a disadvantage. For example, as he wrote, "an army consisting only of infantry and artillery would find itself at a disadvantage when faced with one composed of all three (Infantry, Artillery and Cavalry)", in this case the army would essentially lack maneuverability compared with the other's ability. However, he did not provide an answer to the question, "what the optimum proportions would be", because as he recognized, it is almost impossible to answer. Refer, *On War*, pp. 285-291.

<sup>686</sup> RUSI, "Command in War: Gulf Operations", *Whitehall Paper Series* (1992), p. 34.

manoeuvre route. In this regard, there is a great possibility that the function of the USMC in a future Korean War or any other region, will also remain the same, a large-scale deception. However, as seen in case study 2, it will certainly contribute to delaying both the speed of the North Korean Armed forces' southward advance and culmination of combat power at the front line.

In order to perform a combined or joint operation, it is necessary to achieve consistency in doctrines between services or countries. A good example of this is the US Navy's effort to develop appropriate doctrine in accordance with the Marines doctrinal advancement. The new doctrinal concept of the OMFTS is focused on sustained operations of forces on land, but it needs stable support from the sea. To support the Marines land operation, the USN developed the concept of network-centric warfare (NCW), which is more a technological advancement to the data links connecting all battlefield functions, i.e., C<sup>4</sup>ISR, than just a concept for maximizing firepower in the littorals.<sup>687</sup> Nonetheless, given the development of the ship-to-objective manoeuvre concept, it is necessary for the USN to develop various measures to support the Marines land operation at a great distance from the shore in order to provide timely support including intelligence. Without this kind of effort from other branches in the field of doctrine and equipment<sup>688</sup>, no matter how excellent the combat capabilities of the Marines may be, it will be of no use. This is because the Marines themselves,

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<sup>687</sup> Sam J. Tangredi (Captain, USN), "Who's Afraid of the NETF?", *Proceedings*, Vol. 125/11/1, 161 (November 1999), p. 44.

<sup>688</sup> An international effort to improve the ability of multinational operations in the field of equipment is the Defence Capabilities Initiative (DCI) adopted in April 1999 by mainly the members of NATO. If there is not this kind of effort, the UN or a leading country will have to select the most suitable services or branches or countries to participate in a certain operation. This will be the most important factor that must be prepared for a future multinational combat operation. Refer, Richard Smith, "The Requirement for the United Nations to Develop an Internationally Recognized Doctrine for the Use of Force in Intra-State Conflict", *Occasional Paper No. 10* (SCSI, 1994), p. 28.

considering the complexity and divergence of the modern battlefield and international security environment, may not be able to complete most missions.

It is meaningless to compare the role, functions, and abilities of both amphibious forces like those in the previous two chapters. Instead, it is worthwhile discussing the gist of the STOM concept in terms of the principles of war. Basically, this doctrine, as mentioned above, traces its background to the changing characteristics of the international security system. During the Cold War, an amphibious landing operation was planned against a relatively strong and prepared force understanding that the presence of mechanized, highly mobile enemy ground forces could thwart the landing forces' manoeuvring on shore. With the decrease of the enemy's combat power on shore, it is possible for the USMC to plan a direct manoeuvre to the objectives as in the case of the USMC operation in Somalia<sup>689</sup>. Whilst the previous amphibious manoeuvre doctrine focused on the culmination of combat power at the enemy's shore, where the enemy is relatively less prepared to defend, in order not only to create a beachhead as a base for successive operations inland, but also to take the initiative by creating a turning point, this concept embodies directly taking the main objective, the centre of the enemy's gravity. In this sense, it appears that the former greatly focused on the war principle of 'concentration', whereas the latter gave priority to the principle of 'objective' by directly mastering the visible enemy. The gist of the STOM is understood as an effort to minimize the operational period by bringing the enemy under an authorized

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<sup>689</sup> For example, in Operation Continue Hope in Somalia in March 1994, the US marines (two of MEUs) were dispatched to cover the evacuation of US military forces. In that operation, the forces were pulled out under the protection of the naval task standing off shore, which was on standby to manoeuvre from the ship to the objectives. This kind of operation was possible because of the poorer armed condition of the Somali civilian forces. Frank G. Hoffman, "The US Marine Corps in Review", Proceedings, Vol. 121/5/1,107 (May 1995), p. 131.

organisation's control as soon as possible. Nonetheless, it is not applicable beyond a regional major war situation such as a war in the Korean peninsula. Consequently, to meet the main purpose, it must be capable of combining new ideas with proven war principles. Ultimately, it is no exaggeration to say that the new security environment revitalizes the STOM concept.

As the fundamental *raison d'être* of amphibious forces buildup relied on the amphibious landing operation itself, many basic conditions for a traditional amphibious assault<sup>690</sup> such as the achievement of naval and air superiority, the isolation of the amphibious objective area, and the culmination of combat power ashore, were seemingly unattainable. This raised the most serious doubts whether a nation needs to keep amphibious forces even in the US. However, the new security environment, a series of conceptual developments of doctrine, and the US Navy's espousal to bring the USMC into the centre of naval operations highlighted the Marines ability to perform its mission as the most economic force-in-readiness to meet operational demands overseas as a means of fulfilling foreign policy. Accordingly, it seems that now the core of the US naval activity is no longer the carrier battle group or the strategic nuclear forces (SSBNs), but the USMC. Here, it is, of course, undeniable that their utility in previously surpassing the enemy's military capabilities including intelligence, defence infrastructure and troops as well as of im(ex)plicitly deterred major nuclear power's challenges.

However, the US interests in the post-Cold War era, such as the prevention of nuclear proliferation due to the destructiveness of nuclear weapons capable of threatening the

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<sup>690</sup> William S. Lind, *Manoeuvre Warfare Handbook* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985), pp. 36.

mainland of America and the current international order, and the protection of human rights, transferred the core of military operational objective from 'deterrent' to the 'exclusion' of anti-American interests governments or organisations in pursuit of creating amicable ones. Given this objective, it needs armed forces to decisively be able to fight and vanquish the troops holding them. In this situation, its strategic nuclear forces, as the US nuclear strategy has indicated, and the CVBGs are not suitable means to solve or deter these kinds of challenges. Put simply, the USMC compared with the other branches of Navy and services, is the most efficacious economic force, capable of fulfilling the military and nonmilitary demands of the US, which is the country, which has to dispatch forces to meet military operational demands through sea-routes. This is the worth of the USMC in the post-Cold War nuclear era, and at the same time the reason that it had the minimum reduction ratio in terms of the number of personnel in the QDRs.

After all, it is unsurprisingly true that the USMC rules in another golden age after WWII. However, it is also true that it cannot control those conflicts by itself, thus its role and functions have been significantly changed by way of embodying the joint operational aims as a part of the USN as well as of the total American armed forces. In this regard, it needs to change Clausewitz's words 'war is merely the continuation of policy by other means' to 'armed forces are the most suitable political instruments to keep the current international order', since the roles of armed forces themselves have been transferred with the emergence of nuclear weapons and the dependence on the interrelationship between countries.

## Chapter VI. Conclusions

This study has so far discussed the conditioning factors of three general and three independent variables derived from not only the US National Strategic Direction but also the strategists' theories, and their effects on amphibious forces construction, examining two cases: the USMC and S(R)NI. They are the most militarily powerful of the world's amphibious forces and show extremely contradictory rises and falls according to the transitions of the independent variables. Nonetheless, there is no clear-cut factor to decide why a nation should possess an amphibious force. Their positions in their military hierarchies have always been threatened by the other services or even the other branches of navies, because their role and functions seem to duplicate the other services, Army, Navy and Air Force, as previously examined.

### 1. Amphibious Forces, War and National Power

Given that the *raison d'être* of the other services are the creatures of human efforts to overcome natural obstacles reflecting the development of technology in order to win a war, that of amphibious force buildup also, as its history suggests, rests on the same grounds of the justification for attacking an enemy across a gap of water, in order to achieve the ultimate goal of a war, the neutralization of the adversary's political will. However, as their wartime functions and organisations suggest, amphibious forces are, in some aspects, seen as nothing more than an amalgamation of the other services. Despite this fact, the reason why the nations who possess amphibious forces, created them as a part of their navy instead of embarking their ground forces on ship, is beyond

the main scope of this thesis, and it is a matter of past history. In this regard, it is no exaggeration to say that it has had critical limitations as an independent service from its very origins. This original limitation is the key reason why the USMC and S(R)NI were threatened by others including nonmilitary experts in terms of their usefulness in times of war.

Given the fact that over 70 per cent of the total area of the Earth's surface is sea, the human presence is still thin on the ground, and around 90 per cent of the world's population lives on 10 per cent of the land<sup>691</sup> and most of this is close to the sea. A war is, as most strategists have observed, just the struggle between two different political entities to compel one's will to submit to the other. The most decisive factor in winning a war is to neutralize the roots of the enemy's power, in military terms the 'centre of gravity', which is usually on land. As such, in order to pursue a rapid victory, the shortcut is to approach directly and destroy the centre of the other's power. More than two thirds of all countries, have their own territorial sea and coastline, which can provide an attack route both for themselves and their enemies. One of the attempts to appropriately use this route involves the creation of an amphibious force, and most amphibious forces in the world are well organized and trained to fulfill this requirement. This is the main value of an amphibious force. In this connection, any suspicions regarding the debate about the use of necessary force in the nuclear age are quite irrelevant. It is also part of the purpose of military forces, a means of politics, to project a nation's power overseas in modern terms as a coercive or deterrent tool. It is preferable to leave the final authority to decide how much it is needed, to the relevant nation's politicians, who will decide it in the light of several factors. There is a degree of


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<sup>691</sup> J. P. Cole (1974), p. 22.

uncertainty about how much a nation will possess amphibious forces, whether the name of the organization is 'amphibious force' or not (a specific force to perform amphibious landing operations under the Army's command); it mainly depends on one's foreign policy objectives, and on geographical location as well as economic budget.

Power is relative and one needs to compare with it that of the opposition. If one's physical (visible) power is absolutely greater than that of the other side, it will easily achieve its ultimate goal within the shortest period of time. In stark contrast, even though one's power is less than the opposition, it may achieve its goal if it has excellent abstract factors such as military arts (tactics, strategies), and doctrines. Figure 6-1 displays the relationship between time demands and relative power until it achieves its goal.

**Figure 6-1: Relative Power Strength and Time Consumption**



The vertical axis denotes one's relative power whilst the horizontal axis denotes time. The line is a collection of the points which represent how long it takes according to the relative power. As the figure shows, the role of invisible factors influences the location of the point, which can be in the inner or outer triangle formed by the diagonal line,



according to the degree of their comparative excellence. As the figure shows, good doctrine essentially acts as a force-multiplier, enabling a country to use its military capabilities to greater effect, and thereby reducing the time needed to achieve strategic objectives. As the doctrinal development of the USMC has proved, according to the degree of the enemy's power, these invisible factors could also more actively achieve relative superiority. In this sense, it appears that there is a close relationship between environmental variables and the development of a nation's military power. Apart from a specific discussion about the ingredients of the visible and invisible combat powers, the amphibious force organisation itself contributes to the relative power strength as a component of a nation's overall force structure. Doctrinal development as in the case of the USMC, shortens the time demanded for achieving the desired end state of a war or a battle. In addition to this, the employment of amphibious forces to be deployed and sustained at long distances across the world's seas, such as the use of the USMC by the US and the SNI in the Cold War era by the USSR, can be a key attribute of a nation's superpower status as a means of coercive diplomacy.

## **2. Major Principles for Amphibious Forces Construction**

### **A. Independent Variables and Their Effects**

#### **(1) International/ Regional Security Environments**

Apart from discussing the influence of general facts in a security environment, from now on the debating points are mainly focused on the relationship with nuclear weapons and conventional forces construction. As Michael Sheehan has discussed, "The

existence of nuclear weapons strongly influenced the way in which the great powers behaved towards each other”,<sup>692</sup> the international/ regional security environment, in association with the construction of the conventional armed forces, during the period that this thesis covers, when nuclear parity was achieved, was influenced mainly by the nuclear strategy of each country. The major powers did not want to use their nuclear arsenals as a direct confrontational tool against each other. Accordingly, the security environment was influenced by how to use them and for what purpose. Given the gradual comprehensive understanding of the destructive power of nuclear weapons, their nuclear strategies slowly changed from the concept of real use in a war to a means of deterring the others’ attack by a declaratory policy, i.e., the option of “first use of nuclear weapons”. Thus, they tried to limit the number of nuclear weapons via mutual arms control or the reduction agreements in the Cold War era. In the nuclear parity era, they realized that an additional nuclear arsenal does not have any political significance, even though it is not easy to define a criteria for how much is enough, which may be defined as a military strength capable of destroying the potential enemy.

However, the role of military forces was undeniable in a situation where the two political and military confederations directly confronted each other. As such, military power was still one of the most useful means for pursuing their national interests in some places, i.e., in the Third World. In other words, as long as there was no threat of a nuclear war, nuclear powers did not directly conflict with each other, but armed forces had a critical value as a political means. It means that they were the sub-means of diplomacy to achieve national interests. Nevertheless the practical use of military forces was constrained by the balance of terror system arising from the parity of nuclear forces.

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<sup>692</sup> Michael Sheehan (1996), 172.

After the dissolution of the confrontational alliance system, it appeared that the ultimate goal of possessing nuclear weapons had been reduced to purely defending the homeland and deterring the opposition's challenging behaviour on the basis of nuclear power rather than as a means of intimidation or blackmail against others, or of real use in a war. With this declining influence of nuclear weapons, the role and functions of conventional forces has relatively been upgraded. In accordance with this change, the priority of armed forces buildup has also slowly moved towards the construction of conventional forces. It is, of course, true that the attempt to occupy a relatively superior position in the nuclear competition, i.e., the Reagan administration's SDI programme, was continued as much in an attempt to control the opponent's nuclear capability.

From the above perspectives, it is sufficient to say that the main cause of the transitions in the international/ regional security environments from high politics to low politics resulted in, though not completely, the attempts to reduce the possibility of a major war between the nuclear powers. In this awkward situation, a desire by the minor powers to possess nuclear weapons for the purpose of, according to their justification, defending themselves as a deterrent against superpower interference in their internal affairs, particularly by the rogue states referred to by George W. Bush, has frequently become a source of discord in international politics. From their viewpoint, nuclear weapons are still desirable instruments, because without nuclear weapons they are psychologically and physically forced to invest in the construction of conventional forces, which still do not guarantee their security. Nonetheless, it is natural for a nation, regardless of nuclear or non-nuclear powers, to want to possess an appropriate level of armed forces to guarantee its security considering the force level of potential enemies or the international/ regional security environment. In this sense, the buildup of conventional

forces could be an alternative to a nuclear arsenal; thus it is not easy to conclude that the declining usefulness of nuclear weapons became a prime cause of amphibious forces (AF) construction. The buildup of AF by the two superpowers in the second Cold War era was no more than a processional result derived from their conventional forces construction. Likewise, the security environment, particularly the alleviation of nuclear war tension, is a factor necessary to be taken into significant consideration, and the construction of the AF depends on the relevant country's other variables.

## **(2) Maritime Dominance/ Geographical Factors**

The question of how the Marines and the other services, notably the Navy, should be combined into a coherent force structure has been a classic problem from the first moment of their creation. To meet the crisis response requirements, of course, including contingencies and a war situation, the fundamental condition for the Marines deployment or dispatch as quickly as the situation permits, is the amount of the Navy's amphibious lift capability, which is able to provide manoeuvrability via a sea route. Usually, this is not a force subordinated to the Marines, but to the Navy under the heading of naval amphibious forces. In addition to this, the manoeuvres and operations of the Marines would be dependent on the degree of threat at sea. When a country achieves maritime superiority against the adversary in terms of sea control, it is easy to manoeuvre safely and to perform operations by maintaining its combat power at its maximum level. Hence, naval amphibious forces themselves do not lift the marines in most of the cases that demand naval protection forces, i.e., submarines, surface combat ships. This action is also interpreted as an effort to assert maritime dominance. In this regard, maritime dominance is not connected with the *raison d'être* of amphibious forces, but it is a condition demanded in the process of performing an amphibious

landing operation after its possession.

As mentioned in Chapter III, even though the law of the sea is concerned with a war situation, the states that are fighting each other may try to obey this law. In addition, it is possible to make an arrangement between the two parties lest they attack ships that are not employed for military purposes in a specific case when they are fighting with limited political goals. However, once a party notices the other's breach of their temporary engagement rule in that war, their promise might not be continued any longer. However, I was unable to find any evidence to prove the relationship between a nation's amphibious force buildup and the law of the sea. Despite this fact, it is true that the international endeavours to regulate the law of the sea, particularly the right of access to ports and other international waters in peacetime has implicitly and explicitly influenced the developments of the maritime powers, i.e., the Soviet ships' port visits.

Nowadays, contribution to the control of the sea has been included as one of the USMC missions reflecting the worldwide deployments of American naval forces. This may be a unique mission for the USMC that others do not have. Despite the fact that the importance of advanced bases has declined with the development of submarines, air transportation and the PGMs, the number of bases overseas is still an indispensable ingredient for the control of the sea. The USMC is not a branch of the Navy. Nonetheless, as a purpose of its creation was the protection of overseas naval bases, it is deployed in most of the US naval bases, as seen in Figure 4-5, controlled by the relevant fleet commander. As the terms, the Naval Expeditionary Task Force (NETF) and the Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) indicate, they are indispensable adjuncts of the US Navy, as a subordinate service of the DoN. Whether this influenced the enlargement of

the USMC or not is not carefully examined in this thesis. This is also applicable to the deployments of the SNI in the Soviet bases far away from the mainland, i.e., a regiment in Petropavlovsk. In this regard, it is not difficult to conclude from the foregoing account that the number of a state's bases overseas could be a cause of the buildup of AF. As long as a state does not deploy its amphibious forces at advanced bases (this mission is able to be performed by sailors or army troops), the independent variable, maritime dominance from the above perspectives, cannot be a principle of general amphibious forces buildup.

### **(3) National Interests/ Foreign Policy**

The competition between the two blocs based on their ideologies in the nuclear parity era formed a firm land border from Europe to the Far East. In addition, owing to the antagonism between the PRC and USSR, the latter's interests rapidly moved toward the Third World using mainly the sea routes in order to enlarge its political and ideological influence. The priority of US interests was to defend its alliance/ free world and to decrease the Soviet influence throughout the world as identified by the NSC-68. Both blocs identified the others by their own image, for example, the US (individualism: collectivism) and the USSR (equality: rule of rich). In this situation, it was not surprising that the two superpowers' interests naturally met in the Third World such as the nations in Southeast/west Asia and Africa. Here, the role of the AF as a component of a nation's military forces was to support each state's foreign policy objectives.

With the demise of the Cold War, considering the relative concept of 'use of force', it seems to be more difficult to meddle in other countries' affairs due to the divergence of the international political power system and the legitimacy or agreements between

political entities demanded in order to do it, i.e., the US forces in the matter of East Timor. Regarding the American security role in the region, the contradictory interests of countries would by and large make it become more complex. In particular, the major powers apparently seem to maintain the current *status quo* in the Asia-Pacific region, where their antagonism has been reduced, i.e. between Russia and the US, and China and the US. In the nuclear age, the main interests of the major powers are defensive in terms of national interest and foreign policy objectives. As a result, the fundamental stance of the US force presence in the region will be dramatically changed by way of reacting to a contingency, rather than by pursuing a permanent presence, according to the developments of the new US security concept and its military doctrine as well as the dynamic power relationship between the major powers. This is because their presence would create suspicions among others. Thus it is natural for the US to withdraw its presence step by step in order to reduce suspicion. Nonetheless, it is nonsense to imagine that the Marines presence in Japan and elsewhere will also go the same way considering its interests, the geo-strategic location and the uncertain future of the strategic configuration as well as the nature of conflict in the post-Cold War era. In this sense, it could be said that the conditioning factor of the US Marine presence in Japan mainly results from the changing characteristics of US interests and foreign policy toward Japan. In the event of it having to withdraw its presence from Japan, the US may invent another form of military presence considering the importance of Japan to its interests. The NETF capable of effectively reacting to any level of conflict is one of the most adequate alternatives compared with the other services because of the ingredients of its marines ground combat capability and the navy's manoeuvrability to reach Japan from its Pacific bases such as Guam and Hawaii.

The deployments of the USMC in the Asia-Pacific area coincided with American interests and foreign policy objectives, i.e., the 3<sup>rd</sup> Marine Division in Japan and the use of the USMC in the Vietnam War. Likewise, the SNI also enlarged its role in the second Cold War era together with its mother service, the Soviet Navy, by constantly deploying at advanced bases, i.e., Cam Ranh Bay, and embarking on naval ships. In this regard, their overseas interests positively influenced the rise of their amphibious forces. This phenomenon continued in the US in the post-Cold War era in that the unchangeable interests toward Asia-Pacific area, even though the specific subject realms had changed, made the US keep its marines at almost the same level as the Cold War era. On the other hand, the diminishing interests of the RF overseas negatively influenced the size of the RNI. It has been downsized to the level of an extremely limited strength, suitable to defend its homeland and to be employed for an amphibious landing in a contingency situation because of its remaining foreign policy objective to defend its territory such as the northern islands dispute with Japan. To conclude, it could be said that there is a close interrelationship between a state's interests in an overseas country and the rise and fall of the AF.

#### **(4) Military Strategy/ Policy**

As seen in the colourful histories of the two amphibious forces, the status of amphibious forces is easily threatened by the other services who are in competition for the budget in peacetime and for missions in wartime. Any change in the independent variables discussed here-which might in turn be precipitated by the changing characteristics of the security environment- could have a profound effect on the development of the amphibious forces. A state's military strategy/ policy decides the basic guidelines for the amphibious forces buildup by allocating it to each theatre or border according to the



result of evaluating the requirement of the AF to defend against each external threat in the protection of its own interests. Fundamentally, it is a very important procedure for the relevant AF to present its combat power requirements in the process of deciding the requirement of a state's total force construction by the national command authority, i.e., the decision making process of the USJCS, regardless of the process of either a 'top-to-bottom' or 'bottom-up' review. As such, the designation of the Commandant of the USMC as a full member of the USJCS in 1978 has a great significance in reflecting its own developmental plan for future forces construction.

However, as most politico-strategic commentators have pointed out, the hypothesis needs to be recognized that increases in certain categories of military power do not necessarily increase political strength. In the nuclear age, the security of a country is guaranteed not just by its own military power, but by the whole of its alliance or the international community, particularly in the post-Cold war era. As a result, it needs to devote a certain contribution to international security in any way whether by military or nonmilitary means. Nonetheless, as provided by certain evidence in the Soviet security policy, an upper limited existence of military power afforded by the national command authority did not maximize its political significance. In striking contrast, it became a cause of the demise of the national system. Consequently, it is necessary to reflect on force requirements after the relevant services take all available information and variables into full consideration and the national command authority decides on a total force construction plan.

It is not clear whether the USSR had a total force construction or an operational plan, particularly the Far Eastern TVD's, to employ all its armed forces unlike those of the

US (Table 3-2/ 3 and 5-2). However, it is not difficult to imagine that the rise and fall of the SNI was decided in the same way, because the commander of each TVD had the authority to command all the forces deployed in theatre by the reorganization of the theatre of military operations geographical concept. Given this concept and the geo-strategic configuration of the Far Eastern TVD, it was natural to reinforce the SNI from Brigade to Division. Despite this, it is unclear whether the force requirement of the USMC was decided by a full consideration or not, because the fundamental structure of the USMC *per se* had been guaranteed by constitutional regulation. However, generally speaking, a state's military strategy/policy is a cornerstone for deciding its amphibious force size and equipment.

#### **(5) Maritime Strategy/ Policy**

A state's naval policy to construct its navy is nowadays largely divided into two categories: underwater or surface. In addition, if there is a necessity to project power to another country across the sea, it may consider the buildup of amphibious force. With time, the main aspects of the two superpowers' naval power construction roughly showed a symmetrical direction from the strategic submarines forces at the initial stage of the nuclear era to the surface fleet forces after they realized that a nuclear war might be avoidable. It seems, however, that the scope of the prime goals theoretically never coincided, because Gorshkov's maritime theory focused on the political use of naval forces, whilst American thought remained at the deterrent role of naval forces. Nonetheless, the effects of their practical employments of naval powers were almost the same in the context of political use rather than real engagement, the US dispatch of the task force 77 in the *Pueblo* incident and the Soviet naval activities in the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean from the late 1960s, for example. Consequently, it could be said

that their priorities to construct naval forces took on almost the same order according to the transitions of their relative naval combat powers and maritime strategy.

At the initial stage of the nuclear era, the usefulness of amphibious forces in a future war was certainly doubtful. One of the fundamental questions regarding amphibious forces to have been endlessly argued is whether amphibious assault has validity in modern warfare in terms of efficiency. However, with the achievement of nuclear restraint, particularly by the strategic nuclear submarine forces, and the beginning of the struggle for influence in the Third World, both superpowers began to pay attention to the value of amphibious forces. Of course, their original intentions were to use them for amphibious landing operations in a war, but with the two superpowers' seeking to avoid a direct military engagement, its utility for a low-intensity conflict in the Third World rather than a major war between the two blocs became more prominent. Even so, the strategic value of nuclear submarines was not disregarded due to their possible use in surveillance in terms of a withholding strategy until the end of the Cold War, when the possibility of major war was almost unimaginable. After that, the validity of amphibious forces in the US, the sole country acting as the world's policeman, began to be highlighted compared with the other branches, whereas that of submarine forces became the last resort of Russian homeland defence.

Even though the priority in naval force buildup could be no more than an attempt to get more of the defence budget, it certainly reflected the transition of the enemy's condition. From the above perspectives, it is not difficult to find some fundamental relationships between amphibious forces and the other branches buildup within the navy under the

prerequisite that they need to project naval power<sup>693</sup>. Firstly, if the enemy is too/ relatively strong or not very weak, and it is capable of greatly threatening it, there is a tendency for a state to focus on the construction of an underwater navy as a deterrent force, in order to make sure the enemy suffers lasting damage. Secondly, if the enemy is comparatively weak, a state may focus on the construction of an amphibious force. After all, the priority of the maritime policy/ strategy of a state is in which branch it will invest its resources. In this sense, it is definitely true that the prioritisation of a state's naval policy/strategy is very important in the rise and fall of amphibious forces.

## **B. Additional Conditioning Variables**

### **(1) Economic Strength**

As previously mentioned, it seems that this factor was not important, judging from the fact that both the superpowers kept and abolished/ recreated their amphibious forces in the early stages of the Cold War according to the other factors, i.e., political support in the US, the transitions of military strategy without any significant economic considerations. However, it was possible because their existence was more important than economizing on the defence budget considering the anticipated unlimited competition in enlarging or defending their influence throughout the world. In the light of the delays in the procurement of amphibious lift ships in the US and USSR, it can be seen that the development of the naval component of an amphibious force depends on the relevant country's economic strength.

Strictly assessing the amphibious lift capability of the Russian Federation in the post-

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<sup>693</sup> This prerequisite may include the possibility of participating in a war as a member of alliance.

Cold War era, it might not have been above the level of regimental size in the Pacific fleet, although theoretically they were capable of delivering all the component parts of the SNI. This is because the amphibious ships, except for the ships of *Ivan Rogov* class, were not sufficient to perform an amphibious landing operation at a place (across the high seas) far from its homeland in the missile age. In reality, that of the US also remained at around 3 MEBs, 2.5 MEBs in the post-Cold War era, and a third of total combat troops and equipment. In addition to this, the air component in the USMC demands a vast amount of defence budget to procure new aircraft, i.e., the continuous delay of the procurement of the *Osprey*. With technical developments, and the deterioration of equipment and means of manoeuvre, it is necessary to replace them with new ones. In this regard, the economic strength of a state must be considered as being the most likely influential factor in the buildup of an amphibious force.

However, it appears that this did not significantly influence the ground component of amphibious forces during the Cold War, when a state found it absolutely necessary to have minimum armed forces sufficient to defend itself, as almost the same sub-organisations compared with those of the army demonstrated. In spite of this fact, as the demise of the RNI indicated, in the situation of a total economic collapse so that a state could not afford to keep its armed forces because of lack of ability to supply homes or salaries for military personnel, it could be the greatest influential constraining factor in deciding the existence of the amphibious force. Certainly, there is an interaction between economic strength and the goal of national interest in the modern international economic system. In some aspects, the latter could be revised by the limits of the former, i.e., the decrease of the RNI in the post-Cold War in the circumstances that the RF has a territorial dispute with Japan. The importance of this principle is definitely applicable to

most other countries in the world, except for autocratic countries such as North Korea<sup>694</sup>.

## **(2) Relationship with Political Leaders and Legal Safeguards**

At first glance, it would seem that the crisis of the USMC under the Eisenhower administration arose from economic considerations. However, as it was superseded with the inauguration of Kennedy, it is more rational to think that that came from the relationship with the political leadership in the process of allocating the available defence budget rooted in the struggle between the services. The will and intention of the highest policy maker, usually the president or prime minister of a state, cannot help but influence the rise and fall of amphibious forces, as the last policy decision maker.

With the development of the principle for the respective independence of the three powers of administration, legislation and judicature in a democratic society, the Congress (Parliament) can restrain an independent decision by the highest decision maker. A good example of this is the survival of the USMC in the defence unification dispute of 1944-1947. After that, the fundamental organisation of the USMC was guaranteed by the National Security Act 1947, which is the driving force behind the current existence of the USMC. It is true, as defined in Chapter II, that most amphibious forces in the present world might be based on legal regulations, even though there is difference between their levels of legal protection, according to how easy they are to revise. For example, a state's amphibious force is created by the CNO's order, which can be more easily dissolved than if it is created by a presidential decree. Hence, it could be said that an amphibious force created by the supreme law, such as the

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<sup>694</sup> According to the comparison of defence budgets between the two Koreas in 1997, whilst South Korea allocated about 3.2 % of its GNP for the national defence expenditures, North Korea invested 24.8 % of the GDP (Gross Domestic Product). *Dongailbo*, January 21, 1998.

constitution, is relatively safer in terms of its surveillance from political containment and threats from the other services like the USMC. Considering the duplication of the roles and functions of amphibious forces, it is necessary to be guaranteed its existence by the legal protection as high as possible. It appears that this is an undeniably important factor.

### **(3) Doctrinal / Technical Development**

Generally, there is a close interaction between the development of doctrine and technical development. Usually, one of them in turn attracts the other. For example, the use of Landing Craft, Air Cushions (LCACs) in a amphibious landing operation is a case in which the latter draws the former. On the contrary, the Ship-to Objective Manoeuvre (STOM) and the Operational Manoeuvre From the Sea (OMFTS) doctrines of the USMC are facilitating the development of new equipment to bring them into force. These independent variables are not less important than the others. The emergence of newer, larger, faster and more modern landing ships and craft equipped with anti-missile, -air, and -NBC weapon systems have increased the possibility of successful amphibious landing operations. Nonetheless, it is true that suspicion about the validity of amphibious landing operations was, in fact, continued until the end of the Cold War.

The Gorshkov theory regarding the peacetime functions of the Navy as a foreign policy tool initiated the embarkation of the SNI on Soviet battleships, although on examination it is not clear whether the USSR increased the size of the SNI for its peacetime deployment. At the initial stage of the SNI recreation in the early 1960s, the Soviet military strategists advocated the necessity of amphibious forces after carefully

examining the uses of the USMC in WWII, the Korean War and the US Marines landing in Lebanon in 1958. Furthermore, the USMC is involved in the Navy's doctrinal development in the post-Cold War period such as the doctrine for the NETF.

In this sense, the doctrinal and theoretical development for amphibious forces could certainly be a conditioning factor. In other words, it is certainly true that the existence of amphibious forces would, as the duplication of roles and functions implies, continuously be threatened by the other services without doctrinal / technical development for successful amphibious landing operations. The US Marines effort to develop new doctrines and to provide, as defined in the DoD Directive, its amphibious landing doctrine for the joint force could be understood in this context. The effort to explain to the other services the complexity of amphibious landing operations is a way of highlighting its validity to the others.

### **C. Summary**

From the above perspectives, a new set of principal conditioning factors affecting the rise and fall of the AF can be summarized as follows:

1. General Environmental Factors:
  - a. Security Environment: the relationship with allies, international and regional political and (non)military agreements,
  - b. Maritime Dominion: a number of advanced bases (the control of the SLOC) and the law of the sea
2. Major Policing Factors from the National Strategic Direction:
  - a. National Interests/ Foreign Policy Objectives: to decide necessity overseas regardless of de(of)fensive and (non)military purposes
  - b. Military Strategy / Policy: to provide a basic guideline for the size of amphibious forces demanded



- c. Maritime Strategy/ Policy: to decide how to divide allocated resources (defence budget), and the priority of the components
- 3. Constraining Factors
  - a. Economic Strength: important for the naval and air components of AF
  - b. Relationship with Political Leader: important, but it is possible to be contained by the Congress
  - c. Legal Safeguard: guarantee its surveillance
  - d. Doctrinal and Technical Development: an ingredient to maintain its organisation in the competition for the defence budget
  - e. Geographical Location<sup>695</sup>, *etc.*

Here, the factors of the second category should be decided considering the factors of the first and third categories. In the modern era, putting the above theory into the military/ maritime strategists' theories regarding the major principles of conditioning a state's armed forces, the direction of a national strategy has already included all the other environmental and constraining factors in the development of a policy decision-making system. In other words, even though an increasing number of divisions is determined by the national strategic decision considering all the environmental and constraining factors at that time, there is a possibility of it not being formed because of changes in both policies and the other factors in the process of execution, which is represented as the budgeting stage in the PPBS. This is the key reason why the difference between the plans to construct an amphibious lift capability and their results in the US and USSR occurred.

In addition to this, a state's military force buildup planning depends upon those of both allies and friendly states, and the trends of the current direction of the potential enemy

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<sup>695</sup> As continuously conceived throughout the thesis, a country that has great interest in overseas regions, has inevitably more reason to possess amphibious forces than others. This geographical factor must be reflected in the government's national strategic direction or in the policy-decision making system.

by taking the historic experiences into consideration to some extent. The essence of such planning lies in the achievement of coordination, coherence, and consistency in analyzing the utilization in an integrated fashion all the elements of statecraft-security environments, foreign policy, military (and maritime in this case) strategy, economic strength, technology, political will and leadership to achieve its vitally important goals. From this perspective, there was a great difference between the Nixon and Brezhnev doctrines. Whilst the US began to lessen its defence responsibilities for its allies with the development of their own national power, the USSR became more deeply engaged in its allies' defence in pursuit of both the strengthening of the relationships with its allies and maintaining its influence within the bloc. The effect of this factor on the rise and fall of the USMC and SNI is not clearly estimated in quantitative terms. Nonetheless, as found in the increase of the exercises, i.e., the USMC/SNI and its European allies, and reinforced deployments in the second Cold War era, it appears that this was an undeniably important factor influencing the rise and fall of the amphibious forces.


Despite the fact that most independent variables were carefully discussed, it appears that it was not easy to explain the phenomenon of amphibious force construction throughout the period with just these discussed variables. This may come from the complexity of subject *per se* as well as the limitation of sources and research methods. Even so, it was possible to gather that a state's military force buildup planning was closely rooted in an understanding of the relationship between the major policing principles. Of course, it is not difficult to find a close connection between the planning and the output, and between the upper and lower independent variables. Except for the independent variables discussed and additionally summarized in conclusions, there may be many

variables such as a state's scientific levels, public opinion, psychological-moral aspects, *etc.* In order to reflect all of these, the organization of the modern government (policy making system) is more and more fractionalized with time. It is believed that each department or section is doing its best to produce a sound policy decision.

However, it is sometimes distorted by the powers of each department/decision maker/service and miscalculation of the other conditioning factors. In this sense, the factor of legal protection as in the case of the USMC is probably the most important, so as to maximize the utility and combat power of amphibious forces as a political means to manage the international order, considering the duplication of the roles and functions with the other services. All in all, the most critical factor is its necessity, whether it is crucial to defend a state's national goals and interests, and its foreign policy objectives. It does not matter whether this organisation is positioned under the Army or Navy, or exists as an independent service, which may depend on the socio-political culture and the historic development of the armed forces.

The framework for analysis used in this study appears to have been effective for the purpose of assessing the American and Soviet/Russian amphibious experience during the time period covered by the dissertation. One point that should be stressed here is that there were some additionally important factors in each independent variables whilst the other background factors in the international and domestic context, such as security environment and economic strength, have been integrated into the policy making process as background factors, which have been considered by the policy makers. The additional factors identified in this study are indicated inside of the dotted circles in Figure 6-2.

**Figure 6-2 : Additional Factors for AF Construction**



In the modern era, it seems that the attitude toward amphibious force of the key national decision maker (President or Prime Minister of a state, Commander of Naval Operation, Commander of Marine Corps) is the most important factor, not only because of their place as the final decision maker in each process, but also because only this individual is in a position to consider all aspects of the conditioning factors on the basis of their perspective as a representative of the population or the supreme commander of each organisation positioned by the legal authority. In addition to this, the efforts of members of the amphibious force is also very important in promoting its own prestige, as for example, the lead taken by the USMC in the field of doctrinal development for the US

Navy.

This framework of analysis may not work appropriately in the undeveloped countries, because of their deficiency of information or resources and differences in the policy making process, but may have a broader relevance for some countries. Looking back upon the construction of the Republic Of Korea Marine Corps for example, Korean Marine Corps demands to improve combat strength were always distorted by the Navy or the Ministry of Defense, particularly in the buildup of amphibious lift capability. As a peninsula country confronting North Korea, the utility of marines capable of attacking from the sea to the rear area of the North Korea clearly appears to be very useful. Nonetheless, South Korean amphibious lift capability is still limited at the level of a regiment, compared with the manpower strength of almost 3 ground divisions.

Perhaps the issue is that in the nuclear era a genius in the field of military force construction would be more useful and important than that of the battlefield genius posited by Clausewitz!

### **3. Roles and Functions of Amphibious Force**

The fundamental role of amphibious forces is to embody a state's national security policy in supporting its interests and foreign policy objectives by deploying overseas or waging a war or showing the possibility of using amphibious forces in a war or contingency situation. The original purpose of amphibious force organisation was its

necessity for attacking the enemy overseas. With the openings of overseas naval bases like the USN, to defend and protect overseas naval personnel and facilities also became a *raison d'être* of amphibious forces. However, passing through the nuclear and missile age, its roles and functions also enlarged into the general roles and functions of armed forces covering various spectrums of the use of military forces by performing missions allocated by the supreme national command authority. Nonetheless, it is absolutely true that its usefulness for amphibious landing operations is the fundamental *raison d'être* of an amphibious force. It is inconceivable for any reason to think of the existence of amphibious forces without considering their usefulness in wartime. The others are supplementary values derived from the possession of an amphibious force. Owing to its value for amphibious landing operations, amphibious forces are firmly positioned as an indispensable branch or an independent service of the state, i.e., the USMC, although its position is different according to the relevant state's defence posture, i.e., the RNI under the coastal defence units.

As seen in Figure 2-2, the general roles, such as defence, deterrence, compellence, of armed forces as defined by the military strategists are divided by the intensities of the course of military actions; how a state can influence the other's unfavourable actions using its armed forces according to the degree of the escalation of a conflict. In this regard, military forces are a means of a state's foreign policy, and therefore their role is mainly determined by the supreme national command authority considering diplomatic relationships with others or allies. Likewise, the roles of amphibious forces basically do not lie beyond these basic realms. In the process of undertaking an allocated role, the role could be changed according to the opponent's reaction and the order of the supreme national command authority. A good example of this is the role of the 3<sup>rd</sup> Marines in

Japan. Its basic role is to defend its allies, Japan and South Korea, by deterring any kind of external threat. If they deploy on the adjacent sea to the Korean peninsula as a reaction against North Korea's aggressive behaviour, the role is upgraded into compellence, but is still a deterrent against other possible threats. Consequently, there is no a clear point of divergence between the roles even in a single troop, thus the effects of deployment or employment of armed forces imply a varied spectrum of their roles at the same time.

In the process of performing the above roles, the functions of amphibious forces could be summarized as in the contents of Table 2-5. They could also be classified into two categories according to the time: peacetime and wartime functions. However, strictly speaking, it is not easy to divide them according to peacetime or wartime functions as Figure 2-2 suggests. As such, the most important thing is what kind of mission is allocated to an amphibious force by the national command authority. In order to accomplish this, the various capabilities, such as mobility, versatility, sustained reach, resilience, and lift capacity, of the naval and amphibious forces allows the team to function as a state's ready force like the US NETF by making a substantial contribution to any kind of mission. Particularly, the attribute of a ground component of the Navy-Marines Team in the post-Cold War era is critically important in taking and holding the human factor of an opponent's power or territory.<sup>696</sup> In the contemporary era, the capability to perform the MOOTW, which includes the stability operation to establish a legitimate government, gradually becomes more and more important than that in a war. With the movement of the enemy's centre of gravity from the sea to land, the ground

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<sup>696</sup> It appears that if there is a territorial dispute, like the Russo-Japanese case, in the seas adjacent to the territory, it will be more critical than the other case. This could be the reason that the fundamental function of amphibious landing operations for the RNI has not been completely disbanded in the RF.

forces are the main force to establish the ultimate aims of an operation, and they can simultaneously function as an international police force to control the population in a operational area. Consequently, it could be said that the ground force of the naval and amphibious team is at the root of the team power and at the same time it is the most important resource for completing the operational aims.

Another important point is its contribution to strengthening the diplomatic relationships with an alliance by ratifying bilateral military-to-military relations. As military affairs (in modern terms it is referred to as the defence) of the state is of vital importance to the state as a matter of life and death in terms of Sun Tzu, military diplomacy cannot help occupying a very appropriate proportion of the state's diplomatic sphere, although it is clearly nothing but a part of national diplomacy. Even so, with the increased importance of multinational or combined operations, the peacetime connection between the same services or branches of countries, i.e., the creation of the CMFC between the US and ROK Marines, is a tool in pursuing the strengthening of their military and cultural affinity by performing combined exercises and exchanging their personnel and by upgrading mutual understanding. This would be classified as one of the peacetime functions.

To sum up, the USMC is the main force of American naval operations in the post-Cold War era considering the transitions of the international security system. It also experienced many difficulties in surviving the disputes as to whether it was a necessary force or not in the nuclear and missile age posited by the other services and civilian experts. In this way, the other amphibious forces might experience the same dispute, so they may tend to rely on their ontological foundation to survive by pursuing what their



roles and functions are in peacetime and wartime. However, it seems that those attempts are no longer necessary, because they have existed as a component of the total national force in light of carefully examining the above conditioning factors for the AF buildup. As such, whatever roles and functions they have found, it would not be their *raison d'être* in case they do not receive an appropriate mission from the supreme national command authority. In this context, the most important thing is their readiness to react to any kind of mission necessary to defend their national interests and support their foreign policy objectives.

With time and the development of organisation and equipment as a result of the RMA, the original concept of the operational realm of each service is continually vague. Instead, how to contribute to a joint or combined operation as a component of a nation's total force will become more and more the focus. As long as the geographical and geo-strategic politico environment has not changed, the wartime function of amphibious forces as a fighting instrument of a navy will not easily lose its value. However, it is also true that it is impossible for every military organisation to survive without its own revolutionary effort to adjust to the changing international security environment like a chameleon.

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